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- 1 
This -thesis i s oonperned with beliefs i n and about education. 
I t attempts to develop ways i n which such beliefs can be studied i n 
re l a t i o n to the context of which they are an essential part. 
Part I explores the nature of b e l i e f . The concept of "value-
knowledge" i s used to emphasize the commitment that underlying 
beliefs e n t a i l . A "tree-root" metaphor i s also employed to explore 
the ways i n which beli e f s are structured, both i n t e r n a l l y and i n 
rela t i o n to t h e i r social context. I t is argued that commitment and 
structure are two aspects of the same thing. A methodology i s 
developed which relates creative thought to b e l i e f . 
Part I I considers various treatments of educational ideologies. 
I t i s suggested that i n s u f f i c i e n t attention has generally been 
given to the commitment and structuring of b e l i e f s . Certain 
dimensions are elaborated on which educational beliefs and 
ideologies might usefully be considered. 
Parts I I I and BT develop t h i s analysis by examining various 
meanings and implications of "open education" and by exploring the 
notion of "closure". F i n a l l y , Part V i l l u s t r a t e s the methodology 
by reference to the educational beliefs of early nineteenth-century 
B r i t i s h Radicals, early twentieth-century American Progressives and 
contemporary B r i t i s h Child-centred educationists. 
Though the thesis i s intended primarily as a contribution to the 
sociology of education, i t i s suggested that i t has important 
implications f o r the sociology of knowledge. 
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This essay i s intended to be a contribution to the sociology 
of education and to the study of ideology. When Young introduced 
IEaowledp;e and Control, he saw the papers collected there as a 
"radical and widely differing set of departures from what might 
be included under a »textbook definition* of the sociology of 
education" (Young, 1971, ed., p.3)» Since then such papers have 
becoate part of an oi^hodozy in Britain, iriiich i s i t s e l f already 
under challenge (of. Syer and Corrigan, 1976). This essay i s 
within that debate. Pew writers, s t i l l , have attempted to bridge 
the gap between societal ideologies and what individuals actually 
believe and what they learn to believe i n school. How ideology 
works remains a question that i s largely untaokled precisely 
where i t should be a centi?al concern - in the sociology of 
education. One man ^ o has devoted attention to thi s i s Professor 
B a s i l Bernstein. I am c r i t i c a l of much that he has written. Yet 
he has at least taokled this central question. Many of the ideas 
developed i n t h i s essay are the fj^uit of close leading and criticism 
of Bezmstein's approach. 
Some w i l l dismiss any bridge between ideology and belief as 
unattaiziable, and impossible to discuss as a sociological issue. 
Such a 3?etreat i s unacceptable. Certainly, there are major 
epistemologioal problems involved, which have preoccupied 
philosophers for centuries. I t i s not, and cannot be, my object 
i n t h i s essay to write a history of such preoccupations. In 
editing the i n i t i a l draft, I have ali^ady omitted, footnoted or 
dras t i c a l l y reduced treatment of what would certainly be central 
arguments, were that my intention. X am often reduced to straight 
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assertions where th i s may seem incautious and where 1 would prefer 
to be more tentative. X can only excuse this on the grounds that 
what olee X have to say i s , X hope, worth saying. 
2a.vt 1 of t h i s essay i s concerned with the structuring of 
belief. Not only are subjectively held beliefs structured, but 
they are only beliefs, as opposed to noncommittal understandings, 
insofar as t h e i r structures are somehow r i g i d l f i e d and closed. 
The problem i s to conceive of that structuration* For this X 
suggest a "taree-root** metaphor. X then suggest that ideological 
master patterns share many of the properties of individual 
subjective beliefs and that the same metaphor i s useful in 
seeking to undei>stand them. From this discussion emerges & 
methodological appjroach for the consideration of ideology and 
belief, i n empirical contexts. I argue that such contexts are 
inseparable from such ideology and belief, and that no part of 
the t o t a l i t y can be properly understood without consideration of 
both. 
In Part IX, I look at educational ideologies. After 
reviewing certain other treatments of these, I consider some 
examples of ideological anomaly, which give clues as to how a 
mox>e general methodology might be developed. I then suggest that 
two dimensions are universally relevant In considering educational 
issues and that accordingly beliefs on these dimensions must 
always be considered. 
Ylhilst Part I i s concerned with belief and ideology In 
general, and how to consider actual instances of them, Part I I 
i s concerned with these Issues i n specifically educational 
contorts. Parts I I I , IV and V narrow the attention s t i l l further, 
to "Open Education". This was chosen because i t i s peculiarly 
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appropriate to questions of ideological closure. I t i s also 
relevant to some of the central concerns of sociology. I would 
maintain that my approach i s relevant to f a r more than the issue 
o f "Open Education", This i s chosen as an Qxample of how the 
app3roach might be pursued. 
In Fart I I I , I e:mmine possible meanings of the expression 
"Open Education" and develop ideas already introduced for 
application to particular h i s t o r i c a l instances of educationed 
ideology. In Part IV, I consider whether truly "Open Education" 
could in practice be possible, and i f so, in what senses. In 
Part V, I look at some h i s t o r i c a l examples of what, in some 
respects, might be regarded as beliefs in "Open Education". 
These are the educational beliefs of early 19th century B r i t i s h 
Radicals, of early 20th century American Progressives and of 
contemporary B r i t i s h Child-centred educationists. 
Despite these examples, th i s essay i s not intended as an 
h i s t o i l e a l study of education, any more than i t i s a history of 
epistemological debates. Nor i s i t an essay about the consequences 
of particular educational ideologies - although these are 
obviously relevant and Chapter 12 i s devoted to the matter of 
"penetration". The theoretical concern of this essay i s ideology 
and belief (in education) and how to consider actual instances of 
i t . The substantive subject of the last three parts i s the 
ideolOKT and beliefs of teachers, administrators and politicians, 
rather them the implications of these for children at school. 
F i n a l l y , this essay i s not an account of societal structures. 
Fundamental to an understanding of any societal totality, must be 
the appreciation that ideologies and beliefs must be treated as 
re a l , as having describable structures, and as being an essential 
-12-^  
part of that t o t a l i t y . An emphasis on this should not be taken to 
imply that more orthodox study of societal structures and processes 
i s unimpoartant, only that they do not and cannot give a f u l l 
picture. This i s especially the case in a study of education, 
which i s , after a l l , the production and 3?eproduction of beliefs 
and understandings. 
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PARC X - THE,, SgCTURIN BELIEF 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
I assume i n th i s essay that we can validly distinguish 
between the r e a l world-out-there and people's beliefs and 
understandings about i t . The f i r s t of these I c a l l Reality, 
The second I c a l l 'realities*,'^^^ There i s a Reality, 
Independently of how people understand i t . Yet people's 
' r e a l i t i e s * are themselves r e a l . They do themselves constitute 
a part (but not the t o t a l i t y ) of overall Reality, I sha l l be 
using the tenia ' r e a l i t i e s ' , beliefs and 'knowledf^e' inter-
changeably, for to me they are the same thing. What people 
believe about the world-out-there, they assume Implicitly or 
esqplicltly they know. That I s , they 'know' i t . They take the 
object of that 'knowledge' to be r e a l . That i s , i t i s their 
' r e a l i t y ' . I s h a l l also be Introducing the term Value-Knowledge. 
This again refers to beliefs, rather than objectively-valid 
knowledge. reason for using four terms, rather than the 
single term "beliefs", I s to emphasise, i n particular passages, 
certain denotations which a l l these terms have, in my usage, but 
which may be of particular relevance In those passages. A l l are 
"stronger" words, for instance, than mere "understandings", which 
do not e n t a i l the same level of non-rational commitment. I hope 
these distinctions w i l l become clear as I proceed. 
A further distinction which I shall make i s between 
sub.1 eotive 'realities«^ \ held by individuals, and ob.1eotivated 
' r e a l i t i e s * which are external to them. The l a t t e r may include 
the ' r e a l i t i e s ' of other people, but more Importantly they are 
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those ' r e a l i t i e s * which are institutionalised i n social r e l a t -
ions,, or otherwise objectivated in "virtiat everyone knows", or in 
what "experts" or other • reality'-definers take to be valid and 
valuable. Both kinds of ' r e a l i t i e s ' are also real i n themselves. 
Subjective ' r e a l i t i e s ' exist in the mind-brain of individuals. 
Both the nature of the i r origins, and that of their consequences 
need to be understood. Objectivated ' r e a l i t i e s ' also exist, as 
part of the real world with which any individual, any learner, has 
to cope. 
Necessarily, i t i s my 'reality' which i s presented in this 
essay. I sha l l not, however, feel obliged constantly to qualify 
my assertions with such phrases as "in nor opinion" or whatever. 
I s h a l l say a few words about the problem of i T e l a t i v i s m in 
Chapter 2. Meanwhile i t must be assumed that appropriate 
qualifications are implied, and that i t i s meaningful for me to 
write as an "objective observer". 
For an adequate sociological understanding of ideologies -
what they are and how they operate - i t i s essential to distinguish 
between the Reality that i s the world-out-there, in any given 
h i s t o r i c a l context, and the ' r e a l i t i e s ' that people believe i n , 
in that context. At the same time, those ' r e a l i t i e s ' are them-
selves Real, They are a part of the total r e a l i t y of the situation. 
They are in whole or i n part determined by the history of that 
situation, and they play an important determinative role in how 
that situation develops. 
Both external Realities smd internal ' r e a l i t i e s ' are 
structured. What may in particular contexts be regarded as 
contents or elements of the physical and social world, and of 
subjective notions of t h i s , are never isolated. They are always 
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and necessarily - and, sociologically, crucially - related to 
each other non-randomly. In the case of ' r e a l i t i e s ' , I w i l l 
suggest that i t i s convenient and useful to consider them as 
hierarchically structured. This helps us both to identify the 
ideological beliefs with which we are concerned and to assess 
t h e i r adequacy. 
The term Value-Knowledge w i l l be used to denote belief 
structures which, for reasons to be understood in each context, 
have become r i g i d l f i e d . As such, they are closed belief sferu-cjh^ r&s 
which are unquestioned and/or "unquestionable" to their adherents. 
The r i g i d l f i c a t i o n occurs as a result of experience f i r s t l y of 
matexlal and social Reality and secondly of the personal behaviour 
(including thinking) and inherent properties (including belief 
structuratio^i) of the person or persons i n question. This 
rigidifioation constitutes the creation of Value-Knowledge, which 
i s deteiralnative of individual behaviour. Value-Knowledge i s 
thus the bridge between experience and behaviour. I t i s hoped 
that the concept might help us to understand how ideology works. 
I t i s , after a l l , individuals who hold beliefs. And ideologies 
are belief systems. 
The term ' r e a l i t i e s ' can be used both of individually-held 
subjective (strwJK.ro of) belief and of objectivated bodies of 
'knowledge' which are external to - and an important part of the 
experiential environment of - those individuals. This distinction 
between Subjective 'Knowledge' and Objectivated 'Knowledge'allows 
us to examine relationships between the two, in any empirical 
context, and to discuss the transmission of societal "truths" and 
Master Patterns, as well as the subjective creation of novel 
accounts. 
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There i s commonly an isomorphism between intersocietal, 
sociotals institutional and interactional ' r e a l i t i e s ' , which 
"oorresponds" t o actual social relationships iat those different 
l e v e l s . These ' r e a l i t i e s ' are interacting, and frequently 
mutually reinforcing. The Reality to which they "correspond" 
i s to an important extent reproduced by virtue of this isomorphism. 
A view of belief systems as hierarchically structured enables 
us t o search for unifying Basic Beliefs, which underlie both 
subjective ' r e a l i t i e s ' and objeotivated bodies of 'knowledge'. 
An awareness of the inqplicit structuring of belief systems 
enables individuals to reflect upon that structuring, to identify 
closures/rigidifications, and therefore to "open out" belief 
systems through making them explicit and questioning t h e i r 
adequacy. 
Reality and 'Realities' 
Things exist i n the physical worldg independently of 
people's awareness of them. Equally independently, they are 
related t o on© another i n time, space and determination. The 
natural world, in short, i s non-random. Discussion of these 
relationships, of th i s nono-randonmess, must always be, in a sense, 
metaphorical. For that r e a l i t y must always be ontologioally 
distinct from the language with which we attenrpt to describe i t . 
Yet that does not mean those relationships are but a product of 
our language or our understandings. Determinative relationships, 
for example, are re a l , independently of Ifen's a b i l i t y to conceive 
of them, and independently, for instance, of any specific 
sooietally-oontexted notions of "causality". ^•'^  Our notions of 
"things", also, i s generally inadequate. Whilst physicists s t i l l 
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loag to i d e n t i f y elementary p a r t i c l e s , f o r most purposes i t 
should s u f f i c e to r e a l i s e that no thing i s d i s t i n c t and i s o l a t e d . 
A l l things are e x t e r n a l l y r e l a t e d i n time, space and determination 
to other things. Furthermore, a l l things are i n t e r n a l l y structured. 
They are themselves composed of "smaller" elements, i n turn 3?elated 
to one another. 
I n human soc i e t y , people are things i n the same sense. They 
are e x t e r n a l l y r e l a t e d to other human and non-human things i n the 
world* And they are i n t e r n a l l y structured. The possibly unique 
feature of humanity, i t s a b i l i t y to r e f l e c t upon i t s e l f - i n -
relation-to-the-world and thereby i t s creative p o t e n t i a l , does not 
detract from t h i s thing-ness of people. The i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
between brain and behaviour, and the external r e l a t i o n s h i p s vdth 
other people and environment, a.re equally r e a l . People's 
' r e a l i t i e s ' are as structured and as non-random as the R e a l i t y 
e x t e r n a l to them. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r -
a t i o n of su b j e c t i v e ' r e a l i t i e s ' and the stru c t u r a t i o n of the Real 
world-out-there i s of fundamental importance, i f we are to seek 
any understanding of b e l i e f and ideology. The piroblem here i s 
not merely one of whether ' r e a l i t i e s ' "correspond" i n some way to 
R e a l i t y , but one of what reasons there might be f o r any such 
"correspondence", and what consequences f o r behaviour such 
more-or-less adequate "correspondence" might have. 
As an exanq?le of a r e a l object and a notion of i t , consider 
a bus« A p a r t i c u l a r bus cannot but be constructed ( i n t e r n a l l y ) 
i n a c e r t a i n way, and si t u a t e d i n time and space i n r e l a t i o n 
to other human and non-human things. S i m i l a r l y , our notion of 
"bus" *• however much we are tempted to think of i t e x p l i c i t l y as 
something d i s t i n c t - cannot but be a "bus-as-an-example-of-redness". 
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a "bus-filling-with-people", a "l)us-rtuming-over-iny-foot»', and 
countless other "things" as w e l l . Moreover, we can only have 
•knowledge' of things i n the world-out-there i n s o f a r as t h e i r 
i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l relatedness i s i n some way represented i n 
our s t r u c t u r e d notions - however inadequate those notions may i n 
f a c t be. Otherwise, they would be quite l i t e r a l l y inconceivable. 
The structuzutlon of people's b e l i e f s i s both c a u s a l l y and 
f u n c t i o n a l l y r e l a t e d to the s t r u c t u r a t i o n of the R e a l i t y 
"portrayed". However, those b e l i e f s are not merely a passive 
response to the world-out-there. That external r e a l i t y i s not 
the s o l e determinative source of our b e l i e f s . What determines 
b e l i e f s i s experience. But we a l s o experience ourselves. We 
experience not ^ust our external s i t u a t i o n s , but a l s o our 
i n t e r n a l s e l v e s - the i n t e r n a l structuring of our own always-
a l i ^ a d y b e l i e f s , and of our own auLways-ongoing behaviour and 
a c t i o n . 
Moreover, Man has the a b i l i t y to fantasy, to think c r e a t i v e l y 
and to act on the b a s i s not s o l e l y of mechanically-determinative 
b e l i e f s , but a l s o on the b a s i s of hypothesised understandings. 
Consequently, we are i n some ways able to create the veiy 
experiences from which b e l i e f s are derived. People can act upon 
the world (including other people), thereby creating objectivated 
(A) 
' r e a l i t i e s ' f o r themselves and others. ^' An important example of 
such objectivated ' r e a l i t i e s ' i s that which i s presented as 
Educational 'Kaowledge' i n schools. Such objectivated 'knowledge' 
i s r e a l , structured and " s i g n i f i c a n t " f o r people i n schools. 
F i n a l l y , we can d i s t i n g u i s h between "objectivated 'Knowledge'" 
(or "Objectivated ' R e a l i t y ' " ) and an o b . l e c t i v i s t i c view of knowledge. 
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The l a t t e r view, according to Esland, 
"assumes that zones of knowledge are objects which can be 
considered to have meaning other than i n the minds of the 
i n d i v i d u a l s i n which they are constituted, i r r e s p e c t i v e of 
t h e i r human r e a l i s a t i o n " , and 
"has been f i r m l y embedded i n the norms and r i t u a l s of 
academic c u l t u r e and i t s transmission." Esland (1971) p»75. 
I t i s , i n a sense, a p r e s c r i p t i v e view, i n that i t holds that 
there are bodies of knowledge, which should be transmitted to the 
u n i n i t i a t e d . Accojrding to t h i s view, these bodies are taken as 
r e l a t i v e l y unproblematics n e i t h e r t h e i r v a l i d i t y (as accounts 
J1.3. 
of R e a l i t y ) nor t h e i r value ^ o the educans) i s generally open 
to question. 
Ob.lectivated 'Knowledge', however, a r i s e s from the existence 
of such views as t h i s . The pupil i s commonly confronted with 
o b j e c t i v a t e d bodies of 'knowledge* because, a l s o external to him, 
ed u c a t i o n i s t s with an o b j e c t i v i s t i c view of knowledge take those 
bodies of 'knowledge' to be v a l i d and valuable. In everyday l i f e , 
a l s o , i n d i v i d u a l s are confronted with the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d or 
otherwise o b j e c t i v a t e d ' r e a l i t i e s ' of others. However problematic 
( i n v a l i d or non-valuable) they may appear to that i n d i v i d u a l , or 
to us the observers, they are there as part of that i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
o b j e c t i v e environment. They are a part of the R e a l i t y which he 
experiences. 
Notes 
(1) I n the f i r s t draft of t h i s paper, I employed a number of 
d i f f e r e n t bracketing devices, i n the hopes of c l a r i f y i n g 
d i s t i n c t i o n s that are s e r i o u s l y glossed over i n more 
conventional punctuation. Being advised that these may 
confuse r a t h e r than c l a r i f y , I have abandoned t h i s attempt 
here. Where, f o r instance, Ford (1975) would use 
i n t e r r o g a t i v e brackets, I have used oi^dinary double 
inverted commas, undistinguished from conventional use. 
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O r i g i n a l l y , I used s i n g l e inverted commas to i n d i c a t e 
that what was enclosed was believed to be r e a l by the 
people i n question. I r e t a i n t h i s usage only ±ti the case 
of 'knowledge' and ' r e a l i t y ' , which i n d i c a t e what such-
and-such people take to be knowledge and r e a l i t y . On 
occasion, I use c a p i t a l l e t t e r s and/or underlining as a 
s u b s t i t u t e f o r double inverted commas, where a term i s 
being used f o r the f i r s t time or in a s p e c i a l i s e d sense. 
(2) i . e . s u b j e c t i v e 'knowledge' or b e l i e f s . 
(3) I disagree, therefore, with Pord when she says; 
"For many commentators seem to believe that i c a u s a l ? 
l i n k s are things which e x i s t i n the r e a l world. 
Of course they are not ... They are notions which 
people invent i n t h e i r attempts to grasp, order, and 
explain r e a l i t y . Questions about the frequency and 
u t i l i t y of i c a u s a l ? ideas are not questions about 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n the r e a l world, but questions about 
linkages i n the world of theory."- (Ford,(1975) 
pp. 119-120. 
(4) Not that the r e s u l t i n g symbols, a r t e f a c t s and behaviours 
need have the same meaning subsequently to others, nor even 
to the creato r s themselves. I do not, i n t h i s essay, use 
the notion of " c u l t u r e " . However, i t seems relevant to 
note here th a t much ambiguity a r i s e s i n c e r t a i n s o c i o l o g i c a l 
l i t e r a t u r e from a f a i l u r e to see that " c u l t u r e " must always 
be a t l e a s t a second-order concept. I t cannot r e f e r to the 
a r t e f a c t s , behaviours and symbols of a p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r a l 
giwup themselves, but to understandings and b e l i e f s about 
those external objects. The same object may e x i s t over 
time, or even contemporaneously, but have quite d i f f e r e n t 
c u l t u r a l s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r di f f e r e n t p a r t i e s . 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE LOGIC AND CONTEXT OF BELIEPS 
R e l a t i v i s m 
Th© question of r e l a t i v i s m a f f e c t s t h i s essay at two l e v e l s . 
f i r s t l y , the subject of the essay i s people's b e l i e f s . Consequently, 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p s which they believe to hold between t h e i r b e l i e f s 
and th© r e a l i t y to which these "correspond" must i t s e l f be a 
matter f o r consideration. Secondly, ny own understanding of that 
r e l a t i o n s h i p i s an e s s e n t i a l paxi; of my account. S p e c i f i c a l l y , I 
wish to t a l k about the ways i n which a c e r t a i n kind of notion -
those I c a l l " b e l i e f s " or "Value-Knowledge"^^^ - become 
consequential. And I wish to dis c u s s dimensions along which we 
might consider the s t r u c t u r a t i o n and adequacy of people's 
(2) 
b e l i e f s . - I n the l a t t e r case, I s h a l l suggest that though i n 
f a c t we can have no d i r e c t access to other people's b e l i e f s , even 
where these have formed the b a s i s of written or spoken accounts, 
nevertheless i s i t meaningful to t a l k about them. Certai n l y , we 
may i n the event be analysing what we take to be t h e i r b e l i e f s -
that i s , our own sub j e c t i v e understandings of them, Neveirtheless 
t h i s i s more than mere intr o s p e c t i o n , i f we assume that those 
b e l i e f s do have r e a l i t y external to, and independently of, 
ourselves. 
My own pos i t i o n i s one of R e l a t i v i s t Realism. I take i t as 
given that even were we to have b e l i e f s that did, somehow, 
"correspond" to R e a l i t y , or were, i n some other sense, "true", 
yet we could never unquestionably know t h i s . We can never know 
that we know. No b e l i e f s can ever be e i t h e r context-free or 
value-free.^"^^ This much any r e l a t i v i s t would accept. I would 
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(4) d i f f e r , however, from c e r t a i n other forms of r e l a t i v i s m ^ ' i n 
t h a t I am i n no way d i s t r e s s e d at the prospect of dismissing the 
s e a r c h f o r cut-and-dried " t r u t h " and " f a l s i t y " . On the oontrary, 
fundamental to my account of b e l i e f structures i s a notion of 
Adequacy, which e n t i r e l y replaces the need f o r such a misleading 
dichotomy. Moreover, I am prepared unquestioningly to accept 
t h a t there i s a world-out-there, that i t i s r e a l whether I 
r e f l e c t upon i t or not, and that i t contains other people and 
t h e i r b e l i e f s . 
' R e a l i s t i c ' B e l i e f s 
I am p r i m a r i l y concerned i n t h i s essay with b e l i e f s about 
the world as i t " r e a l l y i s " . These b e l i e f s are d e s c r i p t i v e i n 
the sense that, i f v e r b a l i s e d , they would constitute d e s c r i p t i v e 
a s s e r t i o n s or propositions about R e a l i t y . However, the very 
adherence to such d e s c r i p t i v e b e l i e f s can i t s e l f c o nstitute 
p r e s c r i p t i o n - however i m p l i c i t and unrecognised such prescription 
may be. To emphasise t h i s , I s h a l l use the term "Value-Knowledge". 
I wish, therefore, to d i s t i n g u i s h my notion of b e l i e f s from that 
of "values" as i t i s most frequently used. I suggest, even, that 
siuch "values" have no d i s t i n c t r e a l i t y and consequently no 
d i r e c t s o c i o l o g i c a l importance. 
I s h a l l d i s t i n g u i s h l a t e r between b e l i e f s that are strongly 
held and those which are held only for-the-time-being. The 
former c o n s t i t u t e Value-Knowledge proper. They are distinguished 
from fantasy or mild conviction only as a matter of degree, not 
of kind. Such di f f e r e n c e s i n degree are, however, both explicable 
and consequential. I s h a l l a l s o d i s t i n g u i s h between b e l i e f s that 
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have been made e x p l i c i t by t h e i r adherents and those which have 
not. For the moment, however, I s h a l l be discussing b e l i e f s . 
I t may be assumed f o r the moment that these are strong b e l i e f s 
( i . e . Value-Knowledge) about the world-out-there. 
The notion of "values" as a s p e c i f i c kind of p r e s c r i p t i v e 
b e l i e f i s not s o c i o l o g i c a l l y u s e f u l . I t tends misleadingly to 
imply that behind such statements there are b e l i e f s which have a 
p r i v i l e g e d s t a t u s over "merely" d e s c i l p t i v e b e l i e f s . They ai?e 
commonly taken i n some way to influence or determine behaviour 
i n a way that "merely" desc3?iptive b e l i e f s do not. They are 
assumed to be separate and d i s t i n c t from the l a t t e r . I t i s 
sometimes supposed, furthermore, that such "values" are r e l a t i v e l y 
immutable, when compared with d e s c r i p t i v e b e l i e f s . I maintain 
that from a s u b j e c t i v e point of view they "describe" r e a l i t y 
©very b i t as much as "ordinary" d e s c r i p t i v e b e l i e f s . They need 
be no more strongly-held. And i n practice "ordinary" b e l i e f s are 
j u s t as p r e s c r i p t i v e . 
A d i s t i n c t i o n commonly made i s that between cognitive and 
a f f e c t i v e behaviour. Yet the two are inseparable. As Holly »ays, 
i n d i s c u s s i n g Bloom et a l . ' s Taxonomy of Educational Objectives 
(Bloom et a l . 1956), 
"Their i d e o l o g i c a l commitment to cognition as pure mental 
operation uncontaminated by f e e l i n g ,., means that t h e i r 
categories remain ex t e r n a l and f o r m a l i s t i c . How, f o r 
instance, does one achieve 'comprehension' without, as a 
p r i o r condition, having a f e e l i n g of involvement? How, 
having achieved comprehension, can one remain unaffected 
by i t ? " Holly (1973/74) p,138.(5) 
I n p r a c t i c e , cognition and a f f e c t are inseparable (although 
the degree to which the two aspects of the same b e l i e f s are made 
e x p l i c i t may vary considerably). 
D i s t i n c t i o n s are a l s o found between " a t t i t u d e s " and " b e l i e f s " . 
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A l l p o r t (1954), f o r instance, would see the two statements, 
1» " I d i s l i k e Negroes" and 
2. "Negroes are stupid", 
as i n d i c a t i n g an a t t i t u d e and a b e l i e f , r e s p e c t i v e l y . F i r s t l y , 
however, such statements have no s o c i o l o g i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e as 
d i s t i n c t expressions of underlying notions. I f made by the same 
person, then they express aspects of the same b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e . 
Secondly, both might e a s i l y i n d i c a t e b e l i e f s . There i s no 
evidence i n the ver b a l formulations alone as to the strength of 
commitment of the speaker. Strength of b e l i e f n e c e s s a r i l y e x i s t s 
only i n context - i n p a r t i c u l a r people, i n p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s , 
at p a r t i c u l a r times. T h i r d l y , as T a j f e l puts i t , 
"'Bad' or 'good', even ' l i k e d ' or ' d i s l i k e d ' , become 
i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e statements of fact not dif f e r e n t i n t h e i r 
mode of a s s i m i l a t i o n from, f o r example, 'large' or 'small'." 
T a j f e l (1973) PP. 75-6. 
Furthermore, b e l i e f s are inseparable, i n p r a c t i c e , not only from 
the ways i n which they are learned, but from t h e i r consequences 
upon behaviour. 
Another common d i s t i n c t i o n i s s i m i l a r to the l a s t . I t i s 
made on the b a s i s of the permanence of notions, rather than of 
what they are "about", or of how they are learned. "Opinion", 
" a t t i t u d e " and "character t r a i t " are believed by Brown (1963) 
to be pro g r e s s i v e l y harder to change by 'techniques of persuasion" 
(though they are defined i n terms of how they are acquired). 
Again, I i n s i s t that the differences are only a matter of degree. 
They are not q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t . 
Kly major objection i s to d i s t i n c t i o n s between "knowledge" 
(or somietimes " b e l i e f " ) and "values". There are no such things 
as values. They do not have objective r e a l i t y . They cannot, 
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t h e r e f o r e , o f f e r a s o c i o l o g i c a l l y u s e f u l category. They do not 
e x i s t independently of people's (contexted) minds. I n s o f a r as 
i t i s p o s s i b l e to t a l k of them at a l l , they are inseparable from 
those people's ' r e a l i s t i c ' b e l i e f s . I t i s possible to abstract, 
f o r the purposes of a n a l y s i s , people's b e l i e f s , because a l l 
d e s c r i p t i v e b e l i e f s , r e f e r to some aspect of the b e l i e v e r ' s 
' r e a l i t y ' . But "values" i n i s o l a t i o n do not r e f e r . There are 
only s t a t e s of valuing. C e r t a i n l y , we can t a l k about - and 
thereby a b s t r a c t - such psychological s t a t e s . But we cannot then 
reunite such a b s t r a c t i o n s with the r e f e r e n t i a l b e l i e f s from which 
they were i n the f i r s t place divorced. We cannot t a l k about "The 
Values", that "aod i s good", or that "Murder i s wrong", or that 
"Pedestrians should not jay-walk". To accord d i s t i n c t ontological 
s t a t u s to such "values" would be idealism. 
m p r a c t i c e ( i . e . i n the r e a l world), those b e l i e f s which 
are so commonly separated off as "values" aare no d i f f e r e n t from 
d e s c r i p t i v e b e l i e f s . To show t h i s , l e t me borrow R u s s e l l ' s 
much-used proposition that "The (present) King of France i s bald". 
Now whatever the r e f e r e n t i a l s t atus of mere propositions, when 
they appear as a s s e r t i o n s they n e c e s s a r i l y r e f e r to what i s taken 
to be ' R e a l i t y ' . 
When someone says, "The King of France i s bald", he means, not 
only that "There i s a (man who i s , or i s c a l l e d , the) King of 
F3?ance, and that man i s bald", 
but, more than thats " I believe that there i s a (man who i s or 
i s c a l l e d , the) King of France, and I believe that that man i s 
bald". 
(To repeat, I am assuming f o r the moment that the b e l i e f s I am 
d i s c u s s i n g are " s i n c e r e " , and that they are r e a l l y believed. 
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Strength of b e l i e f i s , f o r the moment, another matter). 
T h i s set of stated b e l i e f s i s no d i f f e r e n t i n kind from the 
equivalent elaboration of "Murder i s warong"s 
When someone ways, "Murder i s wjTong", he means, not only that "There 
i s a r e a l or possible c l a s s of actions which we c a l l 'murder', and 
i t i s wrong to commit any such ac t i o n " , 
but " I b e l i e v e that there i s (such a c l a s s of a c t i o n s ) and I 
b o l i e v e that i t i s wrong (to commit them)". 
I n t h i s example, the d e f i n i t i o n of "wrong" may of course be 
debatable. I t may not be consensual. But the debate would be with 
others, not by the b e l i e v e r with himself, as b e l i e v e r . I n s o f a r as 
he b e l i e v e s the second statement ( i n s o f a r that i s , as i t i s an 
accurate p o r t r a y a l of h i s b e l i e f s ) , then i t i s no d i f f e r e n t i n 
kind from h i s b e l i e f s about the King of Prance's h a i r s t y l e . 
I n short, i t i s delusory to i s o l a t e a c e r t a i n kind of b e l i e f 
c a l l e d "values", c h a r a c t e r i s a b l e by what i t supposedly r e f e r s to 
(God, murder, j a y - w a l k e r s ) . S o c i o l o g i c a l l y , the only u s e f u l way 
t o t a l k about "values" i s i n s p e c i f i c contexts, where they are 
inseparable from the r e f e r e n t i a l ( d e s c r i p t i v e ) b e l i e f s of 
p a r t i c u l a r people. Whilst we may meaningfully be able to t a l k 
about the possible meaning of such b e l i e f s i n the abstract ( b e l i e f s 
about God, about murder, e t c . ) , valuation i s n e c e s s a r i l y contexted. 
Moreover, i t i s an e s s e n t i a l part of any b e l i e f s , i n p r a c t i c e . 
Mannheim appears to make a s i m i l a r point when he t a l k s about 
the p e c u l i a r l y modem phenomenon of t a l k i n g about "values". This 
arose, he suggests, from the d i f f u s i o n of economic theory. However, 
h i s complaint i s l i n k e d with an argument about r a t i o n a l i t y which 
I would want to q u a l i f y . He says that. 
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"The view which holds that a l l c u l t u r a l l i f e i s an orientation 
towards obj e c t i v e values i s j u s t one more i l l u s t r a t i o n of a 
t y p i c a l l y modem r a t i o n a l i s t i c disa^egard f o r the basic 
i r r a t i o n a l mechanisms which govern man's r e l a t i o n to h i s 
world. Par from being permanently v a l i d the int e r p r e t a t i o n 
of c u l t u r e i n terms of objective values i s r e a l l y a p e c u l i a r 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the thought of our own time ..." 
Mannheim (1936/60) p.73. 
I would maintain, however, that men do behave " r a t i o n a l l y " , 
according to a ra t h e r r e s t r i c t e d use of that term. I n s o f a r as 
men's b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s become r i g i f i e d ( a notion that I s h a l l 
esjplain i n Chapter 3) then t h e i r behaviour i s i n p r i n c i p l e 
p r e d i c t a b l e according to those structures. This essay i s directed 
a t the problem of how we might consider c e r t a i n common structures 
of b e l i e f , relevant to education. I would not say. that man tends 
to act " r a t i o n a l l y " i n the sense of action directed to c e r t a i n 
( i n v a r i a n t ) o b j e c t i v e s . The non-randomness of behaviour must be 
seen i n the l i g h t of b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s . (These may be conveniently 
chai'aoterised - and analysed - i n terms of c e r t a i n Basic B e l i e f s , 
along c e r t a i n Dimensions, which I discuss below). 
Meanwhile, Mannheim i s ri g h t when he continues the above 
passage, 
"... But even granting f o r the moment that t h i s conception 
/of o r i e n t a t i o n towards objective values/ had some merit, 
the existence of c e r t a i n formal realms of values and t h e i r 
s p e c i f i c s t r u c t u r e would be i n t e l l i g i b l e only with reference 
to the concrete s i t u a t i o n s to which they have relevance and 
i n which they are v a l i d . There i s , then, no norm which can 
l a y claim to formal v a l i d i t y and which can be abstracted as 
a constant u n i v e r s a l formal element from i t s h i s t o r i c a l l y 
changing content," BSannheim, l o c . c i t . 
(7) 
I n t a l k i n g of the unifying Basic B e l i e f s ^ / of b e l i e f 
s t r u c t u r e , I may appear to be resorting to something akin to the 
"higher values" which I have been attacking. The p r i n c i p a l 
d i f f e r e n c e s are as follows. F i r s t l y , Basic B e l i e f s are no more 
(nor l e s s ) p r e s c r i p t i v e b e l i e f s than any others. Secondly, the 
notion of "value" - i n Value-Knowledge - applies to b e l i e f s at 
-28-
(8) 
l e v e l of i n c l u s i v e n e s s ^ , not merely to those at a "high 
l e v e l " . Such valuation inheres i n the s t a t e of believing, not 
i n the overt r e f e r e n t i a l content of the b e l i e f s i n question. 
A notion to which I was at f i r s t sight a t t r a c t e d i s that of 
f9) 
"value-orientations".^^'' Certain formulations of t h i s notion are 
s i m i l a r to what I c a l l Dimensions, The suggestion behind "value-
o r i e n t a t i o n s " i s that although p a r t i c u l a r people's contextual 
experience may not be concretely the same,yet i t may be possible 
to examine t h e i r B a s i c B e l i e f s i n terms of c e r t a i n supposedly 
u n i v e r s a l c r i t e r i a , and along certato dimensions which supposedly 
are u n i v e r s a l l y r e l e v a n t . I have two main objections to the 
" v a l u e - o r i e n t a t i o n s " formulation, however. F i r s t l y they r e f e r 
almost e x c l u s i v e l y to dimensions "at the top" of beliefs, 
i s o l a t e d from the s t r u c t u r e s of b e l i e f of which they (or t h e i r 
e quivalents) are really i n t e g r a l p a r t s . Secondly they are 
remarkably context-free. They tend to be presented as though 
learned i n one context ( u s u a l l y infancy) and then magically t r a n s -
f e r r e d to another ( i n adolescence or adulthood). Yet t h i s 
" t r a n s f e r " does not f i t a great deal of empirical evidence. 
People may be "achievement-oriented" or " i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c " , f o r 
i n s t a n c e , i n one context, but not i n another, Wheire such 
c o n t i n u i t i e s are found, then i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s continuity 
that i s i n need of explanation. I t should not be taken as an 
independent, explanatory v a r i a b l e . S t a b i l i t y (and change) i n 
people's b e l i e f s need to be explained i n terms of past and ongoing 
experience. I t i s most misleading to assume that the " n a t u r a l " 
s t a t e of man i s consistency, and to use t h i s to explain s o c i a l 
order. 
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I n using the concept of "Basic B e l i e f s " , therefore, 
e s p e c i a l l y of Objectivated B e l i e f Systems, and of r i g i d i f i e d 
i n d i v i d u a l s ' s t r u c t u r e s of ' r e a l i t y ' , I wish to d i s s o c i a t e i t 
from any s o t i o n of "higher-order values". They are i n t e g r a l 
p a r t s of more comprehensive b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s . They are them-
se l v e s non-random products of past and ongoing experience. 
To t h i s extent, my usage of "Basic B e l i e f s " has s l i g h t l y 
perverted Ford's use of the expression. She describes them as 
"metatheoretical judgments", which are untestable and a prioiriL 
and which " i n a most profound sense ... we believe because we 
b e l i e v e " (Ford, 1975, p.88, her emphasis). I d i f f e r i n s t r e s s i n g 
that there are much lower l e v e l b e l i e f s which are j u s t as 
consequential - though t h e i r verbalised form may be d i s c r e d i t a b l e 
on contextual or l o g i c a l c r i t e r i a - and that the e x p e r i e n t i a l 
b a s i s of such strong b e l i e f (Value-Knowledge) i s c r u c i a l i n our 
luiderstanding of how Basic B e l i e f s are produced and reproduced. 
An i l l u s t r a t i o n may help to emphasize that what are commonly 
conceived of as "high l e v e l values" are not what I mean by e i t h e r 
"Value-Knowledge" or "Basic B e l i e f s " . Take the supposed "value" 
that "Thou s h a l t not k i l l " . This could well be a high-level notion, 
i n the terms described below. But t h i s i n no way means that i t 
must be values as 'knowledge'. I n most cases, such a formula i s 
not learned from d i r e c t experience at a l l , e i t h e r through 
experience of world-out-there r e a l i t y , or through subjective 
elaboration. I t i s most probably l e a r n t "off the peg". I f i t 
were nonetheless strongly-believed ( i . e . Value-Known), then t h i s 
would be through i t s incorporation i n a quite d i f f e r e n t structure 
of b e l i e f s - not about " l i f e " or " k i l l i n g " at a l l but about 
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( f o r i n s t a n c e ) the t r u t h of God's word, or the danger of oneself 
being hurt. Were the 'knowledge' that "Though sh a l t not k i l l " 
put to the t e s t ( f o r instance i n War-time), i t would to a major 
extent be 'knowledge' s t r u c t u r e s about God or about one's own 
danger ( f o r i n s t a n c e ) that would be being challenged, rather than 
those about l i f e and death. Compare t h i s , f o r instance, with 
drinking and d r i v i n g . I 'know' that I should not didnk-and-drive. 
But i t i s questionable whether that 'knowledge' i s t r u l y Value-
Knowledge, to me. Two kinds of experience might r e a l l y impress 
the importance of such a b e l i e f on me. F i r s t l y , I might witness 
o r be part of a drink-and-drlve accident. Secondly, I might be 
breathalysed-and-convicted by the"d)ue processes of Law." I f the 
former occurired, my Value-Knowledge Structure concerning drinking-
and-driving would be predominantly re l a t e d to b e l i e f s about 
"drink", about " d r i v i n g " , about "life-and-death" and "motor 
ac c i d e n t s " . I n the second case, however, ny drink-and-driving 
b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e would probably be quite d i f f e r e n t . I t would be 
composed of such elements as " p o l i c e " , "being-caught" and "being-
fined-and-losing-my-licence". The occasions on which such Value-
I&iowledge would s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t my subsequent behaviour 
and the ways i n which i t would do so would therefore be l i k e l y 
to be very d i f f e r e n t . Yet the social-scientist-oh-the-doorstep 
might evince from me the (as i t happens) t o t a l l y ambiguous "value" 
th a t "Drinking-and-Driving i s bad" - Strongly Agree. Where 
"off-the-peg" notions are n e i t h e r Value-Kuown as a r e s u l t of d i r e c t 
experience relevant to t h e i r immediate r e f e r e n t s , nor as a 3?esult 
of the " s i g n i f i c a n t " experience of being fined, or preached to 
e t c . , then, however h i g h - l e v e l those b e l i e f s i n terms of r e f e r e n t i a l 
content, t h i s has nothing to do with values. F i n a l l y , there i s 
- 3 1 -
plenty of evidence i n p o l i t i c a l and i n d u s t r i a l sociology to 
demonstrate that off-the-peg, so-called "values" may be quite 
' meal 
(12) 
inoperative i n a c t u a l behaviour.^^ ^  ^  They frequently n quite 
d i f f e r e n t things i n d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l milieu, anyway. 
I am leaving t i l l l a t e r the question of e x p l i c i t and i m p l i c i t 
b e l i e f s . Meanwhile, my d i s t i n c t i o n between apparently high-level 
"values" and (not n e c e s s a r i l y high-level) b e l i e f s i s c l o s e l y 
r e l a t e d to the d i s t i n c t i o n between understanding and b e l i e f . For 
I may be able to understand what i s meant by the verbalised high-
l e v e l b e l i e f of aiiother person. But that i n no way means that I 
beli e v e i t , or i n t e r n a l i s e i t as Value-Knowledge of my own. 
S i m i l a r l y , Value-Knowledge may be quite unverbalised. Another 
r e l a t e d d i s t i n c t i o n i s that between rhetor i c and ideology. 
The former may be quite d i f f e r e n t to what we r e a l l y believe, 
(14) 
And we may be quite unaware of the l a t t e r , ^ ' 
I have not s a i d that p r e s c r i p t i v e b e l i e f s cannot be Value-
Knowledge. They can, and t h i s can be very important. But such 
"should-ness" does not s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i s t i n g u i s h b e l i e f s of a 
p a r t i c u l a r kind, from a s o c i o l o g i c a l point of view, "Should"-
statements and "Is"-stateraents are, a f t e r a l l , only verbal 
fonnulations. I t i s not the verbal formulation that constitutes 
what i s s o c i o l o g i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . I t i s the strength-of-belief, 
T h i s i s c l e a r when we consider that "Thou shalt not k i l l " can 
not-inadequately be reformulated as " L i f e i s sacred", and 
v i c e - v e r s a . What, i n s o c i a l behaviour, determines the p r e s c r i p t i v e 
content of b e l i e f s i s not t h e i r apparent (verbal) reference to 
"should-ness" rather than " i s - n e s s " , but the strength of Value-
i 
B e l i e f that accompanies t h e i r a s s e r t i o n . Indeed, Value-Knowledge 
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which i s not ass e r t e d , because i t i s im p l i c i t / i m v e r b a l i s e d , i s 
ge n e r a l l y the most s i g n i f i c a n t , s o c i o l o g i c a l l y . 
I t i s th© struc t u r e of b e l i e f s and t h e i r inherent Value-
Kaowledg© content,then, that a c t u a l l y have determinative e f f e c t s 
upon behaviour. But "Should"-beliefs can s t i l l be important. 
I n Chapter 7, I s h a l l make such a d i s t i n c t i o n . No p r i v i l e g e d 
s t a t u s , however, should be accorded to b e l i e f s e x p l i c i t l y form-
ulat e d i n p r e s c r i p t i v e terms, I f we consider b e l i e f s that r e f e r 
to a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e of a f f a i r s - a p o l i t i c a l system, say, or 
an i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p - the following questions might 
be askedj 
a. Does that s t a t e of a f f a i r s e x i s t ? 
b. Could i t e x i s t ? 
c. Does i t CLnevitably) hiave to e x i s t ? 
d. Should i t e x i s t ? 
Such questions have p a r t i c u l a r relevance to the dimensions of 
Change. ^ ''^ ^ 
Notions and Mod.els 
B e l i e f s are ' r e a l i s t i c ' . They r e f e r to what i s taken to 
be r e a l i n the world-out-there. Or, since one's own b e l i e f s a l s o 
have r e a l i t y , a t any given point i n time, they may r e f e r to these 
too. B e l i e f s may r e f e r , then, to what are taken to be properties, 
things or r e l a t i o n s h i p s out-there. Or they may r e f e r to one's own 
notions and models and the r e l a t i o n s h i p s within and between them. 
The term Notion r e f e r s to any p a r t i c u l a r b e l i e f or under-
standing. Notions may or may not be verbalised and they may or 
may not be adequate i n any of the senses suggested below. 
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( E x p l i c i t n e s s and adequacy are closeXy r e l a t e d , as we s h a l l see.) 
Ver b a l i s e d notions I c a l l ConceptB. In using a name (which may 
be a s i n g l e word, a phrase, or even a lengthy t r e a t i s e ) to 
i n d i c a t e a notion, one i s thereby employing a concept. 07he name 
i t s e l f r e f e r s not to the concept, nor to the previously unverbalised 
notion, but to the aspect of 'Reality* to which the notion i t s e l f 
r e f e r s . A l l three,then, refer to ' r e a l * objects. To use or 
develop concepts i s to attempt to bridge the gap between b e l i e f 
and language. Conceptualisation may i t s e l f improve understanding, 
and t h i s i t s e l f may make b e l i e f more adequate. Frequently, however, 
we f a i l to say what we i m p l i c i t l y mean. 
I n diagrammatic form: 
Notions 
B e l i e f s Understandings Concepts Unverbalised notions 
( e x p l i c i t ) ( i m p l i c i t ) 
Strength of Adequacy of 
4 — B e l i e f < Elaboration 
( A l l notions are oontexted and a l l notions refen) 
V e r b a l i s a t i o n should be distinguished from v e r b a l i s a b i l i t y . 
W© may use simple names to r e f e r to complex R e a l i t i e s and yet be 
w e l l aware of that complexity. Often we can elaborate further, i f 
the need a r i s e s . I n such cases, simple names, or simple statements, 
short-hands f o r more complex 'knowledge',^ 
On the other hand, such simple names may not be a short-hand 
a t a l l , but mere c l i c h e s . Vtoen I say "nuclear physics", and when 
a nuc l e a r p h y s i c i s t employs the same expression, we nay 
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(17) o b j e c t i v e l y be referxdng to the same object^ • i n the world-out-
therse S u b j e c t i v e l y , however, these v e r b a l i s a t i o n s i n d i c a t e 
quite d i f f e r e n t notions/concepts. I f asked to elaborate on 
what I meant by "nuclear physics", I might not know where to 
s t a r t , f o r reasons of ignorance. The s p e c i a l i s t , however, might 
not know whea?e to s t a r t f o r quite d i f f e r e n t reasons. 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t even to conceive of "elemental" notions -
j u s t as i t i s d i f f i c u l t to conceive of "elemental" things, i n 
the r e a l world-out-there. Notions are inherently r e l a t e d and 
e i t h e r c a s u a l l y or i n v a r i a b l y associated with other notions i n 
our b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s . They are n e c e s s a r i l y s t ructures i n 
themselves. And they are always, and at the same time, elements 
of other notional s t r u c t u r e s . 
I t i s tempting to say that such "elemental" notions are 
e i t h e r t y p i f i c a t i o n s , or constructs of them. However, the term 
" t y p i f i c a t i o n s " g enerally denotes e x p l i c i t reference to what are 
taken to be " p r o p e r t i e s " i n R e a l i t y - "properties" such as 
"redness", or "aroundness", or "dog-ness", or "car-ness". To 
r e f e r e x p l i c i t l y to such supposed "propez>ties", one needs to 
have well-developed (and f a r from elemental) notions of them. One 
a l s o needs to be able to a b s t r a c t ; for one i s r e f e i r i n g , i n 
t y p i f i o a t i o n s , not j u s t to the known, but to hypothetical 
in s t a n c e s of those "ps^operties" i n other, unknown, s i t u a t i o n s . 
P r i o r to t h i s development of abstraction and e x p l i c i t n e s s , 
we have i m p l i c i t and i l l - f o r m e d notions of the "properties" i n 
question, which are i n i t i a l l y undivo3?oed from concrete experience. 
So "dog-ness" as an i m p l i c i t p r e - t y p i f i c a t i o n f o r an infant may 
have a notional s t r u c t u r e that includes " h a i r i n e s s " , "wagginess", 
e t c . . and "our-Sheba-ness" - r a t h e r than "all-known-and-
-35-
unknown-dogness»'» 
Language i t s e l f i s a p r e r e q u i s i t e of abstraction. But, 
once even elementary language i s acquired, abstraction 
n e c e s s a r i l y , and by the same token, occurs. I t occurs i n 
respect of the objects r e f e r r e d to by p a r t i c u l a r names, and by 
the concepts -in-formation that these names i n d i c a t e . I t i s a 
f i c t i o n that a b s t r a c t i o n i s something that occurs only i n 
"high-level^thinking. 
" A l l ideas without exception are abstract, since the 
v e i y process of forming ideas i s a process of abstraction. 
When, therefore, we apply the term 'abstract' to d i s t i n g u i s h 
c e r t a i n ideas from others, we use t h i s term only i n a 
r e l a t i v e sense, meaning that one idea i s more abstract than 
another, or rather, represents a higher l e v e l of a b s t r a c t i o n . " 
Comforth (1954) p.72. 
(Th© account that follows i s i n part an attempt to give meaning 
to such expressions as "higher l e v e l of abstraction" .) 
I n view of what I have j u s t s a i d about " t y p i f i c a t i o n s " and 
" a b s t r a c t i o n " , I p r e f e r not to use Berger's notion of "pre-
t h e o r e t i c a l " thought (or b e l i e f s ) . I would speak, rather, of 
" p r e - l i n g u i s t i c " b e l i e f s . Much - and possibly most - of our 
'knowledge' remains " p r e - l i n g u i s t i c " , long a f t e r infancy. For i t 
r e f e r s to r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n R e a l i t y which we have e i t h e r not 
attempted, or not been able, to name and thereby conceptualize. 
T h i s does not mean, however, that we have no notions of i t . 
Nor - importantly - does i t mean that those notions may not be 
very r e a l Valtte~Khowledge, and therefore consequential. 
Value-Knowledge c o n s i s t s of r i g i d i f i e d (or closed) b e l i e f 
s t r u c t u r e s . Such r i g i d i f i c a t i o n can occur even i n the case of 




Such apparently "simple" notions^ then, are a l s o structured. 
A l l notions are at the same time models. They are models of 
what i s taken to be R e a l i t y , or some aspect of i t . At l e a s t 
i m p l i c i t l y , they r e f e r to structu3?ed re l a t i o n s h i p s i n the 
world-out"there, and they are themselves structured. The 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between these two kinds of structure - on the one 
hand of R e a l i t y and on the other hand of ' r e a l i t i e s ' - i s 
discussed below. Theories are a l s o models. What distinguishes 
t h e o r i e s from other kinds of notion i s that, however inadequately, 
they r e f e r to determinative r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n the world-out-
there. Believed t h e o r i e s are determinisms. 
Theories are not necessa3?ily e x p l i c i t explanatoiy models. 
Even models which ovei*tly are «non-explanatoiy* frequently contain 
a covert, perhaps unrecognised, reference to determinative 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s . E s p e c i a l l y ^ e n i t comes, not to " s c i e n t i f i c " 
models, but to "everyday" ones, i t frequently happens that our 
understandings of determination are unvoiced. They are there i n 
our i m p l i c i t b e l i e f s , f o r a l l t h a t . Because of the f a c t of 
determination out-there, we almost i n e v i t a b l y have some i m p l i c i t 
t h e o r i e s about i t . These i m p l i c i t theories may not be p a r t i c u l a r l y 
adequate. C l e a r l y we do not i n 5 ) l i c i t l y know whatever happens i n 
the world about us, as i f i t were merely a question of 
i n t r o s p e c t i o n and v e r b a l i s a t i o n . On the contrary, our i m p l i c i t 
•knowledge' i s generally non-adequate i n a number of ways. But 
n e i t h e r are we t o t a l l y ignorant of determinative (and other) 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n R e a l i t y . We tend to have i m p l i c i t 'knowledge' 
of R e a l i t y ^ i n s o f a r as we experience i t . Our very f a i l u r e to 
make our models e x p l i c i t i n i t s e l f tends to prevent them from 
becoming more adequate. To give a b r i e f example: I s h a l l argue 
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l a t e r that "progressive" teachers are not ignorant of p o l i t i c a l 
s t r u c t u r e s and economic r e l a t i o n s h i p s , i n t h e i r pedagogical 
i d e a l s - as some would argue. Rather, they do have 'knowledge' 
of the functions of education, of the I n d u s t r i a l labour market, 
of s t a t e apparatuses. But t h i s 'knowledge' i s frequently low-
l e v e l , i m p l i c i t , and inadequate. 
B e l i e f s as St r u c t u r e s 
The r e s t of t h i s chapter outlines one way i n which we may 
conceive of b e l i e f s as s t r u c t u r e s . I suggest that there are 
c e r t a i n l o g i c a l and contextual c r i t e r i a or dimensions, according 
to which we can form an image of the shape, of these str u c t u r e s , as 
w e l l as t h e i r adequacy. I use i n p a r t i c u l a r a "tree-root" 
metaphor to c l a r i f y c e r t a i n c e n t r a l features. 
Whilst t h i s view of b e l i e f structures i s above a l l h i e r a r c h i c a l , 
i t must be distinguished immediately from any s o c i a l prestige or 
power that may i n p r a c t i c e be associated with d i f f e r e n t " l e v e l s 
of a b s t r a c t i o n " , or d i f f e r e n t 'knowledge'-areas. Much of Young 
(1971. ed.) i s concerned with t h i s s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n of 
(19) 
'knowledge'.^ Some w r i t e r s have claimed that c e r t a i n c u r r i c u l a r 
developments promoted by the Schools Council perpetuate or 
r e c r e a t e s o c i a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n within B r i t i s h schools, despite 
an apparent s h i f t towards equality, i n comprehensivisation.^^^^ 
C l e a r l y , c e r t a i n branches of 'knowledge' and forms of thought 
are regarded as superior, more worthy and e n t i t l i n g the master 
of such thought and 'knowledge' to higher remuneration and 
(21) 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
The s o r t s of d i s t i n c t i o n that I am maJsing i n t h i s section 
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are obviously r e l a t e d to t h i s s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n of 'knowledge*, 
i n our so c i e t y . However, they are a n a l y t i c a l l y quite d i s t i n c t . 
To hold that they were i n e v i t a b l y r e l a t e d i n p r a c t i c e , one would 
have to assume that e i t h e r innate i n d i v i d u a l differences, or 
s o c i e t a l l y necessary e x p e r i e n t i a l differences, made i t i n ^ o s s i b l e 
f o r more than ai few to become "abstract thinkers". I would 
challenge both assumptions, but that i s not here the i s s u e , I 
am concerned here with the st r u c t u r i n g of b e l i e f s whatever 
evaluations are accorded to "high l e v e l " understandings and b e l i e f , 
and whatever c o n s t r a i n t s a c t u a l l y or supposedly r e s t r i c t t h e i r 
a c q u i s i t i o n . 
Not being concerned here with the s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n of 
(22) 
•knowledge', I can approvingly r e f e r to the work of H i r s t . ^ ' 
His l o g i c areas are s u s p i c i o u s l y s i m i l a r to those i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d 
i n a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t y ' s h i s t o r i c a l l y - s i t u a t e d academic t r a d i t i o n , 
and h i s account may be taken as a legitimation of that t r a d i t i o n 
and the i n e q u a l i t i e s i t helps to reproduce. Nonetheless, i t i s 
not inappropriate to conceive of 'knowledge' i n t h i s society as 
struct u r e d along the l i n e s he suggests. Compare a d i s t i n c t i o n 
made e a r l i e r , between Objectivated 'IQiowledge' and an o b j e c t i v -
i s t i c view of knowledge. The l a t t e r may produce a desc r i p t i v e 
a n a l y s i s of 'knowledge' as i t r e a l l y i s objectivated i n a p a r t i c u l a r 
s o c i e t a l context. But i t a l s o tends to add a p r e s c r i p t i v e element. 
I t l e g i t i m a t e s that 'Knowledge' by saying "And t h i s i s how i t most 
probably must be". This i s only a fur t h e r b e l i e f , and one I would 
r e j e c t . ( 2 3 ) 
At the same time, i n any given h i s t o r i c a l society, s o c i e t a l 
i n e q u a l i t i e s may c l e a r l y produce d i f f e r e n t i a l opportunities and 
needs to theorise and to render i m p l i c i t b e l i e f s e x p l i c i t . I n 
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a c l a s s s o c i e t y , members of d i f f e r e n t c l a s s e s by d e f i n i t i o n have 
d i f f e r e n t experiences, i n impoj?tant respects. Were there no 
experience but that of the world-out-there and i t s r e l a t i o n a l 
p r o p e r t i e s , d i f f e r e n t " l e v e l s " of theory about that R e a l i t y 
would i n e v i t a b l y r e s u l t . However, one experiences a l s o the 
R e a l i t y of one's own subjective b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s . These are 
themselves a source of r e f l e c t i o n and elaboiation. There i s no 
n e c e s s a ^ i n e v i t a b i l i t y that "high l e v e l " 'knowledge' be the 
prerogative of one s e c t i o n of s o c i e t y . 
The idea that 'knowledge' may be structured i s not, of course, 
new. However, i t i s not commonly elaborated i n such a way as I 
attempt i n t h i s chapter. Such expressions as "high l e v e l s of 
a b s t r a c t i o n " and the "deep s t r u c t u r e s of knowledge" are often taken 
to be s e l f - e v i d e n t l y meaningful. And the d i s t i n c t i o n between -
but r e l a t i o n s h i p s between - objectivated and subjective 'Knowledge' 
s t r u c t u r e s are l a r g e l y neglected. 
Since Kuhn (1960) adopted the terra "paradigm" to r e f e r to 
the dominant s t r u c t u r e s of b e l i e f i n p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l s c i e n t i f i c 
(24) 
communities, many w r i t e r s have extended t h i s notion to cover 
whole s o c i e t i e s or c u l t u r e s . This i s i n the t r a d i t i o n of employing 
such notions as "ideologies", "legitimations", " c o l l e c t i v e 
consciences", "master symbols" and "master patterns", found i n most 
(25) 
of the main schools of sociology.^ ^ S p e c i f i c a l l y i n the f i e l d 
of education, the s t r u c t u r i n g of c u r r i c u l a r knowledge - which i n 
my terms i s objeotivated f o r any given l e a r n e r - i s at l e a s t hinted 
at by Durkheim^^^^ and elaborated f u r t h e r by, f o r instance. H i r s t 
and Peters (1970> and by Bruner (e.g. 1974). 
The d i s t i n c t i o n between these objectivated structures and the 
developing s t r u c t u r e s of b e l i e f within the learner, however, i s not 
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(27) always very c l e a r . ^  Even when the d i s t i n c t i o n i s made c l e a r l y , 
i t i s g e n e r a l l y the l e a r n e r ' s int3?oduction to the (objectivated) 
c u r r i c u l a r structure that i s seen as problematic, and rairely that 
c u r r i c u l a r 'knowledge' i t s e l f . T h i s i s the case with Bruner, f o r 
in s t a n c e , i n h i s famous dictum that 
"With respect to making a c c e s s i b l e the deep structure of any 
given d i s c i p l i n e , ... any subject can be taught to any c h i l d 
at any age i n some form that i s both honesit and powerful." 
Bruner (1969/74) p,138.(28) 
When more d e t a i l e d analyses of the struct u r i n g of subjective 
b e l i e f s have been made, these have often been divorced from a 
p a r a l l e l a n a l y s i s of the s t r u c t u r i n g of objectivated b e l i e f systems, 
which l e a r n e r s i n p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t i e s are generally expected to 
a s s i m i l a t e . T h i s i s so, f o r instance, of much Gestalt theory i n 
(29) 
psychology, and of K e l l y ' s theory of personal constructs.^ ' 
I s h a l l be using a "tree-root" metaphor as an a i d to describing 
ray ver s i o n of how 'knowledge' - both subjective and objectivated -
i s s t r u c t u r e d . Metaphors are a common and, arguably, an e s s e n t i a l 
part of s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i s i n g ^ t h o u g h t h e i r use i s not always 
recognised - with vmfortunate consequences. I n sociology, there 
have been many dominant metaphors, as well as more s p e c i a l i s e d ones 
f o r p a r t i c u l a r analyses. Amongst the most common are those taken 
from ecology^^^\ from biology and technology (the organism and 
(32) 
the machine, r e s p e c t i v e l y ^ ' ) , from construction (whence "base" 
(33) 
and " s u p e r s t r u c t u i ^ " ) , from the theatre (whence " r o l e s " and 
" a c t o r s " ^ ^ ^ ^ ) , from l i n g u i s t i c s (whence some versions of 
(35) 
" s t r u c t u r e " , and "competence"^ ' ) . 
The use of metaphors i s n e c e s s a r i l y s e l e c t i v e - or should be. 
Only c e r t a i n aspects can be arelevant to what i s to be described 
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or explained. Thus E l k i n s complains that h i s c r i t i c s have t r i e d 
t o read too much i n t o h i s analogy between s l a v e r y and concentration 
camps: 
"Metaphor and analogy do have ... a serious point of 
v u l n e r a b i l i t y . T h e i r very vividness and p a r t i c u l a r i t y 
are c o e r c i v e i they are almost too concrete. One's 
impulse i s thus to reach f o r extremes. The thing i s 
e i t h e r taken the whole hog ... or i t i s r e j e c t e d out of 
hand on the ground that not a l l the parts f i t . " 
C r i t i c i s m s of h i s metaphor therefore seemed to him to 
be based "on an unwillingness to l e t analogy be used 
f o r l i m i t e d and c o n t r o l l e d purposes even when the 
purposes are made e x p l i c i t and the l i m i t s defined with 
great care ,.," E l k i n s (1959 ) p. 104. 
Horton (1967/71) gives s i m i l a r warnings. He a l s o points out 
that since there i s never exact isomorphism between analogy and 
object there i s frequently a hybridisation of d i f f e r e n t metaphors. 
Permaia (1973), on the other hand, warns of the dangers of 
metaphors becoming c l i c h e s , and t h e i r metaphorical character 
being forgotten. 
My use of the term "tree-root" should therefore be explained. 
I t arose i n the f i r s t place as a description of diagi^unatic 
"shapes" that I had already developed. The p r i n c i p a l point of 
these shapes was to emphasise the notion of I n c l u s i v e n e s s , a3i»d 
thereby of Levels of b e l i e f . However, the reference to tree roots 
i s a l s o u s e f u l i n c e r t a i n other respects. I t emphasises the 
structuredness of b e l i e f systems generally, and i n p a r t i c u l a r 
aecessaary i n t e r - r e l a t e d n e s s between lower l e v e l and higher 
l e v e l b e l i e f s . A (healthy) tree cannot have a trunk without 
roots, nor v i c e - v e r s a . S i m i l a r l y , high l e v e l notions are 
n e c e s s a r i l y r e l a t e d a l l the time to lower l e v e l notions, i n the 
b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s of which they are both always parts. The 
major objection to the analogy may at f i r s t sight be that tvee-
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roots are s o l i d , w h i l s t notions may be t r a n s i t o r y , f l e e t i n g , 
changing. On the contrary, however, t h i s i s a major advantage 
of the analogy. For w h i l s t many notions are indeed f l u i d , i t 
i s those very b e l i e f s - both subjective and objectivated - which 
are not f l u i d , but are r i g i d i f i e d as b e l i e f s about what the 
world i s ' r e a l l y ' l i k e , that are s o c i o l o g i c a l l y the most 
important. Thus an emphasis on the r i g i d i t y of some b e l i e f 
s t r u c t u r e s helps us to understand the nature of Value-Knowledge. 
I t suggests the need to explain why some str u c t u r e s are r i g i d , 
w h i l s t others may be f l u i d . Furthermore, i t leads us to consider 
the p o s s i b i l i t i e s and p o t e n t i a l s of d e - r i g i d i f y i n g - of opening 
up closed b e l i e f s - i n p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l contexts. 
Adequacy 
The foregoing comments were concerned with the senses i n 
which b e l i e f s can be seen as structured; the following have to 
do with the i d e a of "Adequacy". The same dimensions by which we 
might think i n terms of "tree-root" structures, may a l s o be used 
i n considering the adequacy - or otherwise - of our own and 
others' accounts of the world. I n a sense, therefore, the 
dimensions I recommend are a l s o c r i t e r i a . This word i s used 
very t e n t a t i v e l y , however, l e s t i t be thought that quantifiable 
and u n i v e r s a l l y applicable measurements of adequacy are at hand. 
They are not, I p r e f e r , therefore, the word "dimensions", which 
denotes ways i n which we might look at the object i n question, 
r a t h e r than p r e c i s e c r i t e r i a to be applied. 
A b r i e f consideration of other c r i t e r i a sometimes suggested 
f o r the assessment of accounts i s i n order. S i m p l i c i t y i s often 
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advocated. Horton^ f o r instance, s t a t e s that the "over-riding 
aim of explanation" i s "to d i s c l o s e order and r e g u l a r i t y 
underlying apparent chaos 9 , , " (Horton, 1967/71, p.223). He 
a l s o says that 
"The quest f o r explanatory theoiy i s b a s i c a l l y the quest 
f o r unity underlying apparent d i v e r s i t y ; f o r s i m p l i c i t y 
underlying apparent complexity; f o r order underlying 
apparent disorder; f o r regularity underlying apparent 
anomaly." ibid,p.209 (my emphasis). 
Sometimes t h i s need f o r s i m p l i c i t y i s j u s t i f i e d i n terms of 
man's mental c a p a c i t i e s . Andreski, for instance, says. 
"The l i m i t e d nature of our mental powers constitutes 
a s u f f i c i e n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r s t r i v i n g to make our 
foiTOulations as simple as possible i n order not to get 
l o s t i n the maae." Andreski (1964) p.13. 
And t h i s i s a l s o Bruner's argument 1 
Th© "most common blight of human thinking c l u t t e r ... 
I t i s not harmless. I t i s l e t h a l . For i t can be s a i d 
about our knowledge of knowledge that very l i t t l e of i t 
can be dealt with by the human mind at one time. The 
range of human attention i s highly limited, we know by 
comparing men and machines. But t h i s i s both i t s 
strength and i t s weakness. I t imposes a need f o r economy 
i n man as to what he bears i n mind. I t i s t h i s that makes 
theory a n e c e s s i t y rather than a luxury, A concept or 
the connected body of concepts that i s a theory i s man % 
only means of getting a l o t in t o the narrow compass of 
h i s a t t e n t i o n a l l at a time. Without some such a i d , there 
i s c l u t t e r . " Bruner (1969/74) p.139. 
Harre, on the other hand, fin d s the P r i n c i p l e of S i m p l i c i t y 
"highly dubious". F i r e t l y , he says, i t i s by no means c l e a r how 
one might choose between a ^ ^ r i e t y of s i m p l i f i c a t i o n s . And 
secondly, 
"There can be no doubt that the his t o r y of science shows 
that the laws of nature are always more complex than we 
o r i g i n a l l y thought," Harre (1972) p.45. 
I n f a c t , of course, S i m p l i c i t y i s not a c r i t e r i o n of conceptual 
adequacy, but one of s t y l e . I t has to do not with the adequacy 
of the b e l i e f or theory i t s e l f , but with i t s communication. 
(On© of the advantages - but a l s o dangers - of using metaphors 
i s that i t enables ceartain connotations to be " c a r r i e d over", 
without recourse to t h e i r non-simple elaboration i n meticulous 
d e t a i l . S i m i l a r l y , the short-hand involved i n being able to 
r e f e r "simply" to " E i n s t e i n ' s theory of r e l a t i v i t y " or to 
"Marx's theory of su3?plus value" i s s t y l i s t i c a l l y u s e f u l . I t 
saves having to s p e l l out the d e t a i l s i n Ent-fashion^-^^^ every 
time we wish to t a l k about such i s s u e s . But the conceptual 
complexity a c t u a l l y involved i n such theoides cannot be avoided 
i f they themselves are to be understood). 
Another c r i t e r i o n sometimes put forward i s P l a u s i b i l i t y , 
I f a theoiy i s not p l a u s i b l e , i t i s said, then i t i s not a 
"good" theory. I n some ways t h i s i s related to the p r i n c i p l e 
of S i m p l i c i t y , and they are both dismissed by Chomsky: 
"The r e a l problem f o r tomorrow i s tiiat of discovering an 
assumption regarding innate structure that i s s u f f i c i e n t l y 
r i c h , not that of finding one that i s simple or elementary 
enough to be ' p l a u s i b l e ' . There i s , as f a r as I can see, 
no reasonable notion of ' p l a u s i b i l i t y ' , no a p r i o r i insight 
i n t o what innate s t r u c t u r e s are permissible, that can 
guide the search f o r a ' s u f f i c i e n t l y elementary 
assumption' ,.." Chomsky (1968) p.69. 
On the other hand. P l a u s i b i l i t y may not merely be a question 
of s i m p l i c i t y and communicability. I f i t were, i t would be 
the l i s t e n e r ' s / o b s e r v e r ' s understanding whose adequacy was i n 
question, rather thaii the b e l i e v e r " s / t h e o r i s t ' s account. Rather, 
the extent to which a theory accords with the perceived "facts'^ 
must c l e a r l y be a c r i t e r i o n of adequacy. This appears, therefore. 
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i n ray dimension Pra.gmatic Adequacy (see below). 
F i n a l l y , we could consider Morton's suggestion that Parsimony. 
(37) 
Continuity. Scope and Cumulation^ are c r i t e r i a by which theories 
might be judged. At f i r s t glance, these too may seem to concern 
communicability - i . e . s t y l i s t i c c i d t e r i a - more than conceptual 
adequacy. This i s e s p e c i a l l y true, for instance of Continuity, 
However, although Morton's c r i t e r i a are f o r theories set within , 
p a r t i c u l a r bodies of 'knowledge', there i s a sense i n which these 
are what I c a l l L o g i c a l c r i t e r i a . They refer at l e a s t i n part 
to the amount of "data" that might be co-ordinated within 
p a r t i c u l a r t h e o r i e s . Parsimony, f o r instance, may not j u s t refer 
to S i m p l i c i t y , but a l s o to I n c l u s i v e n e s s . ( I n c l u s i v e n e s s i s one 
of my L o g i c a l dimensions, which I explain below). 
I n i t i a l l y , I prepose that HQr dimensions of adequacy may be 
used i n t r e s p e c t i v e l y ^ That i s , they are usef u l f o r an examination 
of one's ovm b e l i e f systems, acting as "observer" on oneself. But 
they may a l s o be used f o r the consideration of other people's 
accounts. Ultimately, t h i s cannot s t r i c t l y be done, because even 
i n considering someone e l s e ' s account, one a c t u a l l y only assesses 
what one takes i t to be. That i s , one assesses one's own under-
standing of i t . Even the consideration of a written account i s 
not a consideration of the a c t u a l b e l i e f s that such an account i s 
axi attempt to v e r b a l i s e , (And w h i l s t one's own understandings 
prompted by a w r i t t e n account may themselves not "correspond" to 
the w r i t e r ' s i n t e n t i o n s , nor might that account i t s e l f "correspond" 
very adequately with these i n t e n t i o n s ) . 
However, i n s o f a r as one's experiences are shared with or 
s i m i l a r to the experiences of the person whose account one i s 
t r y i n g to ajaalyse, then we may expect some s i m i l a r i t y of b e l i e f . 
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Where one's experience i s not so much s i m i l a r as complementary, 
then notions of the other's p o s i t i o n are a l s o l i k e l y to have 
developed, Furthermore, i n s o f a r as one belongs to the same 
l i n g u i s t i c community ( a r e l a t i v e rather than an absolute 
c r i t e r i o n ) , one w i l l a l s o be l i k e l y to have conceptualisations -
v e r b a l i s e d notions - s i m i l a r to those of the other person. 
Whilst an i d e a l correspondence i s therefore obviously not 
possible - and could not be known, even i f i t were to occur -
i t i s reasonable to suppose that others' b e l i e f s can be 
meaningfully considered. I f t h i s were not so, human s o c i a l 
existence would be odd, i f not inconceivable. 
The account which I develop here, then, i s i n i t i a l l y 
d i r e c t e d to s u b j e c t i v e b e l i e f s . I t i s i n i t i a l l y concerned with 
what are e s s e n t i a l l y i n t r o s p e c t i v e c r i t e r i a . But I s h a l l argue 
that i t i s appropriate a l s o f o r the consideration of other people's 
b e l i e f systems, and of bodies of 'knpwledge' objectivated i n given 
s o c i e t a l contexts. 
A f u r t h e r word of warning should be given about the t r e e -
root model. T h i s i s , of n e c e s s i t y , m;^  account of how people's 
b e l i e f s might be structured, and of how we might u s e f u l l y 
consider them. I cannot say that t h i s i s how people a c t u a l l y and 
i n v a r i a b l y do t h e o r i s e . Nor am I saying that t h i s i s how they 
should do so. What i s presented here i s an e x p l i c i t l y meta-
phoidLcal account of how we might conceive of s t r u c t u r e s of b e l i e f . 
I f i n d i t h e u r i s t i c a l l y u s e f u l as a model to a i d understanding, 
and i t does, I suggest, enable us to make c e r t a i n empirical 
hypotheses - about Value-Knowledge i n general and about educational 
ideologies i n p a r t i c u l a r . 
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A word i s a l s o necessary about Fluidity,. Man i s e s s e n t i a l l y 
ereativ©. I n t h e i r thinkihg (as opposed to t h e i r b e l i e v i n g ) ^ ' ' ^ \ 
i n d i v i d u a l s are c r e a t i v e . They can and do create new and 
d i f f e r e n t nobor^ s t r u c t u r e s , whether d e l i b e r a t e l y , or i n response 
to changing contextual situations,^'•'^^ Whilst, f o r instance, 
I may not carry around a ready-made b e l i e f construct that 
r e g u l a r l y r e l a t e s "clouds", "pets" and "beer", i t i s not d i f f i c u l t 
f o r me to devise on®, temporarily, i n ny mind. (They may a l l , f o r 
i n s t a n c e , be things that " s p i l l " l i q u i d on the f l o o r i f wrengly 
haJidled - i f reeves are not mended, pets are not walked or l e t 
out, and beer i s taken to e x c e s s ) . But such a passing fantasy 
i s e x a c t l y t h a t . I t i s passing - not a b e l i e f structure basic to 
fljy 'knowledge' about what the world i s ' r e a l l y ' l i k e . And i t i s 
a fantasy - i t i s not a strengly believed (Value-Known) piece of 
'knowledge', but something constructed f o r the moment. Such passing 
f a n t a s i e s , and a l s o non-deliberate notions that occur and then 
recede i n our ordinary i n t e r a c t i o n with R e a l i t y , are f l u i d 
notions. They are not Value-Knowledge. Yet they too are 
s t m c t u r e d , and structured according to the same dimensions. We 
cannot choose to really-believeAalue-Know them^^^\ though we 
can choose to construct them. Such temporary or non-"valued" 
notions may d r i f t from one point of reference to another. They 
overlap and intertwine. But at any point i n time i t i s possible 
to conceive of them as being "photographed", as i t were. And at 
that point i n time t h e i r s t r u c t u r e s would be, I suggest, 
desoribable i n the same terms as those of Value-Knov/n b e l i e f s . 
This s t r u c t u r a t i o n of f l u i d (non-belief) notions can have 
important methodological implications, as we s h a l l see. 
The e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Value-Knowledge i s that i t 
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l a c t e t h i s f l u i d i t y . Through our experience of R e a l i t y , we come 
to 'know' ^ a t i s ' r e a l ' and what i s not. We cannot f l e e t i n g l y 
decide not to b e l i e v e , f o r instance, that we are s i t t i n g on a 
c h a i r , or that we have a family,, or that Sunderland were promoted 
to the F i r s t D i v i s i o n ,at the end of the 1975/76 f o o t b a l l season. 
We can "doubt" the t r u t h of such b e l i e f s , i n that we could 
fantasy t h e i r non-veracity. But we could not a c t u a l l y choose not 
to believe them. That i s not i n our power. Our experience 
deteiraines t h i s strength of b e l i e f f o r us, (At the same time, 
however, we may create the conditions wheireby experience i s 
created, such that b e l i e f follows. Such experience includes 
experience of our own ( r e a l ) thinking and b e l i e v i n g , as we s h a l l 
s e e ) . 
Since experience (however complex) i s non-random, i t i s an 
e m p i r i c a l l i k e l i h o o d that people of s i m i l a r s o c i e t a l position 
have s i m i l a r b e l i e f s i n c e r t a i n important respects. One person's 
Value-^Kn owl edge - h i s r i g i d i f i e d b e l i e f structures - may therefore 
be d i r e c t l y analogous to the 'knowledge' of others. S i m i l a r l y , 
where other people's concepts are recorded f o r instance i n writing 
where they are "frozen" as i f r i g i d i f i e d b e l i e f s - they too are 
a v a i l a b l e as non-temporary, non-fluid structures f o r a n a l y s i s . 
Moreover, i n s o f a r as s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s can be seen as 
o b j e c t i v a t e d 'knowledge' systems, these too might be examined i n 
the same way. 
F i n a l l y , i t should be remembered that i n t a l k i n g of b e l i e f 
s t r u c t u r e s I am not j u s t r e f e r r i n g to complex and all-embracing 
bodies of b e l i e f , I r e f e r a l s o to the notions which are s t i l l 
complex, but which are the elements of those wider systems. Even 
notions are structured. Indeed a l l notions are models of 
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• r e a l i t y ' - whether they are Value-Known or f a n c i f u l or believed-
for-the-time-belng. Relationships between "lower-level" notions 
are themselves a part of " h i g h e r - l e v e l " notions. The structuring 
of mind i s not separate from i t s notions, but i n t r i n s i c to them. 
However, these i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , though themselves 
notional, may be l e s s e x p l i c i t l y recognised than the "elements" 
themselves. W© do tend to perceive " d i s t i n c t o bjects" i n the 
world-out-there. Accordingly we do, on r e f l e c t i o n , tend to 
conceive of our notions of those "objects" as d i s t i n c t . T h i s i s 
part of the necessary short-hand I have already mentioned. I t i s 
part of the S i m p l i c i t y to which Bruner r e f e r r e d as a necessary 
device f o r communicating, not j u s t with others,but with ourselves 
alsoe But i t should be possible to r e f l e c t upon those i n t e r n a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s « that i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r i n g - of b e l i e f s . I t should 
be possible t o v e r b a l i s e them - i.e» to develop concepts of them. 
The tree-root metaphor i s intended i n pairt as an a i d to t h i s 
e x p l i c i t a t t e n t i o n to the structU3?edness of b e l i e f s . For t h i s 
a t t e n t i o n i t s e l f may thereby become a means to the development of 
higher l e v e l understandings - and to the conscious exercise of 
control over our b e l i e f s . T h i s kind of experience - that of 
r e f l e c t i o n - can i t s e l f produce Value-Knowledge of a movQ "adequate" 
kind. ^ 
Dimensions of Adequacy; The StructuTO of B e l i e f s 
B e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s caa be viewed on two kinds of dimensions, 
the f i r s t l o g i c a l and the second contextual. The f i r s t apply to 
i n t e r n a l properties of b e l i e f structures themselves, w h i l s t the 
second apply to the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between those b e l i e f structures 
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and the R e a l i t y to which they are "intended" to r e f e r . 
1, At f i r s t s i g h t , the Ip^teal c r i t e r i a - I n c l u s i v e n e s s and 
Consistency » might i n some sense seem to be absolute. Many 
have claimed that Logic i s u n i v e r s a l and not c u l t u r a l l y 
s p e c i f i c . Comforth, f o r instance, declares that: 
"No dis c u s s i o n , no controversy or argument, no development 
of thought would ever be p o s s i b l e , i f the laws of thought 
changed and were d i f f e r e n t f o r d i f f e r e n t people. Anyone 
who thinks that the laws of thought change, that d i f f e r e n t 
epochs have a d i f f e r e n t l o g i c , thereby denies the very 
p o s s i b i l i t y of thought as a r e f l e c t i o n of objective r e a l i t y . 
Logic a r i s e s from the i m i v e r s a l requirements of the 
r e f l e c t i o n of r e a l i t y i n thought, and not from the p a r t i c u l a r 
i n t e r e s t s which p a r t i c u l a r processes of thought may serve 
from time to time." Comforth (1954) p.64. 
S i m i l a r l y , Labov suggests a u n i v e r s a l l o g i c , i n denying that 
Negro Non-standard E n g l i s h i s e i t h e r l e s s l o g i c a l , or more 
l i k e l y to impede the development of l o g i c a l thought, than 
Standard E n g l i s h , ^^ -^ ^ 
2. Despite the a t t r a c t i o n of t h i s suggestion, however, I prefer 
to see the l o g i c a l " c r i t e r i a " suggested here as Dimensions, rather 
than c r i t e r i a . For context i s so undivorcible from b e l i e f s that 
i t i n e v i t a b l y a f f e c t s what might otherwise be claimed to be 
" n e u t r a l " or "context-free". The c r i t e r i o n of Consistency, f o r 
i n s t a n c e , might appear to be absolute. Rules of i d e n t i t y and 
negation might seem quite independent of the subject-matter of 
people's b e l i e f s . Yet p a r t i c u l a r applications of the Consistency 
" c r i t e r i o n " must alw«iys di&pSnd ultimately on d e f i n i t i o n s , and 
i n s o f a r as d e f i n i t i o n s are believed to be Pragmatically Adequate 
(see below) they can be n e i t h e r context-free ( i n t h e i r 
determination) nor value-free ( i n t h e i r potential or a c t u a l 
consequences). 
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Nonetheless, Comforth i s r i g h t i n suggesting that there 
may be some u n i v e r s a l moments of experience such that b e l i e f s 
w i l l tend to be consistent i n some sense. The emphasis, however, 
i s on universale of experience rather than u n i v e r s a l s of, f o r 
(44) 
i n s t a n c e , brain s t r u c t u r e . ^ ' The r e a l i t y and non-randomness 
of R e a l i t y - a R e a l i t y experienced, i n d i f f e r e n t respects, by 
a l l men - adequately accounts f o r non-random b e l i e f s t r u c t u r a t i o n . 
I t i s not necessary to pos i t a un i v e r s a l predisposition, or a 
u n i v e r s a l psychological need» i n order to explain Man's e s s e n t i a l 
r a t i o n a l i t y . At the same time, people's apparent i r r a t i o n a l i t y , 
i n many contexts, needs to be explained i n terms of widely 
d i f f e r i n g and contradictory experiences, and the consequently 
wide d i v e r s i t y of b e l i e f s t r u c t u r a t i o n . What seems " i l l o g i c a l " 
o r " i r r a t i o n a l " to an observer may be so only by h i s own c r i t e r i a , 
and by h i s own understanding of the context i n question. 
I n c o n s i s t e n c i e s do, of course, exist i n people's b e l i e f 
systems, and probably u n i v e r s a l l y (!) Indeed, one purpose of 
t h i s section i s to suggest ways of unearthing such in c o n s i s t e n c i e s -
whether as observer, or as subjective thinker. To t a l k of 
i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s i n a given account i s not merely to t a l k of cases 
where the b e l i e v e r / w r i t e r suggests "P" at one point and then "not-P" 
at another. Of course such cases are important. But f a r more 
important are i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s which i n essence are l i k e t h i s , but which 
i n appearance are not. Thus some one might not say f i r s t "P" and then 
"not-P", but merely "P" and then "Q", The use of a single word, where two 
(o r more) l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t terms (and therefore concepts) would be 
more R e a l i s t i c , may conceal from the b e l i e v e r himself the ambiguity 
of h i s b e l i e f s . I t may equally deceive the observer. I t i s of 
the nature of language that i t can c l a s s i f y concepts without 
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e x p l i c i t a t t e n t i o n being paid to them« When a given term i s used, 
the user does not every time have to ask, "What do I r e a l l y mean 
by that? What are a l l the connotations and denotations intended -
and unintended - by me?". As we s h a l l see, one object i n seeking 
higher l e v e l notions i s to resolve i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s . 
I n considering other people's accounts - and, indeed, one's 
own - we need often to be aware of the function of l i p - s e r v i c e 
statements. I t i s p r a c t i c a l l y impossible to make everything 
e x p l i c i t , to cover a l l s i d e s of a problem, when presenting an 
account to others ( o r to o n e s e l f ) . I t would be time-consuming 
and boring to attempt to do so. E i t h e r e x p l i c i t l y or i m p l i c i t l y , 
therefore, one leaves out what does not seem relevant. Often a 
footnote w i l l point out that such-and-such a topic i s relevant, 
but "cannot be gone into here"* This e f f e c t i v e l y r e s t r i c t s the 
w r i t e r / b e l i e v e r himself, and a l s o p o t e n t i a l l y the observer/reader, 
to a p a r t i c u l a r way of looking at the issue at hand. Sometimes 
what i s thereby l e f t out i s of c e n t r a l importance. Moreover, 
i t may not f i t i n t o the main body of the account because that 
account would have to be re-wiritten d r a s t i c a l l y f o r i t to do 
so.^^^^ This r e s t r i c t i o n i s a r i g i d i f i c a t i o n . I t can conceal 
ambiguities or i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s that i n f a c t characterise the 
t o t a l b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e of the w r i t e r / b e l i e v e r , i n respect of the 
i s s u e at hand. Though what i s written may seem e n t i r e l y consistent, 
what i s l e f t out renders i t - or rather should render i t - most 
problematic. I return to t h i s question below, i n seeing how 
"looking at the matter from a d i f f e r e n t angle" may permit a 
h i g h e r - l e v e l r e s o l u t i o n of lower l e v e l i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s . 
3. The "tree-root" metaphor r e f e r s primarily to the dimension 
of I n c l u s i v e n e s s (though, as I have said, i t has other useful 
i m p l i c a t i o n s too). This view of Inclusiveness applies to a l l 
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b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s , whether i t i s i m p l i c i t or e x p l i c i t b e l i e f s 
that are being considered. However, since i t i s not easy to 
see how we might e a s i l y give examples of i m p l i c i t b e l i e f structures, 
the following account uses v e r b a l i s e d notions (concepts). 
B e l i e f s can be seen as h i e r a r c h i c a l l y structured i n such 
a way that higher ozxler notions (verbalised i n the examples given 
here) are more i n c l u s i v e than those below them. One can often 
look at aspects of r e a l i t y i n d i f f e r e n t ways, according to the 
context, such that what i s i n one case a higher (more i n c l u s i v e ) 
notion i s i n others lower. I n the f i r s t place, however, c e r t a i n 
s t r u c t u r e s take on a r i g i d i f i e d structure that i s not i n b e l i e f -
as opposed to fantasy - so amenable to re-ordering. (This I s h a l l 
develop l a t e r ) . I n the second place, there are c e r t a i n " r u l e s " 
which govern the ordering of notions - even fantasied ones. 
The notion of I n c l u s i v e n e s s i s i n p r i n c i p l e quite s t r a i g h t -
forward. "Furniture" i s a higher-order concept than e i t h e r 
" c h a i r " or "table", i n that i t includes both. "Chair", on the 
other hand, does not include " f u r n i t u r e " - except by c l e v e r 
f a n t a s i s i n g . Nor does i t include "table". S i m i l a r l y , "Science" 
i s higher than "biology" or "astronomy"* and so on. Viewed t h i s 
way, one could constmct, from one's own subjective 'knowledge', 
highly complex s t r u c t u r e s , and present them diagrammatically i n 
tree-root fashion. To pursue the "furniture" example 
A. f u r n i t u r e 
r — >— r — 
o f f i c e f u r n i t u r e household f u r n i t u r e 
desk f i l i n g cabinet ... table c h a i r 
f l l e e ~ ^ 
' t e l e - type-
phone w r i t e r 
e t c . 
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Obviously, where such a diagramatically presented structure i s 
a d e l i b e r a t e construct (open to fantasying), r a t h e r than actual 
b e l i e f , i t i s not the only version possible. I n the above example, 
f o r instance, I might have includeds-
B. Household furniture 
I 
bedroom f u r n i t u r e kitchen f u r n i t u r e 
e t c . 
Or I might have s t a r t e d off d i f f e r e n t l y s ' 
C. furniture 








f u r n i t u r e 
with rockers 
etc. 
without legs or 
rockers 
There appears to be an a r b i t r a r y element i n what I see at any 
given moment to be the ' r e a l ' hierarchy. Yet there are very 
r e a l c o n s t r a i n t s on how I can, i n f a c t , present my b e l i e f s . I 
could not, f o r instance, present the following, as i n any way 
a genuine b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e ; -
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f u m i t u r e 
1 
* f u j n i t u r e under i " h i g h f u r n i t u r e ^r" to 50' 
e t c . 
Ors-
1 
• f u r n i t u r e over 
50' 
f u r n i t u r e 
guns wardrobes 
r — — 1 
1a.xmB * l e g s * h a i r doors 
«trees * r a i n 
I 
* s t o o l s 
e t c . 
c h a i r s ^ s t e e p l e s 
.... or any number of i l l e g i t i m a t e models of what my 'knowledge', 
i n p a r t i c u l a r areas, i s . 
Nor could I even present;-
G. fur n i t u r e 
t a b l e s 
coffee t a b l e s 
I 
• t a b l e s 
• f u r n i t u r e 
dining t a b l e s 
etc. 
c h a i r s 
armchairs 
I 
• c h a i r s 
rocking 
c h a i r s 
Although I may be able to choose a seemingly endless number of 
a l t e r n a t i v e s t r u c t u r e s to demonstrate the inc l u s i v e n e s s of my 
notion of " f u r n i t u r e " , there are quite obviously " r u l e s " of 
inolusiveness which would make i l l e g i t i m a t e an even v a s t e r number 
• I l l e g i t i m a t e 
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of a l t e r n a t i v e s . Some of n^ y notions are not included i n c e r t a i n 
others because, i n my b e l i e f s . R e a l i t y " i s j u s t not l i k e that". 
That i s j the empirical r e f e r e n t s of my b e l i e f s are not themselves 
" r e l a t e d " i n the required manner.^^^^ Furthermore, as example 
(0) demonstrates, c e r t a i n notions that are quite c l e a r l y r e l a t e d 
i n a given area of my 'knowledge' may not be interchangeable, 
from the point of view of l e v e l s of In c l u s i v e n e s s . 
The above examples may seem somewhat laborious sind obvious, 
s i n c e " f u r n i t u r e " i s not a s o c i o l o g i c a l l y momentous notion. 
However, the same s o r t s of s t r u c t u r e s and the same s o r t s of 
I n c l u s i v e n e s s r u l e s obtain i n the case of more abstract notions. 
They are relevant to notions that r e f e r to r e a l i t i e s very 
d i f f e r e n t l y understood by d i f f e r e n t people, even within the 
same s o c i e t a l context. As I have said, my notion of " n u c l e a r 
p h y s i c s " i s very low l e v e l , when compared to that of a nuclear 
p h y s i c i s t . But i t i s not merely a matter of s p e c i a l i s e d experience 
producing d i f f e r e n t l e v e l notions of the "same" thing. Such words 
as "democracy" and "freedom" may mean very d i f f e r e n t things to 
d i f f e r e n t people. This does not mean that they r e f e r to d i f f e r e n t 
aspects of R e a l i t y , but that t h e i r equivalent notions have very 
d i f f e r e n t s t r u c t u r e s . To use an e a r l i e r example, "drinking-and-
d r i v i n g " b e l i e f s may have d i f f e r e n t structures, f o r d i f f e r e n t 
people. The same i s true of such notions as "Open Education", or 
" t r a d i t i o n a l pedagogy". 
The idea of h i e r a r c h i c a l l y ordered notions i s not new. Examples 
could be chosen from semantics and from anthropology. Frake 
(1961/73), f o r instance, adopts K e l l y ' s view of dichotomous 
concepts i n discussing the disease names of Subanun ( i n the 
P h i l i p i n e s ) . He i n s i s t s that i t i s concepts, not terms, that are 
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h i e r a r c h i c a l l y ordered. He points out, f o r instance, that i n 
E n g l i s h the word "man" can mean a number of things and be used 
at a number of l e v e l s , according to context. 
Olver and Homsby (1966) have suggested that children, as 
they grow older, i n c r e a s i n g l y group pictures according to a rule 
of subordinate grouping - that i s according to what are taken to 
be common a t t r i b u t e s . However, they contrast t h i s with an 
e a r l i e r ( i . e . younger) pattern, wherein things are grouped not 
because of common a t t r i b u t e s , but because of common membership 
i n , f o r example, a story. According to my usage of "tree-root 
b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s " I would s t i l l see t h i s as h i e r a r c h i c a l . For 
instances 
"Red Hiding Hood" 
wolf food-parcel grandmother wood-cutter 
S i m i l a r l y , I would say that Wittgenstein's "family resemblances" 
can a l s o be seen i n h i e r a r c h i c a l teras. That we do not j u s t 
order our notions i n terms of s t r i c t l y consistent, semantically 
"obvious" d i s t i n c t i o n s i s important. (See below.) At the same 
time, the nature of the including r e l a t i o n s h i p i n each case i s 
c l e a r l y an importemt v a r i a b l e . 
One way of defining the l e v e l of a p a r t i c u l a r notion i s 
sometimes to r e f e r to the extent of abstraction from empirical 
r e f e r e n t s . Horton's version of t h i s in e f f e c t defines the l e v e l 
of a theory i n terms of the number of such referents included or 
accounted for.^^"^^ I would dispute t h i s i n two respects. Pirstfy, 
he seems to imply that a l l l e v e l s are as e a s i l y a v a i l a b l e to 
e x p l i c i t elaboration, i t being merely a question of context, 
which l e v e l one find s appropriate. Secondly, the "area of 
-58-
experience" he r e f e r s to seems to imply that i t i s only the 
number of empirical referents (or "things") that matters. 
I would s t r e s s , r a t h e r , the j^elatedness of "things" i n R e a l i t y . 
I t i s attention to those r e l a t i o n s h i p s that i s important i n 
h i g h - l e v e l understandings. This i s e s p e c i a l l y true of theories, 
which I define i n terms of notions of determinative r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
This attention to relatedness (or s t r u c t u r e ) i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
important i n d e l i b e r a t e attempts to achieve more i n c l u s i v e 
accounts. Achieving greater i n c l u s i v e n e s s i s exi important way 
of r e s o l v i n g the ambiguities and i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s of lower l e v e l 
v e r s i o n s . I s h a l l return to t h i s i n a moment, a f t e r considering 
the two contextual dimensions of Adequacy, Meanwhile a suggestion 
of Bernstein's, about a development i n h i s w o r k , i l l u s t r a t e s the 
point: 
" I n ,. 'On the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and framing of educational 
knowledge', the lower order concepts of s t r a t i f i e d / 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d \ 4 8 ) ^ open/closed(49) f i n a l l y disappeared 
as they could be derived from the concepts c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
and frame," Bernstein (1973) p.261. 
I have argued elsewhere^^"^^ both that Bernstein does not pay 
s u f f i c i e n t a t t e n t i o n to the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between (what I c a l l ) 
I n c l u s i v e n e s s and Consistency and that h i s conceptual framework 
i n " C l a s s i f i c a t i o n and framing ,,." i s s t i l l i n some ways 
inadequate. However, the point I am making here i s w e l l 
i l l u s t r a t e d i n t h i s quotation. 
4. Although I return to i t l a t e r , we might s t r e s s here the 
i n t e r - r e l a t e d n e s s of the two l o g i c a l dimensions. The " f u r n i t u r e " 
examples of tree-root s t r u c t u r e s demonstrated among other things 
that even i n fantasy - l e t alone i n genuine b e l i e f - we are not 
free to construct l i t e r a l l y any kind of i n t e r - r e l a t i o n between 
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notionsf, Certain suggested forms were i l l e g i t i m a t e . ^ •^'"^  The 
i l l e g i t i m a c y of such formations c l e a r l y demonstrates the 
(52) 
relatedness of Consistency and I n c l u s i v e n e s s . 
At the same time, I do not wish to r e s t r i c t the " t r e e -
root" metaphor to s t r i c t l y l o g i c a l l y adequate b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s . 
On the contrary, these two l o g i c a l dimensions can be devices 
f o r considering, and i n some cases assessing, the adequacy of 
b e l i e f s . Many or most b e l i e f systems are not so l o g i c a l l y 
coherent, and a t t e n t i o n to these dimensions i s i n part intended 
as a device f o r "improving" accounts. Actual b e l i e f structures 
do not a l l take the form of p r e c i s e l y defined h i e r a r c h i e s , 
lower l e v e l s may be r e l a t e d to those above i n a manner which, 
to the observer, may seem somewhat a r b i t r a r y . Consider Examples 
A and B, above. These were:-
A. f u r n i t u r e 
. J _ 
o f f i c e f u r n i t u r e household fu r n i t u r e tt • • 
1 ' I — — - — — 1 r 
desk f i l i n g cabinet ... table c h a i r 
r — \ 
f i l e s 
t e l e type-
phone w r i t e r 
e t c . 
and E. f u r n i t u r e 
r — ^ — ^ - J — — [ 
• f u r n i t u r e under i " high f u r n i t u r e ^r" to 50 •furniture over 
50' 
F i r s t l y , notice the dots i n example A. These ind i c a t e that other 
notions have been l e f t out, apparently f o r brevity. They might 
be tr«Jislated as " e t c . " . Although the superordinate notion i n 
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each case i s more i n c l u s i v e than those beneath i t , the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
of subordinate notions i s not exhaustive. One could, f o r instance, 
have added "shop f u r n i t u r e " , " v e h i c l e f u r n i t u r e " , or even some 
i l l e g i t i m a t e category such as "•flower f u r n i t u r e " . Without 
anything other than imaginatively f l i c k i n g through one's 
experience of, and b e l i e f s about, fur n i t u r e , i t i s not c l e a r 
how one would decide when the l i s t of lower l e v e l categories 
was complete. 
I n example E, however, though two out of the three c l a s s e s 
are i l l e g i t i m a t e (as accounts of my f u r n i t u r e - b e l i e f s ) , the 
cat e g o r i s a t i o n i s nonetheless exhaustive. What has been used 
i s a r u l e of Consistency. A l l possible categories, according 
(53) 
to the Relevance-theme of s i z e , are included.^ ' I n order 
to make the f i r s t example (A) as exhaustive, r u l e s of Consistency 
would s i m i l a r l y have to be invoked. This could be done crudely 
(e.g. " f u r n i t u r e foxind i n people's homes" versus "furniture 
not found i n people's homes") or some more sophisticated version 
might be produced ( i n terms, f o r instance, of the fu r n i t u r e ' s 
f u n c t i o n s ) . The point to note i s that the search f o r 
exhaustiveness i s generally an e x p l i c i t e x ercise, whereas every-
day b e l i e f s are frequently not wholly adequate, by s t r i c t 
Consistency c r i t e r i a . They may be ambiguous, overlapping, and 
non-exhaustive. At the same time, of course, e x p l i c i t l y sought 
exhaustive (and thoroughly consistent) c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s may be 
quite inadequate from the point of view of revealing truths 
about the world-out-there. Thus the Inter-relatedness of 
Consistency and I n c l u s i v e n e s s i s i t s e l f problematic. I t becomes 
c l e a r only upon e x p l i c i t elaboration, and i t becomes i t s e l f a 
supra-dimension of l o g i c a l coherence. But i t s t i l l does not 
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i n i t s e l f c o n s t i t u t e the only c r i t e r i o n of b e l i e f Adequacy -
as example (E) demonstrates. There remain contextual 
criteria/dimensions, to which we must now turn. I return to 
t h i s i s s u e l a t e r , f o r i t concerns not j u s t the description of 
b e l i e f systems ( a s they are observed), but the development of 
more adequate notions and t h e o r i e s . That i s , i t becomes a 
methodological question. I discuss my methodology i n respect 
of "tree-root" s t r u c t u r e s below. 
5, By l o g i c a l c r i t e r i a alone, a given b e l i e f structure may 
be b e a u t i f u l l y coherent. Yet i t may j u s t not f i t the f a c t s of 
external R e a l i t y . I n p r a c t i c e , we " t e s t " our b e l i e f s every day. 
Not j u s t t h e i r i n t e r n a l coherence but, as i t were, t h e i r 
e x t e r n a l coherence w i l l determine the extent to which they are 
genuinely held as 'knowledge'. Much of our 'kaaowledge', of 
course, i s not concerned with our immediate experience. I t i s 
not, therefore, t e s t e d i n the same way. By the same token, i t 
may be l e s s strongly believed - l e s s "valued" as 'knowledge'. 
However, i t may be i n t e g r a l not to a structure of b e l i e f about 
the referred-to object i t s e l f , so much as to one r e f e r r i n g to 
(54) 
the experience threugh which the 'knowledge' was mediated.^ 
I may "Value-Know" something about an I t a l i a n earthquake - f o r 
instance that i t occurred - without having immediate experience 
of that phenomenon.^ ' The contextual experience of acquiring 
and reinforcing our b e l i e f s i s , then, a c r u c i a l i s s u e . At the 
same time, i t i s not j u s t contexts externally determined f o r us 
that become more or l e s s releveint.^^^^ I t i s a l s o our own 
a c t i v e -and i n many cases f a n c i f u l - "choice" of relevance zones. 
Both i n "day-dreaming" and i n deliberate reflection^- we may 
"choose" what aspect of R e a l i t y i t i s that our ongoing thoughts 
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are dd.r©cted to, and therefore which sets of b e l i e f s are relevant. 
Accordingly, I suggest two dimensions by which Contextual 
Adequacy might be considered; Pragmatic Adequacy and Relevance. 
^» Pragmatic Adequacy r e f e r s to the problematic notion of 
"correspondence". Brain i s as p h y s i c a l l y r e a l as external 
R e a l i t y , and i n p r i n c i p l e thoughts and b e l i e f s might be 
desoribable i n the same terms as the physical world. Nonetheless 
s u b j e c t i v e b e l i e f s i n the mind are ontologically d i f f e r e n t from 
the R e a l i t y "portrayed" i n them. The ideas of "yellowness", or 
of "A^", f o r example, are not reducible to lightwaves and 
soundwaves, although the r e a l i t y of yellowness and A^-ness might 
w e l l be. S i m i l a r l y , the s t r u c t u r a t i o n of b e l i e f s can only be 
metaphorical, j u s t as any p i c t o r i a l or verbal account of mind 
(such as my "tr e e - r o o t " analogy) can i t s e l f only be metaphorical. 
Nonetheless, there i s a sense i n which our ("metaphorical") 
b e l i e f s must "work" as accounts of Re a l i t y , f o r them to be 
adhered to as Value-Knowledge. ( I am st a t i n g t h i s on the ba s i s 
of e m p i r i c a l experience. We do, as a matter of f a c t , r e a l l y -
believe/value-know things. I am not, that i s , r e l y i n g on some 
f u n c t i o n a l i s t "explanation" i n t e r a s of the needs of human 
sa n i t y , or of s o c i e t a l s t a b i l i t y ) . 
The idea of " r e a l i t y t e s t i n g " i s not i n i t s e l f novel. Esland 
(1971) uses t h i s expression. Berger & Luckmann (1966/71) t a l k of 
" v a l i d a t i o n " . K e l l y says, 
"The constructs which are h i e r a r c h i c a l l y organised into 
systems are v a r i o u s l y subject to t e s t i n terms of t h e i r 
usefulness i n helping the person anti c i p a t e the course 
of events which make up the universe. The r e s u l t s of 
the t e s t i n g of constructs determine the d e s i r a b i l i t y of 
t h e i r temporary retention, t h e i r r e v i s i o n , or t h e i r 
immediate replacement." K e l l y (1963) pp. 43-44. 
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Though the term "reinforcement" has Behaviourist connotations,^^^^ 
the notion i s a t t r a c t i v e . ^ ^ ^ ^ I t i s experience which determines 
what i s ( s t r o n g l y ) believed. Lack of p a r t i c u l a r experiences 
w i l l f a l l to produce apprepriate Value-Knowledge. Furthermore, 
new experience, not j u s t e a r l y or i n i t i a l experience, may be the 
source of new b e l i e f s . Changed circumstances may produce quite 
d r a s t i c changes i n our understandings of the world. Just as 
R e a l i t y i s non-randomly - though complexly - structured, so 
a l s o are ' r e a l i t i e s ' ( b e l i e f s about that R e a l i t y ) . I t i s 
experience of real-world s t r u c t u r e s - of the relationships 
between "elements" i n R e a l i t y - which determines the s t m c t u r -
a t i o n of b e l i e f s , and determines a l s o t h e i r r i g i d i t y (strength 
of Value-Knowledge). Furthermore, the s t r u c t u r a t i o n of subjective 
b e l i e f systems (and a l s o that of objectivated bodies of 'knowledge') 
i s i t s e l f Real. I t can i t s e l f , therefore, be a source of 
experience - and therefore of 'knowledge'. These points w i l l 
be developed i n Chapter 3e 
When i t i s a case of " t e s t i n g " our b e l i e f s against aspects 
of r e a l i t y which are apparently "simple" and unpreblematic, the 
usual version of " r e a l i t y t e s t i n g " seems f a i r l y straightforward. 
For i f we have a c e r t a i n idea about how cars work, or how s o l i d 
buses are, or how poisonous c e r t a i n toadstools are, then we can 
take a c a r to b i t s , step i n front of a bus or eat toadstools - or 
(with a view to c o n t r o l l e d experiments) persuade some one e l s e to 
do these things. However, we a l s o have b e l i e f s about f a r l e s s 
"concrete" "things" i n the world-out-there. We have notions of 
"love" and "democracy" and " c l a s s s t r u c t u r e " which may be 
Value-Known, but which cannot be straightforwardly "tested" 
against the empirical R e a l i t y to which they are supposed to 
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r e f e r . I n t h i s case (but a l s o , one would hope, i n the case of 
buses and toadstools) we do not r e a l l y t e s t our b e l i e f s against 
concrete "things", so much as against other notions that we have 
about r e l a t e d aspects of R e a l i t y , That i s , the apparently hard-
headed and unambiguous dimension of Pragmatic Adequacy i s at 
l e a s t as r e l a t i v i s t i c . i n the end, as the other dimensions. 
Ultimately, i t becomes a matter of Consistency. For i t i s i n 
the context of our o t h e r ' b e l i e f s , and the extent to which any 
given notion i s consistent with them, that p a r t i c u l a r b e l i e f s 
are "tested". Having s a i d t h i s , I should re-emphasise my 
R e l a t i v i s t - R e a l i s t p o s i t i o n . I assume that there i s a world-
out-there. Accordingly, those other b e l i e f s must themselves 
somehow "correspond" to that R e a l i t y . B e l i e f s by d e f i n i t i o n 
r e f e r to that R e a l i t y , Where notions are hopelessly inadequate, 
by the c r i t e r i o n of Pragmatic Adequacy, they j u s t w i l l not be 
believed, (Th i s i s not, however, to deny the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
people " l i v i n g i n a dream world" - f o r I have stressed that 
b e l i e f s t r u c t u r a t i o n i t s e l f i s Real., and therefore a possible 
source of "reinforcement". I t i s not, a f t e r a l l , unknown f o r 
people to " l i v e i n ivo r y towers".) 
F i n a l l y , i n discussing Pragmatic Adequacy, i t should be 
remembered that w h i l s t a l l these remarks i n i t i a l l y concern the 
i n t r o s p e c t i v e examination of one's own b e l i e f systems, they 
should a l s o be taken to apply to considering (understandings of) 
other people's accounts, and bodies of 'knowledge' that have 
been objectivated. Where t h i s i s the case, of course, the 
problem of r e l a t i v i s m i s i n t e n s i f i e d : the R e a l i t y against which 
the observer i s " t e s t i n g " some one e l s e ' s account i s h i s own 
•Re a l i t y ' . I s h a l l argue i n Part I I that an a n a l y s i s of the 
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overt p o l i c i e s , statements and behaviours of teachers, p o l i t i c i a n s 
ahd administrators may, i n revealing t h e i r educational ideologies, 
reveal something of the s o c i a l Reality t o which those ideologies 
r e f e r . But u l t i m a t e l y the observer cannot enter the f i e l d w ith 
no p r e - d e f i n i t i o n s . He cannot divorce his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s from 
the ways i n which he already and ongoingly sees that same 
re f e r r e d - t o R e a l i t y , Thus the observer w i l l i n e v i t a b l y attempt 
to "see through" the accounts of others, and assess t h e i r adequacy 
espe c i a l l y t h e i r Pragmatic Adequacy - i n terms of h i s own 
perspectives. To give an example from i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . 
Pox r e f e i ^ t o managerial p l u r a l i s t ideology, which 
"represents, i n the context of modem business, a high 
point i n sophisticated «managerialism', i n the sense 
t h a t i t serves managerial i n t e r e s t s and goals whether 
p l u r a l i s t s themselves i d e n t i f y with those i n t e r e s t s and 
goals or not," Fox (1974) p,280. 
Such reference t o p r i o r - or at least "independent*' -
perspectives i s i n e v i t a b l e . But that i n no way means that i t 
i s t o be regretted. On the contrary, 
7. The other contextual dimension on which b e l i e f structures 
can be (Considered i s that of Relevance. I n an important sense 
our 'knowledge' i s "stored" i n the brain. Obviously, not a l l 
i s " c a l l e d i n t o play" at any given moment. What appears to be 
relevant may, deliberately or otherwise, be brought to the fore 
i n p a r t i c u l a r contexts. However, what i s considered to be 
relevant at any one moment, i n any one context, i s not randomly 
decided. As Schutz says. 
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"A system of relevances and t y p i f i c a t i o n s as i t exist s 
at any h i s t o r i c a l moment^ i s i t s e l f a part of the 
s o c i a l heritage and as such i s handed down i n the 
educational process t o the members of the in-group." 
Schutz (1957) p.43» 
The c u l t u r a l l y - e s t a b l i s h e d nature of what i s "relevant" i s 
certainly important, as I s h a l l observe i n discussing Master 
Patterns^ i n Chapter 3. That i s , insofar as one has assimilated 
(aspects o f ) the objectivated 'knowledge' of a p a r t i c u l a r 
c u l t u r a l group, Relevance w i l l be pre-determined. However, 
the context of b e l i e f s does not f o l l o w simply i n regular, 
same-as~before patterns. Novel sit u a t i o n s may require novel 
responses and " q a l l i n t o play" new associations of ideas. 
Where one d e l i b e r a t e l y attends t o one's notions and del i b e r a t e l y 
considers what might or might not be relevant - "how we might 
t a c k l e t h i s s i t u a t i o n " - the creative imagination of man i s 
at works 
A good example of t h i s can be found i n any piece of w r i t t e n 
worke Books, chapters and even paragraphs can generally be 
re-»written as "tree-roots", though i t i s rare that the 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n at each l e v e l i s exhaustive. Beneath the 
chapter headings we might have section-headings and beneath 
them (though not necessarily w r i t t e n - i n ) sub-section headings, 
etc.a I n each case, the heading i s l i k e l y t o "suiamarise" the. 
(59) 
included contents, being a short-hand f o r i t . ^ ' But each set 
of equivalent section-headings (and therefore the elaborations 
contained i n the sections) may not constitute an exhaustive 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . More frequently, there ar§ related issues 
dealt w i t h , which do not f i t i n t o a p e r f e c t l y l o g i c a l (consistent) 
pa t t e r n . 
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The present section, f o r instance, has the f o l l o w i n g shape;-
Dimensions of Adequacy s Structures of B e l i e f 
Logical Dimensions Contextual Dimensions 
§ 2 § 3 8 6 1 § 7 
consistency Inclusiveness IZ^ZT 
But i t w i l l be observed that there i s also a § 1» a § 4 and a i 5. 
These also belong under the higher l e v e l i n c l u s i v e "Dimensions 
of Adequacy j Structure of B e l i e f s " . But § 1 and § 5 are by 
way of i n t r o d u c t i o n s , and § 4 makes some geneml points about 
the context of both i 2 and § 3 . 
We might re-w r i t e the structure of t h i s section as follows, then: 
Dimensions of Adequacy : Structures of Belief 
Logical Dimensions Contextual 
1 Dimensions ! I I 
Main points Other points . . . I . 
(the dimensions) 
§ 2 1 § 3 1 § 1 8 4 




But even here, the apparent "neatness" may be deceiving. For by 
what c r i t e r i a have only two kinds of dimension been chosen 
( l o g i c a l and contextual) ? Answer: i n t e r n a l versus external, 
o r w i t h i n - ' r e a l i t i e s ' versus ' r e a l i t i e s ' - i n - r e l a t i o n - t o - R e a l i t y , 
(But, as we have seen w i t h Pragmatic Adequacy, the d i s t i n c t i o n 
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i s already by no means c l e a r ) 9 
Then, why are there only two kinds of l o g i c a l dimension? Answer: 
V e r t i c a l versus horizontal dimensions of the'H;3?ee-root''metaphor. 
(But, even given the adequacy of that metaphor, are there only 
two dimensions to i t ? No, not i n facts by one way of t h i n k i n g , 
the contextual c r i t e r i a are a t h i r d dimension themselves). And 
so we might go on, looking at a l l or any of the chapters ( o f 
t h i s essay^^^^ or any other book). I f we were to exeimine the 
sub-sub-sectioning, there i s l i k e l y t o be even less obvious a 
r a t i o n a l e behind the ordering, and c e r t a i n l y less exhaustive 
coverage than might have been worked out. 
Exhaustiveness i s not the only c r i t e r i o n of merit. I n a 
p e r f e c t l y developed system, i t might wall be very valuable. 
When i t comes down to the smaller ri d e r s t o an argument, 
however, i t may not seem t o be worth the trouble (.just f o r the 
sake of "neatness"). More importantly, the search f o r exhaustive 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s generally comes a f t e r the i n i t i a l i n t u i t e d 
s e l e c t i o n of what i s l i k e l y to be relevant, Buzan (1974) i s 
i n e f f e c t advocating an imaginative free-run of what might be 
relevant when he recommends his form of note-taking. ^ His 
idea of "working from the centre" and j o t t i n g down whatever 
appears t o be relevant - i n no special temporal order, but 
ordered s p a t i a l l y as i t i s j o t t e d down - i s extremely useful: 
i n preparing l e c t u r e s , lessons, papers ,.. and theses. (Though 
I had been doing i t a long time before reading Buzan»s book, 
I had not seen i t i n the same l i g h t , nor done i t so systematically). 
What i t amounts t o , i n f a c t , i s working down a number of t r e e -
root structures - i n i t i a l l y , at any rate - but not by e x p l i c i t 
l o g i c a l c r i t e r i a at a l l , z i t h e r by imaginative association of 
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ideas and selection of relevance, 
I s h a l l say more about Association of id^as as a methodological 
procedure below. Meanwhile, l e t us explore the imaginative side 
of the exercise. I n any given context, one's e x p l i c i t a t t e n t i o n 
may be r e s t r i c t e d t o c e r t a i n aspects of that context., i n default 
of imagination. Imagination i s learned and contexted. One 
learns to be imaginative (or not) about p a r t i c u l a r aspects of 
R e a l i t y . Freire (1972) distinguishes between " s t r u c t u r a l 
perception" and " f o c a l perception". The l a t t e r , f o r reasons 
perhaps of r e s t r i c t i v e education, involves attending only to the 
obvious and immediate problems of l i f e . The former involves 
p u t t i n g these i n the "context" of the t o t a l i t y - of s o c i e t a l 
s t r u c t u r e , f o r example. There need be no difference i n the 
nature of those problems that externally prompt the imaginative 
wider view. Rather one heeds to have developed an e x p l i c i t 
understanding of one's a b i l i t y to think " s t r u c t u r a l l y " . The 
" t h i n g s " attended t o may be the same, but one switches relevances, 
considers the possible inter-relatedness of those "things" i n 
d i f f e r e n t ways seeking a more adequate s t r u c t u r a l notion of 
the t o t a l r e a l i t y . ^ ^ ^ ^ There may i n p r i n c i p l e be an i n f i n i t e 
number of ways of considering given aspects of the world-out-
there. Some may be no " b e t t e r " than others. But the object, 
c l e a r l y , would be t o improve upon pi'evious notions w i t h 
e x p l i c i t accounts that were superior(in the sense of being more 
adequate - according t o the c r i t e r i o n of pragmatic adequacy, 
as w e l l as the l o g i c a l c r i t e r i a ) . 
Ford puts i t i n her own i n i m i t a b l e way; 
.70-
"When one looks at a r e a l world through the eyes of a 
normal rab b i t y s o c i o l o g i s t , one sees things that would 
not be apparent t o a normal rabbity psychologist". 
She adds, i n a footnote: 
"The reverse may also be the case. One paradigm ti^anscends 
the other w i t h respect t o a p a r t i c u l a r problem," 
Ford (1975) PP0I3I, 207 n 35. 
S i m i l a r l y , Goldmann considers Blarxism to be superior to 
"o b j e c t i v e " sociology: 
"Some value-judgments permit a better understanding of 
r e a l i t y than others. When i t i s a question of determining 
which of two c o n f l i c t i n g sociologies has the greater 
s c i e n t i f i c value, the f i r s t step i s t o ask which of them 
permits the understanding of the other as a social sind 
human phenomenon, reveals i t s i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , and c l a r i f i e s , 
by means of an immanent c r i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e , i t s 
inconsistencies and i t s l i m i t a t i o n s , " Goldmann (1969) p»52. 
Whilst, of course, one's newly acquired perspective may become 
j u s t as i'igid as the previous account, the aim of imaginative 
relevance-shift i s to f i n d a way of looking at the phenomena i n 
question which transcends, i n some way, the e a r l i e r notions. 
This transcendence w i l l attempt to overcome any inconsistencies 
th a t may have been i d e n t i f i e d i n the e a r l i e r account. I t may 
involve not j u s t seeking higher, more inclusive notions to those 
th a t previously stood "at the top", but r e s t r u c t u r i n g the account 
altogether. Let me igive an example. In Syer (1974a), I suggested 
tha t Bernstein's notions of three message systems. Curriculum, 
Pedagogy and Evaluation, though useful from certain points of 
view, could not help us to tackle what he called the "power and 
c o n t r o l component" i n education - something which Bernstein had 
e x p l i c i t l y set out t o do, I suggested that these were everyday 
notions, which contained considerable ambiguity and inconsistency. 
Instead, I suggested we dichotomise between superordination and 
subordination i n determinative relationships, and between people 
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i n the r e a l world and the ideas that they have (in c l u d i n g 
ideas which are objectivated i n c u r r i c u l a ) , I did not, 
therefore, s t a r t w i t h Bernstein's suggestion, which might be 
portrayed as 
Educational Knowledge Codes 
Curriculum Pedagogy Evaluation 
and seek a new set of concepts to be included beneath 
"Educational Knowledge Codes", Rather I suggested: 
Determinative Relationships 
S o c i a l i s a t i o n Logic Direct Power Autonomy 
which were, by the c r i t e r i a I suggested, exhaustive - and, I 
f e l t , more us e f u l . This involved looking at the problem from 
a d i f f e r e n t "angle" - or s h i f t i n g the relevance. 
I n conclusion to t h i s discussion on Adequacy dimensions, 
then, ay notion of Relevance i s not j u s t a question of what i s 
determined by context to be relevgint. I t concerns both what 
the b e l i e v e r takes f o r granted to be relevant - r i g i d i f i c a t i o n s 
that would need explaining i n context and what he de l i b e r a t e l y 
and c r e a t i v e l y thinks might be relevant. The s h i f t i n g of 
relevance can be a creative, imaginative exercise - though by 
no means always f r u i t f u l ! I s h a l l ratum to i t beU»s) 
i n discussing my own methodology. 
I n p r a c t i c e , the deliberate s h i f t i n g of relevances i s 
u n l i k e l y t o be divorced from a search f o r more adequate accounts 
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by other c r i t e r i a . I n the next section I discuss I n t u i t i o n . 
This may arise i n the search f o r more Ihclusive understandings, 
i n order to resolve lower l e v e l Inconsistencies. 
I n t u i t i o n and Elaboration 
"People l i v i n g at the seashore grow so accustomed to 
the murmur of the waves that they never hear i t . By 
the same token we look at each other, but we do 
not see each other any more. Our perception of the 
world has withered away5 what has remained i s mere 
recognition." Shklovskij, quoted by Chomsky (1967/68), 
p. 21. 
Our b e l i e f s are predominantly i m p l i c i t , unverbalised. This 
by no means applies only to b e l i e f s that are not strongly-held. 
I t applies t o most of our Value-Knowledge, also, OurHriguistic 
competence, f o r instance,is not a subject of constant r e f l e c t i o n , 
yet we 'know' what i s l i n g u i s t i c a l l y "correct", and what i s 
not.^^^^ The same i s true of our social competence.^^^^ 
Nor i s i t merely "low-level b e l i e f s that are unverbalised. 
Complex and i n c l u s i v e models of ' i ^ a l i t y ' , including theories, 
may also be i m p l i c i t . Gladwin's Trukese navigators, f o r example^^^^ 
demonstrate how complex navigational theory can be wholly unverb-
a l i s e d - 6ind even unverbal!sable t o the 'knower'. 
The i m p l i c i t 'knowledge' discussed i n t h i s section may be 
e i t h e r pre-verbal or post-verbalo I t includes both 'knowledge' 
which has been acquired but never put i n t o words and 'knowledge' 
which has been learned through detailed elaboration, but which 
has then taken on a taken-for-grantedness and no longer 
"requires" constant re-examination. An example of post-
l i n g u i s t i c i m p l i c i t 'knowledge' i s the 'knowledge' of how to 
d r i v e . Not j u s t supposedly "motor" s k i l l s - l i k e the handling 
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of steering, braking, and changing gear - but those of "road 
sense" - "reading" hazards and a h t i c i p a t i n g other road-users' 
behaviours - can be learned w i t h great concentration on verbal-
i s a t i o n . The experienced d r i v e r rarely says to himself a l l 
that he i s " t h i n k i n g " about a l l these things, though he may 
s t i l l be i m p l i c i t l y "concentrating" on d r i v i n g . ^ ^ ^ ^ 
However, t h i s section above a l l concerns pre-rverbal 
b e l i e f s . I t concerns the circumstances i n urtiich people attempt 
t o make verbal what they already i m p l i c i t l y 'know', and the 
in t e n t i o n s and im p l i c a t i o n s that are involved, Shklovskij, 
whom I quoted above, thought that the function of poetic a r t 
was t o "make strange" the object depicted and thus t o t r a n s f e r 
that object t o the "sphere of new perception". This can apply 
not j u s t t o "thing-objects" (as we have said, a l l things are 
structured i n t e r n a l l y aoid e x t e r n a l l y ) , but to the r e l a t i o n s 
between them - both i n the world-out-there, and i n our structured 
b e l i e f s about them. 
The experience of "groping f o r a word" t h a t may be "on 
the t i p of one's tongue" i s often used t o demonstrate that 
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thought i s not i d e n t i c a l w i t h "inner speech". This has 
mainly t o do w i t h post-verbal 'knowledge', i n that the word, or 
name, i s "known-but-teraporarily-forgotten". But such "hunches" 
also occur i n the case of pre-verbal 'knowledge', when an idea 
occurs before i t can be put i n t o words - and, by the same token, 
i s not yet f u l l y grasped and understood. For verbalisation may 
order what we already f e e l we 'know' and enable us to understand 
our own b e l i e f s . That ordering may then, i n t u r n , give us 
grounds f o r being f u r t h e r sure of what we believe - or f o r 
r e j e c t i n g " f a l s e hunches". Verbalisation enables us to reason. 
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and 
"Reason i s not a source of theories, i t i s an a r b i t e r 
of mistakes." Pord (1975) p.70.(^3) 
We have i n t u i t i o n s which we f e e l the need to verbalise. 
I m p l i c i t theories cajn become the basis of e x p l i c i t ones. 
The circumstances which arouse a "need" t o verbalise 
i n t u i t i o n s must be understood. On the one hand, they may be 
"problems" of context or of l o g i c . Our p r i o r b e l i e f s may no 
longer be adequate on e i t h e r contextual grounds - i n " f i t t i n g 
the f a c t s " - or on l o g i c a l grounds - i n being l o g i c a l l y 
coherent. I n p r a c t i c e , these are not sharply d i s t i n c t , f o r 
" f i t t i n g the f a c t s " - though based on experience of a Real 
world-out-there and u l t i m a t e l y inseparable from that Reality -
i t s e l f involves l o g i c a l consistency with ( r e a l ) b e l i e f s 
already and ongoingly held,^^^^ On the other hand, two things 
have to be learned, before such elaborated "solutions" are 
sought. F i r s t l y , one must learn that p a r t i c u l a r kinds of 
"problem" are ones th a t require, and are amenable t o , "solutions". 
Secondly, one must learn a self~conoept such that one believes 
oneself able and e n t i t l e d to seek such "solutions". Both 
things are learned i n p a r t i c u l a r contexts, as a r e s u l t of 
experiences which are i n p r i n c i p l e i d e n t i f i a b l e by the obsea^ver. 
One has to learn the relevance, value and p o s s i b i l i t y of 
i n t u i t i o n , ajad 
" I n t u i t i o n i s an i n v i t a t i o n to go f u r t h e r - whether 
i n t u i t i v e l y or a n a l y t i c a l l y . " Bruner (1965/74) p.104, 
Curi o s i t y i s the lea,rned a b i l i t y , the "need" and possibly 
duty to seek out problems of the sort suggested above and to 
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make sense of them. ^'^ '^^ I t i s re l a t e d t o what Durkheim called 
" r e f l e x i v e thought", Mannheim, "awareness", and M i l l , " ( s o c i o l o g i c a l ) 
imagination", "^^""V Ford c a l l s i t , as I do, " c u r i o s i t y " , ^ "^ ^^  I t i s 
also very closely r e l a t e d t o the question of "openness", i n 
respect of Objectivated 'Knowledge' and of Learning Theory, as 
we s h a l l see l a t e r . 
Many people regard Curiosity as a na t u r a l q u a l i t y of Man, 
which may be " k i l l e d " by r e s t r i c t i v e education. • '^  This notion 
i s sometimes indicated by the term " i n t r i n s i c motivation" 
which Huberman (1974) considers i d e o l o g i c a l , i n that i t serves 
t o l e g i t i m a t e - and t o promote - the academic success of children 
from already advantaged f a m i l i e s . This "natural c u r i o s i t y " view 
sees the loss of c u r i o s i t y as what i s commonly learned. I t i s 
generally accompanied by assertions that t h i s i s wrong. But a 
lack of any clear elaboration of what t h i s c u r i o s i t y i s most often 
makes t h i s rather shallow as a pr e s c r i p t i v e comment. I t i s most 
commonly seen as an e n t i r e l y i n d i v i d u a l q u a l i t y , neutral and 
divorced from the bodies of 'knowledge' which i n my view are 
i n e v i t a b l y involved. 
Bruner (1965/74) t a l k s of the self-rewarding nature of 
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l e a r n i n g and c u r i o s i t y ^ % implying that i t i s "natural" or 
"innate". Yet he i s also concerned with " t r a i n i n g " (his word) 
c u r i o s i t y . He comes close t o my own concern wi t h t h i s concept -
the emphasis on the learned nature of self-concept involved i n 
(76) 
r e l a t i o n t o p a r t i c u l a r areas of 'knowledge'^ - i n t h i s passage; 
"Children, l i k e a dults, need reassurance that i t i s a l l 
r i g h t t o ent e r t a i n and express subjective ideas, t o 
t r e a t a task as a problem, where you invent an answer, 
rather than f i n d i n g one out there i n the book, or on 
the blackboard," Bruner (1965/74) p.78. 
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Many have t a l k e d of the s o c i a l and so c i e t a l contexting of 
p a r t i c u l a r a t t i t u d e s t o , and uses made of, 'knowledge'. 
Znaniecki (1969 ) f o r instance, distinguished between p r i e s t s , 
sages, scholars, technologists, s c i e n t i s t s and explorers - the 
l a s t of these being the small number of discoverers and innovators 
who create new 'knowledge'. I t i s commonly maintained that 
"modem" society i s both characterised by an "open" view of 
(77) 
'knowledge' and produces " i n t e l l e c t u a l s " accordingly,^ ' Yet 
the l o c a t i o n i n society of such " i n t e l l e c t u a l s " i s also usually 
(78) 
taken t o be de l i m i t e d . Furthermore, continued closures -
and t h e i r non-rsmdom character - are extremely important, as 
we s h a l l see. 
Insofar as Curi o s i t y i s a self-concept, i t i s related t o 
the Parsonian notion of a value-orientation. I t i s related t o 
the "Active o r i e n t a t i o n " of Kluckhohn (19^2), the "functional 
autonomy" of Gouldner (1959) and of Pord et al.(1967/71) and 
indeed the "voluntarism" of Berger (1963/66). But, as I have 
said, such ideas as these too e a s i l y become abstracted from 
contextual s i t u a t i o n s . They are given r e i f i e d , determinative 
status as i n d i v i d u a l s ' c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . We should not t a l k 
about " c u r i o s i t y " on i t s own, so much as "curiosity-about-x" 
or "curiosity-about-y", i n p a r t i c u l a r contexts. 
I do not deny that Curiosity i s an i n d i v i d u a l self-concept. 
On the contrary, i t i s t h i s that distinguishes i t from mere 
(79) 
scepticism or accommodation.^ But I would emphasise that 
self-concepts themselves are r e l a t i o n a l concepts. They az*e not 
about the s e l f - i n - a b s t r a c t i o n , but about the s e l f - i n - s p e o i f i c -
kinds-of-context, and i n r e l a t i o n to speci f i c kinds of 'knowledge'. 
These are learned i n expexlence of one's own success or f a i l u r e 
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i n being curious i n the past, and i n experience (and a n t i c i p a t i o n ) 
of other people's reactions t o those attempts,^^^^ 
Being e s s e n t i a l l y a matter of self-concept (but stressing 
again t h a t self-concept i s necessarily concept of s e l f - i n -
relation-to-x»»and-y) the importance of " l a b e l l i n g " i n the 
development (or otherwise) of Curiosity i s obvious.^^^^ 
Cu r i o s i t y involves f i r s t l y an awareness of the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between Reality and one's own ' r e a l i t y ' , secondly eoi awareness 
that one can observe, t a l k and t h i n k about one's own ' r e a l i t y ' , 
and t h i r d l y the Value-Knowledge that such a t t e n t i o n , r e f l e c t i o n 
emd creative elaboration of one's ' r e a l i t y ' i s worthwhile. 
C u r i o s i t y i s a learning concept, as opposed t o Legitimation, 
which i s a being-taught concept (Syer 1975a), 
According t o the context/logic d i s t i n c t i o n made above, 
one may be curious about one's external context, seeking perhaps 
t o develop more adequate accounts of i t and thereby t o achieve 
some autonomy i n r e l a t i o n t o i t . Or one may be curious about 
the l o g i c a l s t ructure of one's b e l i e f s (or the objectivated 
•knowledge' w i t h which one i s confronted), seeking t o develop 
(82) 
more i n t e r n a l l y consistent understandings. One may, of 
course, be both. 
To be "curious" i n t h i s sense requires the use of language. 
To resolve i n t u i t e d problems also requires language. I t i s 
verbal elaboration which i s involved i n rendering i m p l i c i t 
•knowledge' - incl u d i n g i n t u i t e d inconsistencies - e x p l i c i t , 
and r e s o l v i n g them at a higher l e v e l . Like Curiosity i t s e l f , 
t h i s use of language needs t o be learned. And i t needs to be 
learned i n r e l a t i o n t o s p e c i f i c 'knowledge• areas ( i n s p e c i f i c 
relevance zones). 
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The idea of verbal elaboration as a release from i m p l i c i t 
(83) 
closures i s common,^ ' So also i s the idea that i t i s no easy, 
nor automatically undertaken, task, t o render i m p l i c i t b e l i e f 
e x p l i c i t , ^ '^'^^ At the same time, the constraining aspects of 
language should not be overlooked. L i n g u i s t i c determination 
occurs through the absence of Cur i o s i t y about the r o l e of 
language i t s e l f , ' The r o l e of language here i s not merely 
one of rendering i m p l i c i t b e l i e f s e x p l i c i t - producing verbalised 
versions of the same t h i n g . Nor i s language j u s t a t o o l whereby 
r i g i d i f i e d b e l i e f s may be rendered f l u i d and problematic, though 
(86) 
of course t h i s i s important. ' Language i s also a means t o 
higher l e v e l , or otherwise more adequate, understandings of 
R e a l i t y , F l u i d b e l i e f s need not j u s t be replaced by b e l i e f s 
no more adequate than the o r i g i n a l s , but by more adequate 
versions. (This suggestion i s , of course, coupled w i t h a 
d e s c r i p t i v e b e l i e f t h a t , to some extent at l e a s t , "knowledge 
i s power"^ and a p r e s c r i p t i v e b e l i e f that i t i s "human" to 
want t o con t r o l one's circumstances, rather than be unknowingly 
( 88) 
determined by them,^ ') 
Some would argue that the very act of rendering e x p l i c i t 
the inconsistencies i n one's b e l i e f s should be s u f f i c i e n t to 
provoke a search f o r r e s o l u t i o n . I t might even be argued that 
inconsistencies per se - even at the i m p l i c i t l e v e l - w i l l tend 
t o provoke an automatic solution-solving d i s p o s i t i o n , Milgram, 
(S9) 
f o r instance, uses a cybernetic analogy to t a l k of "overload"^® 
and cognitive dissonance theory r e l i e s on a s i m i l a r assumption of 
" n a t u r a l " need.^^*^^ 
I would not be so o p t i m i s t i c . Such all-encompassing views 
tend to divorce human dispositions from t h e i r contexts. They f a i l 
-79" 
t o recognise that any desire, l e t alone "need", to resolve 
inconsistencies has to be learned. I t has to be learned i n spec i f i c 
contexts. And i t has to be "relevant" t o the areas of Reality i n 
question. Accordingly they tend t o forget t h a t , as Holt (1974/75, 
p,188) has pointed out, impotence also corrupts, (and absolute 
impotence corrupts a b s o l u t e l y ) . Curiosity can be " k i l l e d " , or never 
even bom, i n r e l a t i o n t o c e r t a i n contexts. This can produce, i f not 
a tolerance of ambiguity, at least a f e l t i n a b i l i t y t o resolve i t . 
Frequently, a f t e r a l l , such l o g i c a l resolution cannot be separated 
from resolved contradictions i n Reality - and powerlessness to 
achieve that may create as "i n s u f f e r a b l e " an inconsistency with 
b e l i e f s (on grounds of Pragmatic Adequacy) as a "merely" l o g i c a l 
inadequacy, FurtherTnore, the pervading influence of s e l f - i n t e r e s t -
which i s not, of course, always v i n d i c t i v e , nor even " s e l f i s h " - can 
prevent any desire t o resolve inconsistencies that exist only at the 
l e v e l of understanding, not that of b e l i e f . I n direc t opposition to 
the notion of cognitive dissonance, Yinger and Simpson suggest that 
"The human mind has an enormous capacity f o r holding 
mutually contradictory ideas without any f e e l i n g of 
discomfort." Yinger & Simpson (1973) p,102. 
This f a c i l i t y e x i s t s precisely because understanding i s not b e l i e f . 
The fundamentally Value-Known may not be e x p l i c i t . What one i s 
e x p l i c i t l y aware of may not be strongly believed. E x p l i c i t 
inconsistencies may not therefore be s t r e s s f u l . Moreover, our 
• r e a l i t i e s ' are "parcelled up" i n t o b e l i e f structures of d i f f e r i n g 
relevances - r e f e r r i n g t o d i f f e r e n t aspects of r e a l i t y . The learned 
" d i s s o c i a t i o n " of one from another i s a most s i g n i f i c a n t 
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s o c i o l o g i c a l ( i e e . s o c i e t a l l y contexted and s o c i a l l y s i g n i f i c a a i t ) 
v a r i a b l e . 
This i s not t o deny the value of verbal elaboration. On 
the contrary. For i t i s t h i s " p a r c e l l i n g up" - t h i s s t r u c t u r -
a t i o n of b e l i e f s such that we have not one single view of the 
world but a v a r i e t y of them, co-ordinated only imperfectly 
and i m p l i c i t y - which requires v e r b a l i s a t i o n . This i s the deep 
stru c t u r e of our cosmologies, which i s necessarily i m p l i c i t -
and therefore unamenable t o deliberate change - i n default of 
e x p l i c i t a t t e n t i o n . 
Basic B e l i e f s 
The " t r e e - r o o t " metaphor i s intended to be applicable to 
structures not only of s u b j e c t i v e l y held b e l i e f s , but also of 
o b j e c t i v a t e d 'knowledge'. The l a t t e r includes both the accounts 
of i n d i v i d u a l others, ("frozen", as i t were, i n p r i n t , or 
reconstructed according to the observer's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
behaviour etc.) and bodies of 'knowledge' such as those 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d i n c u r r i c u l a , i n cultures and i n s o c i a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s themselves. The l o g i c a l and contextual dimensions 
were considered above p r i m a r i l y i n terms of subjective b e l i e f 
s t r u c t u r e s . The emphasis i n the l a s t section was consequently 
on the elaboration of i m p l i c i t 'knowledge' and the possible 
r e s o l u t i o n of inconsistencies through the development of Curiosity. 
I n t h i s section, I suggest how t h i s same view of structured b e l i e f s 
might be used to consider objectivated 'knowledge'. 
I mentioned above a "metatheoretical judgment", that i t was 
"human" t o be autonomous rather than determined. That judgment 
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was my ovra« "Metatheoretical judgments" i s how Ford (1975) 
defines what she c a l l s "Basic Beliefs*'. One problem w i t h 
such Basic B e l i e f s i s that i t i s not always obvious where 
they are. That i s , on challenging a belief("Why do you - or 
does he - b e l i e s that?") one might be led to a "meta-belief". 
But then i t i s l e g i t i m a t e t o ask, "Why ... that b e l i e f ? " . 
One i s then l e d to a "meta-meta-belief". And so oh. Put 
l i k e t h i s , i t might seem that one w i l l u l t i m a t e l y come to the 
"ul t i m a t e " meta-belief which i s u n j u s t i f i a b l e ( t o the believer) 
o r i n e x p l i c a b l e ( t o the observer). But i t does not always 
work l i k e t h a t . Instead of a f i n i t e regression, one can f i n d 
(91) 
oneself "looping back",^ 
I suggest t h a t t h i s d i f f i c u l t y i n pinning down Basic 
B e l i e f s arises from our a b i l i t y t o switch Relevances (without, 
perhaps, r e a l i s i n g i t ) . The "same" notions may be i-e-ordered 
i n such a way that they are not r e a l l y the same at a l l . They 
are r e l a t e d ones, d i f f e r e n t l y structured. To pin down Basic 
B e l i e f s , therefore, we must nominate the Relevance with which 
we are concerned, and look f o r the appropriate "tree-root" 
s t r u c t u r e . 
The " t r e e - r o o t " metaphor was i n i t i a l l y developed to 
i l l u s t r a t e the dimension of Inclusiveness. I n portraying 
b e l i e f s as h i e r a r c h i c a l l y structured, i t n a t u r a l l y suggests 
t h a t thejre are fewer b e l i e f s "at the top" than at lower level s 
o f inclusiveness. With apologies f o r the mixing of metaphors, 
these can be seen as "underlying assumptions" or "un i f y i n g 
notions"^^^^ - or as Basic B e l i e f s . Were we concerned only 
w i t h fantasized notions, the d i f f i c u l t y of pinning down a v a l i d 
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relevance angle might be insurmountable. But b e l i e f s are r e a l 
and a c t u a l l y structured. However f i g u r a t i v e might be the 
"t r e e - r o o t " model as a device f o r conceptualising t h e i r 
s t r u c t u r a t i o n , they are structured. Whilst the observer's choice 
of relevance angle may confront problems of r e l a t i v i s m , therefore, 
t h i s does not mean tha t his choice need be merely a r b i t r a r y . 
Nonetheless, the complexity of b e l i e f s t r u c t u r a t i o n and the 
metaphorical nature of the "tree-root" model do mean that the 
observer's relevance angle must be made quite e x p l i c i t , and as 
f a r as possible j u s t i f i e d . Having seen people's b e l i e f s as 
structured and non-random, one can avoid t r y i n g t o describe the 
t o t a l s t r u c t u r e ( o r structures) i n terms of a l l the notions, at 
various l e v e l s , that can be gathered together. One can s i m p l i f y , 
by using hi g h - l e v e l Basic Be l i e f s as short-hands - j u s t as 
"The theory of R e l a t i v i t y " or "The Gospel" are short-hands f o r 
complex theory and description. The "tree-root" analogy i s not 
j u s t a d e s c r i p t i v e metaphor f o r the consideration of b e l i e f 
sy-r^ c^tta^ c? i n general, but a h e u r i s t i c device f o r t a l k i n g about 
s p e c i f i c b e l i e f st(v^Jr«.>e5, i n s p e c i f i c contexts. 
Furthermore the same device may be used of objactivated 
bodies of 'Knowledge'. What Bourdieu c a l l s "Master Patterns"^ ' 
might also be considered as hi e r a r c h i c a l "tree-root" structures. 
They might also be characterisable i n terms of t h e i r highest 
l e v e l Basic B e l i e f s . I am not, here, t a l k i n g of the b e l i e f s of 
i n d i v i d u a l people holding p a r t i c u l a r Basic Beliefs as i d e n t i f i a b l e 
notions. I am t a l k i n g of objectivated systems of b e l i e f . Their 
u n i f i c a t i o n i s l i k e l y to l i e not i n the high l e v e l notions of 
any one i n d i v i d u a l , but i n the social or soc i e t a l conte:^ i t s e l f . 
Yet the accumulated b e l i e f s of divers people may make up an 
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i d s n t i f i a b l e body of 'knowledge', experienced by each i n d i v i d u a l . 
I n the Division of Labour. Durkheim appears at f i r s t t o 
deny the p o s s i b i l i t y of any such un i f y i n g Basic B e l i e f . He 
notes the lack of u n i t y i n science - especially "the moral and 
s o c i a l sciences". He sees t h i s as analogous to ce r t a i n anomic 
features of the contemporary d i v i s i o n of labour. But he then 
says: 
"The u n i t y of science w i l l thus form of i t s e l f , not through 
the abstract u n i t y of a formula, f a r too scanty f o r the 
multitude of things that i t must embrace, but through the 
l i v i n g u n i t y of an organic whole. For science to be 
u n i t a i y , i t i s not necessary f o r i t to be contained w i t h i n 
the f i e l d of one and the same conscience - an impossible 
f e a t anyhow - but i t i s s u f f i c i e n t that a l l those who 
c u l t i v a t e i t f e e l that they are collaborating i n the 
same work." Durkheim (1893/1964) p.371. 
Such " c o l l a b o r a t i o n " , of course, need not be seen as active and 
w i l l i n g co-operation (though that may be what Durkheim would 
have prescribed). I t may e n t a i l , e s s e n t i a l l y , common experience. 
I n s o f a r , then, as a society or section of society may be said 
t o have any kind of homogeneity i n respect of i t s culture - or 
Master Patterns - these may be pieced together from the b e l i e f s 
of various members, rather than assumed to be extricable from 
those of any on© i n d i v i d u a l . Nonetheless, i t should i n p r i n c i p l e 
be possible t o conceive of them as structured i n the same "t r e e -
(94) 
r o o t " fashion as i n d i v i d u a l b e l i e f systems. ' 
The question s t i l l remains, however, how we are to i d e n t i f y 
the Basic B e l i e f s . For, i f i n the case of i n d i v i d u a l b e l i e f 
systems i t seems that these cannot be located unless the precise 
Relevance i s f i r s t nominated by the observer, i s t h i s not even 
more the case of b e l i e f systems which are the subjective 
•knowledge' of no single i n d i v i d u a l , but 3?ather characterise a 
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B o c i a l group, or even i n s t i t u t i o n , as a whole? 
I suggest that there may be certain universal moments (or 
dimensions) i n respect of p a r t i c u l a r kinds of experience and 
a c t i v i t y . According to the subject t o be discussed, these might 
be named, and t h e r e a f t e r used as dimensions of experience "along" 
which people concerned w i t h that kind of experience or a c t i v i t y 
are "bound" to have some kind of notion. By suggesting such 
universals, those notions can then be seen as Basic B e l i e f s , 
which adequately or inadequately un i f y other notions i n that 
Relevance area. 
I w i l l suggest i n Part I I , f o r example, a way of considering 
educational ideologies. I w i l l claim that i t i s legitimate and 
usefu l to s t a r t by asserting the relevance of two universal 
dimensions. The f i r s t of these i s the s o c i a l contexting of 
l e a r n i n g , and hence the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s of learning s i t u a t i o n s . 
The second i s the physical separatenesa of i n d i v i d u a l people, and 
therefore of t h e i r physical brains, and therefore of t h e i r 
subjective b e l i e f s and understandings. These are separate from 
the 'knowledge' of others and from objectivated bodies of 
'knowledge', established " t r u t h s " and master patterns. This 
leads me, i n t u r n , to t a l k about the "Power" and the "Knowledge" 
dimensions of educational ideologies, some versions of which can 
be expected i n any i n d i v i d u a l or societal 'knowledge' about 
education. 
I n the next section, I s h a l l say some more about my 
methodology, as i t r e l a t e s t o the i n i t i a l " t r e e - r o o t " metaphor. 
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"Tpe^e-roots^ and Methodology 
The " t r e e - r o o t " metaphor i s not only a way of looking at 
structures of Value-Knowledfee and systems of b e l i e f . I t i s also 
a device f o r the consideration of notion structures, whether those 
notions be strongly-believed or not. I t can also be used, 
therefore, as a methodological device. This was suggested 
e a r l i e r , i n connection w i t h the search f o r higher-level subjective 
understandings and more adequate accounts of Reality. 
I n i l l u s t r a t i n g the " t r e e - r o o t " metaphor, i t was convenient 
t o use single-word, or short-phrase, examples ( " f u r n i t u r e " , e t c . ) . 
This does not mean, however, that the s t r u c t u r a t i o n of these 
" t r e e - r o o t s " i s j u s t a matter of semantics. Where actual 
• r e a l i s t i c ' b e l i e f s are concexmed, single words or phrases are 
short-hands f o r d e s c r i p t i v e , or even "assertive", b e l i e f s about 
what the world i s r e a l l y l i k e o u t - t h e i ^ . To i l l u s t r a t e t h i s , 
consider the notion of "father". Some such "tree-root" as the 
f o l l o w i n g might be presented: 
A, fatherhood 
r Jp— — —^  
b i o l o g i c a l past (and possibly present) ongoing r e l a t i o n -
fatherhood r e l a t i o n s h i p with mother ship w i t h (e.g. 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 
toward) children 
Within a given c u l t u r e , the three lower order notions may be 
implied by the higher (more i n c l u s i v e ) notion of "fatherhood". 
Such a structure might also be a f a i r short-hand f o r the b e l i e f s 
of any one i n d i v i d u a l member of that culture. But insofar as 
they were unquestioned and Value-Known elements of the "fatherhood" 
b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e , an elaboration of t h i s short-hand might take 
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the form of: 
B. ( I believe t h a t ) there are fathers 
I 
who 
have ( b i o l o g i c a l l y ) and therefore had past and therefore have 
fathered children > r e l a t i o n s with the — ^ ce r t a i n responsib-
mothers - and "should" i l i t i e s to the 
maintain some children 
r e l a t i o n s h i p 
Or: 
C. I am a fa t h e r 
which 
means tha t 
I 
I have fathered i . e . that I have had r e l a t i o n s . . . and I have 
chil d r e n - — ^ and I "should" maintain > cer t a i n 
some rel a t i o n s h i p ... r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 
This i t s e l f i s also abbreviated f o r convenience's sake. I t should 
be c l e a r , though, that when i t i s b e l i e f s that are i n question, 
the supposedly "semantic" s i m p l i c i t y of "tree-root"structures 
i s a c t u a l l y very complex. They r e f e r to actual or p o t e n t i a l 
instances of the "things" (e.g. fathers) i n question. They are 
str u c t u r e d according t o c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n a l propierties (such as 
"should", or "implies", or "means") which, i n a f u l l y elaborated 
version, need to be spelled out. And they are context-specific: 
c l e a r l y t h i s view of fatherhood i s by no means universal. Some 
soc i e t i e s do not necessarily conjoin b i o l o g i c a l fatherhood w i t h 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of subsistence and inheritance. 
The i n i t i a l purpose of presenting the " f u r n i t u r e " example, 
then, was to enable a s i m p l i f i e d i l l u s t r a t i o n of "tree-rooting". 
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There i s a f u r t h e r purpose, too. This metaphor can apply not 
j u s t t o ' r e a l i s t i c ' b e l i e f s , but to structures of notions which 
are not strongly-believed (Value-Known) i n s p e c i f i c contexts. 
This same device then has methodological implications. The 
dimensions along which we can see the s t r u c t u r i n g of b e l i e f s 
can also serve as " c r i t e r i a " by which to assess b e l i e f systems. 
Moreover, they can be used as a device f o r the development of 
more adequate subjective understandings. Even without such an 
i n t e n t i o n t o "improve" n o t i o n a l structures, I suggest now that 
the seime metaphor can be employed as a means of analysing the 
b e l i e f systems of others, and objectivated 'knowledge' systems 
i n general. 
I suggested above that books or a r t i c l e s present an excellent 
example of how "t r e e - r o o t s " can be observed i n prac t i c e . Chapter, 
section and sub-section headings - even i f these are not verbalised 
by the w r i t e r - are short-hands f o r the included contents. This, 
however, i s the f i n i s h e d a r t i c l e . Before such a book or a r t i c l e 
comes t o be w r i t t e n , that ordering has t o take place. (Often, 
of course, the ordering i s by no means as coherent as i t might 
have been, even i n the f i n i s h e d product). At an early stage of 
research^^^\ notes or index cards may be arranged under 
p r o v i s i o n a l short-hand headings, the relationships between which 
may be l a r g e l y unrecognised. Even at the i m p l i c i t , i n t u i t e d l e v e l , 
they may be incoherent. At a l a t e r stage, when such notes or 
cai"^as are re-ordered/re-classified, they are l i k e l y t o take on a 
more e x p l i c i t l y reasoned arrangement. Old categories give way 
to new ones, as sub-division and amalgamation take place, and 
a h i e r a r c h i c a l arrangement establishes i t s e l f , as classes of a 
higher l e v e l of inclusiveness become apparent. This may seem 
~88~ 
almost a question of the cards or notes "ordering themselves". 
The model according t o which t h i s ordering takes place may s t i l l 
be l a r g e l y i m p l i c i t . As, however, the i n t u i t e d model becomes 
e x p l i c i t , i t becomes p o t e n t i a l l y more coherent, and the 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r items of data, references, novel 
ideas, etc, becomes that much easier. When the model i s f u l l y 
worked out, the a r t i c l e or book i s perhaps ready f o r w r i t i n g . 
I n mj' experience, t h i s i s an e f f e c t i v e research strategy. What 
i s important t o note here, however, i s t h a t i t i s according t o 
a model or theory - i n i t i a l l y i m p l i c i t , but eventually e x p l i c i t -
tinat the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s take place. That i s , from a cer t a i n 
stage of the research, the Relevance according to which data, 
etc., are ordered i s decided.^^^^ Other data, etc., may meanwhile 
become " i r r e l e v a n t " to the project at hand and be f i l e d elsewhere. 
The exercise of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n necessarily e n t a i l s the use 
of some model - however i m p l i c i t that model may be i n i t s early 
stages, Furthermore, theories are merely a form of model. This 
counters a coaimon suggestion that c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s and theories 
are quite d i f f e r e n t . Morris (1968), f o r instance, says that 
theories are the organisation of concepts i n t o testable 
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propositions, w h i l s t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s do not contain propositions.^ ' 
I maintain that theories may i n any case be i m p l i c i t - i n t u i t e d , 
perhaps, but not ve r b a l l y elaborated. And I maintain that 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s do contain propositions - about the nature of 
the " things" c l a s s i f i e d . B e l i e f s necessarily r e f e r t o what i s 
taken t o be Rea l i t y , But t e n t a t i v e notions also " r e f e r " . 
That i s , they t e n t a t i v e l y imply that "perhaps r e a l i t y i s l i k e 
t h i s " . Any c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , when proposed as a way of ordering 
the " f a c t s " , contains the (at l e a s t ) t e n t a t i v e proposition that 
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" t h i s i s how i t might be", . Furthermore, the very "shape" of 
the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n may contain hidden propositions, f o r instance 
th a t "Reality i s or might be ordered dichotomously" or that 
"Reality i s or might be ordered h i e r a r c h i c a l l y " . I touch b r i e f l y 
on the question of dichotomies below. 
The " t r e e - r o o t " metaphor, then, offers both a plausible 
account of how people's b e l i e f s are structured and also of how 
e x p l i c i t accounts - whether t e n t a t i v e or as attempted elaborations 
of Value-Knowledge - might be ordered. One can see such "t r e e -
r o o t s " i n books and a r t i c l e s . One can see them i n taxonomies 
of fauna and f l o r a , i n kinship diagrams, i n s y l l o g i s t i c arguments, 
(98) 
i n Roget's Thesaurus , as w e l l as i n most coherently w r i t t e n 
accounts about 'Reality'. Are there any major differences, though, 
between the ways i n which they are ( i m p l i c i t l y ) used? Are there 
d i f f e r e n t types of " t r e e - r o o t " structure? 
One way t o consider d i f f e r e n t "tree-root" structures might 
be i n terms of the f o l l o w i n g diatinctionss (a) whether the 
primary emphasis of the w r i t e r i s upon the "elemental" notions 
and the i n t r i n s i c properties of t h e i r supposed referents, or upon 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p s that supposedly connect those elements, and 
(b) whether the structures are supposed to derive t h e i r 
s t r u c t u r a t i o n from a Real s t r u c t u r a t i o n out-there, to which the 
account i s supposed i n some way to "correspond", or are Intended 
e s s e n t i a l l y as h e u r i s t i c a l l y useful - but u l t i m a t e l y a r b i t r a r y -
devices, f o r other purposes. 
According to these two d i s t i n c t i o n s , one could a r r i v e at 
f o u r "types"of " t r e e - r o o t " s t r u c t u r e . 
Type A. Semantic Taxonomiea^^^^ 
These include, f o r instance, taxonomies of plant or animal l i f e 
i n t e m s of genera, and species. They attend p r i m a r i l y t o the 
elements or contents of the structures, and i t i s the re a l 
properties believed t o oharsicteris© the referred-to objects 
( p l a n t s , animals) which d i s t i n g u i s h between classes and between 
h i e r a r c h i c a l l e v e l s . 
Type B, J^S&^9!^^^]^9^B^9I!;. 
These include academic syllabuses, based, f o r instance, upon 
f a c u l t i e s and departments, or upon areas of 'Knowledge'. Though 
i t i s the i n t r i n s i c subject matters that may be the overt 
d e f i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , there i s at least i m p l i c i t l y a strong 
reference to i n t e r - d i s c i p l i n a i y combinations or d i s t i n c t i o n s , 
(For instsuice, "the A r t s " versus "the Sciences",) Though some 
may recognise an a r b i t r a r y , or at least r e l a t i v i s t , character 
i n these d i s t i n c t i o n s and orderings, there i s frequently the 
assumption that the methodologies and logics of the various 
areas of 'knowledge' are t-eal and d i s t i n c t , ^ ^ " ^ ^ ^ 
Type C. l i O ^ i o a l Arguments 
These include, most obviously, l o g i c a l deductions, where lower 
order conclusions can be drarai from higher order premises. 
Explanatory arguments can also be viewed i n t h i s way.^ *^^ ^^  The 
emphasis i s p r i m a r i l y on the structure of the arguments (and i n 
formal l o g i c , symbols may stand f o r elements). Yet these structures 
are not necessarily taken t o have value by v i r t u e of any 
correspondence t o Natural Laws, or whatever.^^^^^ 
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Type D. Affsociational Arguments 
These include the e x p l o i t a t i o n of s h i f t i n g Relevances and the 
creative association of ideas. The emphasis i s p r i m a r i l y on 
contents, though there may be a strong element of fantasying 
and no r i g i d i n t e n t i o n , therefore, of r e f l e c t i n g the world-out-
there as i t ' r e a l l y ' i s . The approach i s , rather, d e l i b e r a t e l y 
t o seek a l t e r n a t i v e ways of looking at i t . 
Diagrammatically, these four "types of "tree-root" s t r u c t u r i n g 




B. Logical Structures C.Logical Arguments 
Emphasis on 
Contents 
A. Semantic Taxonomies D.Associational 
Arguments 
This i s one way of considering possible "types" of " t r e e -
r o o t " structures, I would not claim that i t i s the only, nor 
possibly the best, way of d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g between them. There 
are two reasons f o r t h i s . F i r s t , these "types" are not so d i s t i n c t 
as such a typology might seem t o suggest. I n a l l cases, there i s 
s t r u c t u r i n g , even though primary a t t e n t i o n i n "types" A and D 
may not be on such s t r u c t u r a t i o n . (Being less e x p l i c i t , the 
s t r u c t u r a t i o n may w e l l be less coherent, however). S i m i l a r l y , 
a l l "types" are presumably supposed to be "useful". To say that 
"types" A and B are supposed to r e l a t e more d i r e c t l y to 'Reality' 
does not mesin that they are not held to be h e l p f u l ( i n , f o r 
instance, an understanding of that 'Reality'). Thus i f 
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taxonofflists p r e f e r to c l a s s i f y according to genera and species, 
t h i s may be because that i s more h e u r i s t i c a l l y useful to them 
than c l a s s i f y i n g , f o r instance, according to sisse, or dietary 
habits, or geographical h a b i t a t , or hostility-to-man. These 
other Relevances may, however, be more useful to others, 
c l a s s i f y i n g the same ' r e a l ' l i f e - f o r m s . 
The second reason why t h i s typology should be regarded as 
only one way of d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g between "types" of "tree-roots" 
i s t hat I can ( f o r the moment, at any rate) see no u n i v e r s a l l y 
v a l i d reason why the two dimensions chosen are the best ones 
possible. As a matter of biographical d e t a i l , I at f i r s t 
i n t u i t e d f i v e , not four, "types". Pour roughly corresponded to 
those o u t l i n e d above, and the f i f t h was a kind of amalgam. I t 
was by a t t e n t i o n t o the f i f t h "type" that I was able to c l a r i f y 
the four-part typology, and see that the f i f t h "type" was 
q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t from the other four. I was typologising. 
Tyfiplogisln^ involves f i r s t a search f o r possible relevances, 
that i s , f o r possible ways of viewing the phenomena under 
consideration. I f we aremember the d i s t i n c t i o n between b e l i e f s 
and notions which are not strongly-believed, then i t i s clear 
th a t t y p o l o g i s i n g applies only to the l a t t e r . I t i s a thi n k i n g 
device, not a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of b e l i e f s . The second step i s 
t o select the Relevances which are most useful, f o r the case i n 
hand. There may be various c r i t e r i a by which such "usefulness" 
might be assessed, but one important one i s Exhaustiveness. 
There are, I t h i n k , two ways i n which exhaustiveness might be 
at t a i n e d . The f i r s t of these i s through dichotomisation and 
the second (which I retura to more f u l l y i n Part I I ) i s the 
possible u n i v e r s a l i t y of chosen dimensions. Such u n i v e r s a l i t y 
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would need to be argued, i n each case. 
Dlchotomisation i s sometimes taken t o be a natural and 
i n e v i t a b l e human exercise.^^^"^^ But we do not always dichotomise, 
though we always can. As my examples of " f u r n i t u r e " constructs 
showed, our immediate attempts t o render i m p l i c i t notions 
verbally-elaborate do not automatically "come out as" dichotomies. 
I t i s only with a very special a t t e n t i o n to making (lower l e v e l ) 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s exhaustive, that dichotomies - or bi-polar 
cotitinua - emerge. I n everyday l i f e such exhaustiveness i s not. 
always (or even usually) required or sought. There i s no 
p a r t i c u l a r problem, f o r instance, i n thinking of f u r n i t u r e as 
being e i t h e r household or o f f i c e f u r n i t u r e without concern f o r 
the r e s t . For most purposes, any furnishings thereby l e f t out 
do not matter. I n cer t a i n contexts, however, there i s a 
perceived need f o r exhaustiveness that i s very r e a l . One of 
these i s i n t h e o r i s i n g , or the building of models, f o r instance 
f o r academic purposes. With that "need" comes a tendency to 
dichotomise,^^^^^ 
Wot in f r e q u e n t l y the dichotomous d i s t i n c t i o n s then produced 
are unhelpful, i f not deceptive. F i r s t l y , an ove r t l y plausible 
d i s t i n c t i o n may i n fa c t r e l y on covert d i s t i n c t i o n s , which, 
through remaining i m p l i c i t , carry connotations that lead t o 
i l l i c i t conclusions. I t i s not legitimate t o posit 
"A (but also, c o v e r t l y , P) or B (but also, covertly, Q), 
but not both" 
and then t o "discover" t h a t , empirically, 
"When A then not-Q".^^°^^ 
Secondly, "false dichotomies" can also arise when po s i t i v e 
categories are contrasted w i t h residual or negative categories. 
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Suoh d i s t i n c t i o n s may be l o g i c a l l y l e g i t i m a t e , but t h e o r e t i c a l l y 
not very devastating, and p r a c t i c a l l y misleading,^^^^^ 
Returning t o the question of typologising, as a methodological 
device, care must be taken w i t h the (usually dichotomous) 
dimensions employed. I n the f i r s t place, i t needs to be argued 
tha t the Relevance of the dimensions i s the most appropriate. I n 
the second place, one must be aware that p a r t i c u l a r dichotomies 
may be misleading and may w e l l be b e t t e r replaced by others. 
However, t h i s i s i n no way an argument f o r avoiding such a 
methodological approach. In Part I I , I s h a l l suggest that two 
dimensions are l i k e l y to be universally relevant to educational 
issues. However, i n dichotomising these dimensions (or aspects 
of them) there may c e r t a i n l y be b e t t e r ways of considering 
pax^ticular data. ("Better", i n t h i s case, w i l l mean "more 
productive of hypotheses concerning educational ideologies" -
i n p a r t i c u l a r , how emp i r i c a l l y foimd examples can be understood; 
how they might be rel a t e d t o Master Patterns at the s o c i e t a l 
l e v e l , why they might occur as they do i n s p e c i f i c s o c i e t a l 
contexts, and what consequences t h e i r occurrence might have). 
I n t h i s section, I have suggested that four "types" of 
"t r e e - r o o t " structure might be distinguished. Such structures 
may characterize e i t h e r Value-Known or merely temporarily-held 
notions. When, however, i t i s a question of thin k i n g , rather 
than mere be l i e v i n g , the deliberate search f o r more adequate 
structures may involve not j u s t a search f o r higher levels (as 
described i n the l a s t section, i t may involve a s h i f t i n g of 
relevances and a precision of e x p l i c i t d e f i n i t i o n s and c l a s s i f i c -
ations. Such c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s are not necessarily "atheoretical". 
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They contain implied z'elat ion ships which may i n f a c t be explanatory. 
Great care should, however, be taken i n the selection of dimensions 
believed t o be relevant, especially when these lead t o 
dichotomisations. For these can frequently be deceptive, rather 
than i l l u m i n a t i n g . 
Notes 
(1) or " ' r e a l i t i e s ' " or "'knowledge'". 
(2) I s h a l l explain what I mean by "dimensions" below. Meanwhile 
i t s u f f i c e s t o say that w h i l s t i t may be i l l e g i t i m a t e t o 
expect p a r t i c u l a r b e l i e f s or p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l r e l a t i o n -
ships t o e x i s t a - h i s t o r l c a l l y or universally, nonetheless 
i t i s meaningful t o t a l k of universal dimensions (or 
moments) on which some b e l i e f s or social arrangement 
might be an t i c i p a t e d . 
(3) By "context-freedom" I mean the idea t h a t b e l i e f s might 
be unrelated t o t h e i r s o c i e t a l context i n the sense of 
not being determined by i t . By "value-freedom" I mean 
the idea that b e l i e f s may be unrelated to t h e i r context 
i n the sense of not having any determinative consequences 
upon i t . The f i r s t , then, refers to a supposed lack of 
cause, the second t o a supposed lack of consequentiality. 
Both views I r e j e c t . 
(4) Three other forms of r e l a t i v i s m are worth mentioning. 
P l u r a l i s t i c Relativism sees a l l 'knowledges' as d i f f e r e n t . 
Since we cannot therefore know which i s "true", t h i s 
view holds, then a l l are equally valuable. I cainnot 
accept t h i s view, since some accounts are patently b e t t e r 
than others. Metaphysical Idealism (a term I borrow from 
Flew, 1976) i s an extreme version of P l u r a l i s t i c Relativism. 
Having a strong f o o t i n g i n some contemporary sociology, 
i t s main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s an i m p l i c i t denial that there 
i s any order i n the world-out-there. I t i n s i s t s that 
order exists only " i n the mind". Blum, f o r example, 
says 
" I t i s easy to see that the methodical character of 
marriage, war and suicide i s only seen, recognised 
and made possible through the organised practices 
of sociology. These r e g u l a r i t i e s do not exist 'out 
there' i n p r i s t i n e form t o which sociologists 
f u n c t i o n a l l y respond, but rather, they acquire t h e i r 
character as r e g u l a r i t i e s and t h e i r features as 
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describable objects only through the grace of 
s o c i o l o g i c a l imputation..." 
Blum (1970/71) p.131 (my emphasis), 
I would agree, of course, that Reality i s complex. 
But i t s non-randomness i s not merely a function of 
s o c i o l o g i c a l benificence. 
Whilst both these forms of p l u r a l i s t i c r e l a t i v i s m 
take as t h e i r s t a r t i n g point the context-freedom 
problem (see note 7)» C o n f l i c t Relativism looks 
rather t o that of value-freedom. This view sees 
" t r u t h " as r e l a t i v e not to the origins of b e l i e f s 
and understandings, but to t h e i r consequences. The 
problem i s one of "Whose side are you on?". Whilst 
having more sympathy wi t h t h i s view, I s t i l l r e j e c t 
the i m p l i c a t i o n that t r u t h / f a l s i t y i s u l t i m a t e l y 
meaningful. 
(5) Nonetheless, Holly does make some such d i s t i n c t i o n 
himself, when he says that 
"On the whole ... the central task of primary 
schools i s to promote the learning of formal 
s k i l l s alongside the emotional development 
of the c h i l d . " 
Holly (1973/74) p.175, 
(6) I n c i d e n t a l l y , of course, "baldness" may also be 
debatable. Do two hairs constitute hairiness? 
Does a microscopic fuzz.,..? The average believer 
i n K. of P. hairlessness may not be impressed by 
such n i t - p i c k i n g ( ! ) , but rendering our i m p l i c i t 
d e f i n i t i o n s problematic, by making them e x p l i c i t , can 
be an important way of " f o r c i n g " us to examine our own 
b e l i e f s - an important point that I s h a l l return to i n 
Chapter 2. 
(7) I g r a t e f u l l y borrow t h i s term from Pord (1975) - including 
c a p i t a l l e t t e r s - t o replace what I have variously c a l l e d , 
i n the past, "underlying" or "fundamental b e l i e f s " , 
"supra-content concepts" (an expression adopted and 
adapted from Bernstein, 1971) and " u n i f i e r s " or 
"unifyihg notions" (Syer, 1974b, 1975b). What I 
mean by "Basic B e l i e f s " and by "unifyi n g " , w i l l , I 
hope, become cle a r as t h i s section proceeds. I t i s not, 
I am a f r a i d , wholly i d e n t i c a l with Ford's usage - see 
below, 
(8) "Inclusiveness", also, i s explained below. 
(9) This Weberian-Parsonian notion has been developed, f o r 
instance, by Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck (1 9 6 l ) , I n Syer 
(1972) I looked at a number of such developments and 
usages - and used i t myself - though, to ray mind now, 
rather u n c r i t i c a l l y . 
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(10) At times, very rapid - and d r a s t i c ~ changes of "personality" 
take place, even on a c o l l e c t i v e b a s i s . Not j u s t "opinions", 
but fundamental dimensions of b e l i e f akin to what "value 
o r i e n t a t i o n s " attempt to describe, are involved. See, for 
instance, Bettelheim (1960/70) pp.22-6, et passim; E l k i n s 
(1959) p.115 f f . 
I t i s the f a i l u r e , on the whole, of Bowles and G i n t i s to 
make problematic the t r a n s f e r of school-learned b e l i e f s 
to the economic and p o l i t i c a l sectors - and not j u s t t h e i r 
emphasis on primary s o c i a l i s a t i o n - that makes t h e i r 
"Correspondence P r i n c i p l e " suspiciously f u n c t i o n a l i s t , 
( I say "on the whole", because there i s c l e a r l y a 
disjuncture between t h e i r e a r l i e r work, as represented 
i n Chapter 5 of t h e i r l a t e s t book (1976), and the l a t e r 
chapters of that book, which concern the r e l a t i v e autonomy 
and revolutionary p o t e n t i a l of schools). 
(11) Compare the commonly reported s t r i k i n g of workers who are 
supposedly opposed to s t r i k e s (e.g. Cousins & Brown^ 
'1971'). The most notorious example of t h i s was the 
events at Vauxhalls of Luton, a f t e r the completion of 
Goldthorpe et a l . ' s research (1968-9). (of. Blackburn, 
1969). 
(12) c f . Mann (1970). 
(13) c f . B e l l (1960). 
(14) Also r e l a t e d are such d i s t i n c t i o n s as those made by Keddie 
(1971) i n t a l k i n g of Teacher and. Educationist Contexts. 
(See below). V/ittgenstein (1966) notes that r e l i g i o u s 
b e l i e f s are only d i s t i n c t i v e i n the degree of commitment 
involved, not i n t h e i r content. I agree, but would point 
out f u r t h e r that i t i s only i n a society where there was 
a high proportion of b e l i e f s that are "open" - not 
Value-Known - that such r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s are so d i s t i n c t i v e . 
Any closed, r i g i d i f i e d , Value-Known b e l i e f s are " r e l i g i o u s " , 
i n t h i s sense. 
F i n a l l y , the d i s t i n c t i o n between " t r a d i t i o n " and 
" t r a d i t i o n a l i s m " i s i n s t r u c t i v e . Tradition, to Weber, 
was that which has always existed, whilst t r a d i t i o n a l 
authority was that which was based upon the eveiyday b e l i e f 
i n the sacredness of prevalent t r a d i t i o n s . I f someone was 
s a i d to Value-Know something "because i t was t r a d i t i o n a l " , 
then, i t could mean one of two quite d i f f e r e n t things; 
e i t h e r an objective or a subjective explanation might be 
intended. In the former, everyday experience had produced 
the Value-Knowledge. In the l a t t e r , a ("conscious") b e l i e f 
i n the importance of t r a d i t i o n s was responsible. P r i e d r i c h 
(1972) would c a l l the former " t r a d i t i o n " , and the l a t t e r 
"ideology", but I do not f i n d h i s usage useful. 
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(15)Since each of these dimeissions i s diehotoinously presented 
(the answer i n each case my be Yes or No), the following 
" t r u t h t a b l e " might be constructed:-
I s Gould Has to Shou be be be 
•1. SI Yes (Y) Y Y 
2. Y (Y) Y No 
3. Y (Y) I Y 
4o Y (Y) N N 
Y N Y Y* 
Y Y m Y N N Y* Y N N* N Y ¥ Y** 
N Y ¥ N** 
4. N Y (IT) Y 
3. N Y (N) N 
N N ¥ Y** 
N N ¥ N** 
2, N H (N) Y N N (N) K 
I n t h i s t able, brackets i n d i c a t e that t h i s value i s 
superfluous ( e i t h e r the s t a t e of a f i ^ r s I s , and therefore 
to say that i t Gould-be i s superfluous, or i t I s n ' t , 
and therefore to say that i t Doesn't-have-to-be i s superfluous). 
* i n d i c a t e s a void category, because a s t a t e of a f f a i r s 
cannot both be ( I s ) and not be possible (Couldn^t-be). 
** i n d i c a t e s a void category, because a state of a f f a i r s 
cannot both not~be ( I s n ' t ) and yet n e c e s s a r i l y e x i s t 
(Has to be). 
The remaining categories I have grouped i n p a i r s : 
1« I d e a l 
2. F a t a l i s t i c 
3. Conservative (or X'etrenchment/consolidation) 
4. Radical or Reactionary» 
These four types of b e l i e f about given state of affaire may be 
shown i n t a b u l a r form, as follows:-
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I s , and should be 
or Isn't.and shouldn't be 
I s , but shouldn't be 
or I s n ' t , but should be 
1 
(Could be) 




have to be) 
1. I d e a l 
(YYYY or 
NNNN) 














0 6 ) 
(17) 
The names I have applied to each type should be s e l f -
explainatory. (No fu r t h e r s i g n i f i c a n c e w i l l be attached to 
them i n t h i s e s s a y ) . In each case the b e l i e f i n question 
may f i r s t l y be e x p l i c i t or i m p l i c i t , and secondly i t may 
be more or l e s s adequately elaborated. T h i r d l y , i t may 
als o be Value-Known or merely believed-for-the-time-being, 
though t h i s i s not, of course, a dichotomous choice but 
a continuum. 
These d i s t i n c t i o n s w i l l be useful i n Chapter 7. They are 
not immediately germane to the arguments of t h i s chapter, 
and are included here only because they a r i s e from 
discussion of the notion of "values" and p r e s c r i p t i v e 
statements. I t should be noted that the additional 
dimensions j u s t mentioned (the extent of e x p l i c i t elabor-
ation however (in-)adequate, and the strength of b e l i e f ) 
are not separate. For example: i f a given p o l i t i c a l 
system or pedagogical r e l a t i o n s h i p , say, i s assumed 
i m p l i c i t l y to be i n e v i t a b l e (Has to be), then func t i o n a l l y 
such an assumption w i l l have T j r e s c r i p t i v e e f f e c t s (Should, 
therefore, be). Ideologies commonly r a t i o n a l i s e what i t 
i s supposed "should" be - i n the i n t e r e s t s , f o r instance, 
of the b e l i e v e r - into what i n e v i t a b l y and n a t u r a l l y 
"has to be". And vi c e - v e r s a . 
Lichtheim (1971/74) notes that, "Theorists employ concepts 
as a kind of i n t e l l e c t u a l short-hand ... They use words 
to designate more or l e s s complex i n t e l l e c t u a l models..." 
He goes on, however, "... which have no precise equivalent 
i n empirical r e a l i t y . " (p.9). This i s a dif f e r e n t point. 
By "object", I do not, of course, mean a concrete thing, 
but "that which i s r e f e r r e d to". 
(18) To use an e a r l i e r example, I do not commonly question my 
notion of "baldaess". Furthermore, I may assume i t to be 
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quit© e a s i l y v e r b a l i s a b l e . When I stop to consider i t , 
hov/ever, I f i n d i t l e s s c l e a r than I had assumed. How 
much more true t h i s i s of notions which I have never 
v e r b a l i s e d . 
(19) P a r t i c u l a r l y the papers by Young, Bernstein, Bourdieu 
(two papers, but e s p e c i a l l y pp.174-180) and Keddie, 
Keddfe puts i t s u c c i n c t l y ; 
"Like the pupils who are categorised i n terms of 
l e v e l s of a b i l i t y , knowledge i n school i s categorised 
i n terms of i t s supposed h i e r a r c h i c a l nature with 
reference to c r i t e r i a of age and a b i l i t y . " (p.144) 
(20) For instance, White (1969)5 Shipman (1969/71). 
(21) As an example: 
"The academic value of a subject seems to me to depend 
l a r g e l y on the r a t i o of ideas to f a c t s i n i t ... I t 
could be argued that an accurate account of the r i s e 
and f a l l of export f i g u r e s for Danish cheeses during 
a given decade of the 19th century ... might well be 
more s o c i a l l y u s e f u l than an elaborate topological 
fantasy. Nevertheless our respect f o r the s p e c i a l i s t 
on cheeses i s not high; we value h i s work but not 
him; and the sole reason for t h i s i s the low content 
of ideas - hypotheses, powers of reasoning, capacity 
f o r general ideas, awareness of the r e l a t i o n s h i p of 
elements i n a t o t a l pattern , etc, - i n such 
painstaking, but i n t e l l e c t u a l l y undemanding, work..." 
B e r l i n (1969b) p.19. 
(22) eog. H i r s t (1969/71). 
(23) Actually, H i r s t e x p l i c i t l y says of h i s "cognitive 
s t r u c t u r e s " that "these would seem to me to be the 
l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t areas, though t h i s d i v i s i o n might well 
be disputed ..." H i r s t , (1969/71) p.243. 
This does not, however, a l t e r my argument. I t i s a " l i p 
s e r v i c e statement" which i s c l e a r l y not intended to i n v i t e 
r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , and i f anything 
r e i n f o r c e s the view that the 'knowledge' structures are 
objeotivatable - independently of context - a view that 
I f i n d most suspect. 
(24) For instance Horton (1967/71). 
(25) c f . Gerth & M i l l s (1954/61) pp.276-7. 
(26) I n Durkheim (1925/56). 
(27) This lack of d i s t i n c t i o n i n Bernstein (1967,1971) I 
c r i t i c i s e d and explored i n Syer (1975b). I s h a l l draw 
on t h i s i n Chapter 10. 
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(28) I s h a l l mention t h i s idea, that Objectivated 'Knowledge' 
i s often not taken as problematic, although subjective 
introduction to i t i s , i n greater d e t a i l i n Parts I I and 
I I I , Bruner, i n the terms developed there, i s a 
" P a r t i c i p a t i o n i s t " . 
(29) K e l l y (1963) e.g. p.43. 
(30) See Hesse (1966) 
(31) e.g. Park et a l . (1925) 
(32) c f . Perman (1973) 
(33) c f . Marx (1859/1969)5 Thompson (1973) pp. 27-30. 
(34) For instance, Goffman ( I969) . 
(35) For instance, Levi-Strauss (1963/72). 
(36) The reference i s to Tolkein (1954). Tolkein's Ents 
consider "hasty" any language that does hot f u l l y 
v e r b a l i s e a l l connotations and denotations. In 
contrast, a l s o from f i c t i o n , one might c i t e Delaney's 
(1967) C i r i b i a n ' s language, 
(37) Merton (1957/68) pp.313-4 
(38) c f . Wittgenstein (1953/6?) p.152. 
(39) Compare Schutz' "zones" or "realms of relevance", (See part 7 
of the next section of t h i s chapter.) 
(40) This i s so even i f what we want to believe i s objectively 
true, ( " I f only I could believe what you say ...") 
Similarly, expectations cannot be chosen, whereas aspirations 
perhaps can. 
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( 4 3 ) 
( 4 4 ) 
(45 ) 
Labov (1969 /73) 
I am suspicious of Chomsky's notion that human 
brains are ( i n normal circumstances) u n i v e r s a l l y 
px'edisposed to construct language i n c e r t a i n ways. 
I am suspicious a l s o of theories that reduce consistency 
to psychological "needs" - as i n cognitive dissonance 
. theory. 
As an example of " l i p - s e r v i c e statements", consider 
Bernstein's i n s i s t e n c e s that what he c a l l s the " R e s t r icted 
Code" i s blessed with various merits. Such comments are 
always "tacked on", never integrated with the r e s t of 
the theories developed. (For instance, Bernstein, 1969/73, 
p , 2 1 1 ) . Another example i s pointed out by Bruner (1966/74, 
p.38)5 
"Although Piaget has given us our r i c h e s t picture of 
cognitive development, i t i s one that i s based almost 
e n t i r e l y on experiments i n which age alone i s varied, 
While he admits that environmental influences play a 
r o l e , the admission i s pro forma, and inventive experiments 
remain confined to ^eatevn European chi l d r e n , u s u a l l y 
middle c l a s s at t h a t . " 
( 4 6 ) T h i s does not mean t h a t I am unable t o f a n t 
stinActures; asize alteraatisre 
ornaments 
horseshoes guns 
f u r n i t u r e 
paintings 





e t c . 
But i n that case I am d e l i b e r a t e l y changing - and quite 
d r a s t i c a l l y - the way i n which I am conceiving of, f o r 
instance, "guns" and "steeples". In terms that I s h a l l 
elaborate upon i n a moment, I am changing my angle of 
relevance. Accordingly, d i f f e r e n t structures come into 
operation, 
(47) "A low-level theoiy / I s / one that covers a r e l a t i v e l y 
l i m i t e d area of experience ... A higher-level theory /lg7 
... one that covers a l a r g e r area of experience." 
Horton (1967/71) p,220. 
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(48) The reference here i s to Bernstein et a l . (1966/71) 
(49) The reference here i s to Bernstein (1967/71) 
(50) See Syer (1974a, 1975b), and also Chapter 10 below. 
(51) Bever and Rosenbaum (1964/71), who use a h i e r a r c h i c a l 
notion of semantic l e x i c a l structures, include a 
s i m i l a r argument. 
(52) In Syer <ig74a, 1975b) I have argued t h i s i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p 
i n d i s c u s s i n g some of Bernstein's work on curriculum . 
(53) That i s , f i r s t the dimension f o r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s made 
e x p l i c i t ( " s i z e " ) and second i t i s - i n t h i s case -
exhaustively trichotomised. In example (A), however, the 
i m p l i c i t dimension ("building function") has not been 
exhaustively categorized. 
(54) c f drinking-and-driving example, above. 
(55) Compare the anger that i s roused by the f a l s e "news" 
occ a s i o n a l l y broadcast on A p r i l Fool's Day, 
(56) c f the four ( o r f i v e ) regions of decreasing relevance i n Schutz (1946) 
(57) I t therefore has possible implications of an i d e n t i t y 
between thought and language, and of over-determinism 
(neglecting the human f a c i l i t y to create i n the f i r s t 
place new notions and i n the second place the experience 
whereby those notions may become Value-Known^ 
(58) I used the term extensively i n Syer (1974b). 
(59) The author's a c t u a l headings may, however, be misleading: 
they may not "summarise" the included arguments, so much 
as mention memorable expressions r e l a t e d to them. 
(60) ;ph6 reader might l i k e to compare an early preliminary'- plan of 
Part I of t h i s essay with the "contents page" of the f i r s t 
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(61) Compare Buzan's "patterned summaiy" of his chapt 
memory (Buzan, 1974, p.8c) : er on 
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(62) I hasten to add that I am here t r a n s l a t i n g F r e i r e ' s 
ideas i n t o my own terminology. 
(63) That t h i s i s not j u s t so of elaborated Standard d i a l e c t s , 
but a l s o of non-standard d i a l e c t s , i s well demonstrated 
by Labov (1969/73). 
(54) The obti'usive t a c t i c s of ethnomethodologists have done 
much to demonstrate t h i s . 
( 6 5 ) Gladwin (1964/73). 
( 6 6 ) I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h i s respect that Advanced Driving 
techniques involve an attempt to gtsress-again v e r b a l i s a t i o n . 
(67) e,g, James (1892) pp.163-4, auoted by Slobin (1971) pp. 100-1. 
(68) Ford t a l k s a l o t of " i n t u i t i o n " , "hunches" and "implicit^-
models", and r e f e r s to others, including Kuhn and Popper, 
who have made s i m i l a r observations, see also Syer (1974b). 
( 6 9 ) See, f o r instance, Simon (1970/71) p.251 et passim, on 
the b l i n k e r i n g e f f e c t s of psychometry, but the problematic 
e f f e c t s of teachers' a c t u a l experience of supposedly d u l l 
c h i l d r e n , 
(70) Syer (1974b, 1975a) . 
(71) c f M i l l s i -
"That imagination i s the capacity to s h i f t from one 
perspective to another from the p o l i t i c a l to the 
psychological; from examination of a single family to 
comparative assessment of the national budgets of the 
world; from the t h e o l o g i c a l school to the m i l i t a r y 
establishment; from considerations of an o i l Industiy 
to studies of contemporary poetry. I t i s the capacity 
to range from the most impersonal ahd remote transformations 
to the most intimate features of the human s e l f - and to 
seie the r e l a t i o n s between the two. Back of these there 
i s always the urge to know the s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l 
meaning of the i n d i v i d u a l i n the society and i n the 
period i n which he has h i s quality and h i s being." 
M i l l s (1959/70) pp.13-14. 
(72) " I t i s c u r i o s i t y which i s the starting-point f o r theorising 
and t h e o r i s i n g which i s the f i r s t stage of s c i e n t i f i c 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n ...." Ford (1975) p.221. 
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(73) Plowden, f o r instance, t a l k s of "children among whom 
some seem to have learned only how not to l e a r n " (1 134) 
"The t h r u s t to l e a r n seems to be l a t e n t i n every c h i l d , 
at l e a s t within a very wide range of normality. But 
however good the opportunities, some children may not 
be able to take advantage of them. F a i l u r e may have 
taken away from them the urge to l e a r n . " 
Plowden Report (1967) 1136. 
Holt t a l k s i n s i m i l a r terms: 
"To a veiy great degree, school i s a place where children 
l e a r n to be stupid ... Children come to school curious; 
within a few years most of that c u r i o s i t y i s dead, or 
at l e a s t s i l e n t ..." Holt (1969) p.156. 
(74) For instance, Morrison & Mclntyre (1969/73) PP.151-4. 
(75) Bruner (1965/74) p.28, 
( 7 6 ) See Syer (1975a and 1974b) re s p e c t i v e l y , 
(77) "A s o ciety which must carry out more complicated processes 
based upon thinking and acting with a purpose i n view w i l l , 
i n c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s , n e c e s s a r i l y tend ( s i c ) to produce 
the r e f l e c t i v e type of person." Mannheim (1936/60) p,57. 
" I n t e l l e c t u a l 8elf-~awareness ... i s the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
obligation of our time" Brarason (1961) p.7. 
(78) c f Mannheim (1936/60) Arblaster ( 1 9 7 3 ) . This i s r e l a t e d 
to the assumption that a s c a r c i t y of s k i l l s i n society i s 
i n e v i t a b l e and that i t i s responsible f o r d i f f e r e n t i a l 
rewards f o r occupational performance. As Bowles and G i n t i s 
(1976, Ch.4) point out,this t e c h n i c a l - f u n c t i o n a l i s t assumption 
( c f Davis and MoOre, 1945 /64 ; Kerr et aL,1960/73) remains 
unchallenged by most environmentalist c r i t i c s of "IQ-ism". 
(79) I elaborate upon t h i s i n Syer (1975a), Compare the 
following passage i n Keddie (1971): 
"The questions from the /^'A'V pupils take the framework 
the teacher presents f o r granted, and the pupils show 
a w i l l i n g n e s s to accept the terminology (the 'correct 
term') as part of that framework. The scepticism of 
many 'C p u p i l s , which leads them to question the 
teachers' mode of organising t h e i r material, means that 
they do not l e a i n what may be taken f o r granted within a 
subject, which i s part of the process of learning what 
questions may be asked within a p a r t i c u l a r subject 
perspective." Keddie (1971) p.151 (my emphasis). 
The scepticism here i s not c u r i o s i t y so much as a lack of 
legitimation of teacher-defined r e l a t i o n s h i p s . I t 
involves n e i t h e r the development of higher-level understajadings, 
nor the p o s s i b i l i t y or duty of seeking thefn. One might 
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a l s o compare the dashed hopes of some e a r l y " t r a n s a c t i o n a l " 
deviance w r i t e r s , that truancy ( f o r instajace) was i n c i p i e n t 
r e v o l u t i o n . I t lacked, of course, the p o l i t i c a l 
consciousness that might have made i t r a d i c a l , rather than 
accomiDodative, (See, again, Syer 1975a f o r a development 
o f these d i s t i n c t i o n s ) . 
(80) One might compare the learned reluctance of a d u l t s to take 
up new p u r s u i t s , or to acquire new s k i l l s of c e r t a i n s o r t s . 
Adults might f e e l they w i l l "look s i l l y " i f they are seen 
to be novices at e x e r c i s e s that "even children can do". 
On the other hand there are some a c t i v i t i e s which adults 
are p o s i t i v e l y encouraged to "take up", where i t i s not 
remotely "odd" f o r them to be novices. A major part of 
the B.B.O. "On the Move" programmes, i n connection with 
the recent adult l i t e r a c y campaign, has been to point out 
that i l l i t e r a c y amongst adults i s (a) common, not so 
exceptional as might have been believed, and (b) remediable; 
i . e . one need not look " s i l l y " , and one can do i t . 
(81) Compare Hargreaves (1972) p,40j~ 
"What could be more devastating for a la z y pupil to fi n d 
t h at, when he does respond to the teacher's appeal f o r 
change, h i s e f f o r t s are greeted with suspicion and 
d i s b e l i e f ? Would i t not be reasonable f o r the pupil 
t o conclude that the e f f o r t i s not worth making since 
t h i s i s a game he can never win?" 
(82) I n terms explored i n Syer (1974a), the former (contextual 
c u r i o s i t y ) r e f e r s to the Autonomy and Power r e l a t i o n s h i p s , 
w h i l s t the l a t t e r ( l o g i c a l c u r i o s i t y ) r e f e r s to Logic 
and S o c i a l i s a t i o n . I n Syer (1975a) I was primarily 
concerned with the l a t t e r only, in considering c u r i o s i t y , 
because the contextual considerations involve the 
r e - a p p l i c a t i o n of b e l i e f s as determinative of changes i n 
contextual R e a l i t y . See § 25 of that paper. 
(83) To choose three diverse examples: 
"We must force the frozen circumstances to dajice by singing 
to them t h e i r own melody," Marx, qtd Bowles & G-intis (•1976)p.270. 
"The cosraological scheme connects up to b i t s of experience 
and i n v e s t s the whole with meaning; the people who accept 
i t w i l l only be able to j u s t i f y t h e i r treatment of one 
another i n terms of these ultimate categories. Unless we 
make the process v i s i b l e , we are the v i c t i m s , " 
Douglas (1970/73) p.10. 
"Whatever may be the major di r e c t i o n of influence at euiy 
time, the e x p l i c i t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the structure and 
components of one's conceptual system release one from 
bondage to i t , " H a r rl (1972) p.17. 
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(84) For instances 
"To have an idea i s not d i f f i c u l t , but to attempt to 
c l a r i f y i t , to rescue i t from a l o c a l i n t u i t i o n , to 
make i t e x p l i c i t , yet always to be aware of the ambiguity 
upon which i t s growth depends, i s quite another matter." 
Bernstein (1973) p.263. 
" I t i s not possible f o r one to express the whole of h i s 
construction system. Many of one's constructs have no 
symbols to be used as convenient words or handles. They 
are therefore d i f f i c u l t , not only f o r others to grasp 
and subsume within t h e i r own systems, but a l s o d i f f i c u l t 
f o r the person himself to manipulate or to subsume within 
the v e r b a l l y l a b e l l e d parts of his system.": K e l l y (1963) 
p,110. 
(85) Postman & Weingartner draw on Mcluhan i n t a l k i n g about 
" l a b e l - l i b e l " . McLuhaJn suggests that the medium of 
print-alphabet has produced a predominance of noun-
metaphors, 
"The stiTicture of our language i s r e l e n t l e s s i n forcing 
upon us 'thing' conceptions. In English, we can transform 
any process or r e l a t i o n s h i p into a thing by the simple 
expedient of naming i t into a nouh. We have done t h i s 
with ' r a i n ' and 'explosions', with 'waves' and 'clouds', 
with 'thought' and ' l i f e ' , " 
"'What i s i t s name?' can become a substitute f o r 'How 
does i t work?'" Postman & Weingartner (1969/71) pp.88,36. 
(86) Compare psychoanalysis, one of whose objects I take to be 
to reveal the i m p l i c i t taken-for-granted "unconscious", 
thereby enabling the subject to resolve l o g i c a l 
i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s - and thereby, in turn, emotional 
disturbances, 
(87) See a l s o Part I I , A major e t h i c of Western science has been, 
at l e a s t since Roger Bacon, that "knowledge i s power". The 
Poor Man's Guardian and then the L.S.E, took up Bacon's 
dictum as t h e i r motto, 
(88) This i s a metatheoretical judgment, common i n much humanist 
and e x i s t e n t i a l i s t thinking, which may be inconsistent with 
another, namely e g a l i t a r i a n i s m . See again Part I I , 
(89) Milgram (1970). cf a l s o Drekmeier (1971). 
(90) c f Festinger (1957); Frenkel-Brunswick (1949). 
(91) For example: "Why i s murder wrong?" "Because l i f e i s 
sacred," "Why i s i t sacred ?" "Because murder i s wrong." 
Or, "Because Man must s u r v i v e . " "Why?" "Because l i f e 
i s sacred." etc.. 
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(92) These are expressions I have used before, f o r instance 
i n Syer (1976^. c f a l s o the "domain assumptions" of 
Gouldner (1970, Ch,2), 
(93) Bourdieu (1967/71). 
(94) Davies (1970/71) o f f e r s another example. In discussing 
Henry's "Rome High School",Davies notes that i t "has two 
o r i e n t a t i o n s /which at f i r s t sight seem incompatible or 
at l e a s t i n e x p l i c a b l e i n terms of a single framework/: 
fun and scholarship, but both are subsumed i n the common-
value-system which demands integration into the adult 
so c i e t y .." Davies (1970/71) p.127. 
(95) I t i s , of course, my own research strategy that I am 
describing. However, I am tempted to think that i t i s 
frequently that of others - even i f they do not see i t 
e x p l i c i t l y i n the way I suggest, cf M i l l s (1959/70),p.199.ff. 
(96) The more c e r t a i n one becomes that the model or theory being 
developed i s adequate, the more that now-explicit structuring 
may take on the r i g i d i f i e d character of Value-Knowledge. 
That i s , however, einother matter, f o r the moment, 
(97) c f Morris (1968 ) pp,25-26, 
(98) I am g r a t e f u l to Professor Baldamus f o r t h i s l a s t example, 
Baldamus (1976) employs a "weeping willow" metaphor, 
s i m i l a r i n very many ways to my own "tree-roots" (but 
independently a r r i v e d a t ) to demonstrate suirprising 
s i m i l a r i t i e s between many major s o c i o l o g i c a l and 
ph i l o s o p h i c a l w r i t i n g s — and consequently the b e l i e f 
structure® behind them, 
(99) The names given to these "types" of "tree-root" structures 
are l i t t l e more than l a b e l s . They do not a f f e c t my argument, 
though, of course, they are intended i n some way to "short-
hand"the defining c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of each "type". 
(100) c f H i r s t (1969/71); H i r s t and Peters (1970) 
(101) c f Ford (1975)'s por t r a y a l of Deductive Nomological 
Explanations, e.g. p.45, 
(102) Indeed, Ford, i t w i l l be remembered, denies the r e a l i t y of 
c a u s a l i t y . 
(103) There might be two reasons f o r such an a s s e r t i o n , the f i r s t 
that there i s something i n t r i n s i c to the human brain that 
"needs" dichotomies, and the second that nature i s i n R e a l i t y 
f u l l of symmetries and asymmetries which "impose" themselves 
upon our minds. The f i r s t of these, f o r instance, i s 
t e n t a t i v e l y proposed by Baldamus (1976), and there i s 
considerable evidence ( f o r instance of the d i f f e r e n t i a l 
functions of the two hemispheres of the brain) to back i t 
up. I n s o f a r as a l t e r n a t i v e explanations can be found, 
however, I am i n c l i n e d to d i s t r u s t t h i s view. Any d e t a i l e d 
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attempt to refute i t would, however, be outside the scope 
of t h i s essay. The second tends to be t a u t o l o g i c a l . 
For any b e l i e f about the world-out-there e n t a i l s reference 
to aspects of i t . T h i s i n tura implies i d e n t i t y - as a 
r e a l i t y , and as a "correspondent" ' r e a l i t y ' . I d e n t i t y , i n 
turn, can be taken to imply a dichotomous d i s t i n c t i o n 
between any given P and not~P, The supposed dichotomous 
nature of R e a l i t y i s thus derived from understandings of i t 
as much as from i r r e f u t a b l e " f a c t s " of nature i t s e l f . The 
conclusion i s thus i n part the premise. 
(104) Compare the following: 
"What we propose to do i s to assume that a l l constructs 
follow t h i s b a s i c dichotomous form. Inside i t s p a r t i c u l a r 
range of convenience a construct denotes an aspect of a l l 
the elements l y i n g t h e r e i n . Outside t h i s range of 
convenience, the aspect i s not recognisable. Moreover, 
the aspect, once noted, i s meaningful only because i t forms 
the b a s i s of s i m i l a r i t y and contrast between the elements 
i n which i t i s noted ... In a minimum context, a construct 
i s a way i n which at l e a s t two elements are s i m i l a r and 
contrast with a t h i r d . " K e l l y (1963) pp.60-6l, 
I suggest that K e l l y ' s assumption i s based upon a "need" 
to conceive of personal constructs f o r psychotherapeutic 
purposes, r a t h e r than i t "springing" e i t h e r from the r e a l i t y 
of people's dichotoraous natures, or even from K e l l y ' s own 
" n a t u r a l " dichotomising tendencies. 
(105) In Syer (1975b), f o r instance, I suggested that Esland's 
Epistemological (or Phenomenological)/psychometric dichotomy 
was b a s i c a l l y a, contrast between t h e s i s and synthesis, rather 
than between t h e s i s and a n t i t h e s i s (Esland, 1971), 
Baldamus (1976), on the other hand, has developed an 
i n t r i g u i n g methodological approach based p r e c i s e l y on the 
asymmetricality of dichotomies. This involves, hov/ever, 
making e x p l i c i t what the "hidden" connotations are. 
(106) Pring (1975) has suggested that Bernstein's C o l l e c t i o n / 
Integration dichotomy i s of t h i s kind. He suggests that 
"they r e s t on the i n t e r e s t i n g l o g i c a l device of dividing 
things i n t o two types which, though mutually exclusive, 
are together exhaustive or comprehensive of the universe 
of discourse or what i s being talked about. Such a 
l o g i c a l procedure must assume that the differences within 
the types are l e s s important than the differences between 
the two types. But t h i s i s an i n i t i a l assumption that 
cannot go undefended ..." 
He l i k e n s the dichotomy to others commonly made i n " t h e o r e t i c a l 
work i n the sociology of the curriculum", which he sees as 
equally f a u l t y . 
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"The t h e o r e t i c a l models thus generated gain p l a u s i b i l i t y 
from the v a l i d l o g i c a l move of dividing a l l things into 
a p a r t i c u l a r category ( i t matters not which) and i t s 
negative, but are misconceived in that they then seek to 
a t t r i b u t e p o s i t i v e content to the negative categoity. 
Unless t h i s can be backed up by empirical work, as 
opposed to purely l o g i c a l manoeuvring, the models cannot 
be seen as t h e o r e t i c a l models of p r a c t i c a l r e a l i t y , " 
Pring (1975) pp.70-71. 
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VALUE-KMpWLEDGE 
Mind-Brain and Lanfflage 
I n a sense , my d i s t i n c t i o n between s u b j e c t i v e ' r e a l i t y ' and 
o b j e c t i v e R e a l i t y i s v a l i d only f o r the person i n quest ion. For 
each person J everything out- there i s not of h i s ' r e a l i t y ' , 
though of course he may have not ions of i t . The world-out-there 
i n c l u d e s the ' r e a l i t i e s ' of other people. F o r though these are 
s u b j e c t i v e f o r them they are ex terna l and o b j e c t i v e l y r e a l to 
the f i r s t person cons idered . T a l k i n g genera l ly , ' r e a l i t i e s ' are 
a part of R e a l i t y , 
The R e a l i t y of ' r e a l i t i e s ' i s not a s ser ted here only on 
the b a s i s of e x t e r n a l i t y , however. I see no reason to suppose 
tha t there i s anything non-phys i ca l about mind.^ Bra in i s 
mind, and jrice^^'yersa. The observer needs to d i s t i n g u i s h 
between the two because of the (no doubt Insuperab le ) methodol-
o g i c a l problem of a c c e s s i n g s u b j e c t i v e mind. Ko amount of 
o b j e c t i v e observation of b r a i n pr'operties and processes could 
r e v e a l the s u b j e c t i v e (mind) s ide of ' r e a l i t i e s ' , j u s t as no 
amount of p r e c i s e and accurate desci ' iption of l i g h t or sound 
waves could produce a correspondent account of s u b j e c t i v e l y 
perce ived "redness", or "A^"« (Whether technology or te lepathy 
could develop the means to access subjec t ive mind i s , however, 
another m a t t e r ) . 
Not having such a c c e s s , we must resort on the one hand to 
i n t r o s p e c t i o n , and on the other to metaphor, as a way of 
communicating how mind might "work". The "tree-root" metaphor 
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i s an attempt to do t h i s . I t cannot be supposed that mind i n 
r e a l i t y "contains" s t r u c t u r e s of t h i s shage. Indeed no p i c t o r i a l 
or verba l account could be anything but metaphorical . The 
p r i n c i p a l emphasis of the " t r e e » r o o t " metaphor i s , as we have 
seen, the s t r u c t u r e d nature of Djind, and e s p e c i a l l y of r l g i d i f i e d 
b e l i e f s . I would expect t h i s mind-s tructurat ion to "correspond" 
to some r e a l s t r u c t u r a t i o n of p h y s i c a l bamine (And t h i s might 
i n p r i n c i p l e be accessed through objec t ive observat ion) . However 
f l e e t i n g fantasy not ions may be, they a r e , I suggest, s t ruc tured 
( r e a l l y •- not metaphor ica l ly ) i n time and space, I s h a l l turn 
to determinative r e l a t i o n s i n a moment. Meanwhile n o n - f l e e t i n g , 
r i g i d i f i e d s t r u c t u r e s of b e l i e f cons t i tu te Value-Knowledge. 
The r o l e of language should be mentioned b r i e f l y , I have 
a lready d i scussed the part that language may play i n processes 
t h i n k i n g . F i r s t l y , I spoke of C u r i o s i t y - i n s p i r e d verba l 
e laborat ion of ( h o p e f u l l y ) more adequate accounts . Secondly, 
I d i scussed the c r e a t i v e th ink ing processes involved i n s h i f t i n g 
Relevance, and the part that language plays i n ordering and 
expanding such a l t e r n a t i v e re l evances , f o r instance i n the . 
c r e a t i o n of typolog ies . 
language i s a l s o invo lved i n b e l i e f s . I n putt ing b e l i e f s 
and thoughts into words, there i s a tendency to concret i se them -
even i f t h i s i s subsequently r e j e c t e d . I n s o f a r as v e r b a l i s a t i o n 
may not i t s e l f be an a c t i v i t y of which the b e l i e v e r / t h i n k e r i s 
e x p l i c i t l y aware, such c o n c r e t i s a t i o n may r i g i d i f y our b e l i e f s 
t o o » Language does not j u s t e laborate and expand. I t a l so 
names and c l a s s i f i e s . 
Yet the d i s t i n c t n e s s - i n p r i n c i p l e - between language and 
b e l i e f needs to be remembered i n any account of adequate accounts. 
-115-
Por j u s t as p i c t o r i a l or ve r ba l accounts of b e l i e f (and of 
thought) are n e c e s s a r i l y metaphorical , so, i t can be argued, 
are one's own v e r b a l e laborat ions of one's own b e l i e f s . Our 
i n t e n t i o n should indeed be to conceptual ise the s t r u c t u r a t i o n 
of mind - that i s to develop v e r b a l i s e d notions of the r e a l 
r e l a t i o n a l p r o p e r t i e s . But those concepts of "mind s t r u c t u r e " 
are not i d e n t i c a l to mind s t r u c t u r e i t s e l f . Consequently the 
inherent p r o p e r t i e s of those concepts cannot t r u l y correspond 
to the r e f e r r e d - t o s t r u c t u r a l propert i e s of mind. I t fo l lows 
that our own e x p l i c i t awareness of our own - l e t alone o thers ' -
b e l i e f st3?uctures can only be more or l e s s adequate. Frequent ly , 
indeed, they are thoroughly inadequate. I t i s from t h i s d iv ide 
that thejre a r i s e a l l manner of apparent " i r r a t i o n a l i t i e s " , 
(2) 
wherein people say one thing but do another. For people 's 
behaviour i s determined ( i n s o f a r as i t i s se l f -determined) by 
t h e i r b e l i e f s , rather than by what they say they be l i eve - or 
even b e l i e v e they b e l i e v e . 
Determinative Experience 
I n the sense that s u b j e c t i v e experience i s d i s t i n c t from 
o b j e c t i v e exper ience , and that access to other people's subjec t ive 
thoughts and b e l i e f s i s ( f o r methodological reasons) imposs ib le , 
mind and b r a i n are d i s t i n c t . However, mind i s bra in and 
• r e a l i t i e s ' are r e a l . They are as much part of the r e a l p h y s i c a l 
world as are l i g h t and sound. They are therefore subject to the 
same n a t u r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s of space, time and determination. 
B e l i e f s are obviously loca ted i n time and space, i n people's 
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minds.^^^ They are determined, alsoo 
I n a n o n - c o n t r o v e r s i a l sense , such p h y s i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s on 
the p h y s i c a l b r a i n as i n j u i y or malnutr i t ion can and do a f f e c t 
b e l i e f and thought processes . The argument here i s not concerned 
wi th t h a t . My suggestion i s that b e l i e f s are a product of 
experience and that experience needs to be thought of i n terms 
of the s t r u c t u r a t i o n of Rea l i ty^ R e a l i t y out-there i s s t r u c t u r e d . 
Mind-brain b e l i e f s are a l s o s t r u c t u r e d . We must now cons ider what 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s obtain between the two, 
I have d i scussed Pragmatic Adequacy as a contextual dimension, 
to be cons idered when looking at b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s . On the one 
hand i t can be seen as a c r i t e r i o n , which may be e x p l i c i t l y 
considered when the adequacy of b e l i e f s - one's own, or other 
people ' s - i s to b© understood. On the other hand, i t can be 
seen a s a dimension according to which b e l i e f s are i m p l i c i t l y 
t e s t e d , and by which not understanding but s trength of b e l i e f 
i s ( i n p a r t ) determined. The " r e a l i t y tes t ing" to which our 
b e l i e f s are constant ly subjected are not, on the whole, 
d e l i b e r a t e l y "set up" by the b e l i e v e r , . Nor i s he aware of 
the " tes t ing" that goes,on. Other dimensions of adequacy are 
a l s o the domains of "tes t ing", though the b e l i e v e r may be unaware 
of t h i s . Only i n s o f a r as a given s tructure of b e l i e f s i s 
"adequate" i n these var ious ways do notions ( i . e . s t r u c t u r e s of 
n o t i o n s ) become s t rong ly -be l i eved - i . e . Value-Known. 
I t i s through one's own i m p l i c i t adequacy t e s t i n g that 
b e l i e f s become Value-Knowledge. T h i s i s the same thing as 
b e l i e f s becoming r i g i d l y s t r u c t u r e d . A f l u i d notion i s not 
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Value-Known, whereas a r i g i d i f i e d on® i s . P a r t i c u l a r b e l i e f 
s t r u c t u r e s may be sadly inadequate i n the view of an objec t ive 
o b s e r v e r . (Adequacy c r i t e r i a are i n any case r e l a t i v e , not 
a b s o l u t e ) . Yet they must "correspond" i n some sense to the 
R e a l i t y r e f e r r e d t o , f o r t h e i r r i g i d i f i c a t i o n to be r e i n f o r c e d 
by exper ience . 
The p o s s i b i l i t y of a l t e r n a t i v e - Relevances can be a major 
source of disagreement wi th the observer. As I pointed out with 
the d r i n k - a n d - d r i v e example e a r l i e r , much of our b e l i e f may not 
be i n t e g r a l to Value-Kiiowledge s t r u c t u r e s about the "thing" 
o v e r t l y r e f e r r e d t o . I t may be so at the l e v e l of understanding, 
and p o s s i b l y r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , but the a c t u a l s t r o n g - b e l i e f 
(Value-Knowledge) may be s t r u c t u r e d according to quite d i f f e r e n t 
S'elevances. T h i s i s so of much of our "off-the-peg"'knowledge' -
'knowledge' which we have acquired i n contexts quite separate 
from the re ferred^to R e a l i t y , whether i n school , or i n church, 
o r i n the p u b l i c b a r . We may f u l l y be l ieve such "off-the-peg" 
" f a c t s " , but i t i s our 'knowledge' of the medium i n question that 
conta ins those b e l i e f s . We do not have i s o l a t e d b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s 
merely about the r e f e r r e d - t o o b j e c t s . I t i s experience that 
determines b e l i e f . Though you don't have to have 'known' Caesar 
to b e l i e v e i n him, you do have to have 'known' the mediating 
context of p r i n t , or v e r b a l language, f o r ins tance i n school or 
on the B . B . C . 
Though i t i s R e a l i t y that we experience, i t should not be 
supposed that only ex terna l R e a l i t y i s open to such experience. 
I t i s not j u s t the contextual R e a l i t y of the world-out-there from 
which we l e a r n our b e l i e f s . I t i s a l so the l o g i c a l st3nictures of 
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our own ' r e a l i t i e s ' . These too are rea l^ and these too can be 
and are experienced. Our b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s and our thought 
(4) 
procesaes are a source , i n t u r n , of learned b e l i e f s . 
I t i s because of t h i s r e a l i t y of ' r e a l i t i e s ' that e x t e r a a l 
experience alone w i l l not n e c e s s a r i l y produce pred ic tab le b e l i e f s . 
P a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s can produce d i f f e r e n t understandings and 
b e l i e f s i n d i f f e r e n t people. C e r t a i n l y , s i m i l a r notions may be 
developed i n s i m i l a r contexts . T h i s may be e s p e c i a l l y t r u e , the 
more oppressive and unyie ld ing to personal autonomous ac t ion that 
context i s . ^ ^ ^ Moreover the l e s s a v a i l a b l e are other contextual 
experiences to prompt a l t e r n a t i v e re levances - and p o s s i b l y , 
thereby, a l t e r n a t i v e systems of b e l i e f - then the more the context 
i n question i s l i k e l y to produce i n i t s members s i m i l a r (or 
complementary) b e l i e f s . But there i s no l o g i c a l l y necessary 
determination of any one s t r u c t u r e of b e l i e f s by any given context, 
i n r e l a t i o n to soiy one r e f e r r e d - t o aspect of R e a l i t y , 
I n the d i s c u s s i o n of C u r i o s i t y , above, i t was seen that an 
e x p l i c i t awareness of the non- ident i ty of r e a l i t y and ' r e a l i t y ' , 
and of one's own c r e a t i v e a b i l i t y to construct a l t e r n a t i v e not iona l 
s t r u c t u r e s , i s i t s e l f a l i b e r a t i n g awareness. For i t may l i b e r a t e 
one's b e l i e f s about what might be or should be - and even al low 
more adequate understanding of what i s . Vygotsky s t r e s s e s the 
importance of such "consciousness"; 
"We use ' consc iousness ' to denote awareness of the a c t i v i t y 
of the mind - the consciousness of being conscious, A 
pre-school c h i l d who, i n response to the question 'Do you 
know your name?', t e l l s h i s name lacks t h i s s e l f - r e f l e c t i v e 
avmreness: he knows h i s name but i s not conscious of 
knowing i t . " 
"Becoming conscious of our operations and viewing each as 
a process of a c e r t a i n kind - such as remembering and 
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imagining - l e a d to t h e i r mastea^ye School i n s t r u c t i o n 
induces the g e n e r a l i s i n g k ind of perception and thus p lays 
a d e c i s i v e r o l e i n making the c h i l d conscious of h i s own 
mental processes*" Vygotsky (1934/62) pp,91, 92. 
(Whether i n p r a c t i c e school ing ach ieves what i t ought to do i n 
t h i s respec t i s , of course , another question, A school c h i l d 
who answered ' Y e s ' to the question 'Do you know your name?' -
o r , e .g . , 'Do you know the date of the Spanish Armada?' - would 
probably be considered cheeky) . 
Such s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s may^ then, be a spur to c r e a t i v e 
t h i n k i n g and to freedom from the c o n s t r a i n t s of imposed 
experience . I n i t s e l f , however, i t can create b e l i e f s only 
about i t s e l f . As Vygotsky s a i d , i t has to be l earned . The 
experience of C u r i o s i t y being s u c c e s s f u l l y exerc i sed can teaoh 
the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of that C u r i o s i t y / r e f l e c t i v e s e l f -awareness . 
The not ions thus c i ^ a t e d , however, do not thereby become b e l i e f s 
un le s s they c r e a t e , or l ead to ac t ion designed to crea te , 
experience by which new b e l i e f s may be "tested",- Again, then, we 
d i s t i n g u i s h between thought and b e l i e f . And again i t i s experience 
that determines b e l i e f . We cannot choose to Value-Know whatever 
not ions we choose. 
I have s trong ly empjhasised the s t r u c t u r i n g of not ions and of 
the R e a l i t y to wM.ch they r e f e r . T h i s might seem to imply an 
equal ly strong d i s t i n c t i o n between those s t r u c t u r e s and t h e i r 
contents o r elements. But t h i s i s not so. Such a d i s t i n c t i o n i s 
an a n a l y t i c a l one only . Both m a t e r i a l and s o c i a l "things" i n the 
wor ld -out - there , and our s u b j e c t i v e Jjotions of them, are f i r s t l y 
s t r u c t u r e d i n themselves and secondly "elements" of more i n c l u s i v e 
s t r u c t u r e s . Prom p a r t i c u l a r po ints of view ( p a r t i c u l a r Relevances) 
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i t l a o f ten convenient to conceive of d i s t i n c t "things" and 
no t ions . But t h i s i s only a matter of convenience. To ignore 
that i s to ignore a c r u c i a l f a c t of R e a l i t y , 
"The knowledge that s o c i a l f a c t s are not objec t s but 
r e l a t i o n s between men i s i n t e n s i f i e d to the point where 
f a c t s are wholly d i s s o l v e d i n t o processes ," 
Lukacs ( 1 9 7 1 ) p .181. 
The sEime a p p l i e s to n o n - s o c i a l r e a l i t y , and to ' r e a l i t i e s ' a l s o . 
The case i s s i m i l a r to the d i s t i n c t i o n between words and l e x i c o n , 
i n semant ics . The d i s t i n c t i o n i s a u s e f u l one f o r some purposes, 
but i t only i s o l a t e s words from the l e x i c a l s t r u c t u r e s i n which 
they n e c e s s a r i l y i n h e r e , f o r those purposes. 
So f a r from emphasising s t r u c t u r e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n order 
to d i s t i n g u i s h these from " i so la ted" contents or elements, I wish 
to s t r e s s that even when we do conceive of "things" and notions 
as o n t o l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t - and we frequent ly do - then we are 
ignor ing wliat f o r the purposes of understanding b e l i e f i s most 
important , 
Oompare t h i s piece of 'knowledge's-
"1 can play 'God Save the Queen' on any ordinary piano on 
request . . . I f , however, you asked me to play the chords 
that accompany, say , 'Send her v i c t o r i o u s ' , I should not 
be able to do so without a c t u a l l y p lay ing , or 2:*ehearsing 
i n mind and muscle, the phrases of the tune that lead up 
to i t , I ha.ve the representat ion - the f a c t that I succeed 
i n doing as you ask me would prove that; but i t i s a 
' r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ' l a r g e l y i n terras of my movements ( i n 
r e l a t i o n to my perception of the piano-keys) and only 
minimal ly i n terms of the appearance of the notat ion on 
the page . . . " B r i t t o n (1970) p,9 . 
T h i s example i l l u s t r a t e s the i m p l i c i t n e s s - and frequent ly 
u n r e f l e c t e d - upon nature - of our not ional s t r u c t u r e s , as w e l l 
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a s the non-d iecreteness of those not ions . 
I have a lready d i s t i n g u i s h e d between i n d i v i d u a l s ' subjec t ive 
'knowledge', and o b j e c t i v a t e d bodies of 'knowledge' which the 
i n d i v i d u a l confront s . Both are s t r u c t u r e d . I n both i t i s the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s that need s t r e s s i n g more than the "contents". I n 
the case of language, f o r i n s t a n c e , nat ive speakers acquire what 
i s , i n the f i r s t p l a c e , a system of 'knowledge' that i s object ive 
to them. I n l e a r n i n g that system, they acquire 'knowledge' of 
the deep s t r u c t u r e s of the language, often without any e x p l i c i t 
awareness of i t , 
"No s p e c i a l t r a i n i n g o r i n s t r u c t i o n i s necessary to enable 
the n a t i v e speaker to understand these examples ^ u s t glven7, 
to know which are 'wrong' and which ' r i g h t ' , although they 
may a l l be qui te new to him. They are i n t e r p r e t e d by the 
n a t i v e speaker ins tantaneous ly , and uni formly , i n accordance 
wi th s t r u c t u r a l p r i n c i p l e s that are known t a c i t l y , 
i n t u i t i v e l y and unconsc ious ly ." Chomsky (1969/72) p.131, 
Bruner draws a c lo se comparison between t h i s view of language and 
(7) 
h i s ovrti view of school c u r r i c u l a j -
"Learning to be s k i l l f u l wi th a body of knowledge i s much 
l i k e l e a r n i n g a language, i t s r u l e s f o r forming and 
trajasfonning sentences , i t s vocabulary, i t s semantic 
markers, e t c . . As wi th language, there i s a l so the 
i n t e r e s t i n g f ea ture i n a l l such l earn ing that what i s 
l earned i s i n i t i a l l y ' out s ide ' the l e a r n e r - as a d i s c i p l i n e 
of l e a r n i n g , as a subject ma.tter, as a no ta t iona l 
system Bruner (1969/74) p,127. 
One can become competent i n the deep s t r u c t u r e of a language, 
or of a c u r r l c u l a r / a c a d e m i c s u b j e c t , or of a s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n 
w i t h i t s pat terns of " r u l e s " and expectat ions . But t h i s 
competence may not be e x p l i c i t . I n becoming e x p l i c i t l y aware of 
the s t r u c t u r a t i o n , one becolnes "conscious", i n the sense used by 
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Vygotsky, That consciousness , i n tursi, o f f e r s the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of autonomous a c t i o n , a t l e a s t i n respect of one's own under-
s tandings , 
"To us i t seems obvious that a concept can become subject 
to consciousness and d e l i b e r a t e contro l only when i t i s a 
part of a system. I f consciousness means g e n e r a l i s a t i o n , 
g e n e r a l i s a t i o n i n turn means the formation of a super-
ordinate concept that inc ludes the given concept as a 
p a r t i c u l a r case , A superordinate concept Impl ies the 
ex is tence of a s e r i e s of subordinate concepts and i t a l so 
presupposes a h i e r a r c h y of concepts of d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s 
of g e n e r a l i t y , " Vygotsky (1934/62) p .92 . 
Both o b j e c t i v a t e d systems and subject ive ones, then, can be 
seen as s t r u c t u r e d i n the same sor t of way. However metaphorical 
and however inadequate a p a r t i c u l a r account of that s t r u c t u r a t i o n 
may be, that s t r u c t u r a t i o n i s r e a l . What then of the e x t e r n a l 
R e a l i t y , to which those systems themselves r e f e r ? I s that a l so 
s t r u c t u r e d "on s i m i l a r l i n e s " ? C e r t a i n l y ' r e a l i t y ' should not 
be confused with R e a l i t y , Th© two are d i s t i n c t i n that the 
former r e f e r s to (aspec t s o f ) the l a t t e r . R e a l i t y i t s e l f i s 
s t r u c t u r e d . That i s , i t i s composed of complex r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
( o f space, time and determinat ion) , r a t h e r than composed of 
d i s t i n c t "things", l i n k e d only i n men's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , 
"The weakness of phenomenology seems to us to l i e p r e c i s e l y 
i n the f a c t that i t l i m i t s i t s e l f to a comprehensive 
d e s c r i p t i o n of the f a c t s of consciousness ( o r , to be more 
exact , of t h e i r ' e s s e n c e ' ) • 5?he r e a l s t ruc ture of 
h i s t o r i c a l f a c t s permits , however, beyond the conscious 
meajiing of those f a c t s i n the thoughts and in tent ions of 
the a c t o r s , the pos tu la t lon of an objec t ive meeining which 
often d i f f e r s from the conscious meaning i n an Important 
way," Goldmann (1969) PP» 33-34. 
•123-
R e a l i t y out- there i s not s t ruc tured only i n s o f a r as we impose 
s t r u c t u r a l d e f i n i t i o n s upon i t . Even in the case of s o c i a l systems, 
there i s , at any point i n time, an o b j e c t i v e l y r e a l s t r u c t u r a t i o n 
that i s not mex'ely the sum of people's d e f i n i t i o n s , b e l i e f s and 
understandings . Of course s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s would not be as 
they are ( a t any given point i n t ime) unless the people concerned 
had p a r t i c u l a r b e l i e f s ( i m p l i c i t and e x p l i c i t ) about them. But 
tha t does not mean that those i n s t i t u t i o n s cons i s t only i n those 
b e l i e f s . Such would seem to me to be the impl i ca t ion of 
passages l i k e the fo l lowing , which I would accordingly chal lenge: 
"Great care i s required i n any statements one makes about 
the l o g i c ' of i n s t i t u t i o n s . The log ic does not r e s ide i n 
the i n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e i r ex terna l f u n c t i o n a l i t i e s , but 
i n the way these are t rea ted i n r e f l e c t i o n about them. 
Put d i f f e r e n t l y , r e f l e c t i v e consciousness superimposes the 
q u a l i t y of l o g i c on the i n s t i t u t i o n a l order ." 
Berger & Luckmann (1967/71) po82. 
As much as the "natura l" world, s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s have a R e a l i t y . 
T h i s may w e l l be f l e e t i n g and t r a n s i t o x y (but frequent ly i t i s n o t ) . 
Yet i t i s r e a l f o r a l l t h a t . As such , i t i s a major source of 
experience , and thereby of b e l i e f s . 
I n sum, there are three a n a l y t i c a l l y d i s t i n c t sources of 
experience; ( a ) concrete r e a l i t y , (b) object ivated 'knowledge' -
i n s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s as w e l l as bodies of 'knowledge' that are 
l oca ted w i t h i n those I n s t i t u t i o n s , ajnd ( c ) subjec t ive mind. A l l 
have r e a l i t y (and a l l are u l t i m a t e l y contained wi th in the m a t e r i a l 
w o r l d ) . A l l are s t r u c t u r e d (though our understandings of the 
s t r u c t u r a t i o n s are n e c e s s a r i l y metaphorical and always more or 
l e s s inadequate) . A l l can be the contexts of be l i e f -produc ing 
exper ience . That context i s c r u c i a l to us i f we are to understand 
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the nature of p a r t i c u l a r b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s , ( a ) We may l e a r n 
" d i r e c t l y " from and about the world-out-theres our b e l i e f s may 
i-ofer to the context i n which they are acquired , (b) We may 
l e a r n " i n d i r e c t l y " , through th© medium of p r i n t , or conversation 
e t c . , without "d irec t" experience of the r e f e r r e d - t o "objects", 
( c ) We may a lready hold b e l i e f s , and r e f l e c t upon them. I n t h i s 
case the r e a l i t y of those b e l i e f s or of that th inking i t s e l f 
provides experience - which i n turn can be be l ie f -producing . I n 
p r a c t i c e , of course , a l l three forms of experience are commonly 
combined. 
I t i s not open to us to have j u s t any kind of experience. 
I t i s not , there fore9 open to us to acquire j u s t any kind of 
b e l i e f , (a ) I could not ever have subject ive experience 
a s s o c i a t e d wi th being b l a c k , or g iv ing b i r t h . I could not , 
t h e r e f o r e , ever have d i r e c t Value-Knowledge of those experiences -
what i t i s l i k e to be or do those th ings , (b) I can, however, 
'know' about_ them. I can l e a m " i n d i r e c t l y " i n c e r t a i n l earn ing 
contexts , whether that be the p r i n t e d word, or conversat ion, or 
even observat ion . The Value-Knowledge that I a lready and ongoingly 
have about those lears i ing contexts w i l l in f luence the s trength 
w i t h which my new 'knowledge' i s h e l d . I t w i l l a l s o a f f e c t what 
s t r u c t u r e s of b e l i e f the new 'lojowledge' i s in tegrated i n t o , 
( c ) T h i r d l y , I can r e f l e c t upon the understandings and b e l i e f s 
acquired i n e i t h e r of the above two manners ("d irec t" or 
" i n d i r e c t " ) . Such r e f l e c t i o n i t s e l f const i tutes experience, 
and can produce Value-Knowledge. (How e l se could anyone have 
pass ionate convic t ions about, say, the nature of "the State" -
even i f they are d i r e c t l y subjected to such manifes tat ions as 
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i t s l e g a l a p p a r a t u s e s ? ) . 
The s t rength of Value-Knowledge i s a funct ion of two th ings . 
F i r s t , i t i s a f u n c t i o n of the integratedness of (new) 'knowledge' 
i n t o other b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s . Second, i t i s a funct ion of the 
reinforcement of o ther experiences ("d irec t" or "Ind irec t" -
e . g . s i m i l a r experiences ( a ) of being; such-»and-such, or (b) of 
obta in ing "news" from such-and-such a source, or ( c ) of subjec t ive 
r e f l e c t i o n ) . The f i r s t i s a matter of l o g i c a l adequacy? the 
coherence of b e l i e f in tegra t ions The second i s a matter of 
contextual adequacy; reinforcement through d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t 
" r e a l i t y t e s t s " . 
According ly , Value-Knowledge i s two t h i n g s . On the one hand 
i t i s r i g i d b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s - s t r u c t u r e s of b e l i e f s that are 
r i g i d l y he ld as " c o r r e c t l y " formed and n o n - f l u i d . I n t h i s sense, 
Value-Knowledge i s a s ta te of mind. 
"The uncer ta in ty of an a s s e r t i o n can be expressed 
impersonal ly: 'He might come home today' , ^ u t ^ 
«I be l i eve and i t i s n ' t so' would be a c o n t r a d i c t i o n . " 
" • I be l i eve . , . ' throws l i g h t on my s t a t e . Conclusions 
about my conduct can be drawn from t h i s express ion. So 
there i s a s i m i l a r i t y here to expressions of emotion, of 
mood, e t c . " Wittgenstein (1953/67) p,191. 
But on the other hand, Value-Knowledge i s not j u s t a s ta te of mind. 
B e l i e f s n e c e s s a r i l y r e f e r to what i s taken to be R e a l i t y , Va lue -
Knowledge i s , t h e r e f o r e , a r e la t i ona , l p3x>perty, l i n k i n g R e a l i t y 
and ' r e a l i t y ' . I t i s created i n the I n t e r a c t i o n of the two, that 
i s , by experience . 
I f Value-Knowledge i s i n part a s tate of mind, emotions can 
be seen as ( l earned) responses to s i t u a t i o n s where that Value-
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Knowledge i s cha l l enged . What i s Value-Known i s , i n a sense, 
"sacred". But how we react to the "profajie" (a r e s i d u a l category, 
anyway) w i l l depend on our other r e l a t e d 'knowledge' i n context . 
F e a r , outrage, de l i gh t or m i r t h , f o r ins tance , may r e s u l t from 
something not being "quite r i g h t " , S o a l s o might Cur ios i ty ,^^^^ 
F o r the r i g i d i f i c a t i o n of b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s i s equivalent to 
t h e i r c l o s u r e . And, as Horton says , 
"Absence of any awareness of a l t e r n a t i v e s makes f o r an 
absolute acceptance of the e s t a b l i s h e d tenets , and removes 
any p o s s i b i l i t y of quest ioning them. I n these c ircumstances , 
the e s t a b l i s h e d tenets inves t the b e l i e v e r with a compelling 
f o r c e . I t i s t h i s force which we r e f e r to when we t a l k of 
such tenets as s a c r e d . 
Where the e s t a b l i s h e d tenets have an absolute and 
e x c l u s i v e v a l i d i t y f o r those who hold them, any chal lenge 
to them i s a threat to chaos, of the cosmic abyss , and 
t h e r e f o r e evokes intense anx ie ty ," 
Horton (1967/71) p ,231, 
I r e t u r n 8,t l ength to the not ions of c losed and open views of 
knowledge, below. 
Value-Knowledge and the Hidden Curriculum 
Understanding i s not b e l i e f . One can "learn" theor ie s 
without t h e i r being in tegra ted in to one's Value-Knowledge. 
Consequently they do not , to that extent, determine behaviour. 
Students who wr i t e s t i r r i n g essays about the need to de-school , 
or to d r a s t i c a l l y r e - s t r u c t u r e soc ie ty before any e f f e c t i v e 
r a d i c a l i s a t i o n of education can occur , can s t i l l go o f f to teach 
vd.th r e l a t i v e l y unaf fec ted assumptions about pedagogical p r a c t i c e . 
T h e i r understood t h e o r i e s have not been integrated i n t o t h e i r 
Value-Knowledge. They are exam-room t h e o r i s t s . 
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I n p a r t , t h i s can be seen as a r e s u l t of contextual s i t u a t i o n s 
imposing themselves, A c e r t a i n set of b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s may 
"switch on" i n one context , w h i l s t a quite d i f f e r e n t Relevance 
i s turned to i n a d i f f e r e n t context . This i s the suggestion of 
Keddie ' s d i s t i n c t i o n between the educat ionis t and teacher contexts . 
But i n part a l s o , there i s a sense i n which one Relevance i s 
"more ' r e a l ' " than the other . One i s more fundamentally Value-
Known, and thereby more determinative of actual pedagogical p r a c t i c e . 
(11) 
I t has , as Keddie says , move to do with commitment than doc tr ine . 
When these two aspects are combined, the immediate contextual 
s i t u a t i o n p lays a major part i n determining the Value-Known 
Relevance f o r that s i t u a t i o n . But i t i s not the sole determinant, 
f o r the s t r u c t u r e of the "relevant"' b e l i e f s i s a product of other 
forms of experience a l s o , 
*»Dlrect" experience of the context e x p l i c i t l y r e f e r r e d - t o 
may seem more determinative of Value-Knowledge. I n a sense t h i s 
i s so . But i t i s more complex than t h a t . 'Knowledge' about 
t e a c h i n g - l e a r n i n g acquired i n classroom p r a c t i c e may be d i f f e r e n t 
from that acquired " i n d i r e c t l y " i n a college of education, and 
d i f f e r e n t again from that acquired i n subject ive r e f l e c t i o n . I n 
these three cases i t i s the experience of , r e s p e c t i v e l y , teaching , 
being-taught and r e f l e c t i n g that i s productive of Value-Knowledge. 
Consequently that Value-Knowledge w i l l be "about" those d i f f e r e n t 
k inds of experience , even though the understanding - the e x p l i c i t 
r e f e r e n t - may i n each case concern "classroom teach ing- l earn ing" . 
Three a l t e r n a t i v e Relevance s t r u c t u r e s may therefore be e s t a b l i s h e d . 
Each could be Value-Known. But though a l l three are e x p l i c i t l y 
concezmed wi th "classroom teaching and learning", only one of 
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them i s i S E l i c i t l x "about" t h i s . I t i s J jo t simply the d i f f erence 
of concrete context , then, that determines which 'knowledge' 
Relevance "comes i n t o operat ion". I t i s the ro l e being played 
by the b e l i e v e r - whether as c lassroom-teacher, student, or 
r e f l e c t i v e t h i n k e r . 
Three f u r t h e r i s s u e s a r i s e from t h i s . F i r s t l y , these r o l e s 
are not themselves confined to s p e c i f i c contexts . They are 
g e n e r a l i s a b l e . Thus the "class-room teacher" may be found holding 
the rostrum i n the p u b l i c b a r , i n committees, or at the breakfast 
t a b l e . The "student" may be found i n front of the t e l e v i s i o n , 
and on the shop- f loor . The " r e f l e c t i v e th inker" may i n p r i n c i p l e 
be found anywhere. The extent of a c t u a l g e n e r a l i s a t i o n i s an 
important e m p i r i c a l ques t ion . Dec i s ive i n t h i s respect are not 
j u s t equivalent or s i m i l a r p a t t e r a s of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , but 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s a l s o with bodies of object ivated 'knowledge'. 
U l t i m a t e l y what matters i s the learned (and Value-Known) s e l f -
concept wi th regard to t h i s r'Qlatlonship, Secondly, the separation 
of the three kinds of context-re levance j u s t mentioned i s l i k e l y 
to be a matter of d e f a u l t . That i s , i t w i l l be l a r g e l y through 
a l a c k of e x p l i c i t awareness of these d i s t i n c t i o n s that people's 
behaviour-determining Value-Knowledge i s context-bound. Though 
an understsinding of the d i s t i n c t i o n s need not i n i t s e l f be 
Value-Knowledge, i t can be the b a s i s of a c t i o n . Such act ion can 
I t s e l f create new Value-Known consciousness . T h i r d l y , a l l three 
r o l e - t y p e s j u s t d i scussed are ( i n the case of educat ional processes ) 
i n t e r - r e l a t e d . I n the case of t eachers , t h e i r experiences i n a l l 
three re spec t s are re levant to t h e i r pedagogical p r a c t i c e - and, 
a t a deeper l e v e l , t h e i r educat ional ideo log ies . I t i s l i k e l y , 
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then, that at a higher (more i n c l u s i v e ) l e v e l , a l l three kinds 
of Value-Knowledge may be integrated - however inadequately. 
This i s a "happy-coincidence*' so f a r as the study of educational 
ideologies i s concerned, Por i t suggests that i t may be possible 
t o search f o r o v e r a l l Basic Reliefs, rather than f o r a series of 
d i s t i n c t (context-relevant and lower-level) "Basic Reliefs". 
I r e t u r n t o t h i s issue i n Part Ho 
The idea t h a t contextual experience teaches » at least as 
much as e x p l i c i t l y "educational" material - has l a t e l y become 
popular i n educationist w r i t i n g . One of the more sophisticated 
accounts i s that of Bourdieus 
"An i n d i v i d u a l ' s contact w i t h his culture depends ba s i c a l l y 
on the circumstances i n which he has acquired i t , among 
other things because the ^ c t whereby culture i s communicated 
i s , as such, the exemplary expression of a certain type of 
r e l a t i o n t o the culture^ The formal l e c t u r e , f o r instance, 
communicates something other, and something more, than i t s 
l i t e r a l content: i t furnishes an example of i n t e l l e c t u a l 
prowess and thereby indissoluably defines the ' l i g h t ' 
c u l ture and the ' r i g h t ' r e l a t i o n to that culture ... A l l 
teaching practices i m p l i c i t l y f u r n i s h a model of the ' r i g h t * 
mode of i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y ,„," 
Bourdieu (1967/71) p.199. 
The expression "hidden curriculum" has been popularised by I l l i c h . 
" I am using the term hidden-curriculum t o r e f e r t o the 
structure of schooling as opposed to what happens i n 
school, i n the same way tloat l i n g u i s t s d i s t i n g u i s h between 
the structure of a Isaiguage and the use the speaker makes 
of i t , " I l l i c h (1971), quoted by L i s t e r (1974), p.93. 
Others have embraced the concept as an explanation of a l l education's 
i l l s . Kvai^ceus t a l k s of the "hidden curriculum", the "covert 
curriculum" and even the "subliminal curriculum". He says. 
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"Like th© lower part of the icebergj the covert 
curriculum can be the more important one, a hidden 
and formidable deteiminer of educational behaviour." 
Kvaraceus (1970) pa93. 
These are not by any manner of means the f i r s t t o notice 
t h a t formal schooling systems may not be an unmixed blessing. 
The d i s t i n c t i o n between education and i n d o c t r i n a t i o n , f o r 
(12) 
instance, i s an ol d one.^ Whilst Tories and Whlg>s argued 
over whether i t was desirable or dangerous to promote popular 
education, there were many who favoured working class conscient-
i z a t i o n but opposed state i n t e r v e n t i o n altogether. Marx may have 
been being deeply i r o n i c when he wrote t h a t , 
" I t i s b e t t e r t h a t working men ajid working women should not 
be able t o read and w r i t e or do suras than that they should 
receive education fx'ora a teacher i n a School run by the 
State, I t i s f a r b e t t e r that ignorance should debase the 
working classes than that eternal p r i n c i p l e s should be 
v i o l a t e d . " Marx (1873)» quoted by F r i t h and Corrigan (1976) 
But he was r e f e r r i n g t o the same problem as Hodgskin and 
Robertson, who wrote i n 1823 that i f the Mechanics' I n s t i t u t e 
"was t o be of r e a l service to the workers, i t must be under 
t h e i r c o n t r o l , " 
"Men had b e t t e r be without education, than be educated 
by t h e i r r u l e r s ; f o r then education i s but the mere 
breaking i n of the steer to the yoke; the mere d i s c i p l i n e 
of a hunting dog, which, by din t of severity, i s made to 
forego the strongest impulse of his nature, and instead of 
devouring his prey, to hasten w i t h i t to the feet of his 
master." quoted Simon (1960) p.215. 
More recently, the w r i t i n g of McLuhan has pointed i n f l u e n t i a l l y 
t o the f a c t that 
"The content of the medium blinds us to the character of 
the medium," McLuhan (1964) P,16. 
.131-
The "hidden curriculum", then, has been taken t o r e f e r to the 
character of the medium - the form, or the structure - of 
schooling, as d i s t i n c t from i t s content. Ointis has gone so 
(13) 
f a r as to declare^ ' that the content of education i s 
(14) 
i r r e l e v a n t ; only the form matters. 
There are some important t r u t h s i n t h i s sort of assertion 
as my discussion of context-relevance has, I hope, suggested. 
But i t i s often not at a l l clear what exactly i s meant by 
"content" and "form" ( o r " s t r u c t u r e " ) . Consequently, there i s 
not i n f r e q u e n t l y some confusiono Holly, i n an otherwise 
excellent book, manages to say, on the same page, t h a t , 
"Whether I study the career of Napoleon or the General 
Strike i s r e a l l y less an issue than how and why I study 
them", 
and t h a t , 
because "the post-adolescent generation i n secondary 
schools, colleges and u n i v e r s i t i e s ... are s t i l l only 
h a l f emancipated t h e i r c r i t i c i s m has been directed 
against the organisation rather than the content of 
education." Holly (1973/74) p.22. 
Holly resolves t h i s apparent contradiction by defining "the 
content of l e a r n i n g " as "a question of aims and i n t e n t i o n s " 
( i b i d ) . I t seems that here, as elsewhere, the s t r u c t u r e / 
content d i s t i n c t i o n , i n r e l a t i o n to the "hidden curriculum", 
i s i n t u i t i v e l y c orrect, but lacks sophisticated elaboration. 
A d i s t i n c t i o n between structure and contents i s tenable 
only at defined l e v e l s of analysis - that i s , only when one 
has stated c l e a r l y what Relevance one i s employing. A l l 
contents are also structures. (Notions, f o r instance, are 
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models i n themselves, although f o r p a r t i c u l a r purposes i t may 
be l e g i t i m a t e t o consider them as "elements" i n cer t a i n other 
sti'uctures. This i s a necessary short-hand, which enables us to 
concentrate on s p e c i f i c issues). I n the case of "hidden 
curriculum"^ a d i s t i n c t i o n i s presumably being made from the 
"overt curriculum": that i s , the defined and e x p l i c i t l y 
recognised syllabuses of p a r t i c u l a r educational i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
But t h i s makes "hidden curriculum" a residual category. I t 
conceals more problems than i t solves. I s the "hidden curriculum" 
other kinds of •too^;;ed^' which are also a c t u a l l y imparted -
such as the d i f f e r e n t i a l worth of certain kinds of 'knowledge', 
or behaviours, or people? Or i s i t the structure of r e a l mateidal 
and s o c i a l fflations which may i n part help to produce that 
'knowledge'? Often i t i s not clear whether the "hidden 
curriculum" i s what i s i n the event learned, or what i s object-
i v e l y there to be learned. Metaphorically, i t may be proclaimed 
th a t the medium i s the message. But f o r an adequate theoiy to 
be produced t h i s i s not enough. At what l e v e l , and according 
t o what relevance, can the "hidden curriculum" be seen as 
"s t r u c t u r e " (as opposed t o "content")? And what, i n that case, 
would "content" be? 
I f we considered the structure of so c i a l r e l a t i o n s i n 
education, we might be direct e d t o any of a number of le v e l s -
classi'oom i n t e r a c t i o n , school organisation, the o v e r a l l schooling 
system of a society, or the society as a whole. Accordingly, we 
might look, f o r instance, at pedagogical styles and peer r e l a t i o n s , 
at the organisation of learning groups, at d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s 
between school-types, or at the societ a l functions of formal 
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schooling. Writers concerned w i t h p o l i t i c a l s o c i a l i s a t i o n have 
(15) 
often attended t o such features as these.^ 
Bowles a;nd G i n t i s have looked e x p l i c i t l y to the s o c i a l 
r e l a t i o n s of schooling, i n o u t l i n i n g t h e i r "correspondence 
p r i n c i p l e " , 
"The 'hidden' content of schooling - the values, 
expectations, and patterns of behaviour which schools 
encourage - i s p r i m a r i l y conveyed not by the formal 
curriculum, but by the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s of the schooling 
process i t s e l f * " 
"The s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s of production are replicated i n 
the schools." Bowles (1971) pp»477, 478. 
There appears t o be a clear d i s t i n c t i o n between structures of 
s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s and the content of what i s learned/conveyed 
( o r encouraged!). And the f i r s t i s "determinative" of the l a t t e r . 
When they t r y t o elaborate on t h i s f u r t h e r , however, they encounter 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . ^ ^ ^ ^ The correspondence which they a c t u a l l y discuss 
most i s not between d i f f e r e n t kinds of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , but 
between a t t r i b u t e s valued by both teachers and employers. This 
i s coupled w i t h a determinist - even behaviourist - suggestion that 
these a t t r i b u t e s are produced and/or reinforced by p o s i t i v e and 
negative sanctions administered by teachers. Evidence i s offered 
that these a t t i d b u t e s ~ which are not unlike value-orientations -
are correlated w i t h school grades, when IQ i s held constant. There 
i s l i t t l e that i s d i f f e r e n t here from the 1950s f u n c t i o n a l i s t 
(17) 
p o s i t i v i s m of, f o r instance, Strodtbeck, or Rosen.^ Indeed 
t h e i r r e s u l t s are s i m i l a r . Even the family i s invoked to explain 
i n i t i a l s o c i a l i s a t i o n i n t o these orie n t a t i o n s . 
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I n a chapter s p e c i f i c a l l y dealing w i t h the "correspondence 
p r i n c i p l e " , Bowles and Gintis (1976) make very l i t t l e mention of 
e i t h e r c o n f l i c t , i n the schooling context, or of the subjective 
creation of 'knowledge' and i d e n t i t y . On the whole, pupils 
appear to be more or less passive determinees of a coherent 
school system, which functions as a selector and s o c i a l i s e r . 
The account i s not unlike that outlined by Parsons (1959/61) -
except th a t i t i s corporate c a p i t a l which i s the beneficiary. 
There i s , however, an acknowledgemesat i n t h i s chapter that 
correspondence may f a i l , due t o the " i n t e r n a l dynamic of the 
educational system, and popular opposition" (p.129). This 
i s taken up f o r c e f u l l y l a t e r i n the book. Instead of Camoy's 
t i m i d afterthought, suggesting that free schools might t u r n the 
t i d e of c u l t u r a l imperialism (Gamoy, 1974), Bowles and Gintis 
devote a longish section t o the needs of humanity and the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of so c i a l revolutions 
"Central to our optimism that social revolution i s indeed 
possible i n the United States i s the ever-widening g u l f 
between human needs - what people want - and the imperatives 
of f u r t h e r c a p i t a l i s t expansion and production. This 
p o s i t i o n may seem out of place i n a book which has l a i d 
such stress on the reproduction of consciousness and s k i l l s 
consistent w i t h c a p i t a l i s t expansion ,,, 
^owever^ The work process produces people as well as 
commodities. But people, unlike commodities, can never 
be produced exactly to c a p i t a l i s t s p e c i f i c a t i o n s . The 
product - incl u d i n g the experienced needs of people - depends 
both upon the raw material w i t h which the production process 
begins, and the 'treatment' i t receives. Neither i s by einy 
means under the f u l l c o n t r o l of the c a p i t a l i s t class ..." 
Bowles and Gintis (1976) p.277. 
As they say, t h i s p o s i t i o n may seem out of place ... 
The i n t u i t e d arguments of Bowles and Gintis may not be 
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i n c o n s i s t e n t . But t h e i r notions of the "correspondence p r i n c i p l e " -
l i k e t h a t of the "hidden curriculum" are too vague and ambiguous 
t o reveal how t h e i r i n t u i t i o n s might be adequately integrated 
i n t o a single t h e o r e t i c a l frameworko I t i s not j u s t structures 
of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s that teach (are 'knowledge'-producing 
experience). The organisation of 'knowledge' i s inseparable -
except a n a l y t i c a l l y - from s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s as such. And the 
s t r u c t u r a t i o n of o b j e c t i v a t e d 'knowledge' has "messages" of i t s 
own. Furthermore, we should not assume - l i k e Bowles and G i n t i s 
(and Parsons) - that what i s learned i n school i s l i k e l y t o 
t r a n s f e r t o what "needs" t o be 'known' i n adult l i f e . This 
t r a n s f e r must be taken as problematic. We need also to consider 
the s t r u c t u r a t i o n of subjective b e l i e f s - of p u p i l s , and also 
of teachers - t o see what i s supposedly transferred. We need to 
ask why i t might be t r a n s f e r r e d - and when i t might not. 
Turning t o 'knowledge' objeetivated i n school, we should 
see t h i s - l i k e any notions, at whatever l e v e l - as both 
i n t e r n a l l y ajad e x t e r n a l l y structured. I t has i t s own i n t r i n s i c 
(18) 
" l o g i c " , and an " e x t r i n s i c l o g i c " too,^ ' The i n t r i n s i c l o g i c 
(19) 
of school knowledge - i n any given context - i s the structure 
of the overt curriculum* I t i s the e x p l i c i t l y intended syllabuses, 
etc. (though the actual s t r u c t u r a t i o n may be quite i m p l i c i t ) . 
The e x t r i n s i c l o g i c , on the other hand, i s the structured 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between such educational 'knowledge' aJid the 
s o c i a l and s o c i e t a l context. Such matters as the status of 
p a r t i c u l a r bodies of 'knowledge'^^^^ and the various r i t u a l s of 
(21 > 
schooling^ would here be included. Bruner hints at t h i s 
d i s t i n c t i o n i n the following?-
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"Young ch i l d r e n i n school expend extra-ordinary time and 
e f f o r t working out what i t i s that the teacher wants -
and usually coming t o the conclusion that she or he wants 
tid i n e s s or remembering or doing things at a cer t a i n time 
i n a ceii;ain way. This I r e f e r to as e x t r i n s i c problem 
solving. There i s a great deal of i t i n school," 
Bruner (1965/74) p.78.(22) 
The " i n t r i n s i c l o g i c " of objectivated 'knowledge' i n schools 
has to do with i t s own structure and i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o i t s 
e x p l i c i t l y r e f e r r e d - t o objects ( i . e . h i s t o r i c a l or b i o l o g i c a l or 
mathematical " f a c t s " ) . I t s " e x t r i n s i c l o g i c " has to do wit h 
i t s n o n - e x p l i c i t referents ( i o e , questions of d i s c i p l i n e , status, 
e t c . ) . These are the context of 'Knowledge'-transmission, and 
an i n t e g r a l part of resultant b e l i e f structures. 
Bodies of 'knowledge' cannot, then, be divorced from t h e i r 
context. This includes the social r e l a t i o n s (of education). 
Notions r e f e r , and so do bodies of 'knowledge'. Put d i f f e r e n t l y , 
any attempt to separate out, other than f o r a n a l y t i c a l purposes, 
s o c i a l structure from notional "contents" - or base from super-
structure i s untenable. I t cannot be said that the re l a t i o n s 
of education alone determine consciousness. That consciousness 
(those ' r e a l i t i e s ' ) i t s e l f r e f e r s t o those r e l a t i o n s . 
To give one example; 
"A p r i n c i p l e educational aim should be to enable people to 
make use of t h e i r knowledge w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r social 
s i t u a t i o n . Now i f they az'e studying outside that s i t u a t i o n , 
whether as i n d i v i d u a l s or w i t h i n Open University study 
groups, there i s perhaps a greater danger that t h e i r 
learnings w i l l be divorced from the s o c i a l r e a l i t i e s of 
t h e i r l i f e . I n other words, we may be producing an 
ivor y tower kind of education, even through the non-
t r a d i t i o n a l techniques of the Open University," 
Perraton (1974) pp.58-59, 
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I f Perraton i s r i g h t (and I see no reason t o disagree w i t h him), 
i t i s not j u s t the status of academic 'knowledge', or e l i t i s t 
s e l e c t i o n processes, that may produce "ivory-tower" education. 
I t i s the actual r e l a t i o n s h i p s contained i n the " e x t r i n s i c 
l o g i c " of educational 'knowledge' » i n the relationships between 
aooial r e l a t i o n s and objectivated 'knowledge'. 
This brings us back t o subjective 'loiowledge'. I t i s 
i n d i v i d u a l s who learn . I t i s on i n d i v i d u a l s ' understandings and 
b e l i e f s t h a t the "hidden curriculum" must have i t s e f f e c t s . We 
should regard as problematic the t r a n s f e r of b e l i e f s acquired 
through schooling t o contexts i n which they might be judged 
"appropriate" a f t e r school. I f i t occurs, then t h i s needs 
explaining. There i s no merely l o g i c a l reason why i t should 
occur. 
I suggest that any such t r a n s f e r that does occur does so i n 
default of an e x p l i c i t awareness that i t might have been 
other«9isa. The s t r u c t u r i n g of what i t i s "relevant" t o 
question and r e f l e c t upon i s an essential feature of most education 
systems. Douglas puts i t t h i s ways 
"The c h i l d i s ... indoctrinated i n t o the assumptions of 
h i s society» His c u r i o s i t y i s cheeked or roused, his 
expectations f o r hi,mself are set i n the most hidden way -
not by the overt doctrines handed out, but by what i s 
l e f t i m p l i c i t . " Douglas (1970/73) p.81. 
I t i s a point made by many "de-schoolers" and l i b e r a l educators. 
For instance; 
"The most important and i n t e l l e c t u a l a b i l i t y man has 
yet developed - the a r t and science of asking questions -
i s not taught i n school! Moreover, i t i s not 'taught' i n 
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the most devastating way possibles by arranging the 
environment so that s i g n i f i c a n t question asking i s not 
valued." Postman & Weingartner (1969/71) p.34. 
Such statements are a blanket dismissal of schooling as the 
deadeners of ( o r , i n some cases, the non-inspirers of) Curiosity, 
Any t r a n s f e r of d i s c i p l i n e d work-habits, etc., would therefore 
be seen as a t r a i n e d lack of r a d i c a l questioning. I t i s a 
learned "fo c a l perception". 
I t needs stressing t h a t i n giiany cases children are not 
merely "deadened". They are often consideiiably more l i v e l y 
and curious than msiny c r i t i c s maintain. But t h e i r Curiosity 
channelled. They are not "open-minded" about a l l and 
everything, but only i n s t r u c t u r a l l y ordered areas. What they 
l e a r n by default i s that c e r t a i n kinds of questions are not 
asked. Questions which are "relevant" are l a r g e l y non-subversive. 
Exceptions are suppressed, whether these be i n d i v i d u a l pupils 
who are sanctioned or separated o f f ( i n so-called "sin-bins" , 
(23) 
f o r instance) , or teachers who are dismissed or subjected 
t o pressure, or whole schools which are closed, "reorganised", 
or j u s t "inspected'] ^^^^ Precisely because the s t r u c t u r a t i o n 
of relevance-channelling i s on the whole i m p l i c i t , r e f l e c t i v e 
awareness i s not roused i n those areas, by default. Children's 
subjective b e l i e f s - i n c l u d i n g , of course, t h e i r self-concepts -
are allowed t o develop w i t h i n c e r t a i n paradigmatic closures. 
Relevances appropriate t o questioning are determined ( i n default 
of r e f l e c t i o n ) by both the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , and the objectivated 
'knowledge' structures, and the relationships between these, i n 
(25) 
formal educational i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
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I n d e f a u l t - o f relevance-openness, i t becomes " j u s t obvious" 
what one may or may not "sensibly" dispute.^ The Relevances 
are r i g i d i f i e d . I t becomes Value-Known what i s disputable,- what 
i s questionable - and what i s not •- even i f no e x p l i c i t formulation 
of t h i s i s made. Such Yalue-Known b e l i e f s determine behaviour. 
Master Patterns 
"The most important t h i n g .»,- that we can know about a 
man i s what he takes f o r granted, and the most elemental 
and important f a c t s about a society are those that are 
seldom, debated and generally regarded as s e t t l e d , " 
• Wirth, quoted by Bowles and Gintis (1976) p.116. 
The central thesis of Part I has been that Value-Knowledge 
can be thought of as r i g i d i f i e d b e l i e f structures, which acquire 
t h e i r r i g i d i t y through experience of structured r e a l i t y , and 
which are determinative of human behaviour. A b e l i e f i s a state 
of mind, which r e f e r s t o what i s taken to be r e a l i t y . However 
t r a n s i t o r y a b e l i e f , i t can at any point i n time be considered 
t o have a describable st r u c t u r e . Thought, on the other hand, 
i s a process, R i g i d i f i c a t i o n , i n t u r n , can be seen as a cessation 
of thought, or an absence of thought. Value-Knowledge i s e i t h e r 
post-thought or pre-thought; e i t h e r "worked-out»» b e l i e f s that 
have taken on a r e l a t i v e l y persistent structure, or "unworked-out" 
b e l i e f s , which are r i g i d precisely through lack of considered 
r e f l e c t i o n . 
I n sofar as people i n a given societal or social context 
share s i m i l a r or complementary experiences, they are l i k e l y to 
acquire s i m i l a r or complementary b e l i e f s . The non-randomness of 
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t h e i r experience should be expected t o produce not j u s t non-
random b e l i e f s i n each i n d i v i d u a l , but b e l i e f systems that have 
a structuredness i n social terms. I n default of considered 
r e f l e c t i o n , we should expect describable systems of b e l i e f t o 
(27) 
be shared by members of given s o c i e t a l s i t u a t i o n s . ^ ' 
When we t a l k of c o l l e c t i v e systems of b e l i e f , i t i s , of 
course, questionable i n what sense we can a t t r i b u t e objective 
r e a l i t y t o them. Bel i e f s only exist i n people's minds, and 
people are i n d i v i d u a l s . They are temporally, and s p a t i a l l y 
separate from one another. One cannot a t t r i b u t e a "state of 
mind" t o a group or category, except metaphorically. Nonetheless, 
the suggestion that those i n d i v i d u a l l y held b e l i e f s are non-
randomly decided implies that there i s a s t r u c t u r a t i o n of time, 
space and determination which i s r e a l . The relationships between 
i n d i v i d u a l s ' b e l i e f s are i n p r i n c i p l e a r e a l referent f o r f u r t h e r 
elaboration, i n e f f e c t , the structures ar® r e a l , whilst the 
"elements" of those structures are only "there" from a p a r t i c u l a r 
point of view ( f o r a p a r t i c u l a r Relevance), I t i s perhaps no 
more a r b i t r a r y t o t a l k of a society's p a r t i c u l a r b e l i e f s "x" and 
"y", than i t i s to i s o l a t e the notions of an i n d i v i d u a l . Insofar 
as one does do t h i s , i t i s a device only. I t i s not necessary to 
a t t r i b u t e any a c t u a l , r e i f i e d and d i s t i n c t existence t o those 
b e l i e f s , 
Furthermore, when we t a l k of complementary b e l i e f s - as 
opposed to s i m i l a r or shared b e l i e f s •» we necessarily r e f e r 
e x p l i c i t l y to the soc i a l s t r u c t u r a t i o n of b e l i e f s , (To t a l k 
of s i m i l a r or shared b e l i e f s should also be seen as a reference to 
such so c i a l s t r u c t u r a t i o n ) . We need a way of t a l k i n g about 
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t h a t s t r u o t u r a t i o n - some h e u r i s t i c a l l y useful metaphor, I 
suggest that th© "tree-root" idea i s again appropriate. 
The reason f o r any s i m i l a r i t y or complementarity of b e l i e f s 
should not be pre«'8uppos0d. I t must always be an empirical 
question, why, i n any given context, b e l i e f s appear t o be shared 
or complementary. On the whole, an explanation i s l i k e l y to 
re s t u l t i m a t e l y i n the r e l a t i v e power of p a r t i c u l a r sections of 
society t o determine the "conditioning s i t u a t i o n " of others -
f o r instance, through m i l i t a r y or state power. However, the 
" l o g i c " of p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements do seem to have 
t h e i r own deteminative e f f e c t s on what people come t o believe -
not least i n l e g i t i m a t i n g more fundamental s o c i e t a l power 
struct u r e s . 
Since s o c i e t a l r e l a t i o n s can also be supposed to be 
structured i n time, space and determination, i t may be appropriate 
t o employ some h i e r a r c h i c a l metaphor ( s i m i l a r t o "tr e e - r o o t s " of 
b e l i e f ) f o r s o c i a l r e a l i t y i t s e l f . I f t h i s i s the case (and I do 
not intend to argue i t here)^ then i t would be meaningful t o t a l k 
of " l e v e l s " of s o c i a l r e a l i t y , comparable to levels of b e l i e f . 
Groups, f o r instance, may be seen as lower-level than i n s t i t u t i o n s , 
which may i n tu r n be lower than classes, or societies. I f so, 
i t would be an empirical question, which " l e v e l " of s o c i a l r e a l i t y 
one was concerned wi t h , and what reasons were sought f o r the holding 
of s i m i l a r or complementary b e l i e f s . I n considering b e l i e f systems 
or ideologies, l e v e l s of s o c i a l r e a l i t y roust not be seen as 
d i s t i n c t . Indeed, any suggestion of societal patterns of b e l i e f 
(see below) must also be coupled w i t h an understanding of how such 
patterns are created. That must include both ideational and social 
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s t r u c t u r a t i o n s which are i n t e g r a l l y r e lated t o one another. 
Ins o f a r as a given society i s ordered and/or con t r o l l e d , 
we can expect two important features. F i r s t , there are l i k e l y 
t o be communalities of c e r t a i n kinds of experience. Large 
sections w i l l be l i k e l y t o have s i m i l a r experience of, f o r 
instance, such i n s t i t u t i o n s as the family, of r e l i g i o u s 
i n s t i t u t i o n s , of productive r e l a t i o n s , of state apparatuses. 
One such communally experienced apparatus i s the education 
(29) 
system,^ Since d i f f e r e n t people experience d i f f e r e n t 
sectors of a country's education system, and experience i t 
d i f f e r e n t l y i n each sector, then complementary understandings 
and b e l i e f s (frequently i n c o n f l i c t with each other) about the 
educational apparatus are produced. Yet those differences are 
non-random. There i s common experience of the f a c t of a state 
education system, and of d i f f e r e n t i a l access to i t , and even 
of d i f f e r e n t i a l experiences w i t h i n i t . Though not necessarily 
e x p l i c i t i n any one person's aiind, there i s a structured o v e r a l l 
p a t t e r n of b e l i e f s about education, I borrow Bourdieu's 
expression, "Master Patterns", to discuss that o v e r a l l patterning. 
The idea of "Master Patterns" i s i n many ways not unlike 
other versions of ideologies, c o l l e c t i v e consciences, l e g i t i m -
a t i o n s , master symbols etc. What, t o ray mind, i t emphasises i s 
the sti-ucturedness of these b e l i e f systems. As such i t i s akin 
t o the "templates" of Ardener, the "codes" of Bernstein, the 
"deep structures" of Chorasfy, I t also has much i n common with 
Kuhn's notion of "paradigms".^^^^ Kuhn sees paradigms as shared 
examples, which are determinative of behaviour through being 
what I c a l l "Value-Known", Philosophers of science often say 
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that ^ S c i e n t i f i c knowledge i s embedded i n theory and ru l e s " , but 
"This l o c a l i s a t i o n of the cognitive content of science i s 
wrong. A f t e r the student has done many problems, he may 
gain only added f a c i l i t y by solving more. But at the s t a r t 
and f o r some time a f t e r , doing problems i s learning 
consequential things about nature. I n the absence of such 
exemplars, the laws and theories he has previously learned 
would have very l i t t l e empirical content," 
Kuhn (1969) pp.187-8. 
Kuhn distinguishes between persuasion and conversion. This 
wholly accords w i t h what I have said about understanding and 
b e l i e f . He gives t h i s examples 
"Like many of those who f i r s t encountered, say, r e l a t i v i t y 
or quantum mechanics i n t h e i r middle years, ^ h e s c i e n t i s t 
may f i n d J himself f u l l y persuaded of the new view but 
nevertheless unable t o i n t e r n a l i s e i t and be at home i n 
the world i t helps t o shape. I n t e l l e c t u a l l y such a man 
has made his choice, but the conversion required i f i t i s 
to be e f f e c t i v e eludes him. ... His work /remains7 
p a r a s i t i c on ^ t h e r s ^ ^ * f o r lie lacks the conste l l a t i o n of 
mental sets which future members of the community w i l l 
acquire through education. 
The conversion experience I have likened t o a gest a l t 
switch remains, thereJ^ore, at the heart of the 
revolutionary process." i b i d , p,204. 
Thus Kuhn stresses both the e x p e r i e n t i a l basis of Value-Knowledge^ 
and i t s e f f e c t s on i n d i v i d u a l behaviour. He also stresses the 
paradigmatic nature of s c i e n t i f i c 'knowledge*. I wish t o make 
s i m i l a r points about b e l i e f systems i n general, and educational 
ideologies i n p a r t i c u l a r . 
The second important feature to be expected i n an ordered 
and/or c o n t r o l l e d s o c i e t a l context i s an isomorphism between 
(31) 
various contextual s i t u a t i o n s , i n important respects. This 
i s not to claim, w i t h Bowles sind G i n t i s , a d i r e c t (unexplained) 
correspondence between the so c i a l r e l a t i o n s of production and 
the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s of education. But there i s an element of 
"trejnsfer", i n default of considered r e f l e c t i o n s , of c e r t a i n 
p&tteras of b e l i e f from school to the work/adult context. I t i s 
not so much that the "hidden curriculum" mirrors productive 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s , as that c e r t a i n assumptions may - i n c o n t r o l l e d / 
ordered s o c i e t a l contexts - underlie behaviour i n both. 
Consequently, those assumptions-in-practice ( t h e i r o'bjectification 
i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l and behavioural teinns) are experienced i n 
school. They may become Value-Knowledge to pupils-becoming-
ad u l t s , (a) i n s o f a r as they are not e x p l i c i t l y r e f l e c t e d upon, 
and (b) i n s o f a r as adult experience ( f o r instance at work) i s 
also structured on s i m i l a r l i n e s - and therefore becomes a 
continuing r e i n f o r c e r of patterns of b e l i e f already acquired. ' 
The idea of schools producing Master Patterns which t r a n s f e r to 
adult experience can be read i n t o a number of arguments f o r and 
against d i f f e r e n t kinds of (popular) education. Whether i t was 
a f ear of the "wrong" ideas about society's structure, or a 
desire t o promote a " d i s c i p l i n e d " frame of mind, much I n the 
19th century educational debates can be interpreted i n these 
terms.^"^"^^ As we s h a l l see i n Part I I certain educational 
ideologies can themselves be seen as Master Patterns, The point 
here i s t h a t such ideologies frequently r e f e r to the trsinsmission 
of such Patterns, Their a t t e n t i o n i s to how schools ( i f any) 
should be structured, i n order that the "correct" world view 
i s transmitted. Nonetheless, there i s not always e x p l i c i t 
awareness that i t i s at various level s that the encoding of 
messages takes place. I n classroom i n t e r a c t i o n , i n the 
organisation of teaching groups, i n the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n 
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between types of schools and i n the various functions that are 
i n t e n t i o n a l l y or u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y served by these d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s , 
messages are contained which are in t i m a t e l y related to each other. 
These make up patterns of b e l i e f i n those who experience 
(34) 
schooling. 
What i s thus patterned i s Value-Knowledge. That i s , the 
Master Patterns of a society, or section of society, are patterns 
of people's strongly believed 'knowledge' about what i s 
"unquestionably" t r u e . Pox has said that, 
" I t i s probable that f o r much of the time most men do not 
perceive the conventional and a r b i t r a r y nature of many of 
the s o c i a l arrangements under which they l i v e , and suppose 
them to be the only possible ones given 'the nature of 
thi n g s ' - a notion which usually includes b e l i e f i n an 
unchangeable 'human nature'. This unawareness i t s e l f 
helps to make possible the continuance of the e x i s t i n g 
order Pox ( 1974 ) p.284. 
As we s h a l l see i n Part I I , b e l i e f s about "human nature", and 
about what constitutes " v a l i d knowledge" are of paramount 
importance i n educational ideologies. 
I t must also be remembered that there are no context-less 
b e l i e f s i n the abstract. B e l i e f s necessarily r e f e r . And the 
contexts i n which p a r t i c u l a r Relevances (ways of looking at 
things) become operative are i n t r i n s i c a l ] . y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of 
such b e l i e f s . We do not confront every s i t u a t i o n anew, f i n d i n g 
i t problematic how our b e l i e f s apply i n each case. Relevance 
s h i f t i s a deliberate or fantasying process that i n many or 
most ca:8es does not occur. We l a r g e l y take f o r granted, not 
j u s t what we believe, but what we believe about such-and-such 
a circumstance, i n such-and-such a context. S i m i l a r l y , i n the 
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case of Master Patterns, i t i s the c o n t e x t - s p e c i f i c i t y of b e l i e f s , 
and the Relevances that are taken t o be appropriate, which are 
patterned. There ax^a, as i t were, paradigmatic Relevances. 
Members of a p a r t i c u l a r social group or categozyj subject to 
those PatteKis, w i l l see p a r t i c u l a r objects i n a certain way, 
rat h e r than any other - i n default of r e f l e c t i o n . I n short. 
Master Patterning applies t o both l o g i c a l and contextual dimensions 
o f b e l i e f o 
I f not only i n d i v i d u a l b e l i e f systems, but those of whole 
s o c i a l groups, are structured i n non-random and s o c i e t a l l y 
contexted ways, there remains the question of how to conceive 
of these structures. The " t r e e - r o o t " metaphor i s again useful. 
I f we wish t o characterise a p a r t i c u l a r body of b e l i e f s , i t i s 
not very valuable merely to l i s t ideas. Even i f such ideas were 
not thereby divorced from the referred-=to ' r e a l i t y ' , they would 
b® divorced from other b e l i e f s which i n r e a l i t y are i n t e g r a l l y 
r e l a t e d . Some ordering i s necessa:^, and the " t r e e - r o o t " metaphor 
i s useful i n t h i s respect. This metaphor also suggests that we 
may look f o r Basic B e l i e f s - f o r notions which, i n terms of 
inclusiveness, are "at the top" of p a r t i c u l a r b e l i e f systems. 
There are obviously problems i n t h i s approach. One of these 
i s that to describe Master Patterns we must abstract from what i s 
a c t u a l l y believed by p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s i n the groups or 
categories w i t h which we are concerned. 
" I n describing an ideology there i s always the d i f f i c u l t y 
presented by the existence of mny i n d i v i d u a l variants. 
Some adherents accept while others may rej e c t each given 
item of the syndrome. Only a generalised picture can 
therefore be offered ..." Pox (1974 ) p.260. 
Another problem i s the selection of Relevances. The observer 
may view a p a r t i c u l a r set of referred-to objects i n such-and-such 
a way, and mistakenly assume that the people he i s considering 
must also view them i n that way» His most inclu s i v e category may, 
to them, be f a i r l y low l e v e l - and vice-versa. This problem i s 
unsolvable. I t must i n e v i t a b l y be so. The observer i s himself 
s o c i e t a l l y contexted. He has ce r t a i n assumptions which he imports 
t o h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n . What can b© dona, however, i s to question 
the choice of basic dimensigns chosen, and to attempt t o j u s t i f y 
them on grounds that are reasoned and e x p l i c i t . I d e l i b e r a t e l y 
use the term "dimensions" here. For i f one object of the analysis 
i s t o compare, d i f f e r e n t Master Patterns, and i f the approach 
involves a search f o r Basic B e l i e f s , then c l e a r l y i t cannot be 
assumed that a l l those compared w i l l have the same Basic B e l i e f s . 
( I t i s the object of comparison to f i n d s i m i l a r i t i e s and differences 
i n t h i s respect). But i t might be suggested that c e r t a i n dimensions 
are appropriate i n a l l cases. That i s , one Relevance angle may 
produce s i g n i f i c a n t suggestions i n each case considered. I suggest 
i n Part I I that i t i s reasonable to claim that certain dimensions 
may be u n i v e r s a l l y relevant - whether or not e x p l i c i t l y recognised 
as such - t o questions of education. According to a certain view 
of learning which I have elaborated i n Part I -certain questions 
may become necessarily relevant, no matter whose assumptions/Basic 
Be l i e f s about education are being considered. I s h a l l not be 
concexmed only w i t h s o c i e t a l l y dominant Master Patterns, but wit h 
the Basic Beliefs of p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s or groups. In some 
cases, such Basic Be l i e f s may be regarded as short-hands f o r 
paradigmatic b e l i e f systems. Where t h i s i s so, then we must return 
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t o the underlying s o c i e t a l r e a l i t y , i n which t h i s patterning 
occurs, f o r aii explanation of i t . The i n i t i a l elaboration of 
ideologies may i t s e l f o f f e r clues about the nature of that 
underlying Reality. 
Notes 
(1) Nothing seems to me more unnatural than the following 
suggestions 
"No supposition seems to me more natural than that there 
i s no process i n the brain correlated w i t h associating 
or w i t h t h i n k i n g ; so t h a t i t would be impossible to 
read o f f thought-processes from brain-processes... I t 
i s thus p e r f e c t l y possible that certain psychological 
phenomena cannot be investigated p h y s i o l o g i c a l l y , 
because p h y s i o l o g i c a l l y nothing corresponds to them,.. 
Why should there not be a psychological r e g u l a r i t y to 
which no physiological r e g u l a r i t y corresponds? I f 
t h i s upsets our concept of causality then i t i s high 
time i t was upset." Wittgenstein ( Z e t t e l ) p.608-610. 
quoted by Kenny (1973) p.145. 
I would disagree also, i f the same were said about 
b e l i e f s „ 
(2) Compare the r h e t o r i c a l Educationist's Context and the 
actual (committed-belief) Teacher's Context of teachers 
i n Keddie's study (1971). Kaplan's d i s t i n c t i o n between 
"log i c - i n - u s e " and "reconstructed l o g i c " i s also pertinent 
here (1964). As we s h a l l see i n t h i s chapter, an 
essential feature of the"hidden curriculum" i s that 
p u p i l s are i m p l i c i t l y " t o l d " by teachers to "Do wto,t 
I do, not what I say" - contrary to the usual formulation. 
(3) Though b e l i e f s may also be objectivated. 
(4) Bettelheim h i n t s at t h i s i n saying, 
"Despite i t s greater propensity f o r resolving inner 
c o n f l i c t s , . a n d i t s great value as a t o o l f o r penetrating 
surface behaviour and understanding some of the inhermost 
recesses of the mind, the practice of psychoanalytic 
therapy ... i s b a s i c a l l y no more than a powerful 
conditioning social s i t u a t i o n .... 
Psychoanalytic therapy ... i s essentially a very special 
environment w i t h i t s unique consequences ... " 
Bettelheira (1960/70) p,29. 
(5) Hence the importance of compulsory schooling. Plato may 
have been r i g h t when he said that "Knowledge which i s 
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acquired under compulsion obtains no hold i n the mind ... 
Do not use compulsion but l e t early education be a sort of 
amusement.." Plato, quoted by Sharp and Green (1976), p.42. 
But t h i s concerns only that 'knowledge' which the would-be 
teacher wishes t o "get over". The experience of being 
compelled t o learn p a r t i c u l a r " f a c t s " w i l l produce b e l i e f 
structures (concerning that medium of learning) that may 
undermine the teacher's very i n t e n t i o n s . Compare Goodman, 
who sees the main components of contemporary U,S. schooling 
as; 
"(a) a uniform world-view, (b) the absence of any viable 
a l t e r n a t i v e , (c) confusion about the relevance of one's 
own experience and f e e l i n g s , and (d) a chronic anxietj'-, 
so that one c l i n g s to the one wo rid-view as the only 
security. This i s brainwashing," Goodman (1962/71) p.61, 
(5) At the same time perfect consciousness i s inconceivable. 
We could never be t o t a l l y aware of being t o t a l l y aware of 
what we are being aware of. There must always remain the 
unperceived experience of what we are doing i n our conscious 
r e f l e c t i v e a c t i o n , ( c f also Williams, 1961^7, p, 319). 
(7) However, I would argue that despite the sentiments of t h i s 
quotation, Bruner pays i n s u f f i c i e n t a t t e n t i o n to the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between objectivated and subjective 'knowledge' -
above a l l i n underestimating the problematic nature of 
objectivated 'knowledge' (e.g. i n c u r r i c u l a ) . 
(8) S i m i l a r points are made by Luria, Luria (1956/71), f o r 
instance, discusses the differences between two twins, one 
who had been t r a i n e d t o be aware of his own speech and 
the other i n whom speech arose only as a r e s u l t of p r a c t i c a l 
a c t i v i t y , e.g. p.100, 
(9) Slobin (1971) comments on the humour of anomalies; 
" L i n g u i s t i c meaning allows us t o evaluate the t r u t h value 
of sentences, to make paraphrases, to i n t e r p r e t and laugh 
at anomalies, t o understand ambiguities, and t o agree on 
the appropriateness of f i g u r a t i v e usage," Slobin (1971) 
p.68. 
Of Poetry, he says: 
"Much of the understanding of certain kinds of poetry i s 
based on a b i l i t y t o f i n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s f o r grammatically 
unusual constructions - an a c t i v i t y which can be especially 
pleasurable," i b i d , p,5o 
I have already r e f e r r e d to Shklovskij, who saw the function 
of poetic a r t to "make strange" the object depicted. 
Some have commented on the significajnce of s l i g h t deviations 
from what I c a l l Value-Known " t r u t h s " . See, f o r instance, 
Cohen (1972/73) on "Mods" being fearsome through being so 
"normal"-looking, rather than stei'eotypical "yobs"; or 
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Bettelheim (1960/70) on the preference f o r b r u t a l guards 
over those who merely slapped or swore (p,120). S i m i l a r l y , 
a BoB.G, commentator observed a f t e r the Turkish earthquake 
i n September 1975; 
"For the children at any rate the tragedy i s too great f o r 
comprehension. I t i s only tragedy on a miniature scale 
that t r i g g e r s t e a r s . " B.B.O.Io 17/9/75. 
(10) The r e l a t i o n s h i p between humour and c u r i o s i t y i s noted i n 
the f o l l o w i n g : 
G.I.D.O.C. i s "a place where people go who want help i n 
r e f i n i n g t h e i r questioning, rather than completing the 
answers they have gotten What we should be concerned 
wit h here at C.I.D.O.C. i s to be humourists. That i s , 
people who are constantly aware of the constraints and 
l i m i t a t i o n s of the categories w i t h which we t h i n k , ..." 
n i i c h , i n Wayne H, Cowan (1969). 
(11) Keddie (1971) p.135 et passim. The reference t o doctrine 
and commitment i s to Selznlck (1949). 
(12) See, f o r example, Mannheim and Stewart (19 62 ). 
(13) At Open University conference on " P o l i t i c a l Economy and 
Schooling", Hertford, 22nd-"25th A p r i l 1976, 
(14) There seem t o be p a r a l l e l s i n t h i s with the w r i t i n g of 
Cainoy, a colleague of G i n t i s , who •» despite rather 
careless use of such terras as " i n t e n t i o n " and "motive" -
t r i e s to r u l e out the importance of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , i n 
c u l t u r a l i m p e r i a l i s t p o l i c i e s i n the 19th century 
(Carnoy, 1974). 
(15) e.g. Dreeben (1968). 
(16) Bowles and Gintis (1976) chapter 5. 
(17) e.g. Strodtbeck (1958/61); Rosen (1956, 1959). 
(18) See Syer (1974a). 
(19) I would stress that the context i s most important. 
H i r s t ' s suggestions, therefore, apply t o a p a r t i c u l a r 
academic cu l t u r e (1969/71). 
(20) of Bernstein (1971); Syer (1974a). 
(21) cf Bernstein et a l . (1966/71) 
(22) cf also Holt's " s t r a t e g i e s " (1964769), 
(23) i . e . "withdrawal centres", cf. Mack (1976). 
(24) cf the William Tyndale School ease (Gretton and Jackson,1976), 
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(25) Compare Keddie's description of "Teacher K", who presented 
his own version of economics as the on]^ one: prescribing 
h i s , and proscribing any other, through taking f o r granted 
the correctness of his own„ (He f u r t h e r r e s t r i c t e d t h i s 
f o r lowestream pupils)« 
Compare also, i n a non-educational (?) context: 
The Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration, i n 
considering Police/Irmrigrant Relations (1971/72), "applied 
a narrow i n t e r p r e t i v e framework which served t o neutr a l i s e 
or define as i l l e g i t i m a t e statements or analyses which did 
not f i t w ith i t s own pre-conceived d e f i n i t i o n of 'what the 
problem was". This viev/ shaped the way i t s members 
approached the memoranda submitted to them, the conduct 
i n the verbal exchanges, and the conclusions they 
eventually reached." Clarke et a l . (1974 ) p.4. 
Language also plays a major c l a a s i f i c a t o r y r o l e i n t h i s : 
"Not only does the c h i l d learn what to do, what not t o do, 
but he i s given standardised motives which promote 
prescribed actions, and dissuade those proscribed. Along 
w i t h rules and norms of actions f o r various s i t u a t i o n s we 
learn vocabularies of motives appropriate t o them .., 
'.'They are part of our language and components of our 
behaviour." M i l l s (1940/71) p.115. 
(26) "The obvious i s l i t e r a l l y that which stands i n one's way ... 
someone whose mind i s imprison ed i n the metaphor cannot 
see i t as a metaphor. I t i s j u s t obvious." Laing (1968). 
"'Yes, that's how i t i s , that's r e a l l y t r u e ! ' " 
Althusser (1971/72), p»250<. 
(27) Thus Dos Santos t a l k s of a "conditioning s i t u a t i o n " : -
"A conditioning s i t u a t i o n determines the l i m i t s and 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of action and behaviour of men. Paced by 
i t , they may e i t h e r choose among the various a l t e r n a t i v e s 
i n t e i ^ a l t o that s i t u a t i o n , or they may seek to change the 
conditioning s i t u a t i o n i t s e l f . The f i r s t choice i s never 
completely f r e e , f o r a concrete s i t u a t i o n includes f u r t h e r 
f a c t o r s placing added l i m i t s on action and choice. The 
second choice opens the way to new p o s s i b i l i t i e s , seeking 
to b r i n g about a q u a n t i t a t i v e change which i t s e l f 
must be considered i n terms of i t s concrete p o s s i b i l i t i e s . " 
Dos Santos (1969/73) pp,77-78. 
Baldamus makes a s i m i l a r point i n the fo l l o w i n g : -
"What appears to be common knov/ledge or common sense i s an 
important component of ,., the 'protective C u l t u r a l f a b r i c ' , 
which, i n a given period, makes society immune to the 
relevant intra-systemic pressures. Por example, the 
consumption imperative can only be e f f e c t i v e i n the present 
s i t u a t i o n as long as i t remains i n v i s i b l e . The true 
purpose of soc i a l research as I see i t consists i n making 
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concealed i n s t i t u t i o n a l underpinnings e x p l i c i t and thereby 
enabling the researchei- to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the process of 
aggregate s o c i a l change,'' Baldamus (1971) p«15. 
(28) Compare Ossowski, who says that he uses "social consciousness" 
not as a r e i f i c a t i o n , but as'^an abbreviation to r e f e r to the 
ideas that characterise Gei'tarn m i l i e u , f o r the concepts, 
images, b e l i e f s ajad evaluations that are more or less common 
to people of a ce r t a i n s o c i a l environment and which are 
reinforced i n the consciousness of p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s 
by mutual suggestion and by the conviction that they are 
shared by other people i n the same gi-oup." Ossowski (1963) 
p.6. 
( 2 9 ) Or, i n some so c i e t i e s , the lack of an education system, or 
l i m i t e d access to i t . To speak of such an absence as an 
"apparatus" may seem a l i t t l e "stretched". However, every 
society necessarily includes some mode or modes of education. 
The degree of f o r m a l i t y , and of state c o n t r o l or oversight, 
may vary considerably. I n B r i t a i n , "non-intervention" by 
the state i n c e r t a i n areas of private education i s every 
b i t as important as overt in t e r v e n t i o n . I t i s state action 
i t s e l f , cf T.E.S. 7/1/77. 
(30) Ardener (1971 ) l Bernstein (l97l/73)?Chomsk3r (1965 ) ; 
Kuhn (1962/70) . 
(31) c f Dumont; 
"The more one stresses the ideological aspect, the more 
d i f f i c u l t i t i s to i s o l a t e a special domain w i t h i n the 
caste society i n i t s e n t i r e t y , Por example, the idea of 
hierarchy, so important as f a r as caste i s concerned, i s 
not confined to i t but penetrates the domain of kinship ..," 
Dumont (I970/?2)po75, 
(32) Insofar as r e l a t i v e l y autonomous schools are not_ correspondent 
t o the work-situations of adults, then the b e l i e f s i n i t i a l l y 
acquired w i l l be l o s t a.3 Value-Knowledge, \mlea3_ they have 
beeh r e f l e c t e d upon thereby being based upon l o g i c a l , as 
opposed to contextual, experience, (That l o g i c a l experience 
can be continued apart from immediate context, through 
continued r e f l e c t i o n ) , 
(33) Por instance; "/frames M i l l ' s 7 primary concern at t h i s 
period /c, 18207 was t o lead the non-conformist middle class 
i n an assault on the c l e r i c a l domination of education. I n 
his eyes, the i n c u l c a t i o n of r e l i g i o u s opinions, from an early 
age, was the worst of i n t e l l e c t u a l crimes; as a re s u l t of 
such teaching, people v/ere led h a b i t u a l l y t o disregard evidence 
and became, i n e f f e c t , i n t e l l e c t u a l slaves .,," Simon (1960) 
p „ 9 0 . This might be contrasted with Tocqueville's "dogma": 
"In order that society should exist and, a f o r t i o r i , that a 
society should prosper, i t i s necesaaiy that the minds of 
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a l l th# c i t i z e n s should be r a l l i e d and held together 
by c e r t a i n predominant ideas, and t h i s ceinnot be done 
unless each of them sometimes draws his opinions from 
the common source and consents to accept certain 
matters of b e l i e f already formed." 
Nisbet points out that t h i s i s s i m i l a r to Burke's defence 
of prejudice, on the grounds that reason alone could not 
possibly be the sole basis of human social existence. 
(Nisbet, 1966/70, p. 233.) 
(34) Ford (1975, p.102) refers to the anthropologist Nadel's 
experiment i n which evidence suggested that children's 
cognitive f u n c t i o n i n g was related t o t h e i r c u l t u r a l 
background. (Children of Yaruba and Nape t r i b e s were 
t o l d a story and asked to repeat i t . The structure of 





In Part I I , I o u t l i n e what I take to be the defining 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Ideology and also some essential character-
i s t i c s of Education. I then consider some other treatments of 
educational ideologies, suggesting advantages and disadvantages 
i n the various approaches. Next I look at a small selection 
of i d e o l o g i c a l anomalies, i n the context of education, hoping 
t o show t h e i r p r a c t i c a l and t h e o r e t i c a l significance. F i n a l l y , 
I suggest one way of considering educational ideologies, i n 
t h e i r context, by reference to two Dimensions - "Knowledge" 
and "Power". 
Throughout Part I I i t must be remembered that ideologies, 
l i k e any b e l i e f system, are structured. The methodological 
problem i s to devise ways i n which we may conceive of these 
struc t u r e s , I w i l l suggest that the "tree-root" metaphor and 
the notion of Basic B e l i e f s are useful f o r t h i s purpose. 
B e l i e f s - including ideologies - are both based upon 
experience and consequential i n the determination of human social 
behaviour. This i s generalisable to whole categories sjnd groups 
of people. Attention to structures of social systems, without 
reference t o people's b e l i e f s and understanding, i s bound to be 
inadequate as an account of the t o t a l i t y . This does not, however, 
imply a r e j e c t i o n of generalising methods, and the adoption of 
i n d i v i d u a l i s i n g ones instead. The patterning or s t r u c t u r i n g of 
both subjective and objectivated b e l i e f systems i s a central 
feature of my account. 
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I use the term "ideology" t o indicate three central 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . I t i s not my purpose here t o discuss the 
r e l a t i v e merits and demerits of other peoples' d e f i n i t i o n s ^ ^ \ 
but to present my own d e f i n i t i o n , f o r the sake of t h i s essay. 
Ideologies, i n njy usage, are s o c i e t a l l y contexted systems of 
Value-Knowledge, which a c t u a l l y or p o t e n t i a l l y serve s p e c i f i c 
i n t e r e s t s or functions. 
F i r s t l y , ideologies are s o c i e t a l l y contexted. They arise 
i n i d e n t i f i a b l e sections of h i s t o r i c a l l y situated s o c i e t i e s , as 
a r e s u l t of the experience of t h e i r adherents i n those societies. 
"An ideology i s always the ideology of d e f i n i t e people, 
l i v i n g i n d e f i n i t e conditions, depending f o r t h e i r l i f e on 
a d e f i n i t e mode of production, with d e f i n i t e s ocial 
r e l a t i o n s , doing d e f i n i t e things with d e f i n i t e desires 
and aims. And t h e i r ideology i s not found independently 
of the process of t h e i r material l i f e . " 
Goi-nforth (1954) p.82, 
Secondly, ideologies are the V-alue~Knowledge of t h e i r adherents, 
They are the unquestioned or "unquestionable" b e l i e f s about what 
i s "obvious" or "natural". They are b e l i e f , rather than under-
standing, and i n no way depend upon e x p l i c i t v e r b alisation f o r 
t h e i r s o c i e t a l significance. (On the contrary), 
" I t i s indeed a p e c u l i a r i t y of ideology that i t imposes ... 
obviousnesses as obviousnesses which we cannot f a i l t o 
recognize and before which we have the i n e v i t a b l e eind 
na t u r a l reaction of crying out ... 'That's obvious! 
That's r i g h t ! That's t r u e ! ' " Althusser (1971/72) p.271. 
Value-Knowledge i s structured b e l i e f , which derives i t s strength 
from experience. Ideologies, then, are r e l a t i v e l y coherent and 
"adequate" accounts of Reality. Were they quite inadequate, 
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no more than a few i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h i d i o s y n c r a t i c experience 
would adhere to them as so "obviously t r u e " . Furthermore, 
Value-Knowledge i s consequential. Behaviour i s at least p a r t l y 
determined by Value-Knowledge, 
T h i r d l y , ideologies are consequential i n a more general 
sense, too. They are a c t u a l l y or p o t e n t i a l l y i n t e r e s t - or 
f u n c t i o n - s p e c i f i c . They ai'e a c t u a l l y consequential when t h e i r 
(2) 
adherents have the power to impose t h e i r d e f i n i t i o n s on society; 
But we may also t a l k h y p o t h e t i c a l l y of the consequences of a 
given ideology, were i t t o become dominant: hence p o t e n t i a l 
rather than actual consequentiality defines ideology. Insofar 
as they are a c t u a l , ideologies serve the i n t e r e s t s of i d e n t i f i a b l e 
sections of society. Or, i f members of a p a r t i c u l a r society are 
taken to have common i n t e r e s t s i n certain respects, then ideology 
may be said to be f u n c t i o n - s p e c i f i c . This i s the case, regardless 
of the c o n t e x t u a l l y - s p e c i f i c referents of the ideologies i n 
question. Por instance, 
" I f the term 'ideology' i s taken to mean a l l systems of 
b e l i e f and opinion f u n c t i o n a l l y defined, that i s , defined 
from the point of view of t h e i r role i n i n t e l l e c t u a l l y 
j u s t i f y i n g and organising mass action, then the id e o l o g i c a l 
element i s c l e a r l y an essential part of the social 
sciences." Wiatr (1969) p.29. 
Insofar as a given society i s stable (ordered or c o n t r o l l e d ) , 
at a p a r t i c u l a r time, dominant ideologies are l i k e l y to be those 
of the powerful i n that society. 
"An essential function of the ideology of the r u l i n g class 
i s to present to i t s e l f and to those i t rules a coherent 
world view that i s s u f f i c i e n t l y f l e x i b l e , comprehensive, 
and mediatoty t o convince the subordinate classes of the 
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j u s t i c e of i t s hegemony. I f t h i s ideology were no more than 
a r e f l e c t i o n of immediate economic i n t e r e s t s , i t would be 
worse than useless, f o r the hypocrisy of the class, as well 
as i t s greed, would quickly become apparent t o the most 
abject of i t s subjects," Genovese (1968/72) p,33. 
Consequentiality, or i n t e r e s t - s p e c i f i c i t y , i s the d i s t i n c t i v e 
feature r e f e r r e d to by the term "ideology". The contexted and 
Value-Known features are i n e v i t a b l e features of ajy^ system of 
b e l i e f s (as opposed t o understandings). But to speak of "ideologies" 
i s to point to i n t e r e s t s or functions served - or, where these are 
u n i d e n t i f i e d , to suggest the p o s s i b i l i t y of some such 
consequentiality. ( I suggest below that a l l educational b e l i e f s 
be regarded as i d e o l o g i c a l , i n order to preserve the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of such consequentiality. Assume any educational b e l i e f s to be 
i n t e r e s t - s p e c i f i c , u n t i l i t i s proved othearwise. So also w i t h 
a l l b e l i e f systems). 
I w i l l not here attempt t o discuss other d e f i n i t i o n s of 
"ideology". However, a few points may c l a r i f y my own usage. 
By "ideologies", I do not mean b e l i e f systems that are necessarily 
programmatic, I see as mistaken (or at least less useful) 
Priedrich's view that i t i s 
"a mistaken conception of ideology ... which i s excessively 
broadened to comprehend any set of ideas men may cherish, 
regardless of whether they are programmatic or not," 
P r i e d r i c h (1972) p,95. 
On the contrary 5 one of the most important features of ideology 
i s that i t s prescriptions are i m p l i c i t l y believed, "obvious" and 
"unquestionable". The term should not be r e s t r i c t e d to e x p l i c i t l y 
elaborated programmes. 
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Neither would I i n s i s t that ideologies are delusory. In 
considering the functions of ideology, any discrepancy between 
ideology and r e a l i t y ^ ^ ^ may indeed be s i g n i f i c a n t . F i r s t l y , 
however, we can expect no b e l i e f system to be t o t a l l y adequate. 
And secondly i t i s precisely because of t h e i r r e l a t i v e adequacy 
(as opposed to t h e i r inadequacies) that ideologies are so 
strongly adhered-to, and therefore so consequential. In short, 
ideologies are generally "good" models of Reality, rather than 
"bad" ones. At the same time, of course, i t i s not j u s t r u l i n g 
classes which adhere to r u l i n g ideologies. Ideologies do not 
necessarily serve the i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r adherents. Assuming 
th a t i n s p e c i f i c societies sectional i n t e r e s t s are not i d e n t i c a l 
or convergent, then any s t a b i l i t y may rest upon ideological 
r a t h e r than immediately physical control. Such ideo l o g i c a l 
c o n t r o l e n t a i l s adherence by some, at least, t o b e l i e f s that are 
against t h e i r objective i n t e r e s t s . 
"The concept 'ideology' r e f l e c t s the one discovery which 
emerged from p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t , namely, th a t r u l i n g groups 
can i n t h e i r t h i n k i n g become so inte n s i v e l y interest-bound 
to a s i t u a t i o n t h a t they are simply no longer able to see 
c e r t a i n f a c t s which would undermine t h e i r sense of domination, 
There i s i m p l i c i t i n the word 'ideology* the i n s i g h t that 
i n c ertain s i t u a t i o n s the c o l l e c t i v e unconscious of certain 
groups obscures the r e a l condition of society both to 
i t s e l f and t o others, and thereby s t a b i l i s e s i t . " 
Mannheim (1936/60) p,40. 
Neither do I f i n d . i t important t o i n s i s t t h a t ideologies 
are c o l l e c t i v e b e l i e f systems, I see no special usefulness i n 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between ideologies and, say, perspectives, i f 
(4) 
the l a t t e r i s taken to be more i n d i v i d u a l and i d i o s y n c r a t i c , ^ ' 
Two important features of ideology are t h e i r determination and 
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t h e i r consequentiality. Experience that i s s i m i l a r , common, 
or complementary t o large groups or categories of people w i l l 
tend t o produce widely held b e l i e f s . Depending on other 
contextual f a c t o r s - f o r instance the degree of di r e c t repression -
the significance of those b e l i e f s may rest on the sheer number of 
people holding them i n common. But the ideological b e l i e f s of a 
small group are not d i f f e r e n t i n nature from those of an ent i r e 
population. They are s i m i l a r l y structured and share the q u a l i t i e s 
of Value-Knowledge, 
A l o t depends, i n stressing one rather than another d e f i n i t i o n a l 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , upon what i t i s that i s to be investigated. One 
reason why I prefer not_ to define "ideologies" i n terms of the 
number of believers involved i s that I prefer to regard the 
extensiveness of pa r t i c u l a r ' i d e o l o g i c a l commitments as problematic., 
The extent t o which such-and-such b e l i e f s are adhered to i n given 
populations i s something worthy of in v e s t i g a t i o n . (For the same 
reason, I allowed hypothetical ideologies - with p o t e n t i a l 
consequences, r a t h e r than actual ones - to be included as 
"ideologies", although that term w i l l mostly be used of b e l i e f 
systems a c t u a l l y adhei-ed-to i n s p e c i f i c contexts). 
F i n a l l y , we might note other terms which are related to my 
notion of "ideology": "master symbols", "culture", "(dominant) 
paradigms", "(group) perspectives", f o r instance. Again i t i s 
not ray i n t e n t i o n t o discuss these here. Most of them attend 
p r i m a r i l y t o the f i r s t of the three characteristics l i s t e d above, 
namely the s o c i e t a l l y contexted nature of ( c o l l e c t i v e ) b e l i e f 
systems. I would wa.sh to stress at least as much the i m p l i c i t 
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Value-Knowledge e l e m e n t a n d the consequentiality^^^ of 
ideologies. 
j|Educati,OTi" 
My use of the term "education" i s de l i b e r a t e l y broad, and, 
by i n t e n t i o n at l e a s t , non-evaluative. I t applies t o a l l that 
happens i n learning s i t u a t i o n s . Beliefs about education are 
b e l i e f s about a l l learning processes, contents and contexts, 
I do not r e s t r i c t "education" t o what happens i n formally 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d learning s i t u a t i o n s . A b e t t e r term f o r that 
i s "schooling". Nor am I concerned f o r the moment with such 
d i s t i n c t i o n s as those between "education" and " i n d o c t r i n a t i o n " , 
or "education" and " i n s t r u c t i o n " . Such d i s t i n c t i o n s i n many cases 
r e l y on-an evaluation of the content of what i s learned. They then 
depend on s o c i e t a l l y s p e c i f i c c r i t e r i a , which i t i s b e t t e r t o keep 
problematic. What i s i n some contexts regarded as "indoctz»ination" 
i s seen i n another as "education". This should be a matter f o r 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n and explanation. I n other cases, these d i s t i n c t i o n s 
r e l y not on the content of learned b e l i e f s and understandings, but 
on the nature of the soc i a l relationships and learning processes 
involved. ^Hheve t h i s i s so, they may be derivable from the 
d i s t i n c t i o n s which I make, between "Knowledge" and "Power" 
dimensions. I n t a l k i n g about education, I am concerned on the 
one hand w i t h the subjective processes involved i n learning -
inc l u d i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the i n d i v i d u a l learner - and on the 
other hand w i t h the social contexting of such processes. This 
d i s t i n c t i o n i s only a n a l y t i c a l , however. F i r s t l y , those contexts 
are themselves "educative". They are experienced i n such a way 
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that b e l i e f s and understandings are produced. Secondly, they 
are i n t u r n p a r t l y (re-)produced as a resu l t of what participeints 
have previously learned about the "nature" of such contexts. 
I n looking at b e l i e f s about education, I discuss the 
"Knowledge" and "Pov/er" dimensions. These are best thought of 
i n terms of d i s t i n c t i o n s made e a r l i e r , between objective Reality 
( i n c l u d i n g s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s ) ^ Objectivated 'Knowledge', and 
Subjective 'Knowledge'. I s h a l l elaborate on these two 
dimensions i n Chapter 7, below. I sh a l l also say more about the 
three "realms" in,Chapter 9» Both notions w i l l be explored 
f u r t h e r i n Part I I I and i l l u s t r a t e d i n Part V. Meanwhile, a 
b r i e f account i s i n order here. 
Objectivated 'Knowledge' 
Reality 
( i n c l u d i n g Social Relations) 
Subjective 'Knowledge' 
B e l i e f s on the "Knowledge" dimension concern the nature of both 
Objectivated 'Knowledge' and Subjective 'Knowledge'. More 
importantly they r e f e r to relationships betv/een these two, and 
between each of them and the r e a l world-out-there. Questions of 
epistemology and learning theoiy are here involved. Beliefs 
on the "Power" dimensions concern above a l l the nature of Social 
Relations as axi aspect of Reality. The nature, d e s i r a b i l i t y , 
(7) 
p o s s i b i l i t y and i n e v i t a b i l i t y ^ of p a r t i c u l a r structures of 
s o c i a l and s o c i e t a l r e l a t i o n s are here at issue. Two things should 
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be noted, however. F i r s t , these questions cannot i n practice 
be divorced from b e l i e f s about Objectivated and Subjective 
'Knowledge', where education i s at issue. Questions of framing 
a r i s e ^ i n the Social Relations-Objectivated 'Knowledge' 
relationships? who are the "teachers", or "parents", or 
"elders", who define v a l i d and valuable 'knowledge' f o r the 
educans? S i m i l a r l y , "Power" questions arise i n considering any 
d i f f e r e n t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of access to resources. This may r e l a t e 
t o assumptions about a d i f f e r e n t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l 
p o t e n t i a l . That i s , Social Relations-Subjective 'Knowledge' 
re l a t i o n s h i p s concern more thaji the "Knowledge" question of 
learning theory. The second thing to note i s that t h i s overlap 
of "Knowledge" and "Power" issues i s unavoidable. I t i s , indeed, 
t o be welcomed. Such an a n a l y t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n cannot correspond 
t o o n t o l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t features of r e a l i t y , except from a 
l i m i t e d Relevance angle. The most immediate reason f o r t h i s i s 
that what any one person takes to be Reality ( i . e . that person's 
' r e a l i t y ' ) i s also what that person w i l l take to be objectivatable 
as the 'knowledge' of others. Although, therefore, we may 
d i s t i n g u i s h a n a l y t i c a l l y between the three "realms", i n discussing 
the b e l i e f s of others, they i n e v i t a b l y overlap. Accordingly, the 
"Knowledge" and "Pov/er" dimensions are i n practice inseparable. 
However, t h i s i s e a s i l y neglected, not least by p a r t i c i p a n t s / 
believers tliemselves. "Educational" assertions are often made 
wi t h the assumption that only "Knowledge" issues are involved -
especially those of eplstemology and learning theory. In practice, 
however, important "Power" assumptions may underlie those assejrtions, 
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"Educational Ideologies" 
"Educational ideologies" are societally-contexted, i n t e r e s t -
s p e c i f i c f-alue-Knowledge about learning and i t s context. What 
are commonly considered to be "philosophies", or "aims", or 
"t h e o r i e s " of education are a l l included. I include them p a r t l y 
because of the duty-of-doubt suggested e a r l i e r . ( I t i s methodol-
o g i c a l l y sound to assume th a t there may be i d e n t i f i a b l e i n t e r e s t s 
( o r functions) served by adherence to p a r t i c u l a r systems of b e l i e f , 
at l e a s t u n t i l convincing evidence i s presented to the contrary.) 
They are also included because, beyond what i s e x p l i c i t l y 
considered and i d e n t i f i e d i n them, there i s i n v a r i a b l y some 
f u r t h e r i m p l i c i t reference, A w r i t e r may appear t o address 
himself only to the "Knowledge" dimension, i n discussing learning 
theory, or episteraology, f o r instance. But he must at least 
i m p l i c i t l y have some notions on the "Power" dimension, also. 
These are inseparable from h i s o v e r a l l structure of b e l i e f s . 
Writers v/ho t a l k of "pure education", or "child-centredness", or 
" v a l i d educational knowledge" must always also be assuming 
something about the s o c i a l contexting of learning. 
"Educational ideologies" does not r e f e r merely to the 
t h e o r e t i c a l w r i t i n g s of educationists. Included also are the 
b e l i e f s and assumptions of p r a c t i c i n g teachers, administrators, 
p o l i t i c i a n s and others, whenever they are involved i n educational 
/ 
matters. I f the t h r e e - f o l d Reality d i s t i n c t i o n i s v a l i d , then i t 
i s a part of the belief-producing experience of a l l engaged i n 
education. The more we f i n d c e r t a i n aspects ignored i n e x p l i c i t 
statements, the more s i g n i f i c a n t (and consequential) may such 
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b e l i e f s be. A major empirical object of t h i s essay i s 
t o discuss some such i m p l i c i t b e l i e f s and to attempt t o 
make them e x p l i c i t . 
Notes: 
(1) See, f o r instance, Mannheim (1936/60), Bottomore (1956), 
Plamenatz (1971), Lichtheim (1965), Geertz (1964). 
(2) That power may i t s e l f be legitimated by common adherence 
to i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f s . Conversely, p o t e n t i a l (physical) 
power may not need to be exercised, by v i r t u e of 
id e o l o g i c a l concurrence w i t h an established power 
st r u c t u r e . 
(3) This phrase i s used, f o r instance, by Bowles (1971/75) p.54. 
(4) Sharp and Green d i s t i n g u i s h between teachers' ideologies 
and teachers' perspectives (1975, p.69), seeing the former 
as more general and less dependent on sp e c i f i c context. 
Whilst such an operational d i s t i n c t i o n may be useful, 
i t should not be i n f e r r e d from t h i s that the two are 
d i s t i n c t . On the contraxy, Value-l{nowK ideology i s 
fundamental t o behaviour i n concrete s i t u a t i o n s . 
(5) Thus I would r e j e c t the suggestion seemingly implied by 
Becker & Geer (1960/71) that c u l t u r a l (or i d e o l o g i c a l ) 
b e l i e f s r e s u l t from e x p l i c i t awareness of common problems 
i n need of common solutions. (Their a r t i c l e i s , however, 
somewhat inconsistent. I t i s not certain that t h i s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s f u l l y intended by the w r i t e r s ) . 
(6) I would regard Matza's use of "ideology" (1964, e.g. p.52) 
as lacking i n t h i s respect. He uses i t as v i r t u a l l y 
synonymous w i t h "(sub-)culture", stressing coherence, but 
not oonsequentiality. 
(7) i . e . Questions of " I s " , "Should be", "Could be" and 
"Must be"j cf.Ch.2, note 15. 
(8) c f . Bernstein (1971). 
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£HAPTER_5 \ 
MljlR„-lMATMENTS Qg EDUCATIONAL IDEOLOGIES 
According t o my t h r e e - f o l d d e f i n i t i o n of "ideologies" -
that they are (a) societal3.y contexted, (b) Value-Knowledge and 
(c) f u n c t i o n - or i n t e r e s t - s p e c i f i c - I s h a l l b r i e f l y review some 
other discussions of educational ideologies. I s h a l l take them 
i n the order; ( e ) ^ then ( a ) , then ( b ) . The a l l o c a t i o n of 
p a r t i c u l a r accounts to one or other of these sections i s 
somewhat a r b i t r a r y . I am c l e a r l y not suggesting that a given 
w r i t e r i s exclusively concerned w i t h one or other of these 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of (educational) ideologies* But there does tend 
t o be an eraiphasis i n one d i r e c t i o n or another. This i s i n e v i t a b l e . 
The p a r t i c u l a r d e f i n i t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s with which one s t a r t s 
tend t o di c t a t e the kinds of question one may subsequently ask. 
My own s t a r t i n g p o i n t , of course, ±3 the Value-Knowledge 
characterl.8tic - the nature of the educational ideologies i n 
question. 
Punctiona__and I n t e r e s t s 
Attention t o educational ideologies as such i s a comparatively 
recent development i n the sociology of education* But there has 
f o r a long time been a t t e n t i o n t o the functions of education 
systems. Be l i e f s about how such systems do, or might, or should, 
or must, function are themselves important data. There i s 
remarkable agreement amongst sociologists of education about what 
the main functions of schooling are, A seemingly large number of 
(1) 
diverse functions ^ generally reduces to^ or i s derivable from, 
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those of Selection eind S o c i a l i s a t i o n , These are terms used by 
(2) 
Parsonso They tend thersfor© to carry connotations of 
st r u c t u r a l - f u n o t i o n a l i s m and progressivist Preudianisra. Yet 
e s s e n t i a l l y the same functions are referred'-to, f o r instance, 
by Althusser. H© discusses the reproduction f i r s t l y of s k i l l s 
and submission t o the established order ( s o c i a l i s a t i o n ) and 
secondly of the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s of production ( s e l e c t i o n ) . 
Other w r i t e r s make s i m i l a r d i s t i n c t i o n s . 
This agreement derives from a f a r deeper agreement. Though 
very v a r i a b l e i n emphasis, and therefore i n actual d e f i n i t i o n , 
a l l r e l y on a fundamental d i s t i a e t i o n between structure and 
content, between society ( o r so c i a l structure) and cu l t u r e , 
between p o s i t i o n and r o l e , ©tc,» S i m i l a r l y , they a l l encounter 
the same sorts of problem. F i r s t l y , content i t s e l f I s structured. 
I t can only be seen as elemental t o a "larger" structure from a 
p a r t i c u l a r Relevance angle. Secondly the two aspects are 
always interdependent, i n praetic©. In the case of selection 
and s o c i a l i s a t i o n , f o r instance, selsotion procedures themselves 
"socialise"» They are part of th© hidden curriculum. Experience 
of them teaches b e l i e f s that are fimdamental to how people 
subsequently behave. 
My own variant of t h i s basic d i s t i n c t i o n ^ ^ V between the 
"Power" ejtid "Knowledge" dimensions of education, meets the same 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . I n s p e l l i n g out the bases of the d i s t i n c t i o n , i n 
terras of a t r i - p a r t i t e d i s t i n c t i o n between Reality, Objectivated 
'Knowledge" and Subjective 'Knowledge', I hope t o do two things. 
F i i ' s t , t h i s i n i t i a l elabOMtion demonstrates whv the d i s t i n c t i o n 
does not correspond to d i s t i n c t processes i n re a l contexts. 
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Objectivated 'Knowledge' ^bridges" the r e a l i t y of physical and 
s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , i n any given h^.storical context, and subjective 
(behaviour-inducing) b e l i e f s and understandings about them. 
Second, the emphasis on t h i s interdependence makes c r u c i a l the 
question, how does ideology work? Our aim need not be to f i n d 
neat corx-eapondent d i s t i n c t i o n s . We may make a n a l y t i c a l 
d i s t i n c t i o n s which d i r e c t uo t o those IglatiSSJMES which are the 
most problematic, the most s o o i e t a l l y s p e c i f i c and the most 
consequential i n b e l i e f s t r a c t u r a t i o n . 
Some w r i t i n g s that discuss the two major functions of 
education systems, but w i t h some emphasis on the ideo l o g i c a l 
aspects involved, are i n Hopper (19719 ed,). Hopper's own f i r s t 
a r t i c l e demonstrates some of the problems,, Although his concern 
i s e x p l i c i t l y ^ t h s t r u c t u r a l features « the selection function -
h© pays considerable a t t e n t i o n t o what he c a l l s ideologies of 
l e g i t i m a t i o n and of Implementatioffl,. He attempts t o c l a s s i f y 
societieB, on the basis not eo much of the actual functions of 
t h e i r education systems as of ideologies about these functions. 
B r i e f l y , Hopper defines ideologies of l e g i t i m a t i o n i n teims 
of two questions? who i t i s thought should be selected f o r 
p a r t i c u l a r kinds of education and why they "should" be. These 
two questions alone give him a four-parb typology of education 
systems (or societ i e s ) according t o which type of ideology of 
l e g i t i m a t i o n i s "dominant".He t r i e s t o keep these issues d i s t i n c t 
from ideologies of implem©ntation« These concern the questions, 
when people "should" be selected and how. I n the f i r s t of 
these, he introduces the notions of " e g a l i t a r i a n " and " E l i t i s t " , 
on the grounds that early selection (and therefore d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ) 
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i s e l i t i s t , and l a t e selection i s egalitarian« The passage i s 
worth quoting at length;-
"An e l i t i s t ideology specifies f o r example; that the 
maximum amount of education f o r each c i t i z e n should depend 
on h i s f u t u r e a b i l i t y t o contribute t o economic p r o d u c t i v i t y ; 
/by that ' i n t e l l i g e n c e ^ and 'edueability' are determined 
p r i m a r i l y by hereditary f a c t o r s , so thg.t some people could 
not possibly benefit from education above a given minimum; 
axid /Q7 that those who appear t o be bound f o r e l i t e positions 
should be separated at an early age from those who appear t o 
be bound f o r lower positions so that the former gain i n 
t h e i r confidence to lead and the l a t t e r i n t h e i r willingness 
to f o l l o w * " 
Against t h i s , he poses the "egalitarian'' positions™ 
"An e g a l i t a r i a n ideology specifies, f o r example: /47 that 
the maximum amount of education I s the r i g h t of every 
c i t i z e n regardless of h i s f u t u r e a b i l i t y t o contribute t o 
economic p r o d u c t i v i t y 5 /S7 that ' i n t e l l i g e n c e ' and 
'educability' are determined p r i m a r i l y by environmental 
f a c t o r s so that w i t h proper i n s t r u c t i o n a l l people could 
benefit from a maximum of education and /c/ that those who 
appear to be IJound f o r e l i t e positions should work and play 
as long as possible w i t h those who appear to be bound f o r 
lower positions so that the former w3.11 not lose touch 
wi t h the 'eoHimon man' and the l a t t e r w i l l not become 
overly subordinate and lacking i n i n i t i a t i v e . This ideology 
supports the view that selection should occur as l a t e as 
possible, and that a r e l a t i v e l y small number of routes 
should e x i s t . " 
Hopper (1968/71) p.97 ( l e t t e r i n g added)„ 
How i t l a not cl e a r whether the three perspectives i n each case 
(which I have l e t t e r e d a, b and c) are causes, or descriptive 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , or resu l t a n t symptoms, of e l i t i s m and e g a l i t a r -
ianisra. Nor i s i t clear why these questions should r e l a t e only -
or even p r i m a r i l y - to the question, when selection occurs. The 
three perspectives concern (a) the economic relevance of formal 
education, (b) the h e r i t a b i l i t y or otherwise of educability, and 
(c) the need f o r special s o c i a l i s a t i o n of e l i t e s . Hopper assumes 
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(a) t h a t education i s unprobleraatically related t o an 
unproblematic economic (but not p o l i t i c a l ) goal of. p r o d u c t i v i t y 
or development; (b) t h a t however i t may be determined, 
e d u c a b i l i t y (despite the invert e d commas) i s a r e a l v a r i a b l e , 
which i s relevant t o the unprobleraatic economic goal; and (c) 
that advanced or developed societies are necessarily unequal, 
whatever "humaxiitarian" concern there may be f o r those destined 
f o r n o n - e l i t e p o s i t i o n s . I would take a l l of these assumptions 
t o be open t o question. Hopper's own view^ therefore, of what 
are "obvious" or " n a t u r a l " functions of educatioja systems would 
be a s u i t a b l e object of analysis, as educational ideology. 
However, t h i s i s not, f o r the moment, my point. The point i s , 
simply, t h a t Hopper's d i s t i n c t i o n between " e l i t i s t " and 
" e g a l i t a r i a n " i s t2'iviaD.y divorced from political-economic 
contexts, i n tha t these are assumed t o b© unproblematic. By 
t r e a t i n g the question of eventual selection on ce r t a i n "natural" 
grounds as uaproblematic, Hopper evades a cent r a l problem: 
t h a t s o c i a l i s a t i o n i s an i n t e g r a l part of selection. The 
interdependence of the two i s what i s most i n need of examination 
( i n each empirical context), 
Davies (1970/71) c r i t i c i s e s Hopper's a r t i c l e on s i m i l a r 
l i n e s . I n p a r t i c u l a r , he f i n d s i t "most s t r i k i n g " that Hopper 
assumes the primary fu n c t i o n of education systems t o be that of 
selection* He also suggests that Hopper i s misguided i n 
supposing that e n t i r e education systems - and thereby societies -
can be characteidsed i n terras of single ,"dominant" ideologies. 
Davies notes that h i s t o r i c a l residue, regional v a r i a t i o n and 
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f u n c t i o n a l v a r i a t i o n a l l contribute t o a d i v e r s i t y of educational 
ideologies, w i t h i n single societieso Prom both these c r i t i c i s m s 
a r i s e s the point t h a t I wish here to emphasise. A f a i l u r e t o 
consider the problematic nature of th© se l e c t i o n - s o c i a l i s a t i o n 
d i s t i n c t i o n can b l i n d us t o the problems of why, and w i t h what 
consequences, diverse ideologies e x i s t , how they are i n t e r - r e l a t e d , 
axid how they might change over timee Though I appreciate Davles' 
emphasis on s o c i a l i s a t i o n , i t i s possible that he goes too f a r 
" I n the other d i r e c t i o n " . Consequently the relationships between 
sel e c t i o n and s o c i a l i s a t i o n again appear to be neglected. 
Smith (1971) I s c l e a r l y i n the same t r a d i t i o n as Hopper and 
Davies, He too emphasises the se l e c t i o n - s o c i a l i s a t i o n d i s t i n c t i o n . 
He i s nearest to achieving a balanced understanding of the two. 
His account can be summarized i n the fo l l o w i n g ! -
(7) 
" I t i s useful t o d i s t i n g u i s h s^ong ideologies concerned 
w i t h the f o l l o w i n g : faj the content which i s to be 
transmitted through the education system, /hj the pattern 
of i t s d i s t r i b u t i o n among d i f f e r e n t groups, /oj the 
consequences of the education process f o r m o b i l i t y w i t h i n 
e x i s t i n g s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e , and /SJ the consequences of the 
education process f o r various aspects of the social 
struotuire i t s e l f , " Smith (1971) Pe252 ( l e t t e r i n g added). 
This might be portrayed as followss-
Kiiowledge 
Society/power/ 
use of knowledge 
Content 
a. ( c u l t u r e ) 
c« ( s o c i a l 
m o b i l i t y ) 
Structure/ 
D i s t r i b u t i o n 





This i s p o t e n t i a l l y u s e f u l , as a s t a r t i n g point f o r examining 
educational ideologieso However, Smith's concern i s not, 
primarilys t o examine such ideologies, so much as the education 
systems i n which they might be found. I suggest that by 
approaching MSSl^ii®!. f^^ro *he point of view of t h e i r nature -
what i d e o l o g i c a l (Value-Known) b e l i e f s are, i n terms of t h e i r 
adherence and t h e i r reference ~ we should not presuppose that 
they have p a r t i c u l a r functions,, but rather take those as 
problematic. I t i s worth assuming that they serve some functions 
or i n t e r e s t s , i n t h e i r given context. But whj.ch ones they serve 
i s a matter.for i n v e s t i g a t i o n . Whilst approving, therefore, of 
the sorts of question that the above typology might raise about 
p a r t i c u l a r (idisological) accounts, I am waxy of Smith's i n t e n t i o n 
t o analyse education systems i n these terms. The actual r e l a t i o n -
ship between p a r t i c u l a r ideologies and t h e i r s o c i e t a l context i s 
best examined a f t e r an i n i t i a l examination of those ideologies. 
accounts l i k e that of Hopper, which suggest a "one-to-one" 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between b e l i e f s held and t h e i r functions, are over-
deterministice So also are those l i k e Smith's, which suggest a 
s i m i l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p between b e l i e f s sind t h e i r referents. There 
i s a tendency t o play down the ereati.ve r o l e of people i n making 
historya Certainly b e l i e f s are determined, but men can and do 
create circumstances which become belief-producing experience* 
Ideology tends to function by default, rather than through simple 
d i r e c t i o n of a c t i v i t y ^ I t i s through not r e f l e c t i n g on the 
problematic nature of our b e l i e f s that we are controlled by themo 
Despite (perhaps even because o f ) the interdependence of 
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s o c i a l i s a t i o n and sel e c t i o n , deliberate a t t e n t i o n t o that 
r e l a t i o n s h i p can be f r u i t f u l . I t i s central t o the question of 
how ideology works. I f w© can describe ideologies as such, 
rat h e r than i n te5rms of the functions they are supposed t o 
serve, or are supposed t o correspond with, i t becomes a question 
of how, and undor what conditions 5 there i s mutual determination 
between the r e a l i t y of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s and people's ' r e a l i t i e s ' . 
I t i s useful t o d i s t i n g u i s h between ideologies which i n 
part determine p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l formations and ideologies which 
are tJiemselves produced (determined) withi n those systems« 
Atte n t i o n t o s o c i a l i s a t i o n has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been only to the 
l a t t e r . I t has been to people being schooled i n t o p a r t i c u l a r 
b e l i e f s and value systems through t h e i r experience as p u p i l s / 
students. The work of Hopper, Davles and Smith has pointed t o 
the other l e v e l of ideology i n schools: ideologies of l e g i t i m a t i o n , 
f o r instance, which (are supposed t o ) shape the s t r u c t u r a l 




(e t c . ) ideologies) 
I t I s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the higher l e v e l educational 
ideologies and the lower l e v e l b e l i e f s produced through schooling 
t h a t i s so i n t e r e s t i n g , When, and why, and i n what sense, might 
the b e l i e f s Inculcated i n pupils "correspond" with the dominant 
ideas behind educational arrangements? Wheng and why, are 
master patterns transmitted through schools? Moreover, when 
and why does such reproduction not occur so straightforwardly? 
From t h i s b r i e f look at Hopper et a l . , i t i s clear that a 
d i s t i n c t i o n should be made between the actual functions of a given 
education system and what are believed to be the functions of 
th a t system. These b e l i e f s are an important part of educational 
ideology. Smith's d i s t i n c t i o n s can be useful - as a way of 
accessing the content of given Ideological b e l i e f systems, I 
have tackled the question of function- or i n t e r e s t " s p e c l f l c i . t y 
of (educational) ideologies, then, i n a rather round-about way. 
Hopper et a l . may not be t a l k i n g d i r e c t l y about such functions. 
But t h e i r importance and the attendant d i f f i c u l t i e s are evident 
i n t h e i r work. 
I look i n the next section at a group of w r i t e r s who have 
considered educational ideologies from a Marxian viewpoint. 
Perhaps rather a r b i t r a r i l y , I group them as w r i t e r s concerned 
w i t h who hold such-and-such i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f s , i n sp e c i f i c 
contexts. But of course they are also concerned w i t h the 
functions of i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f a I t i s important t o them, too, 
whose i n t e r e s t s are served by the dominance of p a r t i c u l a r 
ideologies. Indeed, one of these w r i t e r s , Hoare, wri t e s ; 
" I t must be understood that i n the f o l l o w i n g sections there 
i s an ass i m i l a t i o n of very d i f f e r a a t t h l n k e r s which i s at 
times b r u t a l , f o r the purposes of the analysis." 
Hoare (1965) Pa45n. 
This b r u t a l i t y r e s u l t s from c l a s s i f y i n g ideologies on the grounds 
that p a r t i c u l a r ideologies serve p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s or functions. 
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But such a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n cannot e ^ l a i n how i t comes about 
that people of quite d i f f e r e n t axid otherwise unrelated opinions 
(8) 
and objective i n t e r e s t s f i n d themselves i n a l l i a n c e . They 
may share some i m p l i c i t assumptions about the functions of t h e i r 
viewpoints, but that cannot exglai£ the various viewpoints. For 
example, t o group Burt and Bantock together may be v a l i d i f one's 
concern i s wi t h the functions of ideologies. But i t does not help 
us to understand how they come t o be In a j l i a n c e . 
Operational d e f i n i t i o n s mpst depend on what questions one 
wants subsequently to aske I n sjjy case, I s h a l l consider educational 
ideologies i n i t i a l l y i n terras of what they are, rather than who 
holds them, or why, or wit h what consequences. I t i s my objective 
subsequently t o ask such questions, without presupposing the 
ajiswers, 
SooietaLCont^xt 
The term"ideology" i t s e l f i s most associated with the Marxian 
t r a d i t i o n , as i s a s p e c i f i c emphasis on the i n t e r e s t s served by 
id e o l o g i c a l commitment. Writers i n t h i s t r a d i t i o n who have w r i t t e n 
about educational ideologies ha^e obviously had i n mind such 
i n t e r e s t - s p e c i f i c i t y . However, t h i s has often been i m p l i c i t . 
Perhaps i t has been too "obvious" t o need s p e l l i n g out. I n the 
case of some w r i t e r s mentioned below, the very labels chosen to 
c l a s s i f y holders of p a r t i c u l a r ideological b e l i e f s indicate what 
are presumably assumed to be the "obvious" consequences of such 
alignment. Perhaps through fear of idealism, there has been some 
concern to stress that i t i s people who are grouped together, 
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r a t h e r than ideas, emphasising the d e f i n i t e l o c a t i o n i n p a r t i c u l a r 
sections of societies of the ideas discussed. I therefore discuss 
these treatments under the general heading of "so c i e t a l context" •-
th a t i s , who holds the b e l i e f s i n question,where, when, and why. 
The predominantly Marxian approach i n t h i s respect o f f e r s a 
convenient basis f o r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s class p o s i t i o n , w i t h i n a 
p a r t i c u l a r mode of production. I n some versions, t h i s i s quite 
e x p l i c i t . I n others, whether because of the p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s 
of l o c a t i n g i n d i v i d u a l s (especially i n t e l l e c t u a l s ? ) i n clear class 
p o s i t i o n s , or because of the obvious anomalies that occur ( f a l s e 
consciousness?), t h i s emphasis i s less clear. Indeed, c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s 
i n t h i s t r a d i t i o n have tended t o become less "concrete", and made 
more i n terms of i d e a t i o n a l dimensions. 
Among the clearest exponents of class as the basis f o r 
grouping adherents t o p a r t i c u l a r educational ideologies are Simon 
and Williams. 
Simon (1960) provides numerous h i s t o r i c a l examples of class 
i n t e r e s t and alignment as the basis of stands taken on educational 
issues. I n the Leeds Grammar School case, f o r example, (Simon, 
1960, p.105 f f ) he sees a clear d i s t i n c t i o n between (a) the high 
Toiy p o s i t i o n (represented on the one hand by the schoolmaster 
under attack by l o c a l business I n t e r e s t s and on the other by the 
Loz'd Chancellor who i n 1805 adjudicated i n his favour), (b) the 
manufacturing and commercial class i n t e r e s t s ( o f Leeds) and 
(c) the "poor" of the c i t y . Simon describes the struggle -
i n i t i a l l y unsuccessful - by business i n t e r e s t s to oust the 
schoolmaster, because of the "irrelevance" of his c l a s s i c a l , 
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Gra,raniar School, teaching to t h e i r needs f o r l i t e r a t e and numerate 
cler ' i c a l s t a f f . The poor of Leeds, f o r whom grammar school places 
might be supposed t o have been t r a d i t i o n a l l y provided, were, says 
Simon, not powerful enough to inteafvene i n t h i s two-sided dispute. 
Williams (1961/65) does not go i n t o the questio3h of 
educational ideology i n depth. But he e x p l i c i t l y c l a s s i f i e s i t 
i n terms of class p o s i t i o n and class I n t e r e s t . Declaring t l i a t 
they can s t i l l be distinguished i n the 20th century, Williams 
i d e n t i f i e s three groups: the "public educators", the " i n d u s t r i a l 
t r a i n e r s " and the "old humanists",. Thus Williams sets the fashion 
f o r i d e n t i f y i n g holders of p a r t i c u l a r ideologies i n terms of 
t h e i r class p o s i t i o n , but apparently defining them i n terms of 
the content of t h e i r b e l i e f s , or of the "intended" functions of 
t h e i r adherence. Immediately, however, a problem arises, which 
Simon avoided by not e x p l i c i t l y c l a s s i f y i n g ideologies as such. 
For Williams also t a l k s of the "ne?/ working class", who are 
presumably d i s t i n c t from the "public educators". They believed i n 
"the students' choice of subject, the r e l a t i o n of d i s c i p l i n e s to 
actual contemporary l i v i n g , and the p a r i t y of general discussion 
w i t h expert i n s t r u c t i o n . " (p.165). One might have expected 
Williams' "public educators" t o be of or f o r the p r o l e t e r i a t . 
I t seems they are not. Presumably they are s i m i l a r to Simon's 
"Radicals". They are of the same class as, but d i s t i n c t from, 
the " i n d u s t r i a l t r a i n e r s " . Young (1971, p.29) i s more confident 
than I , that Williams indeed intended a four-paart c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . 
But he i s r i g h t i n saying that "one i s l e f t i n doubt as to how 
the 'democratic' / i . e . 'public educators',/ and the 'bourgeois' 
/3..e. ' i n d u s t r i a l t r a i n e r s ' ^ ideologies arise from what appear 
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to ye the same s o c i a l group " ( i b i d ) . What does seem clear i s 
that attempts to c l a s s i f y ideologies according to one c r i t e r i o n 
(e«g. societal-context or class position) do not produce 
groupings that are neat and convenient when one turns to other 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s (e^g. reference of b e l i e f or indeed i n t e r e s t -
s p e c i f i c i t y )c 
At least three w r i t e r s have drawn on Williams' d i s t i n c t i o n s • 
though they have not always acknowledged the debt. Perhaps 
sensing the problems j u s t mentioned, Hoare, Davies and Cosin have 
defined t h e i r "types" of educational ideology more d i r e c t l y i n 
terras of i d e a t i o n a l content. Except i n the case of Davies (and 
even here only loosely) there i s no e x p l i c i t reference to the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the sets of ideas olassifiedo Their 
dimensions are not spelled out - though I suggest they are there, 
i m p l i c i t l y , Nor, on the othei' hand;, do they r e l a t e the "types" 
of ideologies i n terms of t h e i r adherents' i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p s -
as Simon and Williams d i d , by reference t o class structure. 
But c l e a r l y t h e i r "types" do, i n f a c t , owe t h e i r o r i g i n t o 
Williams' d i s t i n c t i o n s , 
Hoare (1965) distinguishes between (a) "conservatives", 
(b) " r a t i o n a l i s e r s of the system", (c) "romantics" and 
(d) "democrats". A l l these, he says, are prominent i n 
contemporary B r i t a i n . He also adds- a f i f t h group, (e) 
•Revolutionaries", whose absence he regrets. The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s 
(q) 
of Davies (1969) and Cosin (1972) are s i m i l a r ^ , though they 
omit the f i f t h , h ypothetical, "type". I n a l l cases, the labels 
given to each group c l e a r l y r e f e r to the i n t e r e s t s supposedly 
served by adherence to p a r t i c u l a r "types" of educational 
ideology. Yet th© grouping i s derived from Williamso Williams 
based h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n on the societally-contextedj or class-
situateds nature of ideologies. Yet neither of these features 
i s spelled out by Hoare, Davies or Cosin. Moreover, the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the ideas themselves i s l a r g e l y i n t u i t i v e . 
Only Davies makes any attempt t o elaborate on t h i s . 
Ihe l a bels themselves r e f l e c t an i m p l i c i t use of dimensions. 
I cannot impose dimensions on other people's c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s 
without dangers of d i s t o r t i o n . Precisely because t h e i r dimensions 
are i n t u i t i v e , they are imprecise. However, Davies himself points 
out t h a t "types" (a) and (b) are i n some sense opposed to "types" 
(c) and ( d ) , i n that they are p o l i t i c a l l y "right-wing", rather 
than " l e f t - w i n g " . ^ ''^ ^ He also suggests a second dimension; 
(a) and ( d ) ^ who "see education as part of a c u l t u r a l whole", 
are opposed to (b) and ( c ) , who "take a u t i l i t a i r i a n view of 
education"o Whether or not Davies e x p l i c i t l y intended theise 
two dimensions to apply t o a l l educational ideologies, I suggest 
t h a t some such i n t u i t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n s are being made by a l l three 
w r i t e r s s -
C u l t u r a l Whole 
U t i l i t a r i a n 






Pour things should be noticed about t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . 
F i r s t l y , i t i s concerned w i t h people and t h e i r b e l i e f s , rather 
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than w i t h supposedly dominant ideologies (as i n the case of 
Hopper)o There may be a " b r u t a l " assimilation of thinkers, as 
Hoare notes. But the basic approach i s ^ by i n t e n t i o n at l e a s t , 
i n d u c t i v e generalisation from what are taken t o be the ideas 
of actual people. The debt to V/illiams' account, and thereby 
to a theory of class s t r u c t u r e 5 makes t h i s clear. 
Secondly, despite t h i s , the l a b e l l i n g of categories and 
the i n t u i t i v e dimensions suggested are not based merely on the 
f a c t that ideologies are societally-contexted. Attention to 
t h i s i s mixed w i t h a t t e n t i o n f i r s t l y to i n t e r e s t - s p e c i f i c i t y 
(how else would "roraeuntics" b© seen as " v^i-Alwl^.^. "?) and 
secondly to the actual content of the b e l i e f s - hence the 
dimensions. 
T h i r d l y , because of t h i s mixture, there i s something 
lackin g from the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . An awareness of how d i f f e r e n t 
"types" are i n t e r - r e l a t e d , and how change might occur i n ideological 
a f f i l i a t i o n , over time, has been l o s t . Yet i t existed i n the 
Williams account, which was more e x p l i c i t l y t i e d to s o c i e t a l -
context. 
Fourthly, there i s i n the event more emphasis - a l b e i t 
unrecognised » on the content of the b e l i e f s than there i s on 
t h e i r contextual o r i g i n (or on t h e i r i n t e r e s t - s p e c i f i c i t y ) . 
The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , indeed, i s remarkably s i m i l a r to that 
produced by Hoyle - from a d i f f e r e n t standpoint - as we s h a l l 
see below. 
In Simon and Williams, there was a clear awareness of the 
i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e i r "types" of' ideology. These 
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were securely grounded i n the s o c i e t a l p o s i t i o n of t h e i r 
adherents. (As w© saw^ though, there were problems i n t h i s . 
For people frequently do not adhere to b e l i e f s that have a 
one-to-one r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e i r class p o s i t i o n ) . I n Cosin, 
Davies and Hoare, t h i s societal-contexting basis of c l a s s i f i c -
a t i o n i s less clear. Attention i s more to the content of the 
b e l i e f s considered. One means of understanding the i n t e r -
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the "types" - namely, i n terms of the »<.U!.Ko.<^S 
of production - has therefore been l o s t . This has not been 
replaced by any e x p l i c i t development of crfete'inter™relationships; 
i n terms of be l i e f - c o n t e n t , 
I d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f s - Indeed any b e l i e f s ° are both states 
of mind and references to Realityo Taking t h i s r e l a t i o n a l 
property f i r s t , i t should be possible to discuss people.''s 
b e l i e f s i n terms of t h e i r content •»• that i s , i n terms of t h e i r 
referents. The danger i n doing so l i e s i n the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
generalising from p a r t i c u l a r instances of b e l i e f , seeking 
s i r a j - l a r i t i e s and abstract relationships between these instances, 
and then a t t r i b u t i n g r e a l i t y t o those relationships. Since 
b e l i e f s r e f e r (however inadequately) to Reality, then any r e a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between d i f f e r e n t people's b e l i e f s can exist only 
i n and through s p e c i f i c contexts. I f we group b e l i e f s together 
on the basis of supposed s i m i l a r i t i e s or d i s s i m i l a r i t i e s , then 
t h i s i s a h e u r i s t i c exercise only, the be t t e r to understand 
people's ideologies. We cannot and should not a t t r i b u t e r e a l i t y 
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(11) t o those c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s and dimensions , except i n s o f a r 
(12) 
as the believers are themselves aware of them. 
Kisbet (1966/70) notes three common ws,ys of dealing with 
the histoxy of thought. One i s to attend t o the thinkers 
themselves. This approach has s i m i l a r i t i e s w i t h the approach 
discussed I n the l a s t sections that of i d e n t i f y i n g ideologies 
i n terms of t h e i r adherents. A second way i s to look at "the 
system, the school, or the iam". And the t h i r d •» Nisbet's own 
i s to begin w i t h "unit^ideas", "which are the elements of 
systems". I mention the notion of unit-ideas below. Meanwhile, 
the "schools of thought" approach might be said to characterise 
something of the Eoare-Davies~Cosin approach already discussed. 
I t i s c e r t a i n l y r e l a t e d t o that of Hoyle. 
Hoyle (1970) c l a s s i f i e s what he 6alls "social theories of 
education" on the basis of two diehotoraous dimensionss 
Noraothetic/Idiographic and Conservative/Radical. Hoyle i s 
e x p l i c i t l y deductive, where Davies et a l . are i m p l i c i t l y so. 
He f i r s t posits his two dimensions, and then considers various 
B r i t i s h educational t h i n k e r s , p r a c t i t i o n e r s , administrators and 
p o l i t i c i a n s i n terms of the resultant four-part typology. 
B r i e f l y , h i s "nomothetic conservatives" are meritocratic or 
ledgsez^faire administrators, ivho s.re concerned with selection 
rather than s o c i a l i s a t i o n , w i t h structure rather than cul t u r e . 
The "nomothetic r a d i c a l s " , on the other hand, have a s i m i l a r 
view of what needs a t t e n t i o n ( s e l e c t i o n ) , but aim to expand 
educational provision and to promote equality of opportunity. 
The objectives of "idiographic r a d i c a l s " are to promote a common 
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c u l t u r e and mutual betterment and to remove e l i t e p r i v i l e g e . 
The "idiographic conservatives" are concerned to preserve and 
develop the creative powers of the e l i t e and to raise the c u l t u r a l 
standards of the masses through enlightened leadership. 
There i s a strange s i m i l a r i t y between t h i s account and 
th a t of Davies, The conservative/radical dimension i s related t o 
Davies* "right-wing^"left"Wing" dimension. The nomothetic/ 
idiographic dimension i s akin t o Davies' u t i l i t a r i a n / c u l t u r a l - w h o l e 
dimension. Yet there are also s i g n i f i c a n t differences, not least 
i n the thinkers and theories which f i n d themselves s l o t t e d i n t o 
p a r t i c u l a r "types", Halsey axiA Floud are regarded as nomothetic-
r a d i c a l s by Hoyle, but (bright-wing") r e v i s i o n i s t s by Davies, 
"Romantics", on the other hand, are absent from Hoyle's typology. 
These differences cannot be a t t r i b u t e d simply to the less 
elaborated nature of Davies' typology. I t arises from d i f f e r e n t 
assumptions being made about what i s Relevant, Davies and Hoyle 
c l e a r l y see the (act u a l or p o t e n t i a l ) function of Halsey and 
Ploud's work rather d i f f e r e n t l y . They have a d i f f e r e n t view of 
the p o s s i b i l i t i e s and d e s i r a b i l i t i e s of socie t a l change. I t i s 
tempting to say that we are t o l d more about the writexs'. own 
(educational) ideologies thaxi about t h e i r subjects'. Hoyle 
does not attempt t o j u s t i f y h i s two dimensions. This i s a p i t y , 
because the society/culture dichotomy can only be metaphorical. 
I t would be misleading, therefore, t o suppose that there r e a l l y 
were f o u r types of t h e o r i s t , based on such a d i s t i n c t i o n , Hoyle 
does, i t i s t r u e , stress t h a t his typology i s intended only f o r 
h e u r i s t i c purposes. His c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s overtly of theozles. 
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Yet there does seem t o be an i m p l i c i t suggestion - i n , f o r 
instance, his lengthy discussion of debates between d i f f e r e n t 
"types" of t h e o r i s t - that there r e a l l y are four types of 
t h e o r i s t . Such a suggestion must be avoided, unless s o c i e t a l l y -
contexted reasons can be offered f o r t h e i r r e a l d i s t i n c t i o n sind 
i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
A f u r t h e r problem arises ixi the accounts of both Hoyle and 
Davies. Both concentrate on the e x p l i c i t , t h e o r e t i c a l viewpoints 
of the people they discuss. Yet even sincere expressions may not 
adequately represent what i s believed, and i t i s b e l i e f s which 
are responsible f o r behaviour. Perhaps Hoyle i s safe here i n 
t a l k i n g about " s o c i a l theories of education", rather than 
"ideologies". But what i s s o c i o l o g i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t i s not 
a r t i f i c i a l l y abstracted ideas. I t i s what i s believed and 
understood i n context. I t i s b e l i e f s , not "mere" ideas, that 
have s o c i a l and s o c i e t a l impact. The relationships, between 
think@i-s/believers and the (education) systems i n which they 
are involved, are c r u c i a l . 
I have suggested that b e l i e f systems can be u s e f u l l y 
considered i n terms of a " t r e e ^ r o o t " metaphor and that a 
search f o r high-level ( i n c l u s i v e ) Basic Beliefs may be possible 
as a means of "short-handing" p a r t i c u l a r b e l i e f systems. I n 
p r i n c i p l e , we can only take t h i s approach i n the case of 
i n d i v i d u a l b e l i e f systems. To seek the Basic Beliefs of a 
gx-Hsup or category of people be to assume an i d e a t i o n a l l o g i c 
that does not ©xi.st. However, insofar as groups or categories 
of people have s i m i l a r or complementaxy experiences, then i t i s 
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l i k e l y that t h e i r b e l i e f s are r e a l l j ^ related to one ajiother, i n a 
way tha t i s i n p r i n c i p l e describable. The daziger i s i n supposing 
that i t i s i n the ideas themselves that that r e l a t i o n s h i p exists. 
I n f a c t i t must l i e i n the belief-producing experience of 
contextual r e a l i t y . The r e l a t i o n s h i p between contextual 
experience and b e l i e f s must always be regarded as problematic. 
I t i s not possible t o assume that experience of contexts X or Y 
w i l l always produce b e l i e f s "X" or "Y". This problem i s not 
adequately covered by Nisbet, i n his exploration of " u n i t -
(13) 
ideas".^ ' I t i s i l l e g i t i m a t e to suggest that such-and-such 
a Basic B e l i e f must necessarily e x i s t i n a given context, because 
of the nature of that context. 
Not ideas, but soc i a l r e l a t i o n s , experience of which may 
generate ideas, can have a " l i f e of t h e i r own^e When there 
be 
appears toj^a c o n t i n u i t y or s i m i l a r i t y of b e l i e f over time emd 
between d i f f e r e n t people, t h i s must be explained not i n tenns of 
an autonomy of ideas, or of the evolution of ideas, but of 
(14) 
i d e n t i f i a b l e s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
However, cer t a i n kinds of rel a t i o n s h i p or i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
arrangement may be universal » not i n t h e i r nature, nor i n t h e i r 
precise content, but i n the f a c t of t h e i r existence, i n some form 
or another. I t may then be possible to ask questions about the 
E'l.^liSElS^ foMi which that r e l a t i o n s h i p takes i n particulax* 
instances. I n t u r n , we may examine the b e l i e f s about that 
r e l a t i o n s h i p which are held by the people concerned. That i s , 
i t may be possible t o consider c e r t a i n "dimensions" which are 
u n i v e r s a l l y relevant t o p a r t i c u l a r kinds of social arrangement. 
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In the case of education, social contexting of some kind i s 
always x'elevanti so also i s some relation s h i p between leaamer's 
b e l i e f s and objectivated bodies of 'kno?dedge'. What questions 
one asks about these has s t i l l t o be decided. Certain commonly 
presented ideas may be appropriate - such as the "model of 
(the well-educated) man"^^^\ or the functions of education 
supposed to e x i s t , t o be desirable etc.. The sorts of question 
asked w i l l depend on what i t i s that most concerns the observer -
what his Relevance angle i s . I t w i l l not be some universal 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of ( i n t h i s case) educational processes which 
"prompts" the questions, Pur-thermore, i t seems desirable to 
ord^r the questions asked i n some coherent manner, rather than 
t o l i s t them i n an apparently random c o l l e c t i o n . ^ ' What 
approach, then^ i s t o be taken i n the case of the "Power" and 
"Krjowledge" dimensions of educational ideologies? A useful way 
to tackle t h i s i s to consider f i r s t the question of ideological 
anomalies. This both i l l u s t r a t e s some of the problems and 
suggests some clues t o a viable approach. In Chapter 6, I 
consider some such anomalies, before returning t o the two 
educational dimensions i n greater d e t a i l i n Chapter 7, 
So f a r i n t h i s section, we have considered b e l i e f s i n terras 
of t h e i r referred-to objects. But be l i e f s are not j u s t r e f e r e n t i a l 
abstractions. They are states of mind. To strongly-believe 
something i s t o Value-Know i t and t h i s dimension i s a n a l y t i c a l l y 
d i s t i n c t from the r e f e r e n t i a l b e l i e f content. The state-of-mind 
property of b e l i e f s i s s o c i o l o g i c a l l y very important. I t i s what 
( i n p a r t ) determines behaviour. Beliefs have to do with motives. 
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By "motives" I do not mean merely what i s e x p l i c i t l y 
recognised^ s u b j e c t i v e l y , as i n t e n t i o n . On the contrary, 
v e r b a l i s a t i o n s of our b e l i e f s are frequently most inadequate. 
Even after-the-event r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s or explanations may be 
very poor representations of wliy we behaved i n such-and-such 
a manner i n p a r t i c u l a r contexts. We behave according to what 
^® i m p l i c i t l y believe t o be the nature of Reality, How we 
verbalise these b e l i e f s i s not always vexy s i g n i f i c a n t . I t i s 
a commonplace that e x p l i c i t declarations of policy and i n t e n t 
are not always a r e l i a b l e guide t o what i s actu a l l y done, nor 
to why i t i s done,^ '''^ ^ 
I t i s an i n t e r e s t i n g question, whether c o n t i n u i t y of 
function musjt e n t a i l some c o n t i n u i t y of ideo l o g i c a l assumption. 
I f two apparently d i f f e r e n t sets of b e l i e f s serve the same 
i n t e r e s t s i n pra c t i c e , are we e n t i t l e d to say that t h i s must 
be appreciated i n some sense by the people concerned, and therefore 
incorporated i n t h e i r underlying beliefs? For instance, 19th 
century educational p o l i c y i n t h i s country was c l e a r l y motivated 
predominantly by desires f o r so c i a l control. This has long since 
been r a t i o n a l i z e d i n other terms i n most (though not a l l ) 
educational l i t e r a t u r e . Yet the i n s t i t u t i o n s created f o r formal 
schooling are s t i l l commonly experienced as situ a t i o n s where 
d i s c i p l i n e i s the f i r s t concern and "education" i s only secondary. 
This does not arise from the nature of learning as such, but from 
p a r t i c u l a r contexts of, and p a r t i c u l a r understandings and b e l i e f s 
about, teaching and learning.^ I am i n c l i n e d t o suggest that 
where i t r e g u l a r l y occurs, what i s e x p l i c i t l y an unintended 
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consequence ( o r l a t e n t function) cannot be dismissed as a 
" f l u k e " , i n terms of people's relevant b e l i e f s . I t i s l i k e l y 
that they have some i m p l i c i t b e l i e f s which r e f e r to these 
"unintended" consequences and which are often i n part instrumental 
i n t h e i r determination. ( I t i s only through the verbal 
elaboration of such i m p l i c i t b e l i e f s that the disjuncture 
between e x p l i c i t i n t e n t i o n and actual function can prompt 
deliberate action designed t o promote change. Much of 
sociology i s the study of unintended consequences). 
I n th© context of schools' hidden c u r r i c u l a ^ , Bowles and 
G i n t i s tend to over-emphasise the effects of s t r u c t u r e , without 
s u f f i c i e n t consideration of content. This i s comparable with 
Gamoy's cava l i e r dismissal of people's intentions i n examining 
19th centuiy colonialism (Camoy, 1974), As McGinn puts i t , 
"Gamoy t a i l o r s h i s standards of evidence t o f i t his 
purpose. I f statements of i n t e n t support his thesis, 
Camoy takes them at face value. I f not, w e l l , one 
cannot r e l y on statements of i n t e n t anyway." 
McGinn (1975) p.248, 
A c t u a l l y , t h i s i s not my main c r i l t i c i s m of Carney's treatment 
of motives. He i s j u s t f a r too loose i n his accounts of why 
given p o l i c i e s were adopted. He i s quite indiscriminate i n his 
use of " i n t e n t " , "purpose", "use", "attempt" and "function", 
(19) 
using them, i t seems, interchajngeably. ^  This looseness i s 
also , found i n Bowles and G i n t i s , ^ '^^ ^ Their m a t e r i a l i s t deter-
minism may be i n t u i t i v e l y sound. But they f a i l t o demonstrate 
how i t i s mediated through people's actual b e l i e f s , and therefore 
t h e i r actual "motives". Motives do matter. 
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Just as motives ( o r i n t e n t i o n s ) are frequently i m p l i c i t , so 
also are they "genuine". They are not always^ or even usually, 
(21) 
conspira^torial or manipulative, Value-ffiaowledge i s a powerful 
motivator precisely i n that i t prompts people t o behave i n given 
ways because th a t i s the "na t u r a l " or "obvious" way to behave. 
Even v/here deliberate action i s involved, i t i s frequently action 
conceived of as " f o r the best". When Kay-Shuttleworth, f o r 
(22) 
instance, spoke of guarding the poor against pernicious opinions • , 
or when Amis decried the d i l u t i o n of standards through numbers^^-^^ 
or the proverbial teacher assures the p u p i l that "This i s going to 
hurt me more than i t ' l l hurt you", there i s no reason immediately 
t o sneer at the supposed hypocrisy of s e l f - i n t e r e s t . Such 
statements can be occasioned by sincere, and even a l t r u i s t i c , 
b e l i e f . I t i s of the nature of ideology that i t consists of 
Valu0~Knowledge - b e l i e f s which do not j u s t r e f e r to what i s 
taken t o be r e a l i t y , but which are i n themselves "values" w i t h 
emotional state-of-mind q u a l i t i e s . This i s not, of course, to 
deny that c o n s p i r a t o r i a l i n t e n t i s common. I t i s , however, to 
deny that that sort of e x p l i c i t i n t e n t i s the substance of 
ideology. Ideology i s b e l i e f . I t i s not statement or thought. 
I t i s t o the Basic Beliefs of educational ideologies that we 
must now t u r n , by considering ce r t a i n anomalies i n practice. 
Notes 
(1) Consider t h i s l i s t , compiled by Huberman:-
"Given t h e i r i n d u s t r i a l mode of functioning, schools are 
r e l a t i v e l y cheap, r a t i o n a l enterprises which process 
large numbers of u n i t s w i t h the help of few executives or 
administrators at a very low per capita cost. They hir e 
t r a i n e d professionals at low wages; they are c e n t r a l l y 
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located; they serve a custodial or baby-sitting function 
which enables parents t o work. In a d d i t i o n , schools teach 
the basic rules of conduct and basic social behaviours, 
r e h a b i l i t a t e s o c i a l deviants, wean children from t h e i r 
parents end widen parochial horizons. They teach basic 
s k i l l s of l i t e r a c y and numeracy and provide i n s t r u c t i o n 
i n health and hygiene, human r e l a t i o n s , cooking and sewing, 
l o c a l and na t i o n a l histozy and l e g i s l a t i o n . They i d e n t i f y 
and cream o f f the ^ l i t e f o r senior professional posts and 
c o n t r o l the numbers of applicants entering the labour 
market at d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s . They provide an environment 
i n which a ch i l d ' s e f f o r t counts f o r something and where 
most tasks are adjusted to h i s l e v e l of mental and 
physical functioning. And they are i n operation ..," 
Huberman (1974) Pe57. 
(2) Parsons (19'59/6l) esp, pp.434-7, 
(3) Althusser (1971/2) esp. pp.244-6, 
(4) jPor instance, Camoy (1974) p»3445 Goodman (1962/71) p.21; 
Dahrendorf (1957/68/73). 
(5) I only saw i t as a variant a f t e r adopting i t . 
(6) His four types of ideology of l e g i t i m a t i o n •» and thence of 
societies -ai*® Communistic, Meritocratic, P a t e r n a l i s t i c 
and A r i s t o c r a t i c . 
(7) He maintains t h i s balance i n Smith (1976), though again 
he does not s p e l l i t out i n these terms, 
(8) See Chapter 6 below. 
(9) Davies (1969) suggests (a) "conservative", (b ) " r e v i s i o n i s t " , 
(c) "romantic" or "psychologistic" and (d) "democratic'* or 
" s o c i a l i s t " . Cosin (1972) suggests (a) " E l i t i s t " , (b) "tech-
n o c r a t i c " or "vocational" or " r a t i o n a l i s e r s " , (c) "romantic" 
and (d) " e g a l i t a r i a n " , 
(10) I would not myself be happy about such a d i s t i n c t i o n . 
Immediately, f o r instance, connotations of e g a l i t a r i a n / 
i n e g a l i t a r i a n and stability/cliange would need to be 
distinguished. But, w i t h respect, that i s not my problem, 
but Davies'. 
(11) "The whole t r i c k of proving the hegemony of t;he s p i r i t i n 
h i s t o r y ... i s thus confined to the following three e f f o r t s . 
No.l, One must separate the ideas of those r u l i n g ... from 
these actual r u l e r s ... 
No,2. One must bring an order i n t o t h i s rule of ideas ... 
No,3, To remove the mystical appearance of t h i s ' s e l f -
determining concept', i t i s changed ,,. i n t o the 'thinkers', 
the 'philosophers', the i d e o l o g i s t s , who again are 
understood as the manufacturers of history ,,." 
Marx & Bngals (1845-6/1969) P»50. 
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(12) Such awareness might, however, be i m p l i c i t . 
Nonetheless, i t would need to be explained, 
(13) Nisbet's f a i l u r e to explore the relationships between 
" a c t u a l i t i e s " and "themes" - v/hich, confusingly, he seems 
to t r e a t as interchangeable leads t o considerable 
ambiguity i n his treatment of "unit-ideas" (Nisbet, 
1966/70, e,g„ pp,23 f f , 36 f f , 109-110, 166, 174 f f ) . 
The imglisM. assumption of the book, especially Chapter 
2, i s that c e r t a i n unit-ideas or themes derive from the r e a l 
experience of the French and I n d u s t r i a l Revolutions, But 
he f a i l s e i t h e r t o s p e l l t h i s out, or to consider the 
problems involved. 
(14) Compare Bourdieu (1966/71) on the r e l a t i v e autonomy of 
i n t e l l e c t u a l f i e l d s ( i n s t i t u t i o n s ) , cf. also Shepherd 
(1974) , On the apparent autonomy of r a c i a l i s t ideas, 
see Rex (1970), Also relevant are the " i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d 
values" (commodity fetishism) of I l l i c h (1971/73), and 
the I'elative autonomy of educational i n s t i t u t i o n s , 
especially u n i v e r s i t i e s - see Althusser (1971/72); Gouldner 
(1975) 5 Bowles 8c Gintls (1976) Chapter 8, 
(15) e.g. Mannheim & Stewart (1962); Postman (1970/73) p.86; 
Weber (1925/48) po243, 
(16) e,g. Seaman (1972) p.42, 
(17) Simon (1960, p.365) f o r instance, notes that o r i g i n a l l y 
educational p o l i c i e s i n t h i s country were quite e x p l i c i t l y 
based upon class i n t e r e s t . These p o l i c i e s remained i n 
many ways unchanged, despite being disguised by educational 
phraseology. Holly (1971/72, Chapter 1) makes a simJ.lar 
observation concerning the use of the word "secondary", 
since the 1944 Education Act, Hoare (1965, p,49) points 
t o the manipulative use of " e g a l i t a r i a n " formulations, 
being apparently democratic i n i n t e n t i o n , but very 
undemocratic i n f u n c t i o n , 
(18) A teacher once wrote t o me -
"Although many theories of education do e x i s t , raajiy teachers 
prefer to concentrate on d i s c i p l i n e and co n t r o l of t h e i r 
class at f i r s t , the idea being t h a t , without these, the 
actual learning process / s i c / cannot take place, and many 
theories tend to be discarded by teachers once they are 
faced w i t h a r e a l class s i t u a t i o n , " 
(19) Camoy (1974) e.g, pp,13,24,159,272,343,357,82. 
(20) Bowles & Gintis (1976) e.g. p,37, 
(21) To be f a i r , Camoy does say as much (page 24). He i s 
inconsistent and ambiguous i n his reference to motive,however, 
(22) c f . Hurt (1971/72) p,23. 
(23) Amis (1969) p.10, 
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CHAPTER 6 
IDEOLOGICAL AI^ OMALIES 
I n many, i f not a l l , major educational debates, strange 
anomalies are to be found i n the descriptions and prescriptions 
of those concerned. People w i t h apparently l i t t l e i n common 
can be found saying very s i m i l a r things. But what i n one 
context, on one person's l i p s , appears "protrressive" or 
"enlightened", can look cynical or reactionary when voiced by 
another. One has constantly t o remind oneself who i s speaking, 
what the context of his assertion i s , and what he i s leaving 
unsaid about the referred-to s i t u a t i o n . ^ ^ ^ 
I t would be naive, however, to suppose that i t i s always 
simply a matter of one party concealing i t s real i n t e n t i o n s , 
w h i l s t the other i s being "honest**. Ideology i s sincere. What 
i s more, motives do matter. However inadequate people's notions 
are about the world i n which they l i v e , i t i s b e l i e f s that guide 
behaviour. When, therefore, we f i n d people of apparently quite 
d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s making s i m i l a r prescriptions, these should 
be taken seriously as something i n need of explanation. 
We need t o ask why, i n p a r t i c u l a r contexts, people are i n 
strange agreement (or disagreement). And we heed to look f o r 
possible consequences of these (non-)alliances. Before auch 
questions can be adequately answered, however, one needs to be 
clear about what the nature of these (dis-)agreements i s : how 
are the respective b e l i e f structures made up? The "tree-root" 
metaphor i s useful f o r t h i s purpose. 
Though i t i s the i m p l i c i t l y held Value-Knowledge that one 
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must attempt to understand, we cannot, of course, have di r e c t 
access to t h i s . People's e x p l i c i t statements may i n some ways 
be inadequate, as accounts of t h e i r real b e l i e f s ( l e t alone of 
the r e a l i t y they attempt t o p o r t r a y ) . But they are nonetheless 
an impor-tant source of data. To discover anomalies or 
inadequacies i n t e r n a l t o someone's e x p l i c i t account i s to f i n d 
clues t o what might underlie those assertions. Clearly, they 
cannot be the only evidence, i f one hopes to construe as accurate 
a p i c t u r e as possible of the subjects' b e l i e f s . The observer's 
own miderstaiiding of the context w i l l play a major part i n the 
f i n a l analysis. But soc i o l o g i s t s cannot be exclusively concerned 
w i t h the "objective" r e a l i t y of such contexts. They must also 
pay close a t t e n t i o n t o what people (appear t o ) believe about 
them, I am not, therefore, suggesting a displacement of 
"obj e c t i v e " analysis of social r e l a t i o n s i n favour of " i n t e r p r e t i v e " 
accounts of actors' b e l i e f s , but merely an appropriate concern f o r 
those b e l i e f s , ( I n the l a s t instance, given the m a t e r i a l i t y of 
mind-brain, the two are i n any case of the same world). 
I n order t o have some f e e l i n g of "anoma].y", the observer 
must be r e f e r r i n g to more than the statements of the observed. 
He must r e l y on some understanding of the socie t a l context i n 
which the statements are made, i n order to f e e l that there i s an 
anomaly t o be explained. One approach might be f i r s t l y t o 
d i s t i n g u i s h dichotomously between the observer's and the observed's 
understanding of the context i n question, and secondly to assume 
that i n some cases, at l e a s t , people's objective i n t e r e s t s are 
non - i d e n t i c a l . I f we simply dichotomise such c o n f l i c t i n terms 
of "same" or " d i f f e r e n t " i n t e r e s t s , we have a possibly crude, but 
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h e u r i s t i c a l l y useful typology of ideological anomalies 
People's s o c i e t a l p o s i t i o n / i n t e r e s t s 
People's 
e x p l i c i t 
prescrip-
t i o n s 
Same Same D i f f -
ei-ent 
D i f f -
erent 
(According to the 
subjective perceptions 
of the people themselves) 
Same D i f f -
erent 
Same D i f f -
erent 
(According to the observ-
er's assessment of t h e i r 
i n t e r e s t s ) 
Same a^e. P.C. a. 6 0 S.B. 
D i f f -











Where the observer believes two parties to have the same 
i n t e r e s t s , he w i l l expect them to have s i m i l a r b e l i e f s and to 
make s i m i l a r p r e s c r i p t i o n s , on relevant issues. V/here he sees 
them as opposed i n some way, he w i l l expect d i f f e r e n t b e l i e f s and 
accounts. Where these rudimentary expectations are not f u l f i l l e d , 
there i s an anomaly to be explained. Before t h a t , there i s an 
anomaly i n need of el u c i d a t i o n . ( I n t h i s schema, the four types 
of anomaly are, of course, as perceived by the observer.) 
False Consciousness, here, i s akin to Strange Bedfellowship. 
I n both cases the people i n question say (and apparently believe) 
s i m i l a r things, w h i l s t the observer believes them to have divergent 
i n t e r e s t s , on the matter i n question. The difference between 
False Consciousness and Strange Bedfellowship depends on the 
subjective i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s by the parties concerned. 
S i m i l a r l y , Deceptive Disagreements are akin t o Happy Coincidences. 
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The difference depends again on the subjective i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s 
of the people observed, A number of examples of these anomalies, 
i n various spheres of educational thought and p o l i c y , are given 
i n Syer ( 1 9 7 ^ . I o u t l i n e a few below. 
In making these d i s t i n c t i o n s I am r e f e r r i n g d i r e c t l y t o 
n e i t h e r the contextual o r i g i n of the b e l i e f s or statements made, 
nor the actual or p o t e n t i a l i n t e r e s t s served by behaviour or 
p o l i c i e s based upon them. The only "external" i s the observer's 
own understandings and b e l i e f s - though these w i l l , of course, 
iriake reference t o both these other aspects. The observer may 
f i r s t f e e l that an i d e o l o g i c a l anomaly ex i s t s , then elaborate i t s 
nature and s t r u c t u r e , and then subsequently seek to explore i t s 
contextual o r i g i n and consequentiality. This dependence upon 
the observer's own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s need not be so closed as i t 
may at f i r s t sight appear. I t i s enough to observe agreement or 
disagreement over p a r t i c u l a r issues and to maintain a "duty of 
doubt" as t o whether the r e a l i n t e r e s t s of those concerned are 
convergent or divergent. I n the l a s t resort, though, consider-
ations of adequacy of the observed's accounts must depend on 
what the observer takes to be l o g i c a l l y and contextually v a l i d 
c r i t e r i a . 
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STRMWE , fflPEELLOWS AH^ ^ HAPPY COINCIDENCES s SOME EXAMPLES 
I o u t l i n e below some anomalies revealed i n discussions of 
three educational issues: (1) c u l t u r a l deprivation and 
edu c a b i l i t y ^ (2) Controversy and the Schools Council Humanities 
Project and (3) parent and p u p i l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The f i r s t of 
these seems to be a case of Strange Bedfellowship and the l a s t 
one of Happy Coincidence, The middle case bridges the two, as 
we s h a l l see. I n discussing these, clues w i l l be found to what 
questions may rel e v a n t l y be asked on the two Basic B e l i e f 
dimensions, "Knowledge" and "Power". I take up these clues 
l a t e r , i n suggesting one way of opearationalising these dimensions. 
(1) C u l t u r a l Deprivation and Educability 
The notion of " e d u c a b i l i t y " (and " i n e d u c a b i l i t y " ) rests on 
assumptions (a) that i n d i v i d u a l s are n a t u r a l l y unequal i n personal 
a t t r i b u t e s relevant to the a c q u i s i t i o n of educational 'knowledge' 
and s k i l l s ; (b) that these a t t r i b u t e s are established and on the 
whole immutable by cer t a i n c r i t i c a l periods of a child's develop-
ment ( i n some cases at conception), and (c) that there i s a 
fundamental v a l i d i t y i n objectivateel bodies of 'knowledge' which 
are presented i n educational i n s t i t u t i o n s and according t o which 
children's l e v e l s of attainment and p o t e n t i a l may be judged. 
There are various manifestations of the " e d u c a b i l i t y " notion, 
i n c l u d i n g " i n t e l l i g e n c e " , "motivation", ^ ' l i n g u i s t i c development" 
and "(achievement) values". 
"Cult u r a l Deprivation" i s a variant of the " ( i n - ) e d u c a b i l i t y " 
n o t i o n . I t a t t r i b u t e s the cause of ine d u c a b i l i t y to the c u l t u r a l 
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(2) background of children.^ ' Some t y p i c a l statements convey the 
idea. 
"In attempting t o exami.ne the achievement problem i n veary, 
very poor Negro c h i l d r e n , I suggest that they lack both 
hope of achievement and fear of not achieving and that they 
come from a cul t u r e lacking ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s of order 
fundamental to the achieving middle class structure. 
S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e i r homes are physically and personally 
disorganised; l i f e does not run on a time schedule and 
so on« Thus, emotionally and cognitively they lack the 
structure on which a conventional educational system can 
b u i l d ... Because of the disorgeinisation of the 
environment the basic perceptual frames of these children 
do not seem t o have been properly constituted ..." 
Henry (1971) pp.48-9. 
The c u l t u r a l l y deprived c h i l d " i s e s s e n t i a l l y the c h i l d 
who has been i s o l a t e d from those r i c h experiences that 
should be h i s . This i s o l a t i o n may be brought about by 
poverty, by meagemess of i n t e l l e c t u a l resources i n his 
home and surroundings, by the incapacity, i l l i t e r a c y , or 
indif f e r e n c e of his elders or of the e n t i r e community. 
He may have come to school without ever having had his 
mother sing him the t r a d i t i o n a l l u l l a b i e s , and with no 
knowledge of nursery rhymes, fairy s t o r i e s , or the 
f o l k l o r e of h i s country. He may have taken few t r i p s -
perhaps h i s only one the cramped, uncomfortable t r i p from 
the lone3.y shack on the tenant farm t o the teeming, f i l t h y 
slum dwelling - and he probably knows nothing of poetry, 
music, p a i n t i n g , or even indoor plumbing," 
Brooks (1966) pp.516-7, quoted by Friedmann (1967/73) P<.257. 
11 
Educational deprivation i s not mainly the ef f e c t of 
poverty; parental a t t i t u d e and maternal care are more 
important that the l e v e l of material needs." 
Wiseman (1967) p ,369 . 
A f u l l e r statement of the " c u l t u r a l deprivation" viewpoint 
can be foui^d, f o r instance, i n Schools Council (1970) , 
At the same time, much of the popularity of the notion of 
" c u l t u r a l deprivation" can be a t t r i b u t e d t o the hope that 
frequently accompanies i t s that such depzdvation may not be 
t o t a l l y irremediable. Unlike geneticist accounts of (in-)educabil-
i t y , environmentalist arguments may o f f e r the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
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s o c i a l manipulation. Hand i n hand, therefore, with the c u l t u r a l 
deprivation model go p o l i c i e s of compensatory education, from 
the massive Headstart Programmes i n the U.S. to the puny E.P.A. 
provisions i n t h i s country, Such p o l i c i e s include such diverse 
features as "p o s i t i v e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n " i n the a l l o c a t i o n of 
resources t o schools, voluntary playsbhemes, language machines 
(B e r e i t e r and Engelman, 1966) and "home v i s i t o r s " - aimed at 
"planned i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the child's language development".^ 
The main point to note here i s the overv/helming acceptance 
of the c u l t u r a l deprivation model, especially, but not only, 
i n the UoS,. Priedmann sums i t up - al b e i t a l i t t l e clumsily -
as follows: 
"The idea, p a r t i c u l a r l y as a popular image, eventually 
a t t r a c t e d widespread public i n t e r e s t and support i n 
connection w i t h the issues of poverty and c i v i l r i g h t s . 
I t turned out to be one of those rare s o c i e t a l l y 
important ideas t h a t , f o r various reasons, possessed an 
image appeal to a broad spectrum of persons and publics 
of various i d e o l o g i c a l persuasions - conservative, 
moderate and l i b e r a l ..." 
Priedmann (1967/73) Po267, 
The predominance of the "e d u c a b i l i t y " notion i s no recent matter 
i n t h i s Gount2:y, I t evolved i n r e l a t i o n to a school system that 
was consciously established on b i p a r t i t e l i n e s , 
" V i c t o r i a n England knew that elementary education was 
f o r working-class children, and that the grammar schools 
were f o r middle-class children. This was as sali e n t a 
fac t of nineteenth century England and Wales ... as the 
f a c t of class consciousness i t s e l f . " 
S i l v e r (1973) PP. x v i i i - x i x . 
The development of psychometry both b u i l t upon and f u r t h e r 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d a p a r t i c u l a r view of " i n t e l l i g e n c e " - one 
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of many from w i t h i n psychology - that embodied a l l the underlying 
assumptions of the e d u c a b i l i t y model, Pidgeon points out that 
"teachers are being constantly assured through t h e i r 
classroom experiences that the p o t e n t i a l a b i l i t y 
theory i s apparently sound and that streaming 
and a selective system of education works ,,. Every 
teachex'j, of course, experiences anomalies - from the 
obviously i n c o r r e c t l y assessed c h i l d a r r i v i n g from 
another school, to the ' l a t e developer' «- but these are 
the exceptions that prove the r u l e . For the most part, 
teachers can see that the system i s working." 
Pidgeon (1970) pp.37-9. 
Pa r t l y i n reaction to the eugenecist theories (not to mention 
genocidal p o l i c i e s ) of Nazi Gei-many, uneasily li n k e d to t h e i r 
own Dilemma, p a r t l y evolving from a growing psychoanalytic 
t r a d i t i o n , as w e l l as f o r other reasons, the search f o r 
environmentalist explanations of " i n e d u c a b i l i t y " gained enormous 
momentum i n raid"'20th century America, Studies of n Achievement 
value o r i e n t a t i o n s ^ a n d f i n a l l y l i n g u i s t i c codes^^^ dominate 
U.S. educational research i n the 1950s and «60s. The l i n g u i s t i c 
formula came, i n p a r t , from B r i t a i n . By that time ( c i r c a 1960), 
there was growing a t t e n t i o n i n t h i s country, too, to non-
g e n e t i c i s t explanations of under-achievement. 
Rosen has conmiented that 
"the way i n which Bernstein's theories have permeated 
contemporary educational t h i n k i n g and have been used to 
j u s t i f y educational practices i s a rare phenomenon i n 
English education, and c a l l s f o r some explanation. 
Educational academics can weave theories and publish 
researches t o t h e i r heart's content, and these can 
accumulate over decades, without a f f e c t i n g practice 
one i o t a or causing a r i p p l e i n staffroom discussion. 
But there are notable and s i g n i f i c a n t exceptions ..." 
One of these i s Bernstein's theory of l i n g u i s t i c codes, Rosen's 
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explariation i s f o r t h r i g h t ; 
" I t was j u s t when /ihe p r e v a i l i n g theory of i n t e l l i g e n c e 
and the concept of the I n t e l l i g e n c e Quotient^ was looking 
sadly t a t t e r e d .,. that the theories of Berastein began 
to be avai l a b l e ... \¥herea3 i n the f i f t i e s children had 
t h e i r IQs branded on t h e i r foreheads, i n the s i x t i e s more 
and more of them had the brand changed to ' r e s t r i c t e d ' 
or 'elaborated'. The ideology vacuum had been f i l l e d . " 
Rosen (1972) Po3,C'"'') 
Rosen also remarks on the strange bedfellowship of support f o r 
Bernstein's theories. 
"Both r i g h t and l e f t i n education p o l i t i c s have seen i n 
these ideas support f o r t h e i r views. Thus Bantock (1965) 
on the r i g h t j u s t i f i e s separate educ^ation f o r working-
class children and c i t e s Bernstein i n support, and Brian 
Jackson (1968) on the l e f t accepts the main thesis, 
Jensen (1968) c i t e s Bernstein i n the very same paragraph 
i n which he makes the outrageous statement that 'much of 
working-class language consists of a kind of 'emotional' 
accompaniment t o action here and now.'" 
Rosen (1972) p.2. 
To give j u s t one example of t h i s , Bantock, i n an a r t i c l e on 
"populai' education", says: 
"My i n i t i a l evidence drawn over a long h i s t o r i c a l period 
and the p a r t i c u l a r analysis which Professor Bernstein has 
given us, make i t reasonable t o assert that many levels 
of abstraction are l i k e l y to be beyond the capacity of 
numbers of people and that among those numbers are l i k e l y 
to be included the p a r t i c u l a r group of children with whom 
I am s p e c i f i c a l l y concerned i n t h i s a r t i c l e . " 
Bantock (1971) p.259. 
At the same time, Hoare can,assert tha-t 
"A theory of education i s ce n t r a l to s o c i a l i s t theory, 
and has been considerably under-estimated by the marxist 
t r a d i t i o n . There exists i n B r i t a i n today one body of 
work i n the f i e l d of education which brings t h i s home 
verey f o i ' c l b l y ; i t i s genuinely revolutionary and any 
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educational theory must integrate i t s achievements. 
This i s the work of Basil Bernstein 
Hoare (1965) p.52, 
The p o p u l a r i t y , i n t h i s country, not j u s t of Bernstein's 
version of socio-linguistic-psychology^^ ^, but of the c u l t u r a l 
deprivation model generally, i s demonstrated i n the Schools 
Council's GrossM with Adversity. Their working party asked 
headteachers from t h i r t y - i n n e r - c i t y areas about deprivation. 
They wanted to know where the "problem" seemed most acute, how 
deprivation was i d e n t i f i e d and what measures were taken to 
counteract i t . Chapter 3 of the working paper summarises the 
r e p l i e s to the f i r s t of these questions. Family pathology 
swamps a l l other explanations. Whilst c r i t e r i a of "deprivation" 
by a number of accounts (e.g, b r u t a l i t y , i n a t t e n t i o n , etc.) are 
lumped together, the one th i n g that a l l have i n common i s 
offence against ras-instream c r i t e r i a of what constitutes "a good 
f a m i l y " (Schools Council, 1970, pp.22-30). The chapter 
concludes; 
"The p i c t u r e emerging from the heads' reports leaves no 
doubt of the seriousness of the problem. In the 
circumstances, i t i s quite remarkable that the reports 
are so free from bitterness and resignation, and so f u l l 
of candour and compassion." 
Schools Council (1970) p,30. 
This l a s t quotation indicates that i t i s by no means a simply 
reactionary i n t e n t i o n that underlies support f o r the c u l t u r a l 
deprivation model. Nor, on the other hand, i s support f o r 
compensatory programmes simply l i b e r a l . As Priedmann points 
out, i n the United States, 
•201. 
"To p o l i t i c a l and social conservatives, n a t i o n a l l y 
supported educational programmes held out the hope of 
'straightening out' and 'keeping s t r a i g h t ' lower class 
c h i l d r e n , of helping them to make and keep them good, 
respectable, s o l i d c i t i z e n s , and of preventing the 
'social dynamite' i n the slums from exploding or 
re"'exploding«" 
Friedmann ( 1967 /73 ) p» 2 6 0 . 
Any student of 19th century popular education p o l i c i e s i n t h i s 
country w i l l f i n d t h i s theme very f a m i l i a r . I t i s brought up 
to date i n reactions to urban r i o t s i n the U.S. i n the mid-1960s. 
The McCone Commission reported, f o r instance, on the Los Angeles 
r i o t s i n 1965: 
"Childa:^n i n disadvantaged areas are often deprived i n 
t h e i r pre-school years of the necessar-y foundations f o r 
learning. They have not had the f u l l range of experience 
so necessary to the development of language i n the pre-
school years, and hence they are poorly prepared to learn 
when they enter school. Their behaviour, t h e i r vocabulary, 
t h e i r verbal a b i l i t i e s , t h e i r experience with ideas, t h e i r 
views of adults, of society, of books, of learning, of 
schools, and of teachers are such as to have a negative 
impact on t h e i r school experience. Thus, the disadvantaged 
c h i l d enters school w i t h a serious educational handicap, 
and because he gets a poor s t a r t i n school, he drops 
f u r t h e r behind as he continues through the grades. His 
course towards academic f a i l u r e i s already set before he 
entei ' s school, i t i s rooted i n his e a r l i e s t childhood 
experiences. The Commission concludes that t h i s i s the 
basic reason f o r low achievement i n the disadvantaged 
areas." 
McCone Commission (1965), quoted by Priedmann (1967/73) pp.260-1. 
Priedmann f i n d s some significance i n the fa c t that the 
c u l t u r a l deprivation model f i r s t developed i n the m i d - f i f t i e s , 
and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n New York City, whose school system at that 
time employed more than a hundred psychologists but no 
so c i o l o g i s t s . 
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"Consequently, when a so c i o l o g i s t has been cal l e d i n 
to p a r t i c i p a t e i n i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y research on the 
'sociological aspects' of c u l t u r a l deprivation, he 
often has found the c e n t r a l core of the topic so 
permeated wi t h psychological suppositions that his own 
e f f o r t s have of necessity been at the periphery of the 
problem as defined." 
Friedmann (1967/73) p ,266 . 
This may be t r u e , and important, but there i s nothing new about 
s o c i o l o g i s t s "taking" rather than "making" problems. C.Wright 
M i l l s complained about the professional ideology of social 
pathologists i n 1943, and r e f e r r e d t o a wide range of e x i s t i n g 
(9) 
text-books t o prove his point. Perhaps u n f a i r l y , Young has 
made s i m i l a r allegations against sociologists of education i n 
t h i s country (Young, 1971, P o l ) . 
In any case, a t t e n t i o n to the family has deep roots i n 
sociology as w e l l as i n psychology, Comte believed that 
society could not be reduced to a sum of i n d i v i d u a l s , but did 
suggest that social groups and communities - of which the family 
was the archetype - were the elements of society, Le Play also 
f e l t that 
"Populations consist not of individuals but of f a m i l i e s . 
The task of observation would be vague, i n d e f i n i t e and 
inconclusive i f i n every l o c a l i t y i t were required to 
extend i t to i n d i v i d u a l s d i f f e r i n g i n age and sex. I t 
becomes precise, d e f i n i t e and conclusive when i t s subject 
i s the f a m i l y . " 
Le Play, quoted by Nisbet (1966/67) p ,62 . 
Furthermore, the p l u r a l i s t e t h i c , on which American function-
a l i s t sociology i s arguably based, reduces to an emphasis on 
groups, of which the family remains the "communal" archetype. 
Here, then, i s a f u r t h e r trend to reinforce the environmentalist 
and psychoanalytic ones already noted. "Ineducability" as the 
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f a u l t of family experience "makes sense" i n t h i s l i g h t . I t 
thus f u l f i l s one of the basic d e f i n i t i o n a l c r i t e r i a of ideologies. 
The s u b - t i t l e of Priedmann's a r t i c l e i s "a commentaiy i n 
the sociology of knowledge". His discussion of various 
challenges t o the c u l t u r a l deprivation model i s paarticularly 
u s e f u l , f o r i t indicates not j u s t the grounds on which i t has 
been c r i t i c i z e d , but also by whom^ V/hilst there are t h e o r e t i c a l 
and conceptual challenges t o i t , i t i s the p o l i t i c a l challenge 
t h a t i s most i n t e r e s t i n g , i n a study of the sociology of 
knowledge: and thus of the so c i e t a l - c o n t e x t u a l i t y of ideologies. 
Priedmann notes f i v e major c r i t i c i s m s . The f i r s t three 
are t h e o r e t i c a l . P i r s t l y , the notion of " c u l t u r a l deprivation" 
has been c r i t i c i s e d as conceptually inaccurate. I t rests upon 
a confusion between the anthropological notion of "cul t u r e " -
of which one cannot be deprived - and an aesthetic "high c u l t u r e " 
idea. The compensatory p o l i c y of " c u l t u r a l enrichment" i s a 
r e s u l t of t h i s confusione (At the same time, t h i s c r i t i c i s m could 
be l a r g e l y answered i f " c u l t u r a l deprivation" were taken to imply 
"deprived ^ ..." i-ather than "deprived of cu l t u r e " . This 
p o s s i b i l i t y i s not considered by Priedmann, presumably because 
he accepts the p l u r a l i s t i c - r e l a t i v i s t view that cultures are 
i n e v i t a b l y coherent and adequate: that there i s no d e f i c i t , only 
d i f f e r e n c e , cf Valentine, 1968). 
Secondly, the notion has been c r i t i c i s e d , says Priedmann, as 
being t h e o r e t i c a l l y inadequate, i n that i t f a i l s to explain 
widespread anomalies to i t s u n i v e r s a l i s t assertions. I t i s over-
de t e r m i n i s t i c and/or s i m p l i s t i c . Mackler and Giddings say that 
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"an adequate theory of deprivation must eventually explain 
why c e r t a i n p upils succeed and others do not, given the 
same solsial backgrounds" 
quoted by Friedraann (1967/73) p,26l. 
(Again, t h i s i s a less serious c r i t i c i s m than might be implied. 
Awareness of such exceptions i s i t s e l f what prompts research, 
w i t h i n the, same paradigm, i n t o the minutiae of d i f f e r e n t i a l 
( f a m i l y ) experience. There may be no f e l t need to search f o r 
wider s o c i e t a l explanations of the c r i t e r i a of success aind of 
deprivation that p r e v a i l ) . 
T h i r d l y , the model has been c r i t i c i s e d on the grounds that 
i t i s an i n c o r r e c t explanation of massive scholastic retardation. 
This i s by i m p l i c a t i o n considerably more r a d i c a l . For i f 
" c u l t u r a l d e p r i v a t i o n " seems adequate (witness i t s popularity) 
at the phenomenal l e v e l , then a more adequate explanation must 
explain t h i s apparent adequacy, as we l l as provide a b e t t e r 
model. The model i t s e l f has t o be explained i n terms of i t s 
s o c i e t a l context. More immediately, t h i s c r i t i c i s m can point 
t o research, f o r instance, i n t o the school, rather than the 
family. I t i s on such grounds as these that Bernstein has 
claimed that "education cannot compensate f o r society" (1970/71), 
The other two sources of opposition to the c u l t u r a l depriv-
a t i o n model are p o l i t i c a l rather than s t r i c t l y t h e o r e t i c a l -
although, of course, p o l i t i c a l demands are often r a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n t h e o r e t i c a l terms, :]he f i r s t of these i s that the model has 
operated as an obstacle to c i v i l r i g h t s progress. I t i s arguable 
that r a c i s t stereotypes not only helped make the cultur.al 
depr'ivation model acceptable i n the f i r s t place, but were r e i n -
forced by i t s a p p l i c a t i o n i n practice. 
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"The new ideology, accepted now even by some l i b e r a l s , 
would make i t seem that unemployment, poor education 
and slum conditions r e s u l t from family breakdown, 
' c u l t u r a l deprivation' and lack of 'acculturation' of 
Southern r u r a l migrants." 
Ryan (1965)» quoted by Priedmann (1967/73) p.262. 
This i s especially true where compensatory education programmes 
are seen t o have f a i l e d i n t h e i r objectives. I t was ( o v e r t l y ) 
the f a i l u r e of Headstart schemes to "boost IQ" that prompted 
Jensen t o publish h i s monograph on black i n f e r i o r i t y i n 1969. 
( c f Labov, 1969/73, p.56). 
The other p o l i t i c a l challenge to the c u l t u r a l deprivation 
idea that Priedmann notes i s that i t i s 
"a device t o force a questionable middle-class culture on 
lower-class students". 
Indeed, i t i s not j u s t black and "lower class" Amexicans who 
have reacted against the "Establishment" i n the age of V/atergate, 
I.T.T, and Vietnam. (See, f o r instance. W i l l s (1970), especially 
part I I I ,) 
Despite these challenges to the notion of c u l t u r a l 
d e p r i v a t i o n , i t has remained, t o use Priedmann's limp word, 
"popular". ,I t has had a l l the hallmarks of a Kuhnian paradigm, 
both i n and out of " s c i e n t i f i c " research. What i s more, i t now 
has an almost unchallenged predominance i n t h i s country, though 
i t may orily have ousted the " p o t e n t i a l a b i l i t y theory" (as 
Pidgeon c a l l s i t ) more recently here than i n the U.S. Perhaps 
because of a more ingrained - because more f i r m l y i n s t i t u t i o n -
a l i s e d - "classism" i n t h i s country, blame f o r educational 
f a i l u r e c arries more legitimacy when directed at the "undeserving 
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poor" and the " c u l t u r a l l y deprived". There i s a strong t r a d i t i o n 
of c l a s s i f y i n g the B r i t i s h working class i n t h i s way, whose 
counterpart i n educational terms may consequently be tha t much 
harder to challenge. 
The question remains, however, what underlying assumptions 
ms.ke t h i s acceptance so common? H i s t o r i c a l l y , t h i s acceptance 
can be explained i n terms of the functions i t has served. The 
consequences of behaviour based on p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c y d e f i n i t i o n s 
then become the r e i n f o r c e r s of those d e f i n i t i o n s . But t o grasp . 
f u l l y how i t i s that such a model operates, one must seek the 
underlying assumptions on which they are based. 
Friedmann f a i l s r e a l l y t o elucidate the strange bedfellowship 
t o which he admirably points. On the one hand, he points t o the 
"broad speet:rum of i d e o l o g i c a l persuasions" (admittedly only 
extending from conservative t o l i b e r a l ) that has been a t t r a c t e d 
t o the c u l t u r a l deprivation idea. He shows, b r i e f l y , what sort 
of appeal t h i s idea - w i t h i t s c o r o l l a r y , compensatory education -
has t o various p o l i t i c a l positions. The imp l i c a t i o n would seem 
to be that some of them have "got i t v/rong"; that some have been 
deluded i n t o pursuing p o l i c i e s which do not, i n f a c t , f u r t h e r the, 
i n t e r e s t s they support. E i t h e r the model serves conservative 
i n t e r e s t s , or i t serves l i b e r a l i n t e r e s t s , and one of them must 
have adopted the model i n err o r . This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s suggested 
by Friedmann's (thoroughly worthwhile) a t t e n t i o n t o p o l i t i c a l 
challenges, j u s t o u t l i n e d . Yet he does make some attempt t o 
locate underlying assumptions at a rather higher l e v e l of 
inclusiveness than "the c u l t u r a l deprivation idea". He does not 
f u l l y succeed, i n that at least two of his three suggestions seem 
to be low-level parts of that idea, rather than higher l e v e l notions. 
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Priedmann»s three suggestions are that 
"(a) our formal educational system, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n i t s 
success with middle class students, and i n i t s practices 
since Sputnik, i s e s s e n t i a l l y sound; (b) the educational 
improvement of c u l t u r a l l y deprived children i n the large 
c i t i e s i s a worthwhile e f f o r t that can succeed even wi t h i n 
the e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n of de_facto segregation; and 
(c) much progress can come about by giving head s t a r t s and 
special a t t e n t i o n to i n d i v i d u a l children and categories of 
chil d r e n , so that they w i l l be helped to overcome some of 
the adverse conditions of t h e i r daily l i v e s , " 
Priedmann (1967/73) p.268. 
The l a s t two of these are not r e a l l y assumptions on which the 
c u l t u r a l deprivation model rests, but a part of that model. 
On the other hand, one could adhere to assumption (a) v/ithout 
accepting " c u l t u r a l deprivation" and compensatory solutions. 
Taken wi t h other underlying assumptions, the model follows 
from i t . 
Three suggestions made by Keddie ?(1972) ^  ""^ ^ go rather 
deeper than Priedmann's. She suggests that underlying much of 
the wx-lting on " c u l t u r a l deprivation" are three central 
assumptions: 
(a) that what constitutes a "good home" i s unproblematic; 
(b) that child-centred education i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y worthwhile, and 
(c) that 'knowledge' corresponds to the external world to the 
extent that a chil d ' s maturational development can be 
assessed by reference t o an already-known "normal" pattern 
of development f o r a l l c h i l d r e n . 
I t i s worth quoting at greater length from t h i s t h i r d 
p o i n t . 
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"The c h i l d ' s maturational c e i l i n g i s lowered so that 
'normal development' i s i n h i b i t e d and he has poor 
concentration and memory. His perceptions are inadequate 
p a r t l y because of the lack of organisation of both time 
and space i n the home and p a r t l y because t h i s lack of 
organisation leads to a poorly structured environment 
i n which the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of learning to discriminate 
are few. This point ,,, invokes a correspondence theory 
which naively assumes that the a b i l i t y to 'discriminate' 
matches the way things ' r e a l l y are' and that what i s 
•out there' to be known caxi be known Independently of the 
any knower comes to know about i t . The conclusion 
then emerges that ' c u l t u r a l l y deprived' children f a i l 
to discriminate because they do not appear to discriminate 
i n ways the standardised t e s t s are designed to measure", 
Keddie ? (1972) p,119. 
Now as w i t h Priedmann's suggestions, Keddie's f i r s t ("good home") 
i s c l e a r l y part of the c u l t u r a l deprivation model, rather than 
underlying i t . The second ("child-centred education") i s less 
clear. The notion i t s e l f l a ambiguous. One conclusion I would 
l i k e drawn from t h i s essay i s that "child-centredness", whilst 
o v e r t l y unconcerned with the s o c i e t a l functions of formal 
education, cannot i n f a c t be so i s o l a t e d . As H i r s t and Peters 
say. 
"This way of conceiving of education represents an escape 
from moral, r e s p o n s i b i l i t y under the cover of a b i o l o g i c a l 
metaphor ^'of 'growth' or development:7," 
H i r s t and Peters (1970) p,31. 
I would add that i t i s a p o l i t i c a l , as much as a "moral" issue. 
And i t i s not a question of abdication of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , so 
much as a f a i l u r e t o acknowledge what r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s 
i n e v i t a b l y taken. Any f a i l u r e e x p l i c i t l y t o act on t h i s i s a 
p o l i t i c a l "decision", a l b e i t one that i s taken only i m p l i c i t l y . 
To access the underlying assumptions of educational ideologies, 
we must consider what i s l e f t unsaid, as much as what i s 
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o v e r t l y consideredo 
Keddie's t h i r d point i s an important suggestion. I t i s not, 
as the quotation shows, a s i n g l e point, but rather a s e r i e s of 
points. I t encompasses two of the assumptions - namely those 
concerning an objectivated body of 'knowledge' and c r i t i c a l 
stages of development - which I have already suggested underlie 
a l l notions of e d u c a b i l i t y , including " c u l t u r a l deprivation". 
Both belong to the "ICnowledge" dimension i n educational 
Ideologies. The f i r s t of Friedmann's suggestions, on the other 
hand,(the fundamental soundness of the education system) r e f e r s 
to the "Power" dimension, which concerns actual and desired 
s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s , and possible modes of change. 
In s p e l l i n g out i n greater d e t a i l some of the arguments 
r e l a t i n g to " c u l t u r a l deprivation", I have attempted not ^ust 
to i l l u s t r a t e the Strange Bedfellowship phenomenon, but also to 
point i n the d i r e c t i o n required f o r a deeper understanding of 
t h i s . I t i s not enough merely to l i s t a s e r i e s of apparently 
unconnected propositions that are e i t h e r i m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y 
assumedo Such l i s t s / c o l l e c t i o n s are inadequate i n that they 
fragment the i d e o l o g i c a l ' r e a l i t i e s ' we are t r y i n g to gra.sp. 
I t i s e s s e n t i a l to grasp the s t r u c t u r a l coherence of ideologies 
i f we are to see how they r e l a t e to the Reality they supposedly 
r e f l e c t . The next example of Strange Bedfellows merges into 
the Happy Coincidence type of anomaly. 
(2) Controversy and the Schools Council Humanities Pro.ject 
I use the term "Controversy" to cover not j u s t the argument 
or debate us u a l l y denoted, but also the positive evaluation placed 
•210-
upon such argument. Parkinson and MacDonald, i n discussing the 
Schools Gomicil/Nuffield Foundation Humanities Project, define 
as " c o n t r o v e r s i a l " 
"problems about which people i n our society advocate 
d i f f e r e n t courses of a c t i o n ^ " 
Parkinson & MacDonald (1972) po299. 
The b a s i c r a t i o n a l e of the Humanities Pro;)ect i s that such 
problems and advocacies not only e x i s t , but should do so";, that 
tolerance of divergent opinions i s a blessing. In t h i s case, 
t h i s i s an educational blueprints But i t i s a l s o an important 
master pattern of advanced c a p i t a l i s m ~ or of the pluralism as 
which t h i s i s often presented! 
"Out of a l l of t h i s h i s t o r y , one simple f a c t emerges f o r 
the r a d i c a l i n t e l l i g e n t s i a , the old ideologies have l o s t 
t h e i r 'truth' and t h e i r power to persuade. ... In the 
V/estersa world, there i s today a rough consensus among 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s on p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s ; the acceptance of a 
Welfare State; the d e s i r a b i l i t y of decentralised power; 
a system of mixed economy and of p o l i t i c a l pluralism,, 
I n that sense, too, the i d e o l o g i c a l age has ended," 
B e l l (1960/72) p.304» 
Mass society i s a consensual society i n the sense that 
there are "consenauaily legitimate i n s t i t u t i o n s within 
which much of t h i s c o n f l i c t takes place and which impose 
l i m i t s on t h i s c o n f l i c t This consensus grows i n part 
from eui attachment to the centre, to the c e n t r a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l system and value order of the society. 
I t i s a l s o a product of a newly emergent ,e. f e e l i n g of 
unity with one's fellow men ..." 
S h i l s (1962/70) p,304. 
Others have pointed to, or been a party to, s i m i l a r sentiments. 
Compare the''politics of non-decision making"of Bachrach and 
Baratz (1962); the "consensus within dissensus" of Bourdieu 
(1967/71); the " i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d c o n f l i c t " of Goser (1956) 
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( n i c e l y mocked by Meszaros, 1972); the "shared, stable system 
of b e l i e f s and values" which, according to Anderson (1969) i s 
the c r u c i a l precondition of L e a v i s ' "interrogative form". This 
contributes to the d e ~ p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of formal education''^ ^ and 
flowers in the Oontroversy i d e a l of the Humajiities Project. I t 
i s the c u l t of Strange Bedfellows - a sort of i n t e l l e c t u a l 
promiscuity - which o f f i c i a l l y sees no danger i n t h i s 
permissiveness. YeD behind t h i s overt tolerance, there remains 
an acceptance of s o c i e t a l i n e q u a l i t i e s which only permit c e r t a i n 
"autonomous" actions to be performed. 
As Wolff et a l . (1969) demonstrate, 
"Pluralism, both as a theory and as p r a c t i c e , simply does 
not acknowledge the p o s s i b i l i t y of wholesale reorganisation 
of the society ... /It7 i s f a t a l l y b l i n d to the e v i l s which 
a f f l i c t the e n t i r e body p o l i t i c . " 
Wolff (1965/69) pp. 59-60, 
or, more damagingly, 
"What i s proclaimed and p r a c t i c e d as tolerance today, i s , 
i n many of i t s most e f f e c t i v e manifestations, serving 
the cause of oppressiono " 
fflarcuse (1965/69) p.95. 
Many of the contributors to Ssjaford et a l . (1971) make s i m i l a r 
points. For example, 
"The capstone i n the /^advanced c a p i t a l i s t / U . S . _7 ideology 
i s the concept of t o l e r a t i o n o Tolerance has come to be a 
value more important than any p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l goal. 
Toleration was bom as the grudging acceptance of f a c t s 
of l i f e - more s p e c i f i c a l l y as acceptgince of the fact that 
p o l i t i c a l l o y a l t y need not require r e l i g i o u s uniformity. 
I t s subsequent h i s t o r y owes much to the competitive model 
of the market, but what i s l e s s appreciated i s the r e l i a n c e 
of the market on a s i t u a t i o n r e l a t i v e l y devoid of strong 
p o l i t i c a l commitment. Tolerance protects the r e a l i t i e s 
of pov;er from c r i t i c a l examination i n s o f a r as i t j u s t i f i e s 
the avoidance of commitment and of the kind of confront-
ation which seems to be the only a v a i l a b l e device f o r 
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revealing the power base of certain s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
Tolerance operates best where the issue i s a natt e r of 
in d i f f e r e n c e to most people, or the major i n t e r e s t 
groups, or where procedural considerations are primary. 
Where the market p r i n c i p l e i t s e l f i s at stake, there i s 
l i t t l e t o l e r a t i o n A l l i s tolerated because l i t t l e 
can be taken s e r i o u s l y . Values reduce to one denomination, 
d i l u t i n g the moral q u a l i t y of l i f e .,." 
Drekmeier (1971) p.232. 
Lest one be tempted to think that t h i s r e f e r s only to the U.S., 
not to t h i s country, one has only to consider s i m i l a r c u l t s 
(12) 
of Controversy, from the B.B.C's Sunday Debate upwards. ' 
A f u r t h e r example can be seen i n the reports of the Select 
Committee on Immigration and Race Relations. As Clarke et a l . 
point out, the 1971 Report on Police/Iimiiigrant Relations 
defined "the problem as one which i s the r e s u l t of 
f a u l t s on both s i d e s , and solutions must therefore 
involve a degree of 'give and take' by both p a r t i e s . 
I t i s an appeal which serves to prevent the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of deeper a n a l y s i s ..." Clarke et a l . ( l 9 7 4 ) p.6, 
The S e l e c t Committee declared that 
"We have come to see communications as c r u c i a l . In 
the widest sense, they are at the root of the problem 
and the s t a r t i n g point of solutions of police/immigrant 
r e l a t i o n s . " 
S e l e c t Committee on Race Relations and Immigration (1971) 
V o l , I , § 307. 
As Clarke et a l . observe. 
"With *hat 'we have come to see', the i l l u s i o n i s complete." 
op c i t . p,8. 
I t seems that tolerance i s l i k e l y only where i t i s not 
believed to matter very much. E i t h e r the issues are seen as 
r e l a t i v e l y inconsequential or, though important, they do not 
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d i r e c t l y impinge on the person who expresses tolerance. As 
Aime Cesare put i t . 
"People are astonished, they are angry. They say: 'How 
strange that i s . But then i t ' s only Wazism; i t won't 
l a s t . ' And they wait and they hope; and they hide the 
t r u t h from themselves .,<> Yes, i t i s Nazism, but before 
they' became i t s vic t i m s , they were i t s accomplices; 
that Nazism they t o l e r a t e d before they succumbed to i t 
they exonerated, they closed t h e i r eyes to i t , they 
legitimated i t , because u n t i l then i t had been employed 
only against non-European peoples." 
quoted in Race Today, March 1970, p e i i . 
Strangely, i t was the perceived urgency of the s i t u a t i o n that 
prompted some people to c a l l f o r a deliberate and constructive 
(13) 
introduction of "race" r e l a t i o n s into school c u r r i c u l a . ' 
The Association of Teachers of English to Pupils from 
Overseas, f o r instance, i n an e d i t o r i a l to i t s E n g l i s h ,^for 
Immigrants, i n s i s t e d that the explosiveness of the topic and 
i t s importance meant i n v e s t i g a t i o n v/as not needed as to whether, 
but when sjad how, there should be teaching about "race" r e l a t i o n s . 
(ATEPO, 1971). Bhatnagar made a s i m i l a r point. Noting that 
many teachers feared to " s t i r things up", he emphasised that 
"Children l i v e i n a s o c i a l milieu where these controversial 
i s s u e s are very much part of t h e i r l i v e s To say nothing 
about i t i n the school would simply reinforce t h e ' b e l i e f 
many children hold that what goes on i n schools i s 
i r r e l e v a n t to the world outside." 
He c a l l e d f o r "frank discussion across the r a c i a l l i n e s . " 
(Bhatnagar, 1970, p,172). There i s quite a l i t e r a t u r e on 
(14) 
Education f o r " R a c i a l " Tolerance^ , but one of the foremost 
textbooks f o r teachers i s s t i l l Bibby (1959). He sets the 
scene f o r the Humanities Project Race Pack; 
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" I t i s important that the teacher should provoke genuine 
discussion - not formal debate, which often tends to confirm 
speakers i n t h e i r views and makes t h e i r abandonment a matter 
of l o s s of p r e s t i g e - encouraging the pupils to express a l l 
points of view quite openly and f r e e l y . Any too obvious 
or premature disapproval of undesirable opinions may lead 
to t h e i r repression, but w i l l not secure t h e i r eradication,,. 
Moreover, i t must be remembered that the c h i l d who e x h i b i t s 
prejudice i s as much i n need of help as the c h i l d who i s 
subjected to i t , and 17 should be treated by the teacher 
with the same sympathy and understanding ..." 
Bibby (1959) pp. 74-5. 
The l a t t e r sophistry i s c l e a r witness that the unaffected can 
best afford to be t o l e r a n t . 
The Schools Council/Nuffield Humanities Project adopted 
t h i s tolerance^and-protection ethics 
"Teaching must permit ajnd protect divergence eind maintain 
respect for i n d i v i d u a l opinionso" Stenhouse (1969) p.128. 
(Stenhouse was D i r e c t o r of the Humanities Project)» But i t also 
added a conscious attempt to change the teacher-pupil r e l a t i o n -
ship i n the use of i t s k i t s . The aim behind t h i s was expressed 
thus J 
" I f we are bo move from £sn J attitude of custodial 
containment to the desire to help pupils to cope with 
l i f e a f t e r they have l e f t school, we must at some time 
wean them from dependence on our authority," 
i b i d , p.126, 
The two o b j e c t i v e s happily coincide i n the Neutral Chairman 
ro l e f o r teachers: 
"Neutral chairmanship i s .., not only a professional 
e t h i c i n c o n t r o v e r s i a l matters, but also the means to 
put r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on the pupils in the task of gaining 
understanding." i b i d , p,126 
I n the same a r t i c l e , Stenhouse summed up the rationale 
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behind the Humanities Project as follows: 
"By d e f i n i t i o n , a c o n t r o v e r s i a l issue divides society, 
and hence divides p u p i l s , parents, and teachers. This 
was our s t a r t i n g point. A democracy values a dialogue 
between informed views, rather than a consensus. Teachers 
whose views range over the whole spectrum of opinion w i l l 
have pupi l s whose views and whose parents' views s i m i l a r l y 
diverge, so teaching should be based on open, but 
d i s c i p l i n e d , discussion r a ther than on formal i n s t r u c t i o n . 
The Project i s therefore committed to r e s p o n s i b i l i t y (the 
acceptance of one's own a c c o u n t a b i l i t y ) rather than to 
authority (depending f o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n on o t h e r s ) . " 
i b i d , p.126-7. 
Elsewhere, Verma and MacDonald (1971) have stated the following 
f i v e premises on which they saw the Project to be based: 
( a ) c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e s should be handled i n classrooms 
with adolescents; 
(b) the teacher should be n e u t r a l at t h i s stage of education; 
( c ) the mode of enquiry i n these controversial areas should 
be discussion, not i n s t r u c t i o n ; 
(d) divergences of views should be protected; consensus 
should not be enforced, and 
(e ) the teacher, as chainnan, i s responsible f o r the quality 
and standards of learning. 
The d i f f i c u l t i e s encountered by both teachers and pupils 
i n attempts to Introduce Humanities Project materials and 
techniques generally are not what I want to discuss here, I\![y 
concern i s s p e c i f i c a l l y with the "Race" k i t . 
The "Race" k i t (Hipkin, 1971) was piloted by f i f t e e n 
t e achers. There was considerable opposition to i t s use. 
Despite defence by the Project team, the Schools Council 
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Progranmie Committee f i n a l l y refused to sponsor publication, 
on the grounds that 
"some of the m a t e r i a l i n the pack i s too disturbing or 
shocking - i n terms of being 'disturbing' rather than 
'sensational' - to be s u i t a b l e material f o r teachers to 
give 14" to I 6 ~ y e a r olds," 
Guardian, 20/1/72, quoted by Taylor (1974) pp,168-9, 
Taylor comments that 
" t h i s statement i s r a t h e r extraordinary when the 
evidence of disturbing r a c i a l , r e l i g i o u s and other 
p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s are readily a v a i l a b l e , 
when and as they occur on TV screens, radio broadcasts 
and i n the newsoapers," Taylor (1974) p.169. 
Her view i s akin to that of A,T,E,P.O. and Bhatnagar, quoted 
e a r l i e r - that "race" r e l a t i o n s i s s u e s have to be 
"discussed openly i n a sympathetic atmosphere, rather 
than suppressed or channelled into violence." 
i b i d , p.169. 
She f e e l s that there i s a great need for materials from the 
Schools Council J since make-shift teacher-made materials may 
be more dangerous, and "time i s running out" ( p , l 6 9 ) . 
This W£is c e i ^ a i n l y the view of the Project team - including 
the f i n a l note of urgency. For despite the profession of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l i n d i f f e r e n c e as to which divergent opinions 
were voiced i n the Controversy s i t u a t i o n , the team was very 
s e n s i t i v e to charges that t h e i r "Race Pack" provoked " r a c i a l " 
sjntipathies, r a t h e r than assuaged them, Verma and MacDonald were 
keen to s t r e s s that despite the l i m i t a t i o n s of t h e i r evaluative 
techniques, they had found no marked deterioration i n 
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a t t i t u d i n a l or p e r s o n a l i t y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s among the pupils at' 
p i l o t schools. (At the same time they i n s i s t e d that no teachers 
had abandoned any of the f i v e p r i n c i p a l s of the Project l i s t e d 
above.) I n f u r t h e r self-defence, Stenhouse and Hipkin (1972) 
again showed t h e i r concern f o r a t t i t u d e change (towards 
t o l e r a t i o n ) , by pointing out tha-t these had only been small 
because the k i t had been i n use f o r so short a time. But s t i l l 
the n e u t r a l i t y e t h i c prevailed, Parkinson (one of the f i f t e e n 
t e achers involved i n the p i l o t experiment) wrote ah a r t i c l e 
i n conjunction with the Project evaluator, MacDonald (1972), 
i n which he confessed that he got angry with white pupils f o r 
t h e i r i n s e n s i t i v e and i n t o l e r a n t statements i n the presence 
of Asian f e l l o w - p u p i l s . But he t r i e d hard to suppress t h i s 
anger, as h i s aim was to encourage the broadening of minds 
at the c h i l d r e n ' s own hands. He feared that to express h i s own 
views would be to l a b e l himself and what he said as s t e r e o t y p i c a l 
"white l i b e r a l " . This may well be true, but one cannot help 
wondering what l a b e l the pupils i n the event found more 
appropriate. 
C r i t i c i s m s of the "Race" k i t are predictable. On the 
whole c r i t i c s saw i t as q u a l i t a t i v e l y different from the 
Humanity P r o j e c t ' s other k i t s . They attacked i t on the grounds 
that the ("laudable") techniques and materials of the Project 
war© inappropriate to the treatment of "race" r e l a t i o n s . As 
Bolton and L a i s h l e y put i t , 
"Race i s not merely another controversial area, to be 
introduced as the subject of a debate or an odd general 
studies lesson. The deficiency of the much discussed 
Schools Council Race K i t l i e s i n i t s treatment of race 
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as one of a general package of controversial areas and 
i n i t s presentation to schoolchildren of complex race 
r e l a t i o n s material i n a s i t u a t i o n where there i s v i r t u a l l y 
no back up from conventional school subjects. The 
educational response to race attitudes in children, to 
the demands of a multi-coloured B r i t a i n i s not a peripheral 
matter; i t l i e s i n the mainstream of development of 
educational aims and o b j e c t i v e s . " 
Bolton & l a i s h l e y (1972) p.6, 
Anne Dummett's c r i t i c i s m s were s i m i l a r . She complained that 
the Project appeared to t r e a t "race" i n a vacuum, not r e a l i s i n g 
that there are tensions, prejudices and i n j u s t i c e s i n schools 
already. The k i t seemed to provide materials with no means of 
i d e n t i f y i n g the r e a l problems at is s u e . The very selection of 
wide-ranging and " b i t t y " material (Chinese, German Jews, 
Eskimos, South A f r i c a , U.S. and U.K.) nowhere put "race" 
i n t o i t s s o c i e t a l context. 
"Everywhere i t i s i s o l a t e d from other h i s t o r i c a l , s o c i a l 
and p o l i t i c a l information. The effect of t h i s s e l e c t i o n 
i s to emphasise that r a c i a l difference i s i t s e l f a cause 
of problems; that i s , to accept an e s s e n t i a l assumption 
of racism i t s e l f , " Dummett (1972) p.360, 
Dummett's solution ( f o r she too f e l t the need f o r a r e a l i s t i c -
but non-neutral ~ introduction of "race" into the school 
curriculum) was to avoid teaching "race" as a subject, whilst 
r e f u t i n g l i e s about "race" wherever they are commonly 
disseminateds i n biology, h i s t o r y , geography, l i t e r a t u r e , 
r e l i g i o u s i n s t r u c t i o n , e t c . . 
Fewer c r i t i c s , on the other hand, have tackled the 
Controversy assumption as such - which u n d e r l i ^ a l l the Project 
m a t e r i a l s . One who has i s Holly. He has complained that 
"The Humanities Project eagerly embraced the Mewsom doctrine 
of one learning f o r the able and another f or the not-so-able." 
Holly (1973/74) p.54. 
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(Others have made the same point. See, f o r instance, V/hite, 1969 ; 
Youngs 1972/73) . What i s l e s s commonplace i n Holly's b r i e f 
treatment i s that he l i n k s t h i s with the objectives and 
assumptions of the Project team, 
"V/hat i s at i s s u e i n the minds of the Humanities team .,. 
i s not_ the c r i t e r i a and techniques of using and evaluating 
evidence, but the techniques of r a t i o n a l , urbane, l i b e r a l , 
middle c l a s s d i s c u s s i o n , " i b i d , p.53. 
T h i s , according to Holly^ i s d i r e c t l y connected with Stenhouse's 
su b j e c t - s p e c i a l i s m - E n g l i s h , Just as History f o r the " l e s s 
a b l e " becomes S o c i a l Studies, Geography becomes Environmental 
Studies £ind RK becomes Moral Education, so English i s t r a n s -
formed int o Humanities. Meanwhile the " l i t e r a r y c u l t u r e " 
p r i n c i p l e s of Arnold, L e a v i s , E l i o t and Lawrence l i v e on. 
What l i v e s on, i n other words, i s a Basic B e l i e f i n 
Controversy •» i n t o l e r a t e d Bedfellows, so long as the confines 
of disagreement are not breached. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , Stenhouse has 
not avoided s p e l l i n g out what he sees those confines to be. 
" I t i s taken as axiomatic that c e r t a i n values are 
inseparable from education and are not c o n t r o v e r s i a l , " 
Stenhouse (1972) , quoted Bolton & L a i s h l e y (1972) p<,17. 
These "values" are presumably the following: 
"Respect f o r persons, a preference f o r r a t i o n a l i t y rather 
than i r r a t i o n a l i t y , s e n s i t i v i t y rather than i n s e n s i t i v i t y , 
imaginitiveness r a t h e r than uniraaginitiveness, a readiness 
to l i s t e n thoughtfully to the views of others." 
Schools Council/Nuffield Foundation (1970) p.9. 
The Humanities Project team s t r e s s the d e s i r a b i l i t y of 
Controversy, assuming - and i n some cases a s s e r t i n g - an 
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underlying convergence i n c e r t a i n obvious " t r u t h s " such as 
r a t i o n a l i t y , s e n s i t i v i t y e t c . This assumption allows them 
to devalue the ar'guments of c r i t i c s , dismissing them as opposed 
to such values. Yet at the same time they f e e l obliged to find 
evidence of increased tolerance (Verma & MacDonald) - or at 
l e a s t of no increase i n intolerance - r e s u l t i n g from the "Race" 
k i t . C r i t i c s of the Proj e c t e i t h e r deny the obviousness of 
t h i s convergence and/or the i n e v i t a b i l i t y that the Controversy/ 
Neutral Chairman technique w i l l produce the kind of tolerance 
expected. The expectation of such toleraJtice pre^-supposes 
convergent i n t e r e s t s , f o r i n the long run Strange Bedfellows 
can only be expected to agree to disagree i f that agreement i s 
(15) 
not harmful to them,^ 
" I n d i v i d u a l s owe to t h e i r schooling, f i r s t and foremost, 
a v/hole c o l l e c t i o n of commonplaces, covering not only 
common speech and language but also areas of encounter 
and agreement, common problems and common methods of 
approaching those common problems: educated people of a 
given period may disagree on the questions they discuss 
but are at any rate i n agreement about discussing c e r t a i n 
questions .e. Disagreement presupposes agreement on the 
areas of disagreement, and the manifest c o n f l i c t s between 
trends and doctrines conceal from the people concerned i n 
those c o n f l i c t s the implied b a s i c concurrence which 
s t r i k e s the observer a l i e n to the system. The consensus 
i n dissensus i s rooted i n the academic t r a d i t i o n , , , " 
Bourdieu (1967/71) p.191. 
By the same token, schooling into t h i s culture of tolerance i s 
l i k e l y to be unsuccessful i n s o f a r as pupils f a i l to accept 
( t o l e r a t e / l e g i t i m a t e ) t h e i r disagreements. One obvious 
reason why such f a i l u r e might occur i s that the attempt may be 
to induce tolerance of c o n f l i c t s which a r i s e i n r e a l - l i f e 
antagonisms experienced d i r e c t l y by pupils - which "matter" 
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to them - even i f they are of merely academic i n t e r e s t to 
Project teams and others. 
I n replying to c r i t i c s . C o n t r o v e r s i a l i s t s are obliged to 
make more e x p l i c i t the convergence of i n t e r e s t s that they 
believe to e x i s t i n r e a l i t y , and the lesson of tolerance they 
expect to be learned from t h i s convergence. In doing so, they 
are proclaiming the P a r t i c i p a t i o n t h e s i s , which i s a Happy 
Coincidence r a t h e r than a Strange Bedfellow phenomenon. 
(3) Parent and Pupil P a r t i c i p a t i o n 
Controversy c o n s i s t s i n a perceived dissensus beneath an 
umbrella of assumed consensus. This assumed consensus i s 
l a r g e l y i m p l i c i t . I t i s a consensus of b e l i e f based upon ajj 
assumed convergence of ( o r non-antagonism of) i n t e r e s t s . Beneath 
t h i s umbrella, i t i s possible - even desirable, as i n the work 
of Coser (1956) , or Coleman (1957), or the Humanities Project 
team - to s t r e s s dissensus/disagreement. The consensus i s so 
taken f o r granted, so "obvious", that i t seems not to be under 
t h r e a t . P a r t i c i p a t i o n , on the other hand, has the same under-
l y i n g model - consensus i n dissensus - but the emphasis t h i s 
time i s e x p l i c i t l y on the consensus. Disagreements or c o n f l i c t s 
are played down as r e l a t i v e l y t r i v i a l , often delusory, or • 
"extremist-inspired". The b a s i c consensus i s stressed to 
"prove" the t r i v i a l i t y of these alleged c o n f l i c t s . ^ 
-222-
B e l i e f Structures of Controversy and P a r t i c i p a t i o n 




I 1 i 1 
"Antagonisms"/ "Antagonisms"/ 
Disagreements Disagreements 
Thus a c t u a l or a n t i c i p a t e d c r i t i c i s m of the Controversy t h e s i s 
can convert i t i n t o the P a r t i c i p a t i o n t h e s i s : as happened i n 
the case of the Humanities Project "Race" k i t . 
P a r t i c i p a t i o n i s a theme of our times,though i t i s not, 
of course, new. I n the case of industry, Ramsay (1976) has 
suggested a c y c l i c a l pattern over the past centuiy during 
which employers have seen i t (sometimes more, sometimes l e s s ) 
i n t h e i r i n t e r e s t s to promote worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n . S i m i l a r l y , 
we often hear c a l l s today f o r public p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n 
structure-planning, or motorway-planning, or school reorganisation 
planning. Antecedents to these c a l l s can no doubt be traced 
to s o c i a l imperialism and to the "Dunkirk S p i r i t " which more 
obviously infonns such P a r t i c i p a t i o n s as "Backing B r i t a i n " , 
Devolutionaiy p o l i t i e s and the lengthy debates about 
(17) 
Incorporation are c l e a r l y r e l a t e d i s s u e s . 
The subject of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n education could be treated 
from a number of angles. The whole question of the autonomy of 
teachers and of schools i s involved. In the U.S., the "who 
controls our schools?" debate has a much stronger (though not 
longer) t r a d i t i o n than i t has i n t h i s country. Counts (1932) 
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sparked off the debate i n the Progressive Education Association, 
Again, i n the '50s, there was a spate of writing, following 
(18) 
Hulburd's This happened i n Pasadena.^ ' Indeed, the debate 
(19) 
has sometimes expanded to "Who r u l e s America?" 
In t h i s country there have been few comparably wide-read 
and i n f l u e n t i a l p u b l ications. Indeed,the majority of writings 
on the subject have been i n the decision-making/politics-of-
education t r a d i t i o n , r a t h e r than that of r a d i c a l p o l i t i c s . ^ ^ ^ ^ 
The dominant id e a i s s t i l l one of schools being r e l a t i v e l y 
autonomous i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
"There can be few educational structures more f l e x i b l e 
than the E n g l i s h s t a t e system. This has disadvantages 
(such as the d i f f i c u l t y of a l t e r i n g 'bad' schools) but 
l a c k of opportunity f o r innovation i s not one of these, 
A c o l o u r f u l and variegated pattern of innovation i s being 
attempted across the nation at a l l times and i n everyday 
s i t u a t i o n s , " Midwinter (1974) p.94. 
However, the experiences of Duane at R i s i n g h i l l , Mackenzie i n 
Aberdeen, Geinnan at Mold, and the recent case of William 
Tyridale^^^^ suggest strongly'tfiat t h i s " f l e x i b i l i t y " i s only 
(21) 
l i m i t e d autonomy. S i m i l a r l y , the supposed autonomy of the 
c l a s s teacher i s complex, but o^ i the whole exaggerated. The 
influ e n c e that teachers have even i n the "teacher-dominated" 
Schools Council i s remarkably l i m i t e d (Young, 1972/73). What 
I wsint to consider here, however, i s the P a r t i c i p a t i o n by 
parents and by pupils i n the running of schools. 
When the Advisory Centre f o r Education published a Where 
report advising parents on what methods were most e f f e c t i v e i n 
in f l u e n c i n g L,B,A. po l i c y , the Chief Education O f f i c e r f o r 
B r i s t o l appeared on the B.B.C's "Nationwide" programme to 
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(23) welcome the report (much to the interviewer's s u r p r i s e ) . ' 
What everyone wanted, he s a i d , was that the best ideas be 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d , and t h i s was only possible i f these views 
were expressed and heard. He made, that i s , a Controversy-
based assumption that ideas expressed would be neutral and 
to the p o t e n t i a l b e n efit of a l l . However, when parents i n 
f a c t attempt to influence the poli c y or running of t h e i r 
c h i l d r e n ' s schools, they are,not always so welcome. To quote 
a t r a n s a t l a n t i c - but thoroughly relevant - experience, 
"The parents come up with a ju s t and proper reason to 
place blame, and they get i t instead. Up they come 
angry and with proper outrage. Off they go, humbled, 
sad, and weakly, having as i t were apologised for the 
stupid thing they've t r i e d to obtain. The look of 
embarrassed humi?.ity. The t e r r i b l e parental horror that 
they may have made a bad mistake. W i l l t h e i r c h i l d now 
get punished? W i l l some kind of s i l e n t r e t a l i a t i o n now 
take place? What ri g h t had they to complain? Wasn't 
i t stupid? Wasn't i t unwise of them when they were 
being received with so much politeness by one of the most 
respected old-time teachers i n the c i t y ? " 
Kozol (1967/68) p.97. 
Kewell (1972) makes s i m i l a r observations about parents who 
complain at the use of corporal punishment - and the f e a r of 
v i c t i m i s a t i o n (e.g. pp,120-1). Parents are vulnerable.because 
(24) 
t h e i r children are vulnerable,^ 
This i s not to say that parents are never l i s t e n e d to, 
of course. Kozol himself was dismissed following a complaint 
from a (white) parent, about the use i n c l a s s of a poem by 
Langston Hughes. However, the experience of other (black) 
parents of children at Kozol's school suggests that i t was not 
merely the fa c t that a parent had complained tliat prompted 
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t h i s actiorio Rather i t was the nature of the complaint. I t 
accorded veiy much w i t h the School Committee's ovtn understanding 
of the f i t role of a Boston schoolteacher. ' 
Though one must, of course, be cautious of too-easy 
generalisations, i t seems that most issues where parents are 
involved tend to be of minor importance. Where more momentous 
decisions are t o be made, parental p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s less welcome. Acco3?d-
ing t o Berg (1968), there was strong parental support f o r Duane 
at R i s i n g h i l l , She describes the despair they f e l t at t h e i r 
i n a b i l i t y t o influence the decision as t o whether the school 
should close (pp. 197-8, 211, 214). The much publicised pressure 
of parents of children at William Tyndale School, however, would 
seem t o have been more i n l i n e w i t h the i n c l i n a t i o n s of those 
already i n power w i t h i n the I.L.E.A,. An experiment i n community 
con t r o l of schools i n Brookljm revealed s i m i l a r weaknesses on 
the part of parents, when members of the Board of Education and 
i t s bureaucracy worked together w i t h members of the teachers' 
union to destroy and d i s c r e d i t the community school board. 
This r e s u l t e d i n the v/ithdrawal of funds by the Ford Foundation 
and the collapse of the venture (Berube & G i t t e l l , 1969). 
Rlbbich (1972/75) has also pointed to the f i c t i o n of community 
co n t r o l i n inner c i t y U.S. schools. 
I t seems tha t the issues on which parents do become 
e f f e c t i v e l y involved tend e i t h e r t o be of minor importance, or 
are i n accordance with the i n t e n t i o n s of ex i s t i n g o f f i c i a l s . 
Within less than three weeks of autumn 1974, f o r instance, there 
appeared i n the Middlesbrough Evening Gazette no less than s i x 
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incid e n t s of parental protest and action i n Teesside - including 
the lobby of an M,P. and the with-holding of children from 
schools The issues were as f o l l o w s 5 the provision of more 
school buses, the promptness of school buses, the placement of 
p a r t i c u l a r children i n one school rather than another (two cases), 
the breakdown of heating i n a school, and the provision of a safe 
(26) 
s t r e e t crossing. Six d i f f e r e n t schools were dnvoHyed. I n at least one 
of these cases, the covert but active support of the headteacher 
played a s i g n i f i c a n t part i n the achievement of the parents' 
(27) 
ob^ectivese^ ' The one genuinely controversial issue, however -
the placement of ch i l d r e n , a dispute which arose from the 
Education Committee's p o l i c y of t r y i n g to achieve a "social 
mix" " was doomed to f a i l u r e . The same fate met an extremely 
vocal and hard-working action group that f o r some years lobbied 
and campaigned t o obtain a secondary school i n the town centre -
a f t e r the Committee had adopted a policy (probably, but not 
(28) 
o f f i c i a l l y , f o r "mix" reasons) of campuses i n the suburbs. 
The pi'omotion of community schools as a motivational 
inducement i s by no means an unpopular idea. "In order to reduce poverty-related psychological and 
so c i a l problems i n the U.S., the major community w i l l 
have t o change i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p to neighbourhoods of 
poverty i n such a fashion that families i n the 
neighbourhoods have a greater stake i n the broader 
society and can more successfully p a r t i c i p a t e i n the 
decision-making process." 
Haggstrom (1964), quoted by Bruner (1971/74) p.175. 
But i t i s not clear that motivation t o p a r t i c i p a t e w i l l produce 
any more genuine autonomy on the part of parents or "community", 
Indeed, such autonomy may be a prerequisite of such motivation. 
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Nor i s i t always at a l l obvious under what circumstances ajay 
r e a l i s t i c objective of r a d i c a l change would manifest i t s e l f . 
"Although some minority subgroups have stressed t o t a l 
independence or, conversely, alliances w i t h r a d i c a l 
v/hites t o change the e n t i r e economic struc t u r e , the 
overv/helming m a j o r i t y i n the black and brown communities 
want to take over the schools so that t h e i r children can 
succeed i n the present economic system ... nevertheless, 
no amount of school co n t r o l by blacks, browns, or women 
w i l l create e q u a l i t y of opportunity i n a r a c i s t and 
sexist economic and soc i a l structure. No amount of 
l o c a l c o n t r o l w i l l attack the suburban preserves of the 
^ l i t e public schoolso" 
Camoy (1972/75)» I n t r o d u c t i o n , po7. 
S i m i l a r l y , charges are sometimes levelled against the "relevant" 
education of community schooling (prompted, f o r instance, by 
(29^ 
Mdwinter i n Liverpool^ ^ ) - that t h i s w i l l change nothing. 
I f anything i t may merely impede children's escape from t h e i r 
slum environment. 
Yet the issue i s not so clear-cut as t h i s . Both Midwinter 
and Camoy hope f o r some sort of communal entrepreneurship, 
whereby the expea?ience of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n schooling may not 
s a t i s f y as an end i n i t s e l f , but form the basis of r a d i c a l 
p o l i t i c a l actions 
"/Local/ co n t r o l may provide the type of leadership t h a t , 
i f i t i s not co-opted, may i n turn create economic counter-
i n s t i t u t i o n s to employ and serve the community. This 
'community mercantilism' i s a real p o t e n t i a l threat to 
the established s t r u c t u r e . " Camoy, ibid,p.7. 
I n h i s book (1974), Camoy rather lamely - ajnd strangely, i n 
view of the stark determinism of the previous 350-plus pages -
proclaims that free schools are p o t e n t i a l l y 
"the strongest element i n decolonizing people i n the society 
and breaking down i t s hie r a r c h i c a l structures." 
Carnoy (1974) pp» 367-8. 
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Against t h i s , one should consider Keave's judgment that 
"The paradox of the 'free school' movement i s t h a t , 
preoccupied w i t h the reforms that might be necessary 
f o r the day a f t e r tomorrow, i t i s less interested i n 
those taking place today ... Unless 'free schoolers' 
are prepared t o b a t t l e f o r /^he introduction of freedom 
of access and freedom t o learn i n one's own t i m ^ i n t o 
state education, then t h e i r s i s a movement that cannot 
be regarded w i t h any seriousness. I f i t remains on the 
fr i n g e s of state education, opposed to i t s extension 
to a l l children i n a single type of school, or unprepared 
to face up to the major issues on current reform, the 
'free school' must be seen as the break-up of radicalism 
i n education, not the breakthrough." 
Weave (1974) p.250. 
Neave sees free schools as merely p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n an o v e r a l l 
schooling system, i n which they can have no real p o t e n t i a l f o r 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t change. Indeed, i n some areas, such as 
Liverpool, f i n a n c i a l assistance i s given by the L,E.A. to 
such schools 
"as a useful instrument f o r coping w i t h the drop out 
problem ... The'free schools' are being asked to take 
over the childminding aspects of education, keeping 
young people o f f the streets and, to some extent, o f f 
the labour market i b i d , p,247. 
The conclusion must be that there i s an empirical p r o b a b i l i t y 
that "community" ajnd parental p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n education may 
serve t o incorporate rather than r a d i c a l i s e , to b l i n k e r and 
l i m i t horizons r a t h e r than t o promote p o l i t i c a l l y e f f e c t i v e 
a c t i o n . At the same time t h i s i s not a l o g i c a l l y necessary 
outcome, and the exercise of l i m i t e d autonomy could provide 
the experience by which r a d i c a l awareness could be created. ^"^ "^^ 
Similar questions arise i n the case of pu p i l p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
(31) 
i n schools. Various r i t u a l s ^ have no doubt always been used 
-229-
(whether or not d e l i b e r a t e l y ) t o promote commitment t o schools' 
" o f f i c i a l " values ~ and t o le g i t i m a t e t h e i r power structures. 
The '^involvement" of ch i l d r e n , be i t as milk monitor or prefect, 
i s an important aspect of t h i s . Apparent autonomy ( i . e , subject-
i v e l y f e l t "autonomy") i n the actual learning of "school knowledge" 
can be a mere extention of t h i s . 
School councils, aimed p a r t l y at providing "experience of 
democracy", but also (and by no means i n c i d e n t a l l y ) at "involving" 
p u p i l s , have been almost proverbial f o r t h e i r lack of r e a l 
l e g i s l a t i v e power. Consider j u s t two examples. F i r s t , Whitley 
Bay High School's council voted i n favour of establishing a 
smoking room f o r senior p u p i l s . The headmaster r a t i o n a l i s e d his 
veto as follows? 
"This i s an educational establishment and we also have a 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y towards health education. Smoking i s known 
to be p o t e n t i a l l y extremely dangerous." The Journal.1/3/75. 
Second, i n the case of R i s i n g h i l l , the L.C.C. Inspectorate 
reported that 
"There i s moreover some suggestion that some members of 
s t a f f f e e l that the /school/ council discusses matters 
which properly are the a f f a i r of the s t a f f . I t i s clear 
that the f l e d g e l i n g democracy of the school i s i n need 
of f i r m and discreet guidance by responsible adults," 
L.C.C. Inspectorate Report on R i s i n g h i l l (1962), quoted 
by Berg (1968) p,131. 
Autonomy, i t seems - and indeed "democracy", even - has i t s 
l i m i t s , though one should be "discreet" about t h i s . 
I n t e r e s t i n g l y , n either of these examples concerns the overt 
f u n c t i o n of the school, namely the transmission of educational 
knowledge - though the Whitley Bay headteacher r a t i o n a l i s e d as 
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(32) i f i t d i d . I t i s i n the selection and organisation of this^"^ ' 
that the most complex questions arise. This i s not^ to say, of 
course, that "non-academic" issues of control are any less 
t r i c k y i n practice. Indeed, the very d e f i n i t i o n of such areas 
i s problematic But, i f "educational" includes a l l that teachers 
are both i m p l i c i t l y and e x p l i c i t l y expected to convey to t h e i r 
p u p i l s , the essential dilemmas of the teacher-pupil r e l a t i o n s h i p 
are h i g h l i g h t e d . 
Geer (1968/71) has suggested that there i s necessarily 
c o n f l i c t i n any teacher-leamer relationship. 
"I n every teaching s i t u a t i o n , the teacher i s , at least 
temporarily, the superior and his p u p i l the subordinate." 
Teaching i s "ein assault on the s e l f " , so that "the absence, 
ra t h e r than the presence, of resistance requires 
explanation when one person seeks so much control over 
another." Geer (1968/71) p.3. 
The f a c t of t h i s inherent conflict^"^"^^ i s an important 
observation, but i t i s equally important to r e a l i s e that i t 
i s t r ue only as an a n a l y t i c a l statement. I t i s a long way from 
t h i s t o Holt's assertion that 
"Teachers f e e l , as I once d i d , that t h e i r i n t e r e s t s and 
t h e i r students' are fundamentally the same ... /But/ 
children i n school are l i k e children at the doctor's. He 
can t a l k himself blue i n the face about how much good his 
medicine i s going to do thems a l l they think of i s how 
much w i l l i t hurt or how bad w i l l i t t a s t e . Given t h e i r 
own way they would have none of i t . " 
Holt (1965/69) p.37. 
Many of Geer's own assesrtions apparently assume that 
because ( a n a l y t i c a l l y ) there i s inherent c o n f l i c t , then i n 
prac t i c e t h i s w i l l always produce (at least l a t e n t ) h o s t i l i t y . 
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Both Holt and Geer are t a l k i n g about a p a r t i c u l a r society 
where t h i s p o t e n t i a l h o s t i l i t y i s undoubtedly l i k e l y . But 
i t i s l i k e l y not merely because, psychologically, learners 
" n a t u r a l l y " resent "assaults on the s e l f " , but because the 
s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s of teaching are i n most cases more fundament-
a l l y antagonistic. The teacher represents ( i s paid by and 
generally believes i n ) the r u l i n g i n t e r e s t s of the society, and 
these are not - i n most cases - those of his pupils. Thus Geer 
i s no doubt r i g h t when she says that 
"In so-called democratic teaching methods, i n t e r a c t i o n 
may seem t o o r i g i n a t e w i t h the p u p i l , but a l l except the 
youngest sense the teacher's guiding hand and frequently 
resent the pretence." Geer (1968/71) p,4. 
But she i s t a l k i n g about the U.S. state education system, not 
teacher-pupil r e l a t i o n s 2er„se (although her a n a l y t i c a l s t a t e -
ment quoted from page 3 was about them). I n the context she 
i s discussing those "so-called democratic teaching methods" 
are an exercise i n P a r t i c i p a t o r y "involvement". But teaching-
learning i s not necessarily antagonistic at the sociological 
l e v e l . Teachers' and learners' i n t e r e s t s could i n some contexts 
converge. The inherent inter-personal c o n f l i c t to which Geer 
i n i t i a l l y pointed i s s t i l l a n a l y t i c a l l y v a l i d , but the 
s o c i e t a l context of the r e l a t i o n s h i p over-rides t h i s . Moreover, 
that s o c i e t a l context i s necessarily there; teacher and p u p i l 
can only e x i s t w i t h i n a s o c i e t a l context. Certainly, the 
respective i n t e r e s t s of teacher and pu p i l are extremely complex: 
short-term and personal, i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s may not accord 
w i t h long-term and objective class i n t e r e s t s - quite apart from 
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subjectivs i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of these. I t i s the subjective 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s and/or i m p l i c i t b e l i e f s that w i l l determine how 
the inherent c o n f l i c t manifests i t s e l f . The subordination of 
the learner may be wholly l e g i t i m a t e d , even when t o the observer 
hi s i n t e r e s t s diverge from those of his teacher - ajnd 
contrariwd.se. Disciples may w i l l i n g l y s i t at the feet of t h e i r 
"master". 
I n t h i s l i g h t , " s o - c a l l e d democratic teaching methods" have 
an added si g n i f i c a n c e . I f they are employed i n a s i t u a t i o n where 
the learners' i n t e r e s t s do not correspond with those represented 
by the teacher, then t h e i r use i s Participatory. I t would be a 
Happy Coincidence i f the learner acquired the 'knowledge' that 
promoted h i s own objective i n t e r e s t s by such methods. That 
Happy Coincidence underlies much "progressive" educational 
thought. For example: 
"We cannot have r e a l learning i n school i f we think i t i s 
our duty and our r i g h t t o t e l l children what they must 
leam«,. The most we can do i s t r y t o help, by l e t t i n g 
him know roughly what i s available and where he can look 
f o r i t . Choosing what he wants to leam and what he 
does not i s something he must do f o r himself." 
Holt (1965/69) p.175. 
"Real l e a r n i n g " here appears to be l i t t l e more than that which 
i s psychologically s a t i s f y i n g . I t i s autonomy to the c h i l d f o r 
i t s own sake. I n p r a c t i c e , where the c h i l d leams l i t t l e or 
nothing t o advance his objective i n t e r e s t s , then he has merely 
p a r t i c i p a t e d , not con t r o l l e d . And however u n i n t e n t i a l l y , t h i s 
B a r t i c i p a t i o n may be promoted by the progressive teacher every 
b i t as e f f e c t i v e l y as by some one who sees pseudo-autonomy merely 
-233-
as a motivational device f o r the transmission of "colonizing" 
knowledge. 
Apart from i l l u s t r a t i n g one kind of i d e o l o g i c a l anomaly, 
the foregoing o f f e r s clues as to hov/ we might tease out some 
fundamental assumptions underlying such anomalies. B r i e f l y , 
the motivational aspects of learning theoiy - such as a stress 
on "involvement" or P a r t i c i p a t i o n - need to be distinguished 
from t'he intended, expected and actual consequences of peda-
gogical s t y l e s , i n terms of what 'knowledge' i s ( t o be) acquired. 
Such 'knowledge' cannot j u s t include overt c u r r i c u l a r 'knowledge'. 
Also, and more importantly, i t includes structures of b e l i e f 
about what constitutes -and what validates - r e l i a b l e and 
worthwhile 'knowledge', about what constitutes "natural" a u t h o r i t y 
and poxver r e l a t i o n s , and about what are " r e a l i s t i c " modes of 
change i n the case of these two. 
One f u r t h e r aspect of pupil/student p a r t i c i p a t i o n should be 
noted. The status of 'knowledge' acquired i s i n t i m a t e l y related 
t o the objective r e l a t i o n s between teacher and learner. The 
"Knowledge" dimension i s inseparable from the "Power" dimension. 
One example w i l l i l l u s t r a t e t h i s i n the context of student 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 
I t has been said that "dialogue" i s the "in-word" i n the 
Open University. Dialogue can be fujadamental t o an autonomously 
created learning s i t u a t i o n , and the term i s c l e a r l y intended to 
accord w i t h Preire's usage (1972, esp.Ch,3), But on the other 
hand i t can merely mean "feedback", f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s t purposes. 
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"Student feedback, of course, i s essential. Nevertheless, 
i t has severe l i m i t a t i o n s as a sole source of feedback. 
The main problem i s that students - p a r t i c u l a r l y i f t h e i r 
own subjective judgments are asked f o r - are generally 
weak at suggesting how improvements might be made. This 
weakness i s due to two reasons; the students do not know 
enough about the subject matter or teaching methods to 
know how else the subject matter might be taught; and i f 
they are i n d i f f i c u l t y , i t may be impossible f o r them to 
be able t o i d e n t i f y and explain the cause of t h e i r 
d i f f i c u l t y , " Bates (1974) p.36. 
I t i s not my purpose to challenge t h i s assertion. But i t i s 
worth s p e l l i n g out axi importeint assumption that Hes behind i t . 
This i s that there i s a v a l i d body of 'knowledge', which i s 
already "there", which has already been mastered by teachers 
(and course team, i n t h i s case), and which has merits beyond 
and despite the appreciation of students. The problem, to 
Bates, i s "merely" pedagogical. This assumption underlies any 
educational p o l i c y which employs teachers as experts - whatever 
the "democratic" or " d i a l o g i s i n g " teaching methods employed. 
Whenever genuine c o n t r o l over the contents of educational 
'knowledge'lies not w i t h the learner, but with the teacher - when, 
i n f a c t , the teacher i s not i n d i f f e r e n t t o what i s learned -
then p a r t i c i p a t o r y aspects of that education w i l l be p r i m a r i l y 
m o t i v a t i o n a l . The objectives w i l l be la r g e l y pre-determined. 
This motivational aspect of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s advocated 
by Bruner; 
"Share the process of education with the learner. There 
are few things so e x c i t i n g as sensing where one i s t r y i n g 
t o go, what one i s t r y i n g t o get hold of and then making 
progress towards i t .,, There must be a system of 
counselling that assures b e t t e r than now that the leamer 
knows what he i s up to and that he has some hand i n choosing 
the goal. This may be r a i s i n g the spectre problem of 
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t o t a l l y i n d i v i d u a l i s e d i n s t r u c t i o n . But learning i s 
i n d i v i d u a l , no matter how many pupils there are per 
teacher, I am only urging t h a t , i n the organisation of 
c u r r i c u l a , u n i t s , and lessons, there be option provided 
as t o how a student sets his goals f o r learning," 
Bruner (19&9/74) pp,132-3. 
Clearly there are i m p l i c i t l i m i t s t o these options. The Happy 
Coincidence l i e s i n two assumptions; f i r s t , that given e f f i c i e n t 
teaching what the learner opts f o r w i l l (more or less) correspond 
t o what the teacher wants and i s able to make available; second, 
tha t what w i l l thereby be learned w i l l s i m i l a r l y correspond t o 
what the teacher defines as educationally v a l i d 'knowledge'. 
Both assumptions r e l y on a view that 'knowledge' and (expert) 
educators are pre-ordained. This i s a doctrine which 
"necessarily a r r i v e s at d i v i d i n g society i n t o two parts, 
of which one i s superior t o society". 
Marx (and Engels^^^^) (1845/88/1969) p. 13. 
The Structure of Ideol o g i c a l Anomalies 
Strange Bedfellow anomalies are cases where d i f f e r e n t 
p a r t i e s are expected by the observer to disagree, but found i n 
the event to express agreement on certain issues. The expectation 
i s based on an observation of d i f f e r e n t experiences and an 
understanding of d i f f e r e n t i a l i n t e r e s t s . Assuming that 
observation and understanding t o be v a l i d , then the overt 
agi'eement cannot indicate i d e n t i c a l b e l i e f structures. 
Nonetheless, the agreement may be f a r from i n s i g n i f i c a n t . A 
f a i l u r e by the parties themselves t o analyse the ov e r a l l structure 
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of relevant b e l i e f s may deceive them i n t o b e l i e v i n g that there i s 
genuine agreement - and genuinely shared i n t e r e s t - with t h e i r 
bedfellows. 
The agreement may, of course, be r e l a t i v e l y t r i v i a l . The issue 
i t s e l f may be unimportant. Or agreement may only e x i s t i n c e r t a i n 
s u p e r f i c i a l respects. But the agreement may be quite b a s i c . Even 
though incorporated i n t o d i f f e r e n t o v e r a l l structures of b e l i e f , 
c e r t a i n apparently d i s t i n c t Basic B e l i e f s may be "shared". This could 
r e s u l t from some u n i v e r s a l l y experienced feature of the world-out-there. 
Or i t could be a consequence of common experience of some h i s t o r i c a l l y 
s i t u a t e d occurrence, assumed by the p a r t i e s concerned to be"universal", 
" n a t u r a l " and " i n e v i t a b l e " . For example, t h i s might be the case of 
c e r t a i n views of i n t e l l i g e n c e or family pathology, mentioned above, 
A p a r t i c u l a r t h e o r e t i c a l account of "educability" may r a t i o n a l i s e , and 
subsequently aexrve to le g i t i m a t e , i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements which 
themselves continue to provide "evidence" of the theory's v a l i d i t y -
though those arrangements only p e r s i s t by vir t u e of that legitimation. -^^ ^^  
\Vhilst Strange Bedfellows are, to the observer, u n l i k e l y 
combinations of people, united i n a common adherence to ce r t a i n 
b e l i e f s , Happy Coincidences are the strange cohabitation of ideas -
i n the same person, or same section of society. The observer may see 
no reason why two contextually r e l a t e d b e l i e f s should i n pr a c t i c e be 
adhered to by the same person or section. They may appear to diverge, 
or even to contradict one another. One object i n elaborating the 
s t r u c t u r e s of b e l i e f i s to help the observer decide whether t h i s 
i n t u i t e d anomaly i s indeed an inadequacy of b e l i e f . I f i t i s so, he 
may then go on to consider i t s explanation and consequences. 
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On r e f l e c t i o n and f u r t h e r examination, the observer may 
come to the conclusion that there i s , a f t e r a l l , no l o g i c a l 
inconsistency i n the observed's b e l i e f s . Two (or more) b e l i e f s 
i n i t i a l l y seen to be quite separate and inconsistent with each 
other may come to be understood as related at a higher l e v e l -
though t h i s may remain unrecognised by the believer/observed. 
( I t v / i l l s t i l l remain to the observer, however, to decide whether 
he f i n d s t h i s o v e r a l l s t r u c t u r e adequate. He may yet f i n d i t 
e i t h e r contextually or l o g i c a l l y l a c k i n g ) . 
On the other hand, the observer may see no l o g i c a l reason 
why the two b e l i e f s should c o e x i s t . They may belong to two 
quite d i s t i n c t b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s , which are not n e c e s s a r i l y 
compatible with each other. I f the two statements of b e l i e f are 
contained within a s i n g l e account, then that account i s inadequate. 
I t may be delusory (contextually inadequate). There i s also the 
p o s s i b i l i t y , however, that a contradiction i n r e a l i t y - i n the 
r e a l s t r u c t u r e of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s referred to - i s i t s e l f 
responsible f o r divergent b e l i e f s . In t h i s case, a coherent 
account encompassing both b e l i e f s must r e f e r to t h i s contradiction. 
(Presumably the observer's own understandings would attempt to 
do this.) 
I n the case of the Par t i c i p a t i o n i s m i l l u s t r a t e d i n the l a s t 
s e c t i o n , the same headteacher may apparently believe i n the 
d e s i r a b i l i t y of pupil autonomy i n school councils, yet seem to 
b e l i e t h i s i n vetoing decisions made by such a body. This does 
not n e c e s s a r i l y mean that the f i r s t b e l i e f was ins i n c e r e or 
half-hearted. Rather, that "autonomy" may have a p a r t i c u l a r 
I 
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meaning which i s considerably delimited by higher l e v e l b e l i e f s 
i n the r i g h t and duty of expert educationists to define what i s 
educationally worthwhile. I n t h i s l i g h t , the p u p i l "autonomy" 
i s not an absolute end i n i t s e l f , but a motivational end to some 
g r e a t e r educational purpose. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , that headteacher 
may genuinely d e s i r e p u p i l autonomy, but f e e l constrained by 
what he takes to be more powerful pressures to r e j e c t c e r t a i n 
school c o u n c i l d e c i s i o n s , (He might well be right.) C l e a r l y , 
we cannot be c l e a r what a p a r t i c u l a r b e l i e f structure might be, 
without considerably more evidence of the empirical s i t u a t i o n , 
(But the b e l i e f s i n question are an important part of that 
situation.) 
I n the cases of both Strange Bedfellows and Happy 
Coincidences, one can seek the high-level notions - frequently 
i m p l i c i t - that make i d e o l o g i c a l anomalies possible. This i s 
not to assume that people's accounts are always so coherent as 
to have some such unifying notion. On the c o n t r a r y , ! have 
pointed to p o s s i b i l i t i e s of t h i s not being so. In p a r t i c u l a r , 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of d i f f e r e n t relevance structures f o r d i f f e r e n t 
contextual s i t u a t i o n s i s most important. But sometimes accounts 
are not s h i f t i n g . They are not f e l t to be problematic, but are 
applied c o n s i s t e n t l y and p e r s i s t e n t l y to educational i s s u e s . 
T h i s i s so of the most s i g n i f i c a n t educational ideologies. 
In some instances, overt anomalies may be uninteresting or 
u n s u r p r i s i n g . The " u n i f i e r " may be e a s i l y found and of no s p e c i a l 
consequence. Happy Coincidences are common but often explicable 
i n straightforward terms. I f I s a i d that I intended to roast a 
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j o i n t and bake a pie i n the same oven, there would be nothing 
s t a r t l i n g about t h i s (were i t not f o r my c u l i n a r y l i m i t a t i o n s ) , 
My b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e i n t h i s respect could be portrayed as: 
cooking 
Oven-use ( e t c . ) 




j o i n t pie 
Harre (1972) dismisses operationalism (the attempt to f i n d 
o b j e c t i v i t y by describing only i n terms of laboratory operations, 
r a t h e r than i n terms of phenomena observed) with t h i s example; 
"The length of a f i e l d can be measured by the use of a 
tape or by the use of a theodolite, plane, table and base 
l i n e . The coincidence of the r e s u l t s of the two d i f f e r e n t 
operations of measurement i s explained by the f a c t that 
both are d i f f e r e n t ways of measuring the same c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
of the f i e l d , namely i t s length." Harre (1972) p,l62. 
I d e n t i t y i n r e a l i t y i s r e f l e c t e d i n a convergence in ' r e a l i t y ' . 
A "coincidence" i s explained. 
To give another example, Mr. Taylor, Chief Education O f f i c e r 
f o r Leeds, comments on a "bonus": 
" I t r i e d s u c c e s s f u l l y to secure uniformity of holidays 
within the c i t y f o r the convenience of parents with 
children at d i f f e r e n t schools and p a r t i c u l a r l y of working 
mothers (i n c l u d i n g t e a c h e r s ) . There was a bonus of 
economy here i n having schools on holiday at the same time 
i n that a l l c e n t r a l kitchens could be shut down and no 
transport to schools was required." 
quoted by Kogan & Van der Eyken (1973) p.174, 
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Now what Mr, Taylor delights i n as a "bonus", or Happy Coincidence, 
i s i n no way rnysterious. I f we s p e l l out an understanding of 
t h i s occurrence i t can be showh thus: 
holidays 
non-use "non-use" non-use 
of s t a f f of children of resources 
freedom of mothers to non-spending on meals, 
look a f t e r children transport,etc. 
(37 V 
There was nothing "flukey" about t h i s "bonus". 
In Happy Coincidences the unifying notions are frequently 
l e f t i m p l i c i t . Yet, to any but those who are constantly 
s u r p r i s e d by l i f e ' s benificence, they must be i m p l i c i t l y 
assumed. I f we attempt to s p e l l the " u n i f i e r s " out, we can 
hope to obtain a b e t t e r p i c t u r e of the subjects' understandings 
of r e a l i t y . 
One f i n a l example should bring out the s o r t s of underlying 
assumption that are most important i n educational ideologies. 
I quote from H i r s t (1969/71). 
"Can there i n f a c t be genuinely un i v e r s a l (educational) 
o b j e c t i v e s ? I r r e s p e c t i v e of the kinds of i n s t i t u t i o n s 
that we have, does i t make sense to set about t r y i n g to 
achieve the same ends with pupils whose IQs are about 
120, and those whose IQs are, say, well below 100? I s 
i t that we need d i f f e r e n t means for d i f f e r e n t p u p i l s , or 
must we formulate d i f f e r e n t , but equally j u s t i f i a b l e , 
ends? ... I n f a c t , how f a r does i t r e a l l y make sense 
to t a l k of educational objectives as a l t e r n a t i v e s ? " 
(p.236). 
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H i r s t seeks 
"to know how these objectives are rel a t e d to each other .. 
What, i n other vrords, are the s t r u c t u r a l or l o g i c a l 
features of the objectives we are interested i n , features 
we cannot ignore i f our c u r r i c u l a are to be coherent?" 
(p.237). 
He goes on to d i s t i n g u i s h between seven or eight "cognitive 
str u c t u r e s " . 
"each of which involves the making of a d i s t i n c t i v e foim 
of reasoned judgment and i s , therefore, a unique expression 
of man's r a t i o n a l i t y . " (p.242). 
Q?hey are as follows: 
r a t i o n a l i t y 
maths human sciences morals philosophy 
physical sciences l i t e r a t u r e & f i n e a r t s r e l i g i o n 
"These would seem t o me to me the l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t areas, 
though t h i s d i v i s i o n might w e l l be disputed..." (p.243) 
H i r s t goes on to say that 
"Education ... / i s 7 the prime function of the school," 
(p.245). 
" I f once the c e n t r a l objectives of r a t i o n a l i t y are 
submerged, or are given up so that these other pursuits 
3>S' vocational s k i l l s ; 'interest'^/ take over, then I 
suggest the school has betrayed i t s educational t r u s t , 
no matter hov/ successful i t may be i n these other 
respects, and no matter how laudible these other ends 
may be i n themselves." (p.245) 
"We can have no adequate grounds f o r forsaking a child's 
progressive i n i t i a t i o n i n t o a l l the d i s t i n c t i v e forms 
of r a t i o n a l i t y , u n t i l we have done everything i n our 
power to achieve t h i s . " (p.245). 
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" I t i s imperative that we f i n d courses involving these 
c e n t r a l elements that a l l pupils can take succe^ssfully. 
I see no adequate grounds f o r saying t h i s i s impossible 
when we have i n f a c t spent so l i t t l e of our e f f o r t t r y i n g 
t o achieve t h i s . Such courses need not be i d e n t i c a l f o r 
a l l p u pils i n spite of t h e i r common objectives and a 
l i k e l y high degree of common content," (p.246). 
My object here i s not t o disagree w i t h what H i r s t has to 
say. I t i s t o s p e l l out the i m p l i c i t structure of what he 
says and t o i d e n t i f y the fundamental assumptions. On the basis 
of these short passages, the following might not be over-
s i m p l i f i e d ; 
1, Children's p o t e n t i a l 2. Educational objectives 
P- \ 
i n s t r u c t i o n i n or (other objectives: 
inducement of i l l e g i t i m a t e ) 
d i f f e r e n t i a l " r a t i o n a l i t y " 
( I Q - v a r i a t i o n ) 
accessible to a l l children 
i n some form 
d i f f e r e n t i a l educational programiaes, not competing, 
but complementing each other - happily coinciding 
i n a single coherent objective. 
Underlying H i r s t ' s prescriptions are certain basic assumptions. 
Amongst them are these: f i r s t l y , children are markedly d i f f e r e n t 
i n t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l p o t e n t i a l ; t h i s i n e q u a l i t y i s i n e v i t a b l e . 
Secondly, there i s a definable and universally v a l i d body of 
•knowledge', which, though H i r s t may not yet have completely 
mastered i t (" ... t h i s d i v i s i o n might well be disputed . . . " ) , 
i s also given. T h i r d l y , the f a c t that the children's i n e q u a l i t i e s 
are based upon t h e i r actual or p o t e n t i a l grasp of t h i s 
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" r a t i o n a l i t y " i s r e g r e t t a b l e , perhaps, but i n e v i t a b l e . Schooling 
should not involve i t s e l f i n objectives which i n any way devalue 
the status of t h i s sort of " r a t i o n a l i t y " . 
Contained here, then, are assumptions about objectivated 
bodies of 'knowledge', about children's p o t e n t i a l and about the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between these two. Assumptions are also i m p l i c i t l y 
contained about the ( r i g h t f u l ) role of v a l i d 'knowledge' - the 
i n t e r a c t i o n a l and the s o c i e t a l r e l a t i o n s that presuppose and f o l l o w 
from adherence t o t h i s version of " r a t i o n a l i t y " . These i n t e r -
r e l a t e d "Knowledge" abd "Power" dimensions are what now need to 
be elaborated. 
Notes 
(1) Related t o t h i s i s the "Greek colonel e f f e c t " i n referencing: 
where a w r i t e r quotes a statement seemingly i n support of 
hi s arguments, but vAilch was made by someone who would not, 
i n f a c t , o f f e r such support, i f asked. Pluckrose (1975) 
opens his book on open education with a quotation from 
Gerassiraos Prahgatos, Greek Education Minister, i n 1971. 
The Greek government at that time was not noted f o r i t s 
promotion of c u r i o s i t y and "open" t h i n k i n g . 
(2) The l i t e r a t u r e on " c u l t u r a l deprivation" i s vast, i t being 
the popular paradigm of educational underachieveraent over 
the past 20 years. Extensive bibliographies can be found, 
f o r instance, i n Bloom et a l . (1965) and i n Frost and 
Hawkes (1966), An overview w i t h p a r t i c u l a r reference to 
B r i t a i n i s K e l s a l l and K e l s a l l (1971). 
(3) e.g. Bullock Report, 1975. A review of strategies of 
compensation can be found i n L i t t l e and Smith (1971). 
The Schools Council Compensatory Education Project has 
produced a number of publications. Chazan and Williams 
(1968) contains a bibliography of these. For a wide 
v a r i e t y of U.S. compensatory programmes and techniques 
see Bereiter and Engelman (1966); Deutsch et ,al.(l967)j 
Deutsch and Goldstein (1965/68); Passow et a l . (1967); 
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Witty (1971). 
For the EPA project schemes, see Halsey (1972, ed.). Per 
work by the NPER see also Quigley (1972). 
(4) cf McClelland (1955, ed.). 
(5) cf Strodtbeck (1958/61); Rosen (1956). For a f u l l e r 
treatment of some of these issues, w i t h many more 
references, but a somewhat inadequate analysis, see 
Syer (1972). 
(6) cf Bernstein (1971/73), especially chapter 7 ( f i r s t 
published i n 1965). 
(7) See also Davies (1970/71) p.111. 
(8) See Coultha3?d (1969/72) f o r c r i t i c i s m of t h i s cross-
d i s c i p l i n a r y ( i n t e g r a t i o n !?) nature of Bernstein's 
theories of l i n g u i s t i c codes. 
(9) The a l l e g a t i o n i s perhaps u n f a i r , i n that l i p s e r v i c e was 
undoubtedly paid by those whom he accuses, to precisely 
these problems. See Ploud and Halsey (1958). 
(10) I take Keddie to be the anonymous w r i t e r of t h i s OU 
u n i t . See also her in t r o d u c t i o n to Keddie (1973»ed.). 
(11) c f Althusser's educational ISA which works only because 
i t i s "covered up and concealed by a universally reigning 
ideology of the school, universally reigning because i t i s 
one of the essential forms of the r u l i n g bourgeois 
ideology: an ideology vrtxich represents the school as a 
ne u t r a l environment purged of ideology ... where teachers 
/iir§7 respectful of the 'conscience' and'freedom' of the 
chil d r e n who are entrusted t o them ... by t h e i r parents ... 
Althusser (1971/72) p.261. 
(12) Amongst the " l i v e l y discussions" engaged i n by opposing 
teams during 1974 and 1975 were those on the Aim of Ever-
increasing Growth, the D i s c i p l i n i n g of Children, the Power 
of Trade Unions, Independent schools, and "Are we g e t t i n g 
equality at the expense of q u a l i t y i n education?" (which 
took Equality as given and only Quality as problematic). 
(13) I say 'strangely', because one f r u i t of t h i s c a l l was the 
Humanities Project "Race" k i t , with a l l i t s accompanying 
tolerance of disagreement - tolerance of intolerance -
the blessing of Controversy. 
(14) See Domnitz (1965, ed.)j Bolton & Laishley (1972), and 
New Community ( 2 ) , 1973. Simpson & Yinger (1972) and 
Bibby (1959) are standard "textbooks". For f u r t h e r 
references, see Taylor (1974) p.138 f f ; r.Iilner (1975), and 
Bhatnagar (1970). 
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(15) That i s , one would expect i n the long run to f i n d a 
congruence between objective/functional i n t e r e s t s and 
subjective perception of i n t e r e s t s . At the same time 
of course, that perception may be - aind frequently i s -
inadequate. A l l I am suggesting here i s that a non-
exploitative/raanipulative insistence on tolerance implies 
a b e l i e f i n i t s j u s t i c e , and that t h i s b e l i e f may be 
delusory. 
(16) I n case the point i s not clear, perhaps I should re-
emphasise that I am not p r i m a r i l y t a l k i n g about r e a l 
( o b j e c t i v e ) i n t e r e s t s here. I am t a l k i n g about 
people's perceptions of (or assumptions about) those 
i n t e r e s t s . Thus a convergence of perceived or assumed 
' i n t e r e s t s ' - i . e . consensus - may or may not correspond 
t o a r e a l convergence - non-antagonism. Of course, as 
I warned above, I am n a t u r a l l y choosing examples where 
i n ^ o p i n i o n such a convergence i n r e a l i t y i s f a r from 
c e r t a i n . 
(17) I would not, of course, wish t o over-simplify the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between these various themes - but 
f o r t u n a t e l y i t i s not the place to elaborate upon 
them here. I n the meantime, i t can be noted i n passing 
t h a t c o l o n i a l administration was i n many cases consciously 
developed on P a r t i c i p a t i o n i s t l i n e s - a theme that i s , I 
t h i n k , relevant t o education p o l i c i e s i n underdeveloped 
countries today. The lesson was not l o s t i n the U.S. 
e i t h e r : 
" I t i s only a f t e r months or years of administration, 
and sometimes not even then, that a M i l i t a r y 
Government o f f i c e r or coloni a l administrator learns 
the v i r t u e s of 'opposition face'. By t h i s i s meant 
that the native leader or appointed o f f i c i a l must be 
allowed some leeway t o oppose the occupying 
administration f o r the purposes of his public, i n 
order that he may the more successfully carry 
through the main and essential necessities of 
government f o r the maintainance of law and order. 
This i s simply good p o l i t i c a l horse sense. One 
good reason f o r giving native leaders some sense of 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y (not necessarily f o r p o l i c i e s , but 
rather f o r methods and procedures f o r carrying them 
out) i s to avoid too much paternalism. This l a t t e r 
i s s t u l t i f y i n g and may lead to complete lack of 
co-operation on the' part of the people. A 
reasonably a l e r t and s a t i s f i e d population i s 
amenable i n terms of labour procurement and any 
other problems of administration requiring the ^ 
co-operation of the people." 
Embree (1949), quoted Anderson (1969) p.266. 
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(18) See Crerain (1962) passim, but especially p.259 f f and 
p.341 f f . 
(19) This i s the t i t l e of Demhoff (1967). He quotes the 
chairman of the Board of Rochester University (also 
President of Xerox): 
"To put i t as crassly as possible, i t ' s a matter 
of sheer s e l f - i n t e r e s t - dollars and cents. Xerox 
w i l l l i v e or die by technology." (quoted,Ohliger 
& McCarthy, 1971, p.60). 
(20) The academic-administrator s t i l l dominates - see f o r 
instance, Fowler et a l . (1973, eds.); Kogan (1975). 
Contrast Locke (1974); Male (1974); Thompson (1970, ed.) 
(21) See Berg (1968); TES 11/4/74 p.4, 14/2/75 p.2, 
24/10/75 p.6; Gretton & Jackson (1976). 
(22) c f Blau & Schoenherr (1971) who t a l k of "new forms of 
power ... emerging i n a contemporary society", which 
point to i n d i r e c t and long-range forms of co n t r o l i n 
other (non-school) organisations. 
(23) 19/5/75. 
(24) See Henry (1966/71) f o r a discussion of V u l n e r a b i l i t y 
i n Education, 
(25) The report by a Boston School Committee member on Kozol's 
dismissal i s ein i n t e r e s t i n g example of Autonomy Allowed, 
and also of the c u l t u r a l deprivation model. 
"Mr.Kozol was advised and counselled by his P r i n c i p a l .. 
and his Supervisor ... to r e s t r i c t his reading and 
reference materials to the l i s t of approved 
publications ... I t has been established as a f a c t 
that Mr. Kozol taught the poem 'Ballad of the 
Landlord' to his class and l a t e r d i s t r i b u t e d 
mimeographed copies of i t to his pupils f o r home 
memoilsation. I t i s also true that a parent of 
one of the pupils registered a strong objection to 
the poem t o the school p r i n c i p a l ,,. 
I t has been stated quite adequately that the curriculum 
of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r school, which i s saturated with 
compensatory programmes i n an e f f o r t t o specially 
assist disadvantaged p u p i l s , does allow f o r innovation 
and creative teaching. However, t h i s f l e x i b i l i t y 
does not and should not allow f o r a teacher t o implant 
i n the minds of young children any and a l l ideas. 
Obviously, a measure of control over the course of 
study i s essential to protect the 94,000 Boston 
school children from ideologies and concepts not 
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acceptable to our way of l i f e . Without any 
r e s t r i c t i o n s , what guarantees would parents have 
that t h e i r c h i l d r e n were not being taugnt that 
Adolf H i t l e r and Nazism were right f o r Germany and 
b e n e f i c i a l to mankind? Mr. Kozol, or anyone els e 
who l a c k s the personal d i s c i p l i n e to abide by r u l e s 
and regulations, as we a l l must i n our c i v i l i s e d 
s o c iety, i s obviously unsuited f o r the highly 
responsible profession of teaching. I n conclusion, 
I must add that Hr. Kozol did bring to h i s pupil s 
an efethusiastic s p i r i t , a high degree of i n i t i a t i v e , 
•and other f i n e q u a l i t i e s found i n the best teachers,..' 
Kozol (1967/68) pp. 211-213 (niy emphasis). 
(26) Middlesbrough Evening Gazette. 24/9/74, 26/9/74, 1/10/74, 
4/10/74, 10/10/74 (two i n c i d e n t s ) . 
(27) Infozmation from f i e l d n o t e s . 
(28) See Secondary Education f o r the Town Area (1973). 
(29) cf Midwinter (1972). 
(30) For reasons of space as we l l as limited empirical research 
on the subject, I have consciously omitted any discussion 
of Parent-Teachers Associations, of the Confederation f o r 
the Advancement of State Education and of the National 
Association of Governors and Managers. Although I have 
not conducted any s p e c i f i c research, my own experience 
as committee member of two P.T.As -,once as teacher and 
once as parent - as a committee member also of a l o c a l 
CASE group, and as a re search-observer i n a number of 
schools does not lead me i n any way to r e v i s e my estimate 
of parental power. Bacon (1976) suggests that i n the 
r e l a t i v e l y " p r o g r e s s i v e " S h e f f i e l d L.E.A., election of 
parent-governors has served to promote the legitimacy 
of government by "professionals", rather than opening 
up greater opportunities of parental control. 
(31) c f Bernstein et a l , (1966/71). 
(32) c f Bernstein (1971); Syer (1974a). 
(33) The d i s t i n c t i o n , here, between f u n c t i o n a l l y objective 
( s e c t i o n a l or c l a s s ) i n t e r e s t s and s u b j e c t i v e l y perceived 
( i n d i v i d u a l ) i n t e r e s t s presents four possible conditions, 
according to whether those of teacher and pupil correspond 
or not: 
Objective I n t e r e s t s : 
s u b j e c t i v e l y 
perceived 
' i n t e r e s t s ' : 
j Same Different 
Same A 3 
Different C D 
- 2 4 8 -
Geer's analysis appears t o put any teacher-learner 
r e l a t i o n s h i p i n t o box D, j u s t i f y i n g t h i s l a r g e l y on 
psychological grounds. See also note 15 above. 
( 3 4 ) c f Draper ( 1 9 7 1 ) p.96 . 
( 3 5 ) c f Corrigan& F r i t h (1975/76), who challenge the"incorporation" 
t h e s i s on the grounds that i n a class society working class 
experience can never be i d e n t i c a l t o middle class 
experience, and that therefore dominant b e l i e f s must 
always have d i f f e r e n t meanings to d i f f e r e n t people. 
( 3 6 ) c f Pidgeon ( 1 9 7 0 ) , r e f e r r e d t o above. I n an e a r l i e r 
d r a f t of Syer (1976EO, I ou t l i n e d some of the underlying 
assumptions i n President Nyerere's "Education f o r Self-
Reliance", Most s i g n i f i c a n t were his assumptions about 
learning theory and the need f o r expertise which had 
d i r e c t p a r a l l e l s i n the prescriptions of c o l o n i a l i s t 
administrations. These are d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d , I suggest, 
t o c o n t i n u i t i e s i n the global s i t u a t i o n of post-independence 
Tanzania. (See, e.g., H i r j i , 19714-?) 
( 3 7 ) This holiday example i s also i n t e r e s t i n g i n that i t i s the 
"eonvenience"AeJ3if icence motive that i s given as the 
" r e a l " reason f o r synchronising holidays, w h i l s t the 
economy involved comes ( o v e r t l y ) as a "bonus". One 
wonders w i t h much such "ideological pragmatism" 
( c f . Williamson, 1 9 7 5 ) which objective i n r e a l i t y has 
p r i o r i t y . 
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CHAPTER 7 
DIMENSIONS OP EDUGATIOMAL IDEOLOGIES 
Universals and Relevances 
Before seeking the determinants or consequences of p a r t i c u l a r 
b e l i e f structures, we must have some understanding of what they 
are, of how they are con s t i t u t e d , ilhis i s f i r s t l y a question 
of conceiving of those structures of b e l i e f . For t h i s I have 
proposed the " t r e e - r o o t " metaphor and two l o g i c a l dimensions 
(of adequacy). Secondly, i t i s a question of contex t u a l i t y . 
Pragmatic adequacy, according t o the observer's understanding of 
other people's b e l i e f s eind of t h e i r context, i s one side of t h i s . 
The other side i s Relevance. I f we are t o compare the b e l i e f s 
and understandings of d i f f e r e n t people or d i f f e r e n t sections, 
then e i t h e r the various b e l i e f s must be structured according t o 
the same Relevances, or differences i n Relevance emgle must 
themselves be an object of i n q u i r y . 
Strong b e l i e f s (Value-Knowledge) are r i g i d i f i e d b e l i e f 
s t r u c t u r e s . They are strongly believed insofar as they are not 
f l u i d , v a r i a ble and arbitraicy fantasies. This r i g i d i t y applies 
not j u s t t o the l o g i c a l structure of the b e l i e f s , but to the 
Relevance angle according t o which notions are held about the 
world-out-there. Through experience, people tend t o acquii*e 
b e l i e f s which are f i x e d , as i t were, i n t o certain channels. 
Given such-and-such a context, appropriate b e l i e f s consistently 
operate. 
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A p a r t i c u l a r Relevazice could not i n v a r i a b l y be the only, 
or most appropriate, way of viewing p a r t i c u l a r kinds of context 
unless that Relevance were universal. Yet i f there were, 
u n i v e r s a l l y , some moment of experience - whatever the societal 
context - then i t might be possible to t a l k of The Relevance 
Angle f o r considering that experience. 
Some w r i t e r s have asserted that there are c u l t u r a l or 
s o c i e t a l universale, Homans ( 1 9 6 1 ) sought the elementary forms 
of hOman existence i n psychological terms. Durkheim ( 1 9 1 2 / 1 5 ) 
examined elementary forms of r e l i g i o u s l i f e , Marx and Engels 
( 1 8 4 5 - 6 / 1 9 6 9 ) proposed the existence of f i v e "moments", universal 
t o h i s t o r i c a l human existences the production of the means of 
subsistence, the production of new needs, the reproduction of 
people (through f a m i l y ) , s o c i a l communication, and consciousness, 
Levi-Strauss ( 1 9 5 5 / 6 3 ) proposes three c u l t u r a l universals i n 
semiotic, kinship auid economic-technological systems. I suggest 
tha t i n considering education, two dimensions are universally 
relevant, namely "Power" and "Knowledge", Basically these 
concern r e l a t i o n s f i r s t l y between the learner and his Real context, 
and secondly between the learner's b e l i e f s and understandings and 
the ' r e a l i t i e s ' of others i n his society or social group. 
I t i s only possible to t a l k of the u n i v e r s a l i t y of 
dimensions. I suggest th a t i n educational beliefs, the "Knowledge" 
and "Power" dimensions are u n i v e r s a l l y relevant. But even then, 
we are u n l i k e l y t o f i n d universal manifestations, on these 
dimensions. We can expebt, i n considering educational issues, 
t o f i n d ( u n i v e r s a l l y ) some b e l i e f s about "Knowledge" and "Power", 
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But we cannot expect t o f i n d the same sorts of b e l i e f s on these 
dimensions, regardless of context. 
I n t r y i n g t o operationalise these dimensions f o r empirical 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n , the observer must be aware of what i t i s that he 
i s imposing on the data. He may suggest (on each universal 
dimension) c e r t a i n lower l e v e l Relevances, as one way of 
considering those data. Having made that suggestion, he may 
seek exhaustive categories at that l e v e l , saying that from t h i s 
point of view (Relevance angle) we might expect such-and-such 
types of b e l i e f . But he must recognise that they are hds categories 
which he i s then employing, according to the way he has decided 
t o consider the data. He cannot l e g i t i m a t e l y proceed t o declare 
th a t there r e a l l y are these types of b e l i e f i n the world-out-
there (unless some f u r t h e r j u s t i f i c a t i o n exists f o r such an 
assert i o n , i n terms of f u r t h e r (lower l e v e l ) universal dimensions), 
In the rest of t h i s chapter I assert the basic Relevance 
w i t h which I am concerned - namely, learning/education - and 
suggest that i n t h i s case there are two universal dimensions. 
Any learner i s subject t o two kinds of rela t i o n s h i p : w i t h 
s o c i e t a l context and wit h other (objectivated) 'knowledge'. 
Accordingly, any one involved i n education - whether as teacher, 
administrator, t h e o r i s t , student, etc. - must have some b e l i e f s 
(however i m p l i c i t and however inadequate) about these sorts of 
r e l a t i o n s h i p , along these dimensions. But the p a r t i c u l a r 
manifestations w i l l depend on non-universal circumstances. So, 
when I suggest that we might consider educational ideologies 
i n terms of t h i s or that sub-category on the "Knowledge" and 
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"Power" dimensions, t h i s i s a suggestion only. I t i s one that 
I believe t o be h e u r i s t i c a l l y u s e f u l , 
"Knowledp:e" and "Power" Dimensions 
I n t h i s section, I elaborate one way of considering the 
"Knowledge" and "Power" dimensions, i n educational b e l i e f and 
p r a c t i c e , A major theme w i l l be not just the re l a t i o n s h i p s , 
r e s p e c t i v e l y , betv/een subjective and objectivated 'knowledge' 
and between learner and others i n society, but these r e l a t i o n -
ships over time. This dimension concerns (notions o f ) change. 
Educational b e l i e f s are always contexted i n time. I m p l i c i t l y 
o r e x p l i c i t l y , they always r e f e r to the f a c t , d e s i r a b i l i t y , 
p o s s i b i l i t y and i n e v i t a b i l i t y of change (or lack of i t ) i n the 
re l a t i o n s h i p s concerned. 
The main o p e r a t i o n a l i s i n g concepteto be elaborated i n 
Part I I I are Openness and Closure. Closure i s quite central 
t o the notions of Value-Knowledge and ideology, f o r the strong 
b e l i e f s (Value-Knowledge) that "motivate" behaviour are strong 
by v i r t u e of the r i g i d i f i c a t i o n of t h e i r stj?uctures. That 
r i g i d i f i c a t i o n c o nstitutes closure. To be unable to see p a r t i c u l a r 
phenomena except i n r e s t r i c t e d and r i g i d l y pre-determined ways i s 
t o lack n o t i o n a l openness. I t i s to lack Curiosity. B e l i e f 
i s closure, w h i l s t the creative acts of thought and r e f l e c t i o n 
are openness. At the same time, the p o s s i b i l i t y of openness -
i n c e r t a i n areas, or ce r t a i n respects - can come to be believed 
i n . ^ ^ ^ By^closure" I do not mean "constraint", although 
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closures may c o n s t i t u t e constraints. Constraints are r e a l 
impediments to change, or to a l t e r n a t i v e courses of action. 
Closures are b e l i e f s , generally i m p l i c i t , i n the f a c t i c i t y 
of such constraints. Someone viho believes, f o r instance, that 
children of a c e r t a i n age are incapable of acquiring certain 
s k i l l s or understandings, has b e l i e f closures i n t h i s respect. 
Were such a b e l i e f an adequate representation of r e a l i t y , then 
(2) 
the equivalent incapacity of children would be a constraint. 
To t a l k of closures of b e l i e f does not necessarily r e f l e c t on 
the v a l i d i t y of those closures. I t does, however, suggest that 
the issue might be open t o question. Subjectively ( i n t r e s p e c t i v e l y ) 
i t makes such questioning possible. 
I n approaching both the issue of change and that of 
openness, I s h a l l employ a four-part d i s t i n c t i o n made b r i e f l y 
i n Chapter 2, between b e l i e f s about what I s , what Could Be, what 
Has To Be, and what Should Be. This i s only one approach, out 
of many that might be taken. I t i s important t o note that a 
b e l i e f that a c e r t a i n state of affe:irsmust i n e v i t a b l y exist 
("is n a t u r a l " ) functions p r e s c r i p t i v e l y . I t i s not j u s t 
d e s c r i p t i v e . One may e x p l i c i t l y believe that something should 
not be, yet f a t a l i s t i c a l l y believe i t to be i n e v i t a b l e . In 
such a case an i m p l i c i t p r e s c r i p t i o n may be f u n c t i o n a l l y the 
same as i f the s i t u a t i o n were believed to be i d e a l . (The 
p o s s i b i l i t y or p r o b a b i l i t y of b e l i e f s being made open may, 
however, vary). 
I am here t a l k i n g about ideology and b e l i e f - what are 
•taken to be, rather than what ac t u a l l y are, r e a l constraints. 
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In discussing the "Power" dimension, therefore, I am not 
dealing w i t h actual s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s so much as understandings 
and b e l i e f s about them. B e l i e f s i n part determine behaviour. 
Ins o f a r as ce r t a i n i d e o l o g i c a l closures are widespread, they 
may be i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d as Objectivated 'Knowledge', As we 
have seen, the interdependence of Objectivated 'Knowledge' and 
Social Reality - and therefore of the "Knowledge" and "Power" 
dimensions of educational ideologies - i s i n e v i t a b l e . Because 
of t h i s interdependence, some of the d i s t i n c t i o n s made below 
may appear a l i t t l e untidy. Hopefully, however, the very nature 
of t h i s interdependence i s rendered that much more problematic 
and thereby the object of r e f l e c t i o n , i n practice. 
The basic d i s t i n c t i o n made i n i d e n t i f y i n g the "Knowledge" 
dimension i s between Objectivated 'Knowledge' and Subjective 
^Knowledge'. Each of these, however, i s d i f f e r e n t l y related t o 
the r e f e r r e d - t o Reality. By considering whether people see 
these r e l a t i o n s h i p s as actu a l , desirable, i n e v i t a b l e and 
possible ( v i z , the I s , Should, Has-to-be and Could-be dimensions) 
we may a r r i v e at a four-part typology of perspectives, with 
regard t o the "Knowledge" dimension. This may be f u r t h e r 
s i m p l i f i e d to a single dichotoiny. The argument i s summarised 




Objectivated 'Knowledge')(Reality* Subjective 'Knowledge')(Reality 
what i s (a) v a l i d 
and (b) valuable 
id) what can be learned, and 
(c) under what circumstances 
r (a) I s leamable (b)Should be learned (c) Has t o 
( i s v a l i d ) ( i s valuable) be learned 
I (and how) 
1 
(d) Could be 
learned 
r i g i d l y s t r u c t u r - status of 'know-
ed " c e r t a i n t i e s " ledge' closed vs. 
v s . ( f l u i d ) open- open ( f o r whom? 
pedagogical need 
f o r "experts" t o 
teach ( i . e . t o 
personal 
l i m i t a t i o n s 
of a b i l i t y 
ness f o r what purpose?) c l a s s i f y and frame ( t o learn 




s o c i a l 
r e l a t i o n s 
themselves 









who i s 
"limited"? 
A l l these are also questions of "Power" 
-> These are p r i m a r i l y questions of "Knowledge" 4— 
Typology of perspectives on "Knowledge"_dimension 
Objectivated 'Knowledge')(Reality 
/What i s and what i s leamable/ 
'knowable': epistemologx/ 
Subjective 'Knowledge' 
)( R e a l i t y /T/hat could 
be learned, by whom: 
l e a d i n g theory7 
Closed Open 
Closed "Determinist" ( " R e l a t i v i s t " ) 
Open ("Liberal") " V o l u n t a r i s t " 
* "X)(Y" denotes "the r e l a t i o n s h i p between X and Y". 
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The question of I s , Should-be, Has-to-be and Cbuld-be 
might be posed i n a number of ways, about both the "Knowledge" 
and "Power" dimensions. I am suggesting that t h i s way i s 
h e u r i s t i c a l l y u s e f u l . B r i e f l y , we have epistemological questions 
about the nature and p o s s i b i l i t y of knowledge. What, i n short, 
i s v a l i d Objectivated 'Knowledge'? Within a given s o c i e t a l 
context, b e l i e f s about such issues w i l l i n practice be inseparable 
from evaluative ones - about what 'knowledge' i s valuable, as 
w e l l as what i s v a l i d . This l a t t e r concern, however, relates 
more d i r e c t l y t o the "Power" dimension. We also have learning 
theory questions, V/hat i s i t possible f o r spe c i f i c i n d i v i d u a l s 
or categories of i n d i v i d u a l s to learn, under certain 
conditions? These w i l l most probably be enmeshed wi t h assumptions 
about necessary l i m i t a t i o n s (or lack of them) i n respect of 
leadership or pedagogy. The l a t t e r i s again more d i r e c t l y a 
matter of "Power", or s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . The two questions most 
s p e c i f i c a l l y to do w i t h "Knowledge" remain. These may be seen 
i n terms of openness or closure, f i r s t l y about the supposed 
constraints of Reality - what may or may not be learned, by v i r t u e 
of being v a l i d or otherwise; and secondly about the supposed 
constraints of i n d i v i d u a l (or category) capacity to learn -
who may or may not learn such-and-such s k i l l s and understandings, 
by v i r t u e of t h e i r g e n e t i c a l l y or environmentally determined 
capacities. 
According to these predominantly "Knowledge" questions, we 
might conceive of four possible perspectives on "Knowledge", A 
"Detex-ministic" view would e n t a i l closure i n respect of both 
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•knowable'^ r e a l i t y and i n d i v i d u a l learning capacity. Bodies of 
(3) 
'Icnowledge* would be already " f i x e d " - at least p o t e n t i a l l y . ^ ' 
Pergonal l i m i t a t i o n s would also be "determined" by p r i o r 
(4) 
circumstance. 
The " V o l u n t a r i s t " point ofi; view would be the opposite i n 
both respects. No predefined bodies of 'knowledge' would be 
assumed t o have any necessary basis i n Reality. I n p r i n c i p l e , 
people create t h e i r own b e l i e f s , which are a l l equally v a l i d . 
S i m i l a r l y no person i s determinatively f i x e d i n p o t e n t i a l . 
A l l have a v i r t u a l l y i n f i n i t e capacity to learn or create. 
The other two p o s i t i o n s , according to thissdiiema, d i f f e r e i t h e r 
i n terms of epistemological or learning theory issues. The 
" R e l a t i v i s t " may hold that no 'knowledge' i s (or can be) certain 
t r u t h , but nonetheless hold deterministic views about i n d i v i d u a l 
l e a r n i n g , such that circumstance determines b e l i e f . The " L i b e r a l " , 
on the other hand, may stress an open view of learning theory, 
w i t h much importance attached to subjective c r e a t i v i t y sind 
discovery. Yet he may assume that what i s learned i s u l t i m a t e l y 
determined by the nature of Reality - which i s probably more 
or less what "experts" already 'know' or suspect. 
Turning to the "Power" dimension, we see how closely t h i s 
i s r e l a t e d t o the questions raised above. A l l the questions 
already asked r e l a t e also t o the "Power" dimensions. They might 
be reduced to two aspects concerning on the one hand the Learner 
and on the other the Teacher. The following diagram and table 
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and e n t i t l e d t o 
frame 'knowledge' 
(about anything) 
vs. few experts 
(Open vs.Closed) 
Everyone capable of 
learning and everyone 
e n t i t l e d to the 
required experience 
vs. r e s t r i c t e d 
p o t e n t i a l and access 
(Open vs. Closed) 
Typology of perspectives on "Power" dimension 
Teaching 
(Who i s competent and e n t i t l e d 
10 frame 'knowledge'): 
Closed Open 
Learning 
(Who i s able Closed " I n e g a l i t a r i a n " ("Relativist"?) 
and e n t i t l e d 
t o l e a r n ) : Open ("Liberal"?) " E g a l i t a r i a n " 
Again the "Knowledge" and "Power" dimensions are i n e x t r i c a b l y 
l i n k e d . For b e l i e f s necessarily r e f e r t o (a supposed) Reality and 
they are also necessarils'' a part of the contextual Reality. Beliefs 
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about what 'knowledge' i s v a l i d and valuable and about how i t 
i s t o be transmitted ( o r discovered) must always have 
impl i c a t i o n s f o r s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s also. These implications 
w i l l be at least i m p l i c i t l y incorporated w i t h a l l educational 
b e l i e f structures. Assumptions about the need f o r experts and 
about the nature of t h e i r expertise bridge both dimensions, 
i n the case of teaching. I n the case of l e a i n i n g , the perception 
of i n e q u a l i t i e s of capacity and a pr e s c r i p t i o n of unequal 
resource provision s i m i l a r l y bridge the "Knowledge" and "Power" 
dimensions. They are predominantly questions of "Power", i n 
that they concern the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s of learning, rather than 
the creation or determination of 'knowledge'. 
Pour types of perspective on "Power" i n education can be 
distinguished as f o l l o w s . The " I n e g a l i t a r i a n " viewpoint holds 
th a t only a m i n o r i t y of people are able and e n t i t l e d to decide 
what i s v a l i d 'knowledge' and how i t should best be taught. 
Only a m i n o r i t y - or at least a l i m i t e d number - can or should 
be i n i t i a t e d i n t o t h i s 'knowledge'. The " E g a l i t a r i a n " p o s i t i o n 
holds that everyone i s both able ajad competent to decide what 
i s worthwhile 'knowledge'. A l l should be equally enabled to 
acquire or create i t . The other two positions foresee actual 
o r desired l i m i t a t i o n s i n one respect or the other. The 
" R e l a t i v i s t " may believe that everyone i s i n p r i n c i p l e able 
and e n t i t l e d to decide what 'knowledge' i s v a l i d and valuable. 
Yet (perhaps because of temporary, h i s t o r i c a l l y situated, 
c o nstraints) not everyone may have the opportunity to pursue 
t h i s 'knowledge'. The " L i b e r a l " , on the other hand, may f e e l 
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th a t i n p r i n c i p l e anyone can compete f o r (or have access t o ) 
bodies of 'knowledge'. But these are v a l i d and valuable only 
i n s o f a r as they are defined as such by a l i m i t e d number of 
"experts". 
The above i s only one way of considering the two universal 
dimensions of "Power" and "Knowledge" i n educational ideologies. 
I t i s exploratory rather than conclusive. I n Parts I I I , IV and 
V, I look more closely at ce r t a i n notions of "Open Education", 
I s h a l l stress that opennesses on the "Knowledge" dimension 
are frequently accompanied by continued closures on the "Power" 
dimension. I n much "progressive" educational thought, the 
"Power" element i s e i t h e r ignored or supposed to be d i s t i n c t 
and i r r e l e v a n t . I t i s not. I t i s inherent i n a l l learning 
contexts and processes and therefore i n a l l education. Before 
t u r n i n g t o "Open Education", I wish t o develop what has j u s t 
been said a l i t t l e f u r t h e r . For i t i s also relevant to a 
consideration of Master Patterns transmitted through schooling 
and of assumptions that underlie "hidden c u r r i c u l a " . 
Educational Ideologies and Master Patterns 
Ideology i n education can be considered at two l e v e l s . 
On the one hand, Educational Ideologies provide the i m p l i c i t 
and e x p l i c i t "motives" of the educational administrators, 
p o l i t i c i a n s sind p r a c t i t i o n e r s who attempt t o organise education 
systems i n accordance w i t h what they see as "natural" and 
situa t e d constraints. On the other hand, education i s , i n an 
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important sense, the transmission of ideology - at least as much 
as i t i s the creation of new 'knowledge'. Much has been w r i t t e n 
about t h i s i d e o l o g i c a l function of schooling, though the term 
" s o c i a l i s a t i o n " may have been used and the i n t e r e s t - s p e c i f i c i t y 
(5) 
of ideology may have been played down.^ ' Those who have seen 
" s o c i a l i s a t i o n " as the reproduction of ideology^^^ have generally 
f a i l e d t o demonstrate how i t i s that what i s learned at school 
becomes relevant i n adult society. I t i s not immediately obvious 
why the patterns of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s that are the hidden 
curriculum of school teach b e l i e f s that are unquestioningly 
determinative of subsequent i ) o l i t i o a l and economic behaviour. 
Further, there i s no clear account of how educational ideologies 
are themselves reproduced: 
(Educational) 
Ideologies ^ 
4^  \/ 
Social Ideology 
Relations > ( s o c i a l i s a t i o n ) 
(e.g.selection) 
Schooling may w e l l reproduce ideology. The problem I am 
addressing i s how t h i s may happen - rather than why i t does. 
We must understand what i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f s (Value-Knowledge) 
are, i n terms of t h e i r adherence and of t h e i r s t r u c t u r a t i o n . 
I have suggested that these are two sides of the same coin: 
t h a t b e l i e f s are "valued" (adhered t o ) insofar as they are 
r i g i d l y structured. I have also stressed that b e l i e f s are 
necessarily contexted. In t h i s section I look at t h i s 
-262-
c o n t e x t u a l i t y of i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f s . How do b e l i e f s learned 
i n one context apparently " t r a n s f e r " t o other contexts? This 
i s the question of Master Patterns. 
I n discussing the "Power" and "Knowledge" dimensions, i t 
became clear that though these dimensions may be a n a l y t i c a l l y 
d i s t i n c t , they are i n practice complexly interdependent. The 
reason f o r t h i s i s that Objectivated 'Knowledge' includes 
•knowledge' about s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , which are the content of 
the "Power" dimension. I t was convenient, i n the l a s t section, 
t o allow "Objectivated 'Knowledge'" to include such social 
(and s o c i e t a l ) r e l a t i o n s as w e l l as other aspects of what, i n 
any given s o c i e t a l context, i s taken to be "true". Prom one 
Relevance angle, they are, a f t e r a l l , not q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t . 
I n t h i s section I s h a l l concentrate on social r e l a t i o n s as a 
fu n c t i o n of objectivated b e l i e f , i n order t o throw l i g h t on 
the Master Patteraing of ideologies transmitted through schools. 
This involves some s i m p l i f i c a t i o n of d i s t i n c t i o n s made i n the 
l a s t section. I n p a r t i c u l a r empirical instances one would have 
t o look again, t o ensure t l i a t such s i m p l i f i c a t i o n was not 
excessively d i s t o r t i v e . 
I f the only aspect of Objectivated 'Knowledge' w i t h which 
we were concerned were that of soc i a l r e l a t i o n s , then the 
"Power" dimension might be s i m p l i f i e d to a dichotomous 
I n e g a l i t a r i a n / E g a l i t a r i a n dimension. This could be related to 
a s i m i l a r l y dichotomous ""Knowledge" dimension, which would now 
l a r g e l y be a matter of learning theory. The r e s u l t bears obvious 
s i m i l a r i t i e s w i t h the two four-part typologies already suggested. 
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I n a way i t i s an amalgam of the two, 
Tgpologj of educational ideologies 
"Power" 
"Determinist" " V o l u n t a r i s t " 
" I n e g a l i t a r i a n " "Productionism" "Part i cipat i oni sm" 
" E g a l i t a r i a n " "Vanguardism" "Redi st ributionism" 
A typology such as t h i s i s not, and cannot be, a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
of Real ideologies. I t i s an abstraction, a device, which I 
f i n d useful f o r organising c e r t a i n thoughts about the "Knowledge" 
and "Power" dimensions. We can universally expect some b e l i e f s 
along these two dimensions, amongst people concerned w i t h 
education. I t i s not l e g i t i m a t e , however, to expect those 
b e l i e f s to be of a p a r t i c u l a r kind, or one of a p a r t i c u l a r set 
of types. Nonetheless, according to the Relevance here chosen, 
the above four "types" have a f a i r l y wide application. I s h a l l 
i l l u s t r a t e t h i s w i t h a few examples and then discuss t h e i r 
usefulness as clues t o Master Patterns i n ecjucation (and i n 
s o c i e t y ) . 
The Productionist point of view i s characterised p r i m a r i l y 
by i t s view of 'knowledge' as closed and pre-determined and of 
the need, consequently, f o r experts to lead the unknowing. 
"Because t h i s educational process of c u l t u r a l transmission 
i s very l a r g e l y i m i t a t i v e , i t i s always deeply 
conservative." Leach (1969/73) p.43. 
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What Popper c a l l s the " e l i t e theory of manifest t r u t h " f i t s 
n eatly i n t o t h i s "type". 
"There may be c e r t a i n t y , but there cannot be c e r t a i n t y 
f o r a l l . I n h i s t o r i c a l f a c t at least some are call e d 
upon to discover and communicate such c e r t a i n t y ; thus 
some acquire an especially intimate r e l a t i o n t o t r u t h , " 
Dahrendorf (196?) p.l60. 
Such views are frequently i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d i n formal education. 
I t i s i n that i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n , of course, that ideologies 
themselves become objectivated. They thus become the source of 
experience and hence of b e l i e f s . The Carnegie Commission on 
Higher Education^'^^ j u s t i f i e d the maintenance of e l i t e 
u n i v e r s i t i e s i n the United States, with the fol l o w i n g quotation; 
" A l l c i v i l i s e d countries ... depend upon a t h i n clear 
stream of excellence t o provide new ideas, new techniques, 
and the statesmanlike treatment of complex social eind 
p o l i t i c a l problems." 
S i r Eric Ashby, quoted by Carnegie Commission on 
Higher Education (1973). 
The English education system has many Productionist assumptions 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d i n i t , whether these be seen as r a t i o n a l i s -
ations of class power, or as notions that have developed i n a 
(8) 
r e l a t i v e l y autonomous manner. ' On the question of learning 
(9) 
theory, many accounts of educability^ converge w i t h these 
s o c i e t a l views of leadership and l i m i t e d expertise. 
"Whatever stage might have been reached by a p a r t i c u l a r 
p u p i l , the majority of secondary school pupils up t o the 
mental age of sixteen years seera to be at the concrete 
operational l e v e l of thought. The syllabuses should 
therefore be organised t o take account of the l i m i t a t i o n s 
i n pupil's reasoning." 
Hallam (1969), quoted by Bantock (1971) p.256 (my emphasis), 
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I t i s not at a l l uncommon to f i n d Piaget's stages of development 
taken as determinative, rather than descriptive, as i n t h i s 
passage. This i s frequently used, moreover, t o j u s t i f y 
q u a l i t a t i v e l y (and q u a n t i t i v e l y ) d i f f e r e n t i a l educational 
p r o v i s i o n . 
The "Determinist" elements that Productionism shares with 
Vanguardism are indicated i n the following complaint by Freire: 
"Revolutionary leadership f a l l s i n t o i n t e r n a l contradictions 
which compromise i t s purpose, v/hen ^ . e , i f ? J^, v i c t i m of 
a f a t a l i s t concept of h i s t o r y , i t t r i e s t o domesticate the 
people mechanically t o a fu t u r e which the leadership knows 
a p r i o r i , but which i t thinks the people are incapable 
of knowing. I n t h i s case, revolutionary leadership 
ceases t o be Utopian and ends UD i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the 
Right ,..," Preire (1970/72) p,72. 
Where Vanguardism d i f f e r s i s i n the assumption that social 
i n e q u a l i t i e s - and i n e q u a l i t i e s of learning capacity, too -
are temporary, h i s t o r i c a l l y s i t u a t e d and remediable. There 
i s a long-term v i s i o n of equality or classlessness, toward 
which leadership i s directed. 
"Consciousness i s i d e o l o g i c a l because i t i s powerless. 
When i t becomes the determining fac t o r , i t sheds i t s 
b l i n k e r s along w i t h i t s dependence on material 
circumstances. A r a t i o n a l order i s one i n which t h i n k i n g 
determines being. Men w i l l be free when they are able 
t o produce t h e i r own circumstances. H i s t o r i c a l materialism 
i s v a l i d only u n t i l i t has brought about i t s own d i a l e c t i c a l 
negation. When t h i s stage has been reached, i t w i l l no 
longer be possible t o speak of h i s t o r i c a l 'laws', f o r 
h i s t o r y i s sub;ject t o 'lav/s' only insofar as i t i s 
unconscious, that i s , i n s o f a r as i t i s not, properly 
speaking, human h i s t o r y at a l l ..." 
Lichtheim (1965/^7) p.21 (emphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) . 
The Vanguardist p o s i t i o n d i f f e r s from t h R . R e d i s t r i b u t i o n i s t one, 
however, i.n seeing ,any need f o r leadership at a l l , Lichtheim 
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himself says: 
"The t r a i n c a l l e d ' h i s t o r y ' i s never going t o deposit 
i t s passengers at the destination of t h e i r choice unless 
they themselves take over the controls. 
Lichtheim (1971/74) PP. 17-18. 
The dilemma of Redistributionism l i e s i n the empirical use of 
leadership, and even forc e , t o remove previous i n e q u a l i t i e s . 
The v i l l a g i s a t i o n programmes i n Tanzania, f o r instance, go 
against such r e d i s t r i b u t i o n i s t themes as s e l f - r e l i a n c e , 
propounded by Nyerere. He has said himself that 
"Five who come i n ^ o a Ujamaa v i l l a g e / u n w i l l i n g l y can 
destroy the e f f o r t s of f i f t e e n who want t o work out a 
new pattern f o r themselves." 
Nyerere (1968), quoted Coulson (1975) p.53. 
This dilemma i s not j u s t one of "ethics". I t concerns learning 
theoiy, too. I t may be a most important question, whether 
experts' p o l i c i e s are the best ones i n terms, f o r instance, of 
ma t e r i a l p r o d u c t i v i t y . Yet w i l l people directed by "experts" 
learn as e f f e c t i v e l y what best t o do, or how best t o control 
and determine t h e i r own futures? This i s u l t i m a t e l y a f a r 
greater problem. In education, subordination to expertise 
may be a more s i g n i f i c a n t "lesson" than immediate s k i l l s or 
understandings. According t o Lentin (1966), Algerians found 
that expatriate advisers ("les pieds rouges") brought new 
kinds of problem, because they f a i l e d to understand the 
t r a d i t i o n a l values of Muslim society. Raikes (1975) reports 
that i n Tanzania the wrong 'knowledge' - i n terras of l o c a l 
a g r i c u l t u r a l conditions - was i n many oases advanced by extension 
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o f f i c e r s . I n both these cases, the "experts" might not have been 
so "ignorant", yet s t i l l have taught messages about expertise 
and leadership t h a t would have countered r e d i s t r i b u t i o n i s t 
p r i n c i p l e s . 
"When the I n t e r n a t i o n a l was formed we expressly formulated 
the b a t t l e cry: the emancipation of the working class must 
be the work of the working class i t s e l f . We cannot, 
therefore, co-operate w i t h people who openly state that ' 
the workers are too uneducated to emancipate themselves 
and must be freed from above by philanthropic big bourgeois 
and petty bourgeois." Marx (1879/1969) p,94, 
"Techniques as such lend themselves equally w e l l t o good 
or bad purposes. Therefore, i t i s often f e l t that control 
f o r desirable ends (the r u l e of the philosopher kings) i s 
good, or at least not bad. But t h i s i s a dangerous b e l i e f . 
I t neglects the complex and often serious effects of any 
external c o n t r o l of man; also the f a c t that when the area 
f o r free decisions grows too r e s t r i c t e d , i t reduces the 
scope of inaJi's personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y axid thus his 
autonomy ..." Bettleheim (1960/70) p.66. 
The R e d i s t r i b u t i o n i s t perspective d i f f e r s from the 
Vanguardist p r i m a r i l y on questions of learning (though there are 
l i k e l y t o be other questions of Objectivated 'Knowledge' as well -
as i s suggested by the extension o f f i c e r and "pieds rouges" 
examples above). I t s d i s t i n c t i o n from Participationism, on the 
other hand, depends on assumptions made about what kinds of social 
i n e q u a l i t y are " n a t u r a l " . "Power" rather than "Knowledge", i s 
involved. There i s a f a i r l y t h i n l i n e between the (Redistribution-
i s t ? ) p r i n c i p l e s of a i d given by China t o other underdeveloped 
countries > and notions of "help" and "service" i n much 
( P a r t i c i p a t i o n i s t ? ) l i b e r a l thought. The d i s t i n c t i o n seems to 
l i e i n assumptions about what i n e q u a l i t i e s are "natu r a l " and 
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about what courses of action f o l l o w from those assumptions. 
Holt puts the point l i k e t h i s : 
"The Good Samaritan ... di d not make himself a permanent 
pro t e c t o r of the t r a v e l l e r . He did not make a business or 
career or vocation out of protecting a l l t r a v e l l e r s . He 
helped because, before his eyes, he could see someone who 
at that moment needed help,.. The trouble w i t h one person 
def i n i n g himself as a helper of others i s that unless he 
i s very c a r e f u l he i s almost certain to define them as 
people who cannot get along without his help," 
Holt ( 1974 /75 ) p.61 (emphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) . 
S i m i l a r points are made by Williams (1961/65) and the Balls (1973) . 
Airae C^saire says that 
" I n a l l p a r t i e s , i n a l l spheres, from the extreme r i g h t t o 
the extreme l e f t / i s rooted/ the habit of doing f o r us, 
the habit of t h i n k i n g f o r us, i n short the habit of 
contesting the r i g h t t o i n i t i a t i v e which i s i n essence 
the r i g h t t o pers o n a l i t y . " 
C^saire ( 1 9 7 2 ) . 
The"motive" f o r such "helping" or "service" l i e s i n assumptions 
of s u p e r i o r i t y . Therein l i e s 
"a f a m i l i a r l i b e r a l dilemma - that of wanting to make what 
are seen as the good things of a society available t o a l l j 
while wanting t o r e t a i n the r i g h t t o define what those 
'good' things are." 
Keddie ? (1972) p.132. 
Ideology i s sincere, but a l t r u i s t i c service may function i n much 
the same way as more conscious Participationism - that which 
e x p l i c i t l y incorporates subordinates, as a means of preserving 
e x i s t i n g i n e q u a l i t i e s . Obvious examples of Participationisra can 
be found i n industry. Jukes the Director-General of Sigineering 
Employers, has said that 
-269-
"Among employers 'there i s now acceptance of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
t o shareholders, t o the enterprise i t s e l f , t o the employees, 
t o the customers of the enterprise and to the public and 
the State'. Within t h i s complex of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and 
constraints i t , ' i s the duty and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the 
employer to manage'. In managing his employees, he must 
remember that 'important though a man's r i g h t t o a job may 
be, i t i s perhaps of even greater importance that he should 
work as a reasonably contented member of a team ... High 
on the l i s t of those things which are essential to the 
smooth running and e f f i c i e n c y of an enterprise i s good 
communication w i t h workers on the shop f l o o r , ' Besides 
promoting team consciousness, good communication i s 
necessary i n securing employee acceptance of change .,," 
Pox (1974) p.259. 
" S c i e n t i f i c management" has often been o v e r t l y manipulative, 
Taylor himself said, 
" I can say, without the s l i g h t e s t h e s i t a t i o n , that ... the 
man who i s p h y s i c a l l y able t o handle p i g - i r o n and i s 
s u f f i c i e n t l y phlegmatic and stupid to choose t h i s f o r his 
occupation i s r a r e l y able t o comprehend the science of 
handling p i g - i r o n ,., The man who i s f i t t o work at any 
p a r t i c u l a r trade i s unable t o understand the science of 
that trade without the ki n d l y help and co-operation of men 
of a t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t kind of education". 
Taylor (1912), quoted by Bowles and Gintis (1976) p,182 
(ray emphasis). 
Karier (1972/71^ has looked at what he c a l l s "conservative 
l i b e r a l i s m " i n United States education (and beyond education). 
He pays some a t t e n t i o n t o P a r t i c i p a t i o n i s t emphasis on 
expertise, 
"The l i b e r a l r o l e i n American society was es s e n t i a l l y that 
of the knowledgeable expert dedicated t o the s u r v i v a l of 
the system through growth." 
"Despite e q u a l i t a r i a n r h e t o r i c , educational l i b e r a l s most 
often, i n pra c t i c e , supported an education directed from 
the top. They repeatedly supported the professionalisation 
of the expert-teacher and the use of improved technique t o 
enlighten the ignorant masses. 'Enlightenment', f o r most, 
implied education f o r s o c i a l c o n t r o l . " 
Karier (1972/73^ pp.95, 106. 
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I have already discussed P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n education, i n 
Chapter 6, Two things need to be pointed out here. F i r s t l y , 
the d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s of Participationisra l i e s mainly i n assumptions 
about learning theory. I t might be called "motivational 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s m " , f o r an appearance of learner autonomy i s 
believed necessary to promote the w i l l and confidence to learn. 
This need by no means be consciously manipulative. Indeed, the 
most important instances a r i s e from Value-Known closure. There 
are assumed to be only l i m i t e d p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r genuinely 
autonomous, l e a r n e r - i n i t i a t e d education. I t i s taken f o r granted 
that there are i n e v i t a b l y pre-determined l i m i t s or evaluative 
c r i t e r i a on what i s to be learned. Secondly, i n t h i s example 
of Participationisra (as w e l l as i n examples of the other broad 
"types" of educational ideology) I have not confined myself to 
narrowly "educational" examples. This i s a clue to Master 
Patterning. 
Ideologies must not be seen as l i s t s of assorted b e l i e f s . 
Such a view f a i l s t o capture the essential structuredness of 
b e l i e f s , by v i r t u e of which they are beliefs' (Value-Knowledge).^^^^ 
Perhaps we should see Master Patterns as "Sestalts" of s o c i e t a l 
s t r u c t u r e . I f we could see schools as microcosms of society, 
or as replicas of employment s i t u a t i o n s , then the t r a n s f e r of 
notions established i n school to other contexts would be plausible. 
But schools are not mere miniatures. They do not merely equip . 
ch i l d r e n to f i t smoothly i n t o t h e i r work roles, w i t h understandings 
and expectations s i m i l a r t o those they enteirfcained v/hilst at 
school. "^"^ ^ 
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Be l i e f s learned ajnd acted-upon i n one context may 
f u n c t i o n a l l y correspond t o b e l i e f s learned and acted-upon i n 
another - though the two sets of b e l i e f s may be ove r t l y quite 
d i f f e r e n t . I n such a case, i t would be the structure of the 
d i f f e r e n t contextual s i t u a t i o n s that corresponded, rather than 
the overt content of p a r t i c i p a n t s ' b e l i e f s . Accordingly, i t may 
be that the same dimensions are relevant, whereby we might 
consider, compare and r e l a t e b e l i e f s found i n various contexts 
and apparently r e f e r r i n g t o quite d i f f e r e n t matters. The . 
dimensions I have considered so f a r ("Power" and "Knowledge") 
are s p e c i f i c a l l y relevant t o learning s i t u a t i o n s , including 
schooling. We may now b r i e f l y consider two extensions of these 
th a t could "bridge" the gap between school and "adult" society. 
The f i r s t concerns the nature of 'knowledge' and of those who 
'know'. The second concerns change. 
I n discussing the "Povrer" and "Knowledge" dimensions i n 
education, I i l l u s t r a t e d t h e i r appropriateness i n contexts other 
than formal schooling. Though I fear o v e r - s i m p l i f i c a t i o n , i t 
may be possible t o see Productionism as ba s i c a l l y opposed to 
Redistributionism, i n that the f i r s t i s characterisable above 
a l l by the Basic B e l i e f that "Knowledge i s Power", and the second 
by "Men are equal". There are many ways i n which t h i s could 
be disputed. Fortunately, i t i s not the purpose of t h i s essay 
to argue f o r such an assertion, so much as to demonstrate that 
such assertions are worth i n v e s t i g a t i n g - that a search f o r 
Basic Beliefs i s a viable exercise, and methodologically 
worthwhile. "Knowledge i s Power" was a slogan of the " l e f t " 
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r a t h e r than the " r i g h t " i n 19th century B r i t a i n , and much of -
the argument of t h i s essay has to do with the r a d i c a l i s i n g 
p o t e n t i a l of e x p l i c i t v e r b a l i s a t i o n and Cu r i o s i t y . However, i f 
we r e s t r i c t our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of "knowledge" considerably to 
i n d i c a t e b e l i e f , r a t h e r than "true knowledge", i t may be 
legitimate to claim that 'knowledge', as b e l i e f (as Value-Knowledge, 
as c e r t a i n t y , as cl o s u r e ) i s conservative rather than r a d i c a l , 
f u n c t i o n a l to pre-determined ends rather than ever-new ones. 
Bacon was f i r s t responsible, I believe, f o r the slogan that 
"Knowledge i s Power" and i t i s most associated with s c i e n t i f i c 
'knowledge', or 'knowledge' about the natural v/orld. As such i t 
tends to pre s c r i b e mastery of the environment as an end i n i t s e l f . 
This i n turn tends to imply a "value" of e f f i c i e n c y and 
e f f i c i e n c y i n turn r e i n f o r c e s the need f o r "corr e c t " 'knov/ledge' -
non-fle x i b l e c r i t e r i a by which e f f i c i e n c y might be judged. 
Without a p a r a l l e l Basic B e l i e f that "Men are equal", t h i s need 
or des i r e f o r e f f i c i e n c y can j u s t i f y inequality. For i t may be 
believed that the "expert" i s more able to master the environment, 
and to help others to do so, than one who i s " l e s s q u a l i f i e d " . 
T h i s i n turn may imply a need f o r some form of s o c i a l control, 
whereby the expert i s enabled to pursue the desired mastery, 
without obstruction. Opposed to t h i s i s a Basic B e l i e f that 
"Jilen are equal". For such a b e l i e f , being p r e s c r i p t i v e at l e a s t 
as much as d e s c r i p t i v e , would make i l l e g i t i m a t e any rule of 
experts. I t would thereby q u a l i f y the supreme importance of 
e f f i c i e n c y and i n turn mastery of the environment. 
Compare t h i s f i r s t statement v/ith those that follow i t : 
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"What i s meant by doing a good job of production? This in-
no way re f e r s t o increased output. Rather i t depends on 
whether or not we have developed production according t o 
s o c i a l i s t p r i n c i p l e s ... whether or not we have aroused 
the revolutionary a c t i v i t y of the masses," 
Mao Tse-Tung (1965), quoted by Ramsay (1974) p. 5. 
"The process of r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n heightens ... the 
signif i c a n c e of the specialised expert who i s highly 
t r a i n e d with a l i m i t e d sphere. Therewith, social knowledge. 
&h& the power of making decisions become more and more 
concentrated f o r purely p r a c t i c a l reasons i n a l i m i t e d 
number of p o l i t i c i a n s , economic leaders, administrators, 
and j u r i s t s ..." 
Mannheim ( 1940 ) p.47. 
"The fundamental standards and values of language are 
expressed i n i t s uses i n "the discerning appreciation of 
a r t and l i t e r a t u r e " by "the few ( i n any society) v/ho are 
capable of unprompted f i r s t - h a n d judgment ..." 
Leavis (1932) quoted by Filmer (1976) p.10. 
There i s a discernible Master Pattern common to the l a s t two 
statements. Though t h i s may derive from a common productive 
base i n a given society, i t i s not learned i n re l a t i o n s h i p w i t h 
t h a t productive base, nor even i m p l i c i t l y associated w i t h i t , at 
the l e v e l of b e l i e f . Other f a c t o r s , such as the o b j e c t i f i a b i l i t y 
of 'knov/ledge' through l i t e r a c y , can also be looked t o as ( p a r t i a l ) 
explanations of such inegalitaidanisra. ^ '^'''^  The Basic B e l i e f , which 
may be transmitted by a v a r i e t y of means i n a given society -
i n c l u d i n g , of course, schooling - i s something akin to "Knowledge 
i s Power", without any counter-belief that "Men are equal". 
E m p i r i c a l l y , these seem t o be d i a l e c t i c a l l y opposed to each 
other, rather than complementary. They characterise quite d i f f e r e n t 
Master Patterns. 
The other dimension which seems to, have a Master Pattern-like 
importance i s that of Change. This has been i m p l i c i t throughout 
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the above discussion of Productionism, Vanguardism, Redistributionism 
and P a r t i c i p a t i o n i s m . For i n societies i n which ineq u a l i t i e s , of 
various sorts already e x i s t , b e l i e f s i n the p o s s i b i l i t y , 
d e s i r a b i l i t y and legitimacy of e i t h e r a l t e r i n g or preserving 
such relationships of i n e q u a l i t y necessarily involve a perspective 
on Change. Various v/riters have pointed t o the l i b e r a l i s t 
assumption that anything but "orderly change" i s e i t h e r impossible 
( i n t h a t i t would not achieve i t s objectives) or l i t e r a l l y , as 
w e l l as metaphorically, "unthinkable".^^^^ 
I suggest that these Master Patterns are "masters" precisely 
i n t h a t they are Relevant at a number of d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s and 
contexts. I n d i v i d u a l l y , i n personal i n t e r a c t i o n , at the societ a l 
and indeed at the i n t e r s o c i e t a l l e v e l , the same Basic Beliefs 
may operate - because on the same dimension. To give j u s t one 
example, consider some Productionist notions that are congruent 
at a l l these l e v e l s . The term "Productionisra" (aJid indeed that 
of "Redistributionism") i s borrowed from underdevelopment 
l i t e r a t u r e . I t i s sometimes called, i n that context, 
"Incrementalism".^ ' I t has been e x p l i c i t l y stated i n terms of 
educational p o l i c y by Poster (1969). Elsewhere, Poster states 
t h a t 
" I must ... confess my personal adherence to the idea of 
•piecemeal refo:mi» and l i m i t e d 'social engineering' as the 
only way of e f f e c t i n g useful change i n educational 
i n s t i t u t i o n s which, i n my opinion, are not easily 
susceptible t o rapid and massive transformation ,.," 
Poster (1970), quoted by Ohliger & McCarthy (1971) p*25. 
At the i n t e r a c t i o n a l l e v e l , the "incrementalist" or "productionist" 
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stance can be seen i n the f o l l o w i n g : -
•The teacher's "own time and energies are not shared out 
equally among a l l her p u p i l s . This i s quite e x p l i c i t l y 
recognised by the teacher herself. There are, i n the class, 
too many d i f f i c u l t children f o r her t o spend as much time 
and energy as they need ... Those v/hom the teacher considers 
most able to b e n e f i t , the b r i g h t e s t , receive the extra 
a t t e n t i o n , not those most i n need, f o r them there would 
be l i t t l e pay o f f and the r e s u l t s would be few compared 
wi t h the energy expended. Even were she to spend a l o t 
of time w i t h them, the pay o f f would probably be minimal. 
Given that the pupils generally have such a poor prognosis, 
the teacher believes that her extra a t t e n t i o n and e f f o r t s 
should go t o the b r i g h t e s t , those who may be able to make 
something of themselves, or those she might be able t o 
make as good as 'normal' children w i t h a l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n . 
This d i f f e r e n t i a l a l l o c a t i o n of the teacher's time and 
energies i s j u s t i f i e d i n terms of the economic r e s u l t s . . . " 
Sharp and Green (1975) p.97. 
PurtheiTnore, the d e t e i m i n i s t i c understanding of Piagetian stages 
of c h i l d development has obvious p a r a l l e l s i n notions of development 
at the s o c i e t a l l e v e l , according to a preconceived, u n i l i n e a r 
model of s o c i e t a l change. 
F i n a l l y , the common use at various levels, of the terra 
"paternalism" i s more than coincidental. To t a l k of "state 
paternalism" i s , of course, metaphorical. But i t i s a metaphor 
which i s immediately comprehensible because the patterns of 
a u t h o r i t y , leadership, protection etc. that ( i n a given society) 
are learned i n re l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h fathers/parents are also 
symbolically appropriate i n other contexts - not least at school. 
What happens, then, when Master Patterns operate, i s not a t r a n s f e r 
of a single "Gestalt" from one context to another. There i s a 
c o n t i n u i t y of c e r t a i n kinds of Basic Belief on fundamentally the 
same dimensions ( f o r instance "knov/ledge", "leadership" and 
"change"). These are assumed to operate at various l e v e l s . 
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because they are i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d at those various l e v e l s . To 
some extent, they remain i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d i n s ofar as those 
assumptions remain closed. Functional c o n t i n u i t y between levels 
operates i n default of any e x p l i c i t understanding and questioning. 
There i s no necessary reason why p a r t i c u l a r b e l i e f s , developed 
i n novel contexts, should have the same basic structure as those 
"relevant" i n p r i o r contexts. But the development of some 
b e l i e f s may be necessary on the same dimensions. Insofar as a 
society i s ordered/controlled, and as b e l i e f s remain i m p l i c i t , 
then congruent b e l i e f s are l i k e l y to develop. Master Patterning 
e x i s t s not i n a simple one-to-one correspondence between (e.g.) 
school and political-economic context, but betv/een a v a r i e t y of 
s o c i e t a l contexts. The same dimensions are then relevant f o r the 
observer. And the same kinds of b e l i e f may be taken by the 
p a r t i c i p a n t t o be "relevant", i n default of open elaboration. 
I t i s not a question of "traJisfer" from one context to the other 
of p a r t i c u l a r b e l i e f s that again become relevant. Rather there 
i s already w i t h i n any r e l a t i v e l y c o ntrolled or ordered society, 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l congruence such that Master Patterns are relevant 
( f o r a l l or most people) i n various contexts. One might have 
suspected, had t h i s not been pointed out, that an encouragement 
of C u r i o s i t y i n one context might therefore "transfer" from one 
(18) 
context t o another. But t h i s i s by no means necessarily t r u e , 
nor even e m p i r i c a l l y common. Curiosity tends to be confined w i t h i n 
paradigmatic boundaries. People may learn to be Curious about 
p a r t i c u l a r contexts, without any necessary "t r a n s f e r " t o others. 
B r i l l i a n t l y inventive people w i t h i n t h e i r own special f i e l d of 
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academic study are not necessarily radical i n t h e i r s o c i a l and 
p o l i t i c a l l i v e s . As we s h a l l see, openness i n respect of certain 
"Knowledge" issues has not i n practice always e n t a i l e d openness 
on matters of "Power", I t i s t o the question of "Open Education" 
th a t we now t u r n . 
Notes 
(1) Hence a p o s s i b i l i t y e x i s t s of determined indeterminacy, 
of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d openness, of permanent rev o l u t i o n . 
(2) The d i s t i n c t i o n i s analogous to that made e a r l i e r , between 
determinism ( c f . closure) and determination ( c f . constraint), 
(3) Even i f c e r t a i n " t r u t h s " are not yet 'known', i t may be 
assumed that they are nonetheless "there" awaiting 
discovery, 
(4) "You cannot make a s i l k purse out of a sow's ear." 
(5) See Chapter 5. 
(6) For instance, Althusser (1971); Bowles and Gintis (1976). 
(7) Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (1973), p.30, 
quoted by Bowles and Ginti s (1976), p,208. 
(8) For example, i n Stevens' (1960) study of grammar schools, 
teachers believed that such schools should t r a i n f o r 
leadership and service. 
(9) See Chapter 6, above. 
(10) Reported by Cruise O'Brien (1971/73) p.335. 
(11) Chou En-Lai's "Eight Principles of Chinese Aid" (1964), 
reprinted i n Bailey (1975) p.588. 
(12) A l i s t such as the f o l l o w i n g may not be inaccurate, but i t 
misses out the most important ch a r a c t e r i s t i c of ideologies -
i t s s t r u c t u r a t i o n . 
"The major reason ... why the powerful r a r e l y need to 
make t h e i r pov/er v i s i b l e ajnd obvious i s that a l l the 
social i n s t i t u t i o n s , mechanisms, and p r i n c i p l e s which 
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i t i s c r u c i a l l y important f o r them t o liave accepted 
and l e g i t i m i s e d are accepted and l e g i t i m i s e d already 
aJtid come under no serious threat ... Crucial f o r 
them, too, i s the v i r t u a l l y universal acceptance of 
class and status s t r a t i f i c a t i o n , and of the 
h i e r a r c h i c a l orgajaisation of work with i t s massive 
i n e q u a l i t i e s of a u t h o r i t y , reward, status, and job 
autonomy. Essential, i n turn, f o r the acceptance 
of these i n e q u a l i t i e s are such c u l t u r a l b e l i e f s as, 
f o r example, that those i n authority ought to enjoy 
higher rewards than those they command, and that 
the alleged (and probably engineered) scarcity of 
a p a r t i c u l a r s k i l l , t a l e n t or a b i l i t y j u s t i f i e s 
i t s holder i n demanding a larger a l l o c a t i o n of l i f e 
chances than those of more common or modest 
attainments." Pox (1974) p.277. 
I would not fundamentally disagree w i t h any of the points 
Pox makes. But the coherent structure of such ideology 
i s missing. 
(13) I f t h i s were so, how easy i t would he to produce radicals 
and r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s , merely by changing r e l a t i v e l y 
s u p e r f i c i a l aspects of school structures. And how easy i t 
would be to demonstrate the hypocrisy of educational 
administrators and others. 
(14) cf. Goody & Watt (1962). 
(15) e.g. Karier (1972/73);Morton & Watson (1971/73). 
(16) c f . Petras & Baporte (1970/73). 
(17) c f . Organski (1965). 
(IB) As I o p t i m i s t i c a l l y suggested i n Syer (1974b). 
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PART I I I - TOWARDS A DEFItJITIOH OF "OPEN EDUCATION" 
CHAPTER 8 
THE NOTION OF "OPEN EDUCATION" 
In Part I I I , I apply the perspectives developed i n the 
f i r s t two parts of t h i s essay to a consideration of "Open 
Education". I n t h i s chapter I point b r i e f l y to some problems 
commonly encountered i n the use and d e f i n i t i o n of t h i s expression. 
Often i t seems t o be a vague slogan which disguises more than i t 
reveals. 
Slogans 
H i l l (1975) suggests that the expression "Open Education" 
i s s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y and therefore lacks i n t r i n s i c meaning. 
I t implies, he says, both u n r e s t r i c t e d option f o r students and 
sp e c i f i c goals f o r teachers. The two are incompatible. 
Dismissing i t as a mere slogan, he suggests that we can only 
look at what upholders of "Open Education" i n fact advocate, 
i f we are to know what the slogan s i g n i f i e s . ^ 
I agree, of course, that i n s o f a r as people believe i n . 
something they c a l l "Open Education", then those actual b e l i e f s 
are i n e v i t a b l y contexted and r e f e r e n t i a l . They cajnnot be understood 
except i n r e l a t i o n to that context. I agree also that b e l i e f s -
a l l b e l i e f s - are value-laden, insofar as they are r e a l l y believed. 
As such, t o c a l l "Open Education" a slogan - a "yum" expression, 
as H i l l chooses to c a l l i t - does not distinguish i t s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
from most other verbalised b e l i e f s . But I cannot agree that the 
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verbal formulation i s i n e f f e c t i r r e l e v a n t . H i l l ' s approach i s 
to ignore whatever he would see to be denoted or connoted by the 
words, "open" and "education", except insofar as they "happen" 
to be relevant to what i s a c t u a l l y advocated. This begs some 
important questions. For i n practice those denotations and 
connotations are relevant t o any emotive appeal that the 
(2) 
expression might have. They are part of the l o g i c a l structure 
of those b e l i e f s . Moreover, i t i s heuristically useful t o consider 
what "Open Education" could mean - not as an al l - o r - n o t h i n g 
category, but i n any important senses whatever - before seeing 
how p a r t i c u l a r empirical instances of supposedly "Open Education" 
a c t u a l l y measure up t o such hypothetical d e f i n i t i o n s . Such 
empirical instances are l i k e l y to d i f f e r from one another i n 
ways that might not othervd.se be so evident. 
Vagueness 
The notion of "Open Education" i s often e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y 
vague. I t contains numerous inconsistencies. I t i s ra r e l y 
c l e a r what exactly i s supposed t o be "open". One w r i t e r t o 
comment on t h i s i s Pring. I n strongly c r i t i c i s i n g Bernstein (1971), 
as w e l l as other " t h e o r e t i c a l work i n the sociology of the 
(3) 
curriculum"^ he has suggested that such dichotomies as 
"C o l l e c t i o n " / " I n t e g r a t i o n " and "Traditional"/"ProgreBsive" 
are inadequate i n that they f a i l to do j u s t i c e to the complexity 
of p r a c t i c e . Above a l l they tend t o adopt the l o g i c a l l y v a l i d 
but t h e o r e t i c a l l y dubious practice of "dividing a l l things i n t o 
a p a r t i c u l a r category ( i t matters not which) and i t s negative". 
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thus producing, a residual category of questionable t h e o r e t i c a l 
(4) 
value. Elseiwhere, Pring has attemnted t o c l a r i f y what he 
th i n k s might be understood by the term " i n t e g r a t i o n " . 
" • I n t e g r a t i o n * as such i s an empty word. There must be 
i n t e g r a t i o n of something and one cannot understand or 
appreciate what i s meant by curriculum i n t e g r a t i o n u n t i l 
one has c l a r i f i e d what i t i s that i s being integrated ... 
Any p a r t i c u l a r recommendation f o r curriculum i n t e g r a t i o n 
implies some underlying theory of knowledge or of value 
or of learning ... To explain what one means by int e g r a t i o n 
necessarily involves one i n such t h e o r e t i c a l considerations. 
Because of the f a i l u r e of so many educationists t o 
understand t h i s , the word i n t e g r a t i o n i s bandied about as 
though i t s meaning were clear, and recommendations f o r 
curriculum i n t e g r a t i o n are made as though i t s value were 
se l f - e v i d e n t . " Pring (1970/71) p.266. 
I agree wi t h Pring's complaint and discuss t h i s a r t i c l e f u r t h e r 
i n Chapter 9. 
Tunnell (1975) has also remarked on the vagueness of 
"Open Education" and i t s s u s c e p t i b i l i t y to overlapping or p a r t i a l 
d e f i n i t i o n s , l i k e H i l l , he dismisses the p o s s i b i l i t y of t r u l y 
open education. He atterants t o define i t i n terras of what he 
takes i t to r e f e r t o em p i r i c a l l y , najnely "elementary school 
practices that the B r i t i s h r e f e r t o as 'informal education'". ^ •^^  
(nonetheless his d e f i n i t i o n of "education" i s l a i d dov/n a p r i o r i . 
I t i s not derived from practice, i n educational ins t i t u t i o n s . ) 
I n contrast, I take "education" to r e f e r to anything 
r e l a t e d t o learning contextsp contents and processes. These 
may be looked at i n terms of two universally relevant dimensions, 
"Power" and "Knowler'ge". More s p e c i f i c a l l y , these dimensions 
themselves r e l a t e t o a view of Reality as consisting of three 
"realms" - (a.) the objective world-out-there, including Social 
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Relations (and s o c i e t a l s t r u c t u r e s ) ; (b) Objectivated "Knowledge", 
which i s external t o any i n d i v i d u a l learner and inseparable from 
the s o c i a l context of which he i s a part; and (c) Subjective 
•Knowledge', which i s the understandings and b e l i e f s of any given 
I n d i v i d u a l s , I s h a l l explore some possible meanings of "Open 
Education" i n terms of these three "realms" and of the r e l a t i o n -
ships between thera, 
aim i s not t o produce a single d e f i n i t i o n of "Open 
Education". I t i s to i d e n t i f y ways i n which education might 
r e a l l y be open and therefore ways i n which i t might, i n p a r t i c u l a r 
contexts, be considered a c t u a l l y or p o t e n t i a l l y "open". We can 
then consider empirical instances, t o see what i s indeed open -
and, more importantly, what remains closed. The search w i l l be 
f o r actual constraints and ide o l o g i c a l closures i n substantive 
contexts. Only then, i f an adequate picture of p a r t i c u l a r 
educational ideologies i s to be achieved, w i l l i t be possible t o 
ask why such b e l i e f s may have arisen and what might be t h e i r 
f u n c t i o n a l or i n t e r e s t - s p e c i f i c consequences. 
Disguised D i s t i n c t i o n s ; State and Process 
"False dichotomies" often involve the suppression of 
d i s t i n c t i o n s that should r e a l l y be made e x p l i c i t . I n choosing 
the Relevance angle according to which one wishes to examine 
p a r t i c u l a r phenomena, i t i s i n e v i t a b l e that other possible singles 
may be overlooked. Nonetheless, covert a l l u s i o n may s t i l l be 
made t o such other Relevances. To recognise t h i s , and to seek t o 
make them e x p l i c i t , can be methodologically very useful. But where 
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i t i s unnoticed, i t can be most misleading. 
A d i s t i n c t i o n that i s often not made e x p l i c i t i n treatments 
of such notions as "Open Education" i s that between state and 
process. I t i s common to f i n d "Open Education" (or " i n t e g r a t i o n " , 
or "informal education") confused w i t h "innovation", or the 
processes involved i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s i n g new forms of pedagogical 
p r a c t i c e . (Such new forms may often be of the "integrated" or 
"open" type, whence the confusion.) Consequently, many have 
commented on the anxiety, or i d e n t i t y c r i s i s , that may be 
experienced i n the course of i n s t i t u t i o n a l change. This i s 
frequently a t t r i b u t e d t o the new type of practice, rather than 
t o the processes of change, Caton (1972), f o r instance, t a l k s 
of teachers i n a " c o l l a b o r a t i v e learning" context as experiencing 
"a threat t o t h e i r security both as a person and a 
s p e c i a l i s t . The comfort of the classroom has gone. 
Gone also i s the security of the subject-material. 
Paced w i t h the loss of many of the supports that prop 
up the teacher's image, the reaction i s often fear, 
r a t i o n a l i s e d i n t o educational argument. I t i s g a l l i n g 
t o f i n d your subject deemed ir r e l e v a n t by pupils because 
you have f a i l e d t o use i t w e l l 
Caton (1972) p.58. 
Bernstein (1967/71) discusses such phenomena i n terms of mixed 
(7) 
and pure categories. I do not deny that "Open Education" may 
lack the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of emotional security. But t h i s should be 
(8) 
kept quite d i s t i n c t from issues of change. 
"Open Education" can be a vague and ambiguous slogan. Yet 
t h i s does not make i t a meaningless expression. Insofar as 
people have b e l i e f s about the a c t u a l i t y , p o s s i b i l i t y , d e s i r a b i l i t y 
or i n e v i t a b i l i t y of something they c a l l "Open Education", then 
-284-
those b e l i e f s need to be described, i f the observer wishes to 
produce an adequate account of the relevant educational contexts. 
Such a description i s , I suggest, possible, i f we consider the 
"Power" and "Knowledge" dimensions of educational b e l i e f s . In 
the next chapter, I consider ways i n which opennesses might 
e x i s t i n any of the three "realms" - Objective Reality (including 
especially s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s ) , Objectivated 'Knowledge•and 
Subjective 'Knowledge'. I i l l u s t r a t e my arguments by re-
examining Pring's a r t i c l e on " I n t e g r a t i o n " , In Chapter 10, 
I extend t h i s by looking at Bernstein's approach to "Open 
Education", I t w i l l be seen that the issues 3?aised r e l a t e to 
some c e n t r a l concerns of s o c i o l o g i c a l theory. 
Notes 
(1) On t h i s basis. H i l l suggests three meanings: 
(a) procedural openness, which he suggests i s common 
i n much informal education and unobjectionable; 
(b) normative openness, which stresses pupil/student 
autonomy, but which he s t i l l regards as "educational" 
i n that i t contains a non-neutral objective of personal 
autonomy, and (c) revolutionary openness, which he 
does not view w i t h such tolerance. Though i t c l e a r l y 
i s equally non~neutral - and according to his c r i t e r i a 
would be equally "educational", therefore ~- he views 
t h i s as a cloak f o r i n d o c t r i n a t i o n (undefined) and 
condemns the tendency f o r teachers to s l i d e from 
normative to revolutionary openness. He feels they 
would not do so i f they were aware of the significance 
of what they were doing. 
(2) To appreciate the p o s i t i v e evaluation denoted by 
"openness" i n our society, one has only t o consider 
such expressions as "open-minded", "open house", 
"openly", "open-hearted". Compare the appeal of the 
term "community" i n our society. "Race" r e l a t i o n s 
organisations and approved schools are not c a l l e d , 
respectively, "Community r e l a t i o n s councils" and 
"Community schools" f o r reasons that are i r r e l e v a n t to 
the meaning of the word "community". Not any "yum" word 
w i l l do. 
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(3) Pring (1975) especially pp. 71-72, 
(4) I b i d , See also Chapter 2 above. 
I t i s i r o n i c that a recent attempt t o grasp the complexity 
of such p r a c t i c e , and t o operationalise i t f o r empirical 
research, s t i l l reduces t o a single continuum of "Formal-. 
(Mixed) - Informal" teaching s t y l e s . See Bennett (1976), 
Meanwhile, despite my agreement w i t h most of Pring's 
c r i t i c i s m s of Bernstein (1971), he seems basically to 
have missed the p o i n t , which concerns not boundaries, 
but codes. See Syer (1976b). 
(5) Tunnell (1975) p,l6. 
(6) c f . Chapter 2. 
(7) c f , Douglas (1966/70). 
(8) I return t o t h i s i n discussing the notion of "penetration" 
i n Chapter 12, cf . also Syer (1974a), where I elaborate 
on the process/state d i s t i n c t i o n i n r e l a t i o n to Bernstein 
(1971), I suggest there that the Collection and 
In t e g r a t i o n types of educational knowledge code should 
be c a r e f u l l y distinguished from processes of " c o l l e c t i n g " 
and " i n t e g r a t i n g " - a d i s t i n c t i o n which Bernstein f a i l s 
t o make. 
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CHAPTER 9 
DIMENSIONS OF OPENNESS IN "OPEN EDUCATION" 
Openness i s simply lack of closure. Such a d e f i n i t i o n 
may appear to court the dangers of dichotomising between one 
selected chaa?acteristic and everything else.^^^ "Openness" 
could merely become a residual categoiy. However, my aim i s 
not t o produce two exclusive categories. Least of a l l i s i t 
t o apply the notions of "openness" and "closure" i n the 
expectation of f i n d i n g a correspondingly dichotomised Reality. 
I t i s , rather, t o i d e n t i f y dimensions on which notions of 
openness and closure seem relevant and t o give s o c i o l o g i c a l l y 
relevant meaning t o those notions. 
Broadly, closure i s any r i g i d i t y of b e l i e f s tructure. 
Any b e l i e f s (whether i m p l i c i t or e x p l i c i t ) i n the "obviousness" 
or "naturalness" of something can be determinative of behaviour. 
A l l are p o t e n t i a l l y consequential. Most important, however, are 
dete r m i n i s t i c b e l i e f s , i . e . , closed, r i g i d i f i e d b e l i e f s about 
determinative r e l a t i o n s h i p s . The "causality" involved may be 
(2) 
quite i m p l i c i t . 
B e l i e f s necessarily r e f e r . They are about (what i s taken 
to be) the r e a l world. So f a r as educational b e l i e f s are 
concerned, the most relevant structures and relationships 
r e f e r r e d to are as follov/s: f i r s t , social r e l a t i o n s and s o c i e t a l 
structures; second, the s t r u c t u r i n g of (what i s taken to be) 
" v a l i d and valuable knowledge" ( i . e . Objectivated 'Knowledge'); 
t h i r d , structures of subjective b e l i e f s and the properties of 
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physical mind-brain. Wot only i s each of these structured, but 
they are non-randomly r e l a t e d to each other. These i n t e r -
r e l a t i o n s h i p s are themselves the objects of educational b e l i e f s . 
The most relevant are those indicated by arrows i n the diagram 
below. Fourth, then, Social Relations-Objectivated 'Knowledge' 
re l a t i o n s h i p s include epistemological issues on the one hand and 
the framing of (educational) 'knowledge' on the other. F i f t h 
and s i x t h , the Social Relations-Subjective 'Knowledge' and the 
Objectivated 'Knowledge'-Subjective 'Knowledge' relationships 
both involve learning theory. The former refer s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
t o environmental and physiological relationships - which concera 
both "Knov/ledge" and "Power" dimensions. The l a t t e r refers to 
l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , on the "Knowledge" dimension, i n t e r n a l 
t o b e l i e f systems themselves. 
2, Ob.lectivated 'Knowledge' 
4. epistemology; framing ^ 
1. Social Relations 6. learaing theory 
\ ( l o g i c a l ) 
5. learning theory 
(contextual) 
3. Subjective 'knowledge' 
Since b e l i e f s r e f e r , any analysis of actual educational 
b e l i e f s must consider the context of those b e l i e f s and thereby 
what i s i m p l i c i t l y , as w e l l as e x p l i c i t l y , r e f e r red-to. In 
Part I I I , I am dealing p r i m a r i l y w i t h l o g i c a l or d e f i n i t i o n a l 
d i s t i n c t i o n s , though I s h a l l i l l u s t r a t e with selected examples. 
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I n context, however, one must consider whose education i s being 
considered, i n what s o c i e t a l context. In Part IV, I say more on 
t h i s . I n Part V, I look at a few specific h i s t o r i c a l instances. 
Meanwhile, a b r i e f i l l u s t r a t i o n should c l a r i f y my point. 
"Openness" may r e f e r i n some cases t o the matter of access to 
educational i n s t i t u t i o n s . I n a speci f i c context, one would want 
t o know what i n s t i t u t i o n s , f o r which people, at what age, under 
what conditions, etc., access was being considered. I t i s 
u n l i k e l y that one could t a l k simply of a p a r t i c u l a r education 
system being "open" i n respect of access. The range of types 
of school and resources made d i f f e r e n t i a l l y available to d i f f e r e n t 
people at d i f f e r e n t ages and from d i f f e r e n t social classes i s often 
quite broad.^"^^ Nonetheless, i t i s possible to consider the 
matter of "access" and to discuss i t s possible implications i n 
general terms, before looking at sp e c i f i c s o c i e t a l contexts. 
I n the f o l l o w i n g three sections, I consider some possible 
meanings of "openness" i n respect of the three "realms" and 
rela t i o n s h i p s between them. 
Social Relations; Access 
Notions of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s are most obviously relevant t o 
education i n the case of pedagogical relationships and the 
organisational structure of schools, Bernstein (1967/71) 
characterises "open schools" p r i m a r i l y i n these terms. He t a l k s 
Of achievement (rat h e r than a s c r i p t i o n ) of teacher- and p u p i l - r o l e s , 
of co-operation between, teachers, of f l e x i b i l i t y of teaching 
-289-
groups, and of contacts between school and the outside society. 
The notion o f , " p a r t i c i p a t i o n " i n education, which I discussed 
i n Chapter 6, i s closely related t o t h i s aspect of open or closed 
s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s i n schools. 
Access t o i n s t i t u t i o n s i s another area i n which openness 
might e x i s t , or be believed t o e x i s t , i n educational s o c i a l 
r e l a t i o n s . "Open" i n everyday language r e f l e c t s t h i s i n such 
expressions as "open fortun" and "open door". The Open University 
i s taken to be open p r i n c i p a l l y i n t h i s sense, Weber discussed 
the openness and closedness of relationships solely i n terms 
(4) 
of access, "Access" i n such a context normally means access 
t o membership of p a r t i c u l a r groups or i n s t i t u t i o n s . However, we 
can also t a l k of access to meanings, or t o c u l t u r a l understandings, 
Egan (1975) defines "open" i n terms of access i n t h i s sense and 
t a l k s of removing obstacles t o learning (p.24). There i s c l e a r l y 
an overlap between s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s and Objectivated 'Knowledge', 
where the notion of "access" i s involved. 
The Open University presents an i n t e r e s t i n g i l l u s t r a t i o n of 
how the "access" aspect of openness may i n fact be constraining. 
Harris and Holmes (1976) note the s i m i l a r i t i e s between the Open 
University's objective of open access and the contest m o b i l i t y 
e t h i c o u t l i n e d by Turner (1960/61). Trow has called the Open 
University 
"a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y ingenious way of increasing access 
to an illte i n s t i t u t i o n by s u b s t i t u t i n g motivation f o r 
f o r a a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , and by allowing people to combine 
u n i v e r s i t y work w i t h f u l l - t i m e employment. Some of the 
ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the ^ l i t e u n i v e r s i t y have been discarded, 
but the u n i v e r s i t y maintains the high standards of I ' l i t e 
B r i t i s h u n i v e r s i t i e s and t h e i r clear boundaries." 
Trow (1974) p.66, 
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The major feature of Turner's contest m o b i l i t y i s i t s 
emphasis on achievement, rather than a s c r i p t i o n . I t has been 
common t o see s o c i a l m o b i l i t y as a major feature of "open 
(7) 
s o c i e t i e s " . ' Prom t h i s , i n t u r n , derives the most common 
understanding of the slogan "Equality of Opportunity". This-
i s generally seen as a matter of equity, rather than equality -
at l e a s t u n t i l very recently. 
I t i s possible t o regard Meritocracy as a master pattern 
i n most western s o c i e t i e s . I n prescribing the r i g h t of the 
"able" t o lead/rule - as much as describing the need f o r them 
t o do so - i t l e g i t i m a t e s , i n e q u a l i t i e s that might be less 
t o l e r a b l e , were a s c r i p t i v e c r i t e r i a alone employed. Even 
opponents of Meiltocracy have commonly opposed the c r i t e r i a 
of s e l e c t i o n , rather than i t s f a c t - ju s t as opponents of 
"bureaucracy" have r a r e l y advocated i r r a t i o n a l i t y . Often, 
no doubt, they regard themselves as meriting leadership, though 
not on grounds of q u a n t i f i e d assessment, Bowles and Gintis 
(1976) attack the l e g i t i m a t i n g r o l e of the meritocratic i d e a l . 
I n a very d i f f e i ^ n t context, Douglas (1970/73) refers i n d i r e c t l y 
t o the same sort of phenomenon,^^^^ 
The access view of openness i s c l e a r l y located w i t h i n a 
s o c i e t a l context of i n e q u a l i t y and indeed w i t h i n an ide o l o g i c a l 
context where c e r t a i n forms of i n e q u a l i t y are considered 
l e g i t i m a t e , often "natu]?al". Achievement i s not a mode of 
eq u a l i t y , but a p a r t i c u l a r view of equity. Equality, l i k e 
freedom, i s more than a state of mind. I t i s a condition of 
s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . Total openness would have no l i m i t a t i o n s of 
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access. There would not be an open door, but no w a l l . 
Consequently, where b e l i e f s about "Open Education" r e f e r to 
the access available t o c e r t a i n s o c i a l positions, i t i s necessary 
t o examine the context i n question, to f i n d who has access (and 
who does n o t ) . What l i m i t a t i o n s are there and what specialisation 
of roles i s involved? Clearly, I am not p o i n t i n g to two 
dichotomous types - "openness" and "constraint" - and seeking 
t o c l a s s i f y a l l s o c i e t a l structures accordingly. We must observe 
actual contexts and seek t o understand what closures exist ( i f iany, 
of course) i n the b e l i e f s of people advocating, or believing i n 
the existence of "Open Education" i n these terms. 
Objectjvated 'Knowledge* 
Postman and Weingartner l i s t certain notions which, i n t h e i r 
view, are taught i n U.S. schools. These c l e a r l y indicate what a 
closed view of Objeotivated 'Knowledge' might be l i k e : 
" 1 , The concept ^^.e. n o t i o a / of absolute, f i x e d , 
unchanging ' t r u t h ' , p a r t i c u l a r l y from a p o l a r i s i n g 
good-bad perspective. 
2. The concept of c e r t a i n t y . There i s always one and 
only one ' r i g h t ' answer, and i t i s absolutely ' r i g h t ' , 
3. The concept of i s o l a t e d i d e n t i t y , that 'A i s A» period, 
simply, once and f o r a l l . 
4. The concept of f i x e d states and 'things', with the 
i m p l i c i t concept that i f you know the name you 
understand the 'thing'. 
5. The concept of simple, single, mechanical causality; 
the idea t h a t every e f f e c t i s the r e s u l t of a s i n g l e , 
e a s i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e cause. 
6. The concept that differences e x i s t only i n p a r a l l e l 
and opposing forms: good-bad, right-wrong, yes-no, 
short-long, up-down, etc., 
7. The concept that knowledge i s 'given', that i t 
emanates from a higher a u t h o r i t y , and that i t i s to 
be accepted without question," 
Postman & Weingartner (1969/71) p,203. 
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Young attempts a d e f i n i t i o n of "openness" which attends 
p r i m a r i l y to the structure of 'Knowledge'. I t also refer s 
somewhat loosely to the so c i a l r e l a t i o n s involved (including 
access). He defines i t as 
"the question of /aj the r e l a t i o n between knowledge 
areas and between those w i t h access to them", 
"/a7 how r e l a t e d are the knov/ledge areas?" and 
" ^ ^ the idea of c u r r i c u l a consisting of knowledge areas 
i n 'open* or closed r e l a t i o n to each other". 
Young (1971) pp.33,35 ( l e t t e r i n g added). 
Thus he i s r e f e r r i n g t o (a) the i n t e r n a l structure of bodies 
of 'knov/ledge' and (b) the structure of social r e l a t i o n s i n 
which those bodies of knowledge are located. He possibly implies 
also, i n the f i r s t d e f i n i t i o n , that the relatio n s h i p between 
(a) and (b) i s i t s e l f importajit. However, i n devising a 
typology of Dimensions of the Social Organisation of Knowledge 
i n Curricula, Young considers openness and closedness only i n 
sense ( a ) . The question of access (an aspect of social r e l a t i o n s 
of education) i s considered separately by Young, i n terms of 
Specialisation or "Scope". 
Questionability of Objectivated 'Itoowledge' i s an important 
kind of openness. V/here no a l t e r n a t i v e i s conceivable,then the 
view of Objectivated 'Knowledge' i s closed, i n t h i s respect. 
Horton (1967/71) points to a number of ways i n which African 
t r a d i t i o n a l thought i s not unlike Western s c i e n t i f i c thought. 
Sut what he does consider t o be a major distinguishing feature 
i s an openness t o a l t e r n a t i v e s . 
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"The key difference ,,. i s that i n t r a d i t i o n a l cultures 
there i s no developed awareness of a l t e r n a t i v e s t o the 
established body of t h e o r e t i c a l tenets, whereas i n 
s c i e n t i f i c a l l y oriented cultures such an awareness i s 
highly developed. I t i s t h i s difference we r e f e r t o 
when we say that t r a d i t i o n a l cultures are 'closed' and 
s c i e n t i f i c a l l y oriented cultures 'open'." 
Horton (1967/71) p.230, 
Openness or closure, here, concern more than the content and 
str u c t u r e of p a r t i c u l a r b e l i e f s . Whether e x p l i c i t l y or i m p l i c i t l y , 
epistemological issues are also involved: b e l i e f s about the 
re l a t i o n s h i p between the world-out-there (i n c l u d i n g isocial 
r e l a t i o n s ) and objectivated 'Knowledge'. 
Closures i n t h i s case are assumptions of "naturalness". 
I f a constraint i s believed t o be i n e v i t a b l e , then tl&it b e l i e f 
i s closed. This i s f a i r l y obvious with b e l i e f s about the nature 
of the physical world. I t applies also to b e l i e f s more central 
t o formal education. Take the question of "standards". When 
educational standards (or c u l t u r a l standards of any s o r t ) are 
upheld as unquestionable, i t i s assumed that some absolute or 
"n a t u r a l " t r u t h i s being propounded, ^ "^^  ^  Pears of f a l l i n g 
standards - and measures taken t o counteract them - involve 
closures of b e l i e f which are of considerable significance i n 
(12) 
education. 
Yet standards, too, are not j u s t i n t r i n s i c t o bodies of 
(13) 
b e l i e f . Standards are inseparable from framing^ - as are 
b e l i e f s about them. When Amis complains that 
"the u n i v e r s i t i e s today are f u l l of students who do not 
understand what stucly i s about, and who are p a i n f u l l y 
bewildered by the whole business and purpose of u n i v e r s i t y 
l i f e ; more has meant worse" 
Amis (1969) p.10, 
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he i s assuming not j u s t that there are definable standards. 
He i s also assuming th a t there are some people (the students 
he r e f e r s to amongst them) who are not competent t o know what 
these standards are, w h i l s t others ( i n c l u d i n g , presumably, 
himself) who are. He i s not making assumptions solely about 
the nature of'knowledge', but also about the soc i e t a l r e l a t i o n s 
i n which that 'knowledge' i s contexted. Standards, i n short, 
imply framing, which i n t u r n implies expertise (or the r i g h t 
t o frame on some other b a s i s ) . Closures of b e l i e f i n one respect 
imply closures i n the other. 
However, i t i s s t i l l possible t o consider the s t r u c t u r i n g 
of bodies of Objectivated 'Knowledge' i n i t s own r i g h t - so long 
as i t i s r e a l i s e d that t h a t i s hot the whole story. The 
"t r e e - r o o t " metaphor was designed p a r t l y f o r t h i s purpose. I n 
Syer (1975b) I discussed how one might understand Bernstein's 
use of such expressions as the "deep structure" of knowledge 
(14) 
and "education i n depth". I suggested that the "tree-root" 
metaphor was useful as a device f o r conceptualising both 
o b j e c t i v a t e d bodies of 'Knowledge' and subjective b e l i e f s and 
understsindings,but that Bernstein (amongst others) confuses the 
two. Bernstein says that 
"integrated codes w i l l make available from the beginning 
of the pupil's career, c l e a r l y i n a way appropriate to a 
given age l e v e l , the deep structure of the knowledge: 
i . e . the p r i n c i p l e s f o r the generating of new knowledge." 
Bernstein (1971) p . 6 l . 0 9 ) 
This view assumes that the str u c t u r e of Objectivated 'Knowledge' 
i n t o which the learner i s being i n i t i a t e d i s r e l a t i v e l y f i x e d . 
-295-
As such i t i s a closed view. I t i s a p a r t i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t 
form of closure, being common to much "open" educational t h i n k i n g . 
This i s not necessarily a c r i t i c i s m of such "Open Education", but 
an insistence that where there are closures, they need to be 
i d e n t i f i e d . 
Bernstein's f a i l u r e t o d i s t i n g u i s h between the s t r u c t u r i n g 
of learners' subjective 'knowledge' and tha t of objectivated 
C u r r i c u l a r 'Kiiowledge' again suggests the p r a c t i c a l i n s e p a r a b i l i t y 
of the three "realms": (Social) Reality, Objectivated 'Knowledge' 
and Subjective 'Knowledge', The question arises, whether the 
l a t t e r two may not i n f a c t be co-dependent, as we l l as interdepend-
ent. I s there a necessary, l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between them, or 
does t h i s j u s t "happen" t o occur i n practice? Esland (1971), f o r 
instance, tends t o confuse epistemological and psychological issues. 
Such a confusion i s e n t i r e l y understandable i f the two are 
necessarily r e l a t e d by "correspondent" structures of Objectivated 
and Subjective 'Knowledge'. The p l a u s i b i l i t y of Bernstein's 
d i s t i n c t i o n between Collection and Integration - and of other 
(16) 
dichotomies complained about by Pring^ - r e s t s i n part on the 
close association of p a r t i c u l a r epistemological w i t h p a r t i c u l a r 
l e a r n i n g theories. I have suggested that the same "tree-root" 
metaphor may be used i n consideration of both objectivated bodies 
of 'Knowledge' and subjective 'knowledge'. This i t s e l f i s 
i n d i c a t i v e of a close r e l a t i o n s h i p . I n p a r t i c u l a r , a " c o l l e c t i o n " 
view of 'knowledge' - where items of 'knowledge' are not seen to 
be s t r u c t u r a l l y r e l a t e d , but only l i s t e d or collected together -
accords w e l l w i t h what Popper cal l e d "bucket theories of the 
mind".(^'^^ 
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Theories of objectivated and of subjective 'knowledge' 
are, I suggest, co-dependent. Yet i t must be emphasized that 
some aspects of learning theory are cl e a r l y d i s t i n c t . I n the 
(18) 
case of programmed learning f o r instance, p a r t i c u l a r 
philosophical and psychological assumptions may need to operate 
f o r t h i s t o be advocated: 
"Programmed learning ,,,, p a r t i c u l a r l y of the l i n e a r type, 
i s compatible wj.th a set of philosophical assumptions 
about knowledge: namely that i t has an i n t r i n s i c form. 
I t also incorporates some behaviourist assumptions about 
learning and conditioning." Seaman (1972) p.41. 
But i t i s possible t o hold s i m i l a r philosophical assumptions, but 
a quite d i f f e r e n t view of learning. Consider the following 
passage. 
"Teaching i s p r i m a r i l y ... l i s t e n i n g t o the pu p i l and 
responding ... w i t h f u r t h e r questions ... Jacques 
Maritain's book on education i s one of the best 
statements I've heard about what a teacher does i n t h i s 
respect. He thinks of the teacher as knowing more than 
the p u p i l does yet i n some sense not conveying i t but 
seeing that i t i s made available to the p u p i l . The great 
use of superior knowledge i s t o understand what the p u p i l 
i s l e a r n i n g as i t i s learned. I t takes great wisdom t o 
be able t o f o l l o w a learning p u p i l s e n s i t i v e l y enough to 
know what the next step i s f o r him, and you don't press 
the next step. You watch i t happen. I f i t s t i c k s , you 
help i t a b i t , but i t ' s not a transmission or an 
imposition o r a f i l l i n g of a vessel or any of those 
t h i n g s . . . " 
Scott Buchanan (1970), quoted by Ohlige.r and McCarthy 
(1971) p,95. 
Here the speaker has s i m i l a r closures i n respect of Objectivated 
'Knowledge'. A good teacher,to him, knows what i s v a l i d and 
worthwhile. The end product, the pupil's subjective 'knowledge', 
i s s i m i l a r l y viewed as something that w i l l be assessable by 
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by objective (and therefore closed) c r i t e r i a . Yet the i r o n i c 
pedagogical approach advocated suggests a learning theory that 
i s open, i n the sense of non-determinative. There i s no f i x e d 
expectation that the p u p i l w i l l i n e v i t a b l y learn according 
t o preconceived and i n e v i t a b l e processes. 
Learning theory involves two kinds of r e l a t i o n s h i p . That 
between Objectivated 'Knowledge' and Subjective 'Knowledge' has 
p i l m a r i l y to do w i t h l o g i c a l structures of 'Knowledge'. P a r t i c u l a r 
people's b e l i e f s about one are co-dependent w i t h t h e i r b e l i e f s about 
the other. But the r e l a t i o n s h i p between (Social) Reality and 
Subjective 'Knowledge' concerns the contextuality of learning and 
the physical properties of the b r a i n . These I discuss i n the 
next section. 
Subjective 'Knowledge' and Mind-Brain 
We have seen that closure or openness i n respect of 
Objectivated 'Itoowledge' i s l o g i c a l l y related to closure 
openness i n respect of subjective 'knowledge'. Total opeimess 
i n the former case would imply adherence to no culture - whether 
t r a d i t i o n a l or r a d i c a l - and no c r i t e r i a of v a l i d i t y and value, 
whereby subjective 'knowledge' could be judged. Nonetheless, 
the two "realms" must be distinguished. They are o n t o l o g i c a l l y 
d i s t i n c t . Postman and Weingartner make the d i s t i n c t i o n i n t h i s 
passage: 
"I n our questions curriculum, subjects frequently lose 
t h e i r clear and a r b i t r a r y l i m i t i n g dimensions. We w i l l 
need to s t a r t t a l k i n g more about the 'structure of the 
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l e amer and his learning' and less about the 'structure 
of the subject'," 
Postman & Weingartner (1969/71) p.83. 
The d i s t i n c t i o n i s important, because closure about the 
l o g i c a l s t ructure of 'kiiowledge' does not necessarily imply 
t o t a l closure i n respect of learning theory. There i s also the 
contextual dimension of learning theory. To consider t h i s we 
may exsunine what are taken t o be "natural constraints" i n and 
upon mind-brain. I t i s possible t o hold closed b e l i e f s about 
what 'knowledge' should be created - that i s , to have pre-
established c r i t e r i a of v a l i d and valuable (objectivated) 
'knowledge' - yet at the same time t o be "open" about what 
subjective structures may, i n practice, be produced. No 
deter m i n i s t i c assumptions about what learaers w i l l i n fa c t 
learn are en t a i l e d necessarily by closures i n respect of what 
i t would be "desirable" f o r them t o learn. This i s so i n the 
case of the " P a r t i c i p a t i o n i s t " perspective. The preferred 
end-product i s already 'known'. Yet i t may be considered t h a t , 
to achieve that product, some sense of autonomy needs to be 
f e l t by the learner. Hence the so-called "discovery method", 
mocked here by Goodman. 
" I t i s impossible t o do creative work of any kind when 
the goals are predetermined by outsiders and cannot be 
c r i t i c i s e d and a l t e r e d by the kinds that have t o do the 
work, even i f they are youngsters ... 
The compromise of the National Science Foundation on 
t h i s point i s rather comical, 'Physical laws are not 
asserted; they are, i t i s hoped, discovered by the 
student'; 'there i s a desire to allow each student to 
experience some of the excitement that s c i e n t i f i c 
pursuits a f f o r d ' - I am quoting from the NSP'S Science 
Course Improvement Pro.;jects. That i s , the student i s t o 
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make a leap of discovery t o - what i s already known ,.. The 
excitement of discovery i s reduced to the animation of 
puzzle-solving. I doubt that puzzle-solving i s what 
creative thought i s about, though i t i s c e r t a i n l y what 
many Ph.Ds, are about." Goodman (1962/64/71) p.42. 
On the other hand, the po s i t i o n i s defended by Bruner: 
"As so frequently happens, the concept of discovery, 
o r i g i n a l l y formulated t o h i g h l i g h t the importance of 
s e l f - d i r e c t i o n and i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , had become detached 
from i t s context and made an end i n i t s e l f . Discovery 
was being treated by some educators as i f i t were valuable 
i n and of i t s e l f , no matter what i t was a discovery of, or 
i n whose searvice." Bruner (1972/74) p. 15. 
Many less sophisticated educationists than Bruner have assumed 
that the objective was unproblematic aind that only the means 
( i . e . the mode of learning) needed consideration. This i s a 
common form of closure i n most "Open Education" i n practice.^ ' 
Humanist approaches have been most c r i t i c a l of closures 
concerning i n d i v i d u a l capacity, rather than structures of thought 
and b e l i e f . The notions of educability and c u l t u r a l deprivation 
were discussed i n Chapter 6. I emphasised the c i ^ i t i c a l stages 
hypothesis: t h a t whether at b i r t h , or subsequently, there are 
stages i n i n d i v i d u a l development, a f t e r which major changes i n 
i n t e l l e c t u a l (and other) development are u n l i k e l y or impossible. 
I n t e l l i g e n c e , or motivation, or l i n g u i s t i c s k i l l s , f o r instance, 
are believed t o be f i x e d by a cer t a i n age. 
Deterministic i n t e r p r e t a t i o i B are commonly made of Piaget's 
theory of c h i l d maturation, of Bloom's s t a t i s t i c a l c o l l e c t i o n s 
f 20 ^ 
about s t a b i l i t y and change i n human cha r a c t e r i s t i c s ^ ' and of 
Bernstein's l i n g u i s t i c codes. Bruner, on the other haj:id, claims 
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t h a t , 
"There seems t o be l i t t l e evidence .,. f o r anything l i k e 
c r i t i c a l periods i n human growth - such t h a t , f o r example, 
i f a s k i l l i s not l e a r n t during a p a r t i c u l a r period i n 
the l i f e cycle, i t cannot be learnt l a t e r . The only 
exception may be i n the sphere of language .,, But what 
does seem evident, even i f there are not dramatic a l l - o r -
nothing watershed points i n human development, i s that 
c e r t a i n s k i l l s not le a r n t early come much harder l a t e r 
on." Bruner (1969/74) p.145. 
Holt (1974/75) i s p a r t i c u l a r l y indignant about the l i m i t e d 
accomplishments of most ch i l d r e n . He sees t h i s as a consequence 
of closed b e l i e f s about what they are "normally" capable of. 
He r e f e r s , f o r instance, t o Japanese Suzuki-trained v i o l i n i s t s 
and says, 
"By contrast, I t h i n k of a school ... i n which four- and 
five-year o l d children are formed i n t o what i s ca l l e d a 
rhythm band. Using small drums, b e l l s and cymbals, they 
beat out, more or le s s , the rhythm of some piece that 
the teacher plays f o r them. The children, l i k e t h e i r 
teacher, believe that what they are doing i s very close t o 
the l i m i t of what they can do, and i n v i t e us to marvel at 
i t . A l l the while children of no greater natural a b i l i t y , 
i n Japan, are playing on t h e i r r e a l v i o l i n s music by 
V i v a l d i , Handel and Bach.'' 
Holt (1974/75) p.73. 
Perhaps the f o l l o w i n g i s a t o t a l l y open view of i n d i v i d u a l 
p o t e n t i a l : 
" I n denying that people are n a t u r a l l y competent or 
n a t u r a l l y good, I am not a f f i r m i n g that they are 
n a t u r a l l y incompetent or n a t u r a l l y e v i l . I-.am af f i r m i n g 
t h a t they are n a t u r a l l y nothing." 
Str i k e (1975) p.188. 
Whilst educationists have concentrated on notions of 
i n t e l l i g e n c e , or i n t e l l e c t u a l p o t e n t i a l of some kind, such 
closures are j u s t instances of more general closures concerning 
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i n d i v i d u a l cha3 ? a 6 teristics. The j o u r n a l i s t A l i s t a i r Cooke 
expressed a common closure when ( i n discussing Governor 
Rockefeller's declaration that he would cease a l i f e - t i m e 
habit of g i v i n g b i g presents, i f he became vice-president) 
he said 
"We a l l know that character never changes, except i n 
the movies." Cooke, B.B.C. Radio 4, 24/11/74. 
This i s not exclusively a g e n e t i c i s t assumption, as Adomo 
et a l . i n d i c a t e : 
"Although personality i s a product of the social 
environment of the past, i t i s not, once i t has 
developed, a mere object of the contemporaiy environ-
ment. What has developed i s a structure w i t h i n the 
i n d i v i d u a l , something which i s capable of s e l f -
i n i t i a t e d action upon the so c i a l environment and of 
selection w i t h respect to impinging s t i m u l i , something 
which although modifiable i s frequently very resistant 
t o fundamental change." Adomo et a l , (1950) 
Total closure on t h i s issue would deny any such m o d i f i a b i l i t y 
( a f t e r c r i t i c a l stages). Total openness would presumably deny 
any necessary human consistency. I n examining empirical 
instances of educational b e l i e f , we need t o know to what extent 
such consistency i s assumed to be necessary (not j u s t frequent) 
and " n a t u r a l " , what kinds of people are the objects of such 
b e l i e f s , i n what contexts, and i n what respects. Again we see 
tha t w h i l s t "Open Education" as a type may not be a valuable 
concept, the notions of closure and openness i n certain specified 
(21) 
respects can be very useful.^ 
S i g n i f i c a n t closures about supposed human cha r a c t e r i s t i c s 
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often concern p a r t i c u l a r categories of people. Examples are 
(22) 
d e t e r m i n i s t i c b e l i e f s about "race" and sex.^ Both were found 
i n the psychometric emphasis of much U.S. Progressive education, 
(23) 
e a r l i e r t h i s century,^ ' I return to t h i s i n Chapter 15 below. 
As f o r the contemporary ( B r i t i s h ) versions of "Open Education", 
closures i n t h i s respect are r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t , but s t i l l 
important. (See Chapter 16.) 
Deterministic b e l i e f s often appear as categorisations 
(of types of people, f o r instance), within i m p l i c i t causal models. 
For no categorisation can e x i s t except within a broader notional 
s t r u c t u r e . Such b e l i e f s may have significazit consequences. 
Real constraints can arise when notional closures a f f e c t p o l i c y 
and are thereby i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d . That i s , b e l i e f s about the 
Social Relations-Subjective 'Knowledge' r e l a t i o n s h i p can bring 
about r e a l constraints i n Social Relations. Frankly r a c i s t 
assumptions, f o r instance, can have clear p o l i c y implications.^ 
Less overt d e t e r m i n i s t i c - b e l i e f s may be s i m i l a r l y consequential -
perhaps more i n s i d i o u s l y so, through r e f e r r i n g to what i s "obvious" 
and "unquestionable". Constraints may be reproduced, from which 
closures themselves are i n t u r n derived. Those closures, indeed, 
may l e g i t i m a t e continued constraints and i n e q u a l i t i e s . 
We are here c l e a r l y dealing w i t h the "Power" dimension. 
Assumptions about categories of people, about t h e i r place w i t h i n 
the s o c i e t a l structure and about the preferred role of education 
i n t h e i r case are not matters only of subjective 'knowledge'. 
They concern r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h i s subjective 'Knowledge' 
and s o c i e t a l r e l a t i o n s . Educational objectives are involved here: 
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who i s supposed to benefit from formal education? I n much 
" Open Education", there i s an emphasis on the i n d i v i d u a l 
l e a r n e r - not j u s t on psychological (learning theory) grounds, 
but on moral grounds too. Often i t i s assumed that what i s 
(25) 
good f o r the i n d i v i d u a l i s thereby good f o r society.^ ' But 
humemist educationists often avoid dealing with t h i s e x p l i c i t l y . 
They attend only to the question of l e a r n e r autonomy. Pe t r i e 
(1975) suggests that the two fundamental p r i n c i p l e s of "Open 
Education" are f i r s t l y a personal construct view of 'knowledge' 
and secondly a respect f o r student i n t e g r i t y . He argues cogently 
that strong views of these are untenable. (He himself advocates 
a mild view and the promotion of "judgment"). Respect f o r 
student i n t e g r i t y can l o g i c a l l y involve a t o t a l l y open view of 
how pedagogical r e l a t i o n s - and ultimately s o c i e t a l r e l a t i o n s -
should be structured. For that could be l e f t to student choice. 
T h i s might be implied, f o r instance, in the following: 
"We cannot have r e a l learning i n school i f we think i t 
i s our duty and our r i g h t to t e l l children what they must 
l e a r n . We cannot know, at any moment, what p a r t i c u l a r b i t 
of knowledge or understanding a c h i l d needs most, w i l l 
most strengthen and best f i t s h i s model of r e a l i t y . Only 
he can do t h i s . He may not do i t very w e l l , but he can 
do i t a hundred times b e t t e r than we can." 
Holt (1964/69) p.175. 
However, i n i t s strong sense, t h i s kind of openness i f s e l f -
defeating. As P e t r i e points out, i t s truth i s Inconsistent with 
i t s a s s e r t i o n . I n p r a c t i c e , any advocate of such student 
i n t e g r i t y and personal construct theory must have l i m i t s to what 
he intends - however i m p l i c i t those l i m i t s may be - because h i s 
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b e l i e f s are both i n and about the r e a l world. Accordingly, i n 
examining any p a r t i c u l a r version of "open" educational t h i n k i n g 
and b e l i e f , we must ask what closures, i n t h i s respect, are taken 
f o r granted. What l i m i t s are assumed to be necessary on the r i g h t 
of i n d i v i d u a l learners to frame t h e i r own 'knowledg^'? 
Pring's " I n t e g r a t i o n " 
Pring (1970/71) fears that the popular appeal of c a l l s to 
" i n t e g r a t e " c u r r i c u l a may be detariLmental to education, because 
teachers and others have not spelled out precisely what i s intended. 
He suggests f o u r ( o r perhaps f i v e - see below) " l i n e s of argument" 
that might be taken by i n t e g r a t i o n i s t s . This attempt to s p e l l 
out what i n p r a c t i c e may be l a r g e l y i m p l i c i t and l o g i c a l l y 
inadequate i s most worthwhile. I applaud the assertion that 
"any p a r t i c u l a r recommendation f o r curriculum i n t e g r a t i o n 
implies some underlying theory of knowledge or of value 
or of l e a m i h g . " (p,266) (26) 
Indeed, I would argue that a l l of these are always involved. 
I n t h i s section I attempt to s p e l l out i n the case of Pring's 
four ( o r f i v e ) " l i n e s of argument" what these underlying theories 
are. This i s something Pring does not do. (Perhaps, as a 
professional philosopher, he i s more cautious than I about the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of s i m p l i f y i n g d e f i n i t i o n s of "knowledge", "value" 
and "learning" i n order to operationalise them i n t h i s context.) 
To do t h i s , I employ d i s t i n c t i o n s made already i n t h i s essay. 
I t i s my i n t e n t i o n t o demonstrate the a p p l i c a b i l i t y and usefulness 
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of these d i s t i n c t i o n s i n c l a r i f y i n g a t h e o r e t i c a l analysis of 
" i n t e g r a t i o n " . 
I t i s convenient t o quote at length the l i n e s of argument 
(27) 
o f f e r e d by Pring. They are as followss-
1. (a) "No proposition or argument of any enquiry i s , 
admittedly, without a l o g i c a l structure which can be 
i d e n t i f i e d as such and which determines t o some extent 
the r o l e i t can play i n the enquiry ... Nonetheless 
many problems inc l u d i n g those of considerable personal 
importance cannot be raised, l e t alone answered, w i t h i n 
any one cognitive s t r u c t u r e . Different sorts of enquiry 
have t o be brought t o bear upon a p a r t i c u l a r problem. 
Sex education ... i s an obvious example." (p.268). 
(b) "There i s a f u r t h e r educative task of i n t e g r a t i n g the 
d i s c i p l i n e s i n s o f a r as these are brought to bear upon a 
problem which cannot be f i t t e d i n t o the l i m i t s of. any 
one d i s c i p l i n e . " (p.270). 
"The p u t t i n g together of the d i s t i n c t i v e enquiries 
represented by the d i s c i p l i n e s i s i t s e l f an educational 
task that should have a place within the curriculum..."(p.268). 
2. (a) "The d i s c i p l i n e s represent the worked out structures of 
knowledge, the systematic organisations of experience, the 
p a r t i c u l a r conceptual schemes which determine how one 
c l a s s i f i e s , i ndividuates, and proceeds w i t h yet f u r t h e r 
enquiry ... They do not, however, r e f l e c t the pupil's 
l e v e l and mode of understanding, nor do they indicate 
the process whereby the p u p i l might a t t a i n these 
structures of knowledge." (pp. 268-9 , o r i g i n a l 
emphasis). 
(b) "The 'natural' c u r i o s i t y of the p u p i l , h±v 'spontaneous' 
enquiry, would lead t o the gradual d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of a 
conceptual structure that t y p i f i e d the worked out modes 
of understanding. Although the end product might be the 
d i f f e r e n t foiros of knowledge, the educational process 
towards t h i s goal would be an integrated a c t i v i t y , 
focusaed upon or united i n the current i n t e r e s t or enquiry 
of the p u p i l . " (p.269). 
"The c u r i o s i t y and free enquiry of the p u p i l might be seen 
as the i n t e g r a t i n g f a c t o r and the f i n a l systematisation of 
knowledge, manifest i n the d i f f e r e n t d i s c i p l i n e s , would be 
said t o develop from such an enquiry." (p.270-1). 
3. (a) "There are no d i s t i n c t d i s c i p l i n e s of thought, 
characterised by d i f f e r e n t modes of enquiry. Rather i s a l l 
enquiry a matter of solving problems ... There i s always 
the same pattern t o any enquiry and the r e s u l t i n g knowledge 
i s e s s e n t i a l l y that of te n t a t i v e hypothesis, constantly 
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tested and reformulated. The d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of knowledge 
i n t o d i s t i n c t modes characterised by d i f f e r e n t processes of 
enquiry and v e r i f i c a t i o n i s dismissed. Enquiry i s basically 
of the same pat t e r n , though the r e s u l t i n g structures of 
understanding might be distinguished by t h e i r respective 
organising concepts," (p«269). 
"The method of enquiry i t s e l f i s unitary and ... there i s 
no t h e o r e t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of modes 
of understanding upon which the fragmentation of the 
syllabus i s based." (p.271). 
(b) "Sometimes of course the pupi l does not appear to be 
•spontaneously' or ' n a t u r a l l y ' curious. I n such cases the 
pu p i l needs t o be 'stimulated'. I n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y enquiry 
sometimes begins w i t h a key lesson i n which the p u p i l i s 
given a ba t t e r y of ' s t i m u l i ' ..." (p.269). 
4. (c) "Whatever i t s nature, knowledge i s said t o be of value 
i n s o f a r as i t meets the needs of the p u p i l or i s of social 
u t i l i t y . The 'needs' of the pupils are l i s t e d ... and these 
become the u n i f y i n g f a c t o r s i n determining the balance of 
the curriculum." (p.270). 
"The value of knowledge depends on the degree to which i t 
s a t i s f i e s the 'needs' of the i n d i v i d u a l oi* of society ; 
'needs' give d i r e c t i o n said purpose, and thereby an 
i n t e g r a t i n g thread t o the educational process." (p.271). 
(b) "Themes l i k e 'Meua and his environment' are subdivided 
i n t o smaller themes such as 'Family', 'Hbme', 'Leisure', 
•Work', To study material w i t h i n the ambit of such themes 
w i l l , i t i s claimed, enlighten the p u p i l i n matters relevant 
to his immediate needs." (p.270). 
"Certain concepts such as 'power' and 'communications' are 
complex i n meaning, are central t o our thinking i n the 
d i f f e r e n t d i s c i p l i n e s of thought, need close scrutiny i n 
themselves, and thereby o f f e r fresh ways of entering i n t o 
d i f f e r e n t areas of knowledge" (p.271).(28) 
These are the four l i n e s of i n t e g r a t i o n i s t argument which 
Pring e i t h e r observes i n pract i c e , or thinfes might be put forward. 
( I t i s not clear which.) Though Pring does not express i t i n such 
terms, i t seems to me that the f i r s t three hinge on epistemological 
and learning theory assumptions, w h i l s t the f o u r t h depends on 
(29 ) 
assumptions about "e t h i c s " and learning theoiy.^ ' (Pring does 
not i n i t i a l l y number these l i n e s of argument. I t i s where he 
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does - on pages 270-1 - that the " f i f t h " l i n e of argument i s 
distinguished from the f o u r t h . Since nothing preceding i t seems 
t o me to lead up t o t h i s separate "argument", I t h i n k i t j u s t i f i a b l e 
t o t r e a t i t as a rather anomalous footnote t o number 4.) 
I have presented each l i n e of argument i n two parts ('a' or 
'c' and 'b'). I n each case, the second part seems to r e f e r t o 
questions of learning theory, w h i l s t the f i r s t refers to e i t h e r 
epistemological or e t h i c a l ones - but not, e x p l i c i t l y at l e a s t , 
t o both. These l i n e s of argument, then, are of the fol l o w i n g form: 
1. (a) epistemological argument 4» (c) e t h i c a l argument 
(b) learning theory argument (b) learning theory 
2. (a) epistemological argument argument 
(b) learning theory argument 
3. (a) epistemological argument 
(b) learning theory argument 
I t w i l l be remembered that Pring stated that 
"ajay p a r t i c u l a r recommendation f o r curriculum i n t e g r a t i o n 
implies some underlying theo3ry of knowledge or of value 
or of l e a r n i n g . " (p.266, my emphasis). 
But i n a l l education b e l i e f s , both "Knowledge' (including 
epistemological and learning theory) and "Power" dimensions are 
i n e v i t a b l y involved. B e l i e f s are always contexted. They always, 
the r e f o r e , have a p o l i t i c a l - or " e t h i c a l " - component. Advocates 
of any of Pring's four l i n e s of argument would, i n practice, be 
making assuipptions of both kinds. I n some cases these are 
apparent even i n Pring's formulation. Elsewhere they might be 
i n f e r r e d . But i n a l l cases one would have t o look at actual 
empirical instances of such b e l i e f s to understand them properly. 
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Por example, i n argument 1 ( a ) , i t i s suggested that 
"many problems including those of considerable importance 
cannot be raised, l e t alone answered, w i t h i n any one 
cognitive s t r u c t u r e . D i f f e r e n t sorts of enquiry have t o be 
brought t o bear upon a p a r t i c u l a r problem." (p.268). 
But c l e a r l y the choice of what "problems" are to be tacked at 
school, which ones are of "considerable personal importance", why 
they are and whether these are the appropriate concern of formal 
education are a l l e t h i c a l (or p o l i t i c a l ) questions, not epistemological 
ones. The "needs" of the c h i l d or of society (or of any other 
s o c i a l grouping) are j u s t as much at issue here as they are i n the 
f o u r t h l i n e of argument. 
S i m i l a r l y , i n the f o u r t h l i n e of argument, there i s c e r t a i n l y 
an i m p l i c i t epistemological assumption being made. This i s despite 
Pring's assurance that an answer t o the question, "What i s the aim 
of education", given i n terms of c h i l d or so c i e t a l "needs", 
"does not raise the epistemological issues that I have 
been considering." (po270). 
They may not raise them e x p l i c i t l y , but there i s c l e a r l y a 
r e l a t i v i s t stance implied i n the way Pring has formulated t h i s 
l i n e of argument. One would expect some such stance to be taken 
by any advocate of t h i s view, i n practice. Again, i n l i n e s of 
argument Z and 3, there i s no e x p l i c i t l y e t h i c a l perspective 
r e f e r r e d t o . But t h i s could j u s t be a feature of the way Pring 
has presented them, divorced as they are from any s p e c i f i c 
context. Even as they stand, one could argue that i m p l i c i t 
p r e s c r i p t i v e assumptions are indicated, concerning the d e s i r a b i l i t y 
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of maximum i n d i v i d u a l performance, or of maintaining established 
c u r r i c u l a r boundaries as an e t h i c a l issue. As i n the case of 
educational standards, questions of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and subject 
boundaries are inseparable from questions of framing, and 
therefore of "power". ^"^ ^^  
D i s t i n c t i o n s between the four l i n e s of argument are made 
clear e r i f they are rei n t e r p r e t e d i n terms of the three "realms" 
suggested i n t h i s essay. I f we consider epistemological, learning 
theory and e t h i c a l / p o l i t i c a l dimensions i n terras of (a) Objective 
Reality ( i n c l u d i n g s o c i a l and s o c i e t a l r e l a t i o n s ) , (b) Objectivated 
'Knowledge' and (c ) Subjective 'Knowledge', then v a r i a t i o n s between 
the f o u r forms of integrationism become clearer, Epistemology 
has t o do w i t h r e l a t i o n s h i p s between Reality and Objectivated 
'Knowledge'. Learning Theory has to do with those between 
Subjective 'Knowledge' and both Reality and Objectivated 'Knowledge', 
Ethics (or "Power") have to do w i t h relationships between Reality 
( i n c l u d i n g s o c i e t a l r e l a t i o n s ) and both Objectivated 'Knowledge' 
and Subjective 'Knowledge'. 
Objectivated 'Knowledge' (OK) 
epistemologyI "ethics" 
Reality (R) ^ ^^ ^^ ^^  learning theory 
learning theory; " e t h i c s " 
Subjective 'Knowledge' (SK) 
With these d i s t i n c t i o n s made, Pring»s four l i n e s of argument 
might be seen i n these terms; 
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1. (a) The epistemological assumptions are that established 
d i s c i p l i n e s (OK) do not correspond to the objective Reality (R). 
Nonetheless, there are inherent structures and logics i n these obj-
ectivated d i s c i p l i n e s . These may not always be appropriate, 
however, to the kinds of enquiry that should be undertaken 
i n schools. 
(b) As f o r learning theory, the inherent structures of 
established d i s c i p l i n e s (OK) i n e v i t a b l y play a part i n 
i n d i v i d u a l s ' learning processes (SK). But since they do not 
correspond adequately w i t h the real world (R), the search 
f o r i n t e g r a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s i s both necessary and also a 
viable "educative task". 
(c) Although e t h i c a l c r i t e r i a may not be e x p l i c i t l y mentioned, 
questions of value arise i n deciding what kinds of enquiry 
should be undertaken i n schools (see a ) , and what constitutes 
an "educative task" (see b ) . The choice of problems to be 
tackled and especially those of "considerable importance" are 
e t h i c a l / p o l i t i c a l questions. 
2. (a) Epistemologically i t i s assumed that objectivated 
d i s c i p l i n e s (OK) more or less "correspond" with the objective 
Reality (R). 
(b) Learning theory concerns the most e f f e c t i v e way of 
introducing these d i s c i p l i n e s (OK) to the c h i l d (SK). That i s , 
the object i s to make SK correspond with OK. The assumed 
na t u r a l c u r i o s i t y of the c h i l d (which has to do w i t h mind-brain 
i n a s o c i e t a l context - i n other words the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between SK and R) i s a great help i n t h i s . 
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(c) No e x p l i c i t mention i s made of e t h i c a l issues. However, 
unless e x p l i c i t l y questioned, a b e l i e f i n the correctness of 
objectivated d i s c i p l i n e s (OK) as an adequate i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
the r e a l world (R) tends to e n t a i l two things. I t e n t a i l s 
f i r s t l y - axi acceptance of i t s own e t h i c a l standing - t h i s i s 
especially so where the Reality i n question involves s o c i e t a l 
r e l a t i o n s - and secondly a l e g i t i m a t i o n of the current framers 
of knowledge. Therefore, not only would "natural c u r i o s i t y " 
(b) and i n t e g r a t i o n (a) lead to the c h i l d subjectivating 
established forms of 'knowledge', but they should do t h i s , 
3. (a) Epistemologically, established d i s c i p l i n e s (OK) do not 
adequately represent Reality (R). Discipline boundaries are 
a r b i t r a r y and there i s e s s e n t i a l l y only one mode of enquiry. 
(b) I n learning theory, therefore, only one broad approach 
i s necessary. This i s one of problem-solving. I t i s backed 
by stimulus-response theory, concerning what induces children 
to l e a r n . I n both these respects there i s an emphasis on 
the R-SK r e l a t i o n s h i p - i n teras f i r s t l y of the nature of 
mind-brain and secondly of what are to be examined as 
"problems". 
(c) E t h i c a l l y , there are again no prescriptions e x p l i c i t l y 
stated. However, there i s the i m p l i c i t assumption that 
educators have the r i g h t and the duty t o stimulate those 
lacking i n "spontaneous" c u r i o s i t y . As i n a l l of these f i r s t 
three arguments, there i s also probably (but not necessarily) 
some f u r t h e r assumption about the d e s i r a b i l i t y of developing 
subjective understandings of a l l children t o t h e i r optimum 
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l e v e l , however t h i s may be defined. 
4. (a) The epistemological assumption i s a r e l a t i v i s t one. 
There are various r e a l i t i e s (Rs) and various possible 
accounts that may adequately or inadequately "correspond" 
w i t h them (OKs), 
(b) Learning theory i s rather ambiguously treated by 
Pring here. I t seems, though, that what i s regarded as 
"relevant t o ^he c h i l d ' ^ ^ inasediate needs" i s supposed to 
be more ea s i l y learned than that which i s not (R-SK rather 
than OK-SK). 
(c) E t h i c a l l y , subjective accounts (SK) - and indeed the 
objectivated curriculum (OK) - should be developed so as 
t o be relevant t o s o c i e t a l and/or i n d i v i d u a l needs (R), 
The aim i s again t o educate children t o become able to deal 
w i t h problems - which of course are unspecified. 
I have dealt w i t h Pring's arguments at some length, not 
because I wished to challenge his l i n e of argument, but because 
t h i s treatment seemed to i l l u s t r a t e well some of the points I 
h8,ve been making, i n considering how we might approach cases of 
allegedly "Open Education"^ I have stressed that i n a l l educational 
b e l i e f s and t h i n k i n g there are epistemological, learning theory 
and e t h i c a l / p o l i t i d a l assumptions involved, whether or not they 
are made e x p l i c i t . Certainly, as Pring suggests, one or other 
aspect may be emphasised i n any l i n e of argument put forward, 
Pring complained that such l i n e s of argument are too frequently 
unelaborated. I t seems t o me that a l l features need elaboration, 
i n each case. Moreover, i t i s assumptions, rather than l i n e s of 
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argument, which are i n practice most important. I t i s b e l i e f s , 
r a t h e r than understandings, which are most consequential. This 
being the case, a l l three "realms" - and i n turn both the 
"Knowledge" and the "Power" dimensions - are always involved, 
i n p r a c t i c e . A l l three must be examined i n empirical instances. 
Notes 
(1) cf Pring's c r i t i c i s m , i n f e r r e d to i n Chapter 8 above. 
(2) i . e . the closures w i t h which I am most concerned are theories, 
however i m p l i c i t . They are "causal" models, r e f e r r i n g to 
assumed determinative relationships i n the world-out-there. 
of Chapter 2 above. 
(3) I n Syer (1974a) I c r i t i c i s e d Bernstein (1971) f o r f a i l i n g 
t o d i s t i n g u i s h adequately between levels w i t h i n education 
systems and t r y i n g t o generalise on that basis. B r i e f l y , 
and i n h i s teiros, weak c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and framing f o r 
teachers or students, and i n primary schools, s i x t h forms, 
or remedial streams are very d i f f e r e n t social phenomena. 
They need other (more basic) concepts f o r t h e i r d i s t i n c t i v e 
elaboration. 
(4) Weber (1919/48) pp. 139-143. 
(5) c f . Schutz (1944/71). 
(6) c f . also Clark (1960) on American open-door colleges. 
(7) e.g. Davis, Gardner & Gardner (1944/65). 
(8) For changing d e f i n i t i o n s of "equality of opportunity" i n t h i s 
country, see S i l v e r (1973, ed.)| Halsey (1972,ed.) chapter 1, 
For the U.S., see Coleman (1968/71). On the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between s o c i a l m o b i l i t y ajid "equality of opportunity", see, 
e.g. Huberman (1974). Ribbich (1975) i s c r i t i c a l of the way 
the slogan l e g i t i m i s e s economic (and " r a c i a l " ) i n e q u a l i t y , 
as are Bowles and Gintis (1976). 
(9) For instance: 
"The robustness of t h i s perspective (even those who r e j e c t 
i t have nagging doubts) i s due, i n no small part, to i t s 
incorporation i n major s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s - f a c t o r i e s , 
o f f i c e s , government bureaus, and schools. For the 
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technocratic j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the h i e r a r c h i c a l d i v i s i o n 
of labour leads smoothly t o a meritocratic view of the 
process whereby i n d i v i d u a l s are matched to jobs..." 
Bowles & Gintis (1976) p.105. 
P a r t i c u l a r l y relevant to t h i s i s the assumption held by most 
prominent psychometrioians at one time that " i n t e l l i g e n t " was 
more or less equatable w i t h "moral". See Karier (1972/73t>) 
especially pp. 122-3. I s h a l l return t o the American 
Progressive movement i n Chapter 15. 
(10) Douglas (1970/73, pp.53-4) praises Bernstein's d i s t i n c t i o n 
between p o s i t i o n a l and personal families on the grounds that 
i t i s a higher l e v e l a bstraction than the more conventional 
achievement/ascription. For i n some f a m i l i e s (and I would 
say i n our society) roles may be achieved, but then acquire 
quasi-ascriptive c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . 
(11) To repeat, I am not wishing to imply that closures - i n t h i s 
or i n any other respect - may not "correspond" w i t h some 
r e a l constraints. The r e l a t i v i s t - r e a l i s t p o s i t i o n I 
o u t l i n e d i n Chapter 2 i n s i s t s that b e l i e f s , though r e l a t i v e , 
are: not a r b i t r a r y or random. Closures may indeed "correspond" 
w i t h r e a l c o n s t r a i n t s , and standards - however i d e o l o g i c a l l y 
held (and therefore i n t e r e s t - s p e c i f i c ) - may be j u s t i f i a b l e 
on quite d i f f e r e n t grounds. 
(12) This can be seen aliundred years apart i n the statements of 
Robert Lowe and of Amis and Conquest. Lowe, who a year l a t e r 
was resigned t o an extended suffrage-and dressing the need 
to "compel our future masters to learn t h e i r l e t t e r s " , opposed 
t h i s extension i n 1866 because a "conspiracy of the ' u n f i t ' 
would swamp and o b l i t e r a t e not only property, but i n t e l l i g e n c e , 
c u l t u r e , t o l e r a t i o n , patidotism." (Simon, 1960, p.355). 
Amis and Conquest (19^9) have more recently affirmed t h a t , 
"Our dispute i s not of course about E l i t e s at a l l , but about 
what should c o n s t i t u t e an education ..." (p.158). 
(13) I suggested i n Syer (1974a) that Bernstein's notion of 
"framing" (1971) i s too ambiguous to be used i n analysis of what 
he c a l l s the "power and c o n t r o l component" i n education. The 
term i s nonetheless u s e f u l , to denote "control over the 
organisation o f what i s taken t o be v a l i d and valuable 
'knowledge' - e.g. curriculum". 
(14) See also Chapter 10 below. 
(15) Although Bernstein acknowledges reading Chomsky (Bernstein, 
1973, p.267), he appears to lean more heavily on Bruner i n 
t h i s passage - sind, I suspect, throughout. Consider the 
f o l l o w i n g ; 
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"We begin w i t h the hypothesis that any subject can be 
taught e f f e c t i v e l y i n some intellectua?.ly honest form 
to any c h i l d at any stage of development." 
Bruner (1960) p.33. 
Later Bruner, too, was influenced by Chomsky's w r i t i n g s : 
"With respect t o making accessible the deep structure 
of any given d i s c i p l i n e ... any subject can be taught 
to any c h i l d at any age i n some form that i s both 
honest and poweirful." 
Bruner (1969/74) p.138. 
I n t h i s l a t t e r passage, Bruner, too, assumed a c l e a r l y 
r e i f i e d curriculum, 
(16) See Chapter 2, note 106, 
(17) Popper (1963). Compare also Preire's c r i t i c i s m s of a 
" n u t r i t i o n i s t " view of knowledge ( F r e i r e , 1970/72, p.22 f f ) . 
As f o r advocates of "bucket" theories of the mind, 
compare the f o l l o w i n g : 
" I n t e l l i g e n c e , as psychologists use the word, i s almost 
synonymous w i t h what the Board of Education, somewhat 
uneuphoniously, has c a l l e d 'educable capacity'. Capacity 
must obviously l i m i t content. I t i s impossible f o r a 
p i n t jug t o hold more thajn a pint of milk; and i t i s 
equally impossible f o r a child's educational attsiinments 
to r i s e highei* than his educable capacity permits." 
Burt (1937) p.447. 
I n the 19th centuiy, the Rev.Robinson, p r i n c i p a l of a 
teachers t r a i n i n g college at York,gave evidence to the 
Newcastle Commission (1861): 
"The present course tends to impart information rather 
than to develop the f a c u l t i e s and t o d i s c i p l i n e the mind. 
The p r i n c i p l e i n short ... i s to pour i n t o the students' 
minds a large supply of knowledge which they i n turn 
may discharge i n t o the minds of t h e i r scholars ... The 
great feature of the course ... i s cram. The master 
has been crammed himself and so he crams his p u p i l s . " 
quoted by Hurt (1971/72) p.140 ( o r i g i n a l emphasis). 
I am not sure, but I t h i n k Robinson approved of t h i s 
perspective. He was c e r t a i n l y unsympathetic to teachers who 
t r i e d t o raise themselves above t h e i r "natural" s t a t i o n . 
Again we see the 'TPower"/consequentiality aspects of 
educational b e l i e f s , inseparable i n practice from the 
"Knowledge" component, 
(18) c f . Goodman (1962/64/71) Chapter 6, f o r a strong attack on 
programmed learning. 
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(19) See Syer (1974b) and Part V belov;. 
(20) e,g, Bantock (1971). Bloom (1964) reported a number of empirical 
f i n d i n g s , f o r instance that by the age of 9, at least 50% of 
general achievement pattern at the age of 18 has been 
developed. But Bloom himself (1968) claims that children 
d i f f e r i n the rate at which they learn, not i n t h e i r basic 
capacity t o learn - which his findings are generally taken 
t o i n d i c a t e . On the r e i f i c a t i o n of research findings see 
Pord (1975) Chapter 20. 
(21) Again i t should be pointed out that the nature of actual, 
r e a l constraints i s not here at issue. Rather, I am 
considering what are taken to be constraints - that i s 
closures of b e l i e f . Meanwhile, evidence that the common 
assumption of immutable human chara c t e r i s t i c s may be a 
function only of s o c i e t a l circumstance, rather thain of 
innate determination i s not lacking, Bettleheim describes 
the d r a s t i c changes that he witnessed (and experienced) 
i n Dachau and Bttchenwald, and which caused him to revise 
much of h i s previous t h i n k i n g on psychoanalysis and 
s o c i e t a l change; 
" I also saw f a s t changes taking place, and not only i n 
behaviour but personality too; i n c r e d i b l y f a s t e r and 
often much more r a d i c a l changes than any that were 
possible by psychoanalytic treatment. Given the 
conditions of the camp, these changes were more often 
f o r the worse, but sometimes d e f i n i t e l y f o r the b e t t e r . 
So one and the same environment could bring about r a d i c a l 
changes both f o r b e t t e r and worse, I could no longer 
doubt that environment can and does account f o r important 
aspects of man's behaviour and personality .... 
My experience i n the camps taught me, almost w i t h i n days, 
that I h a d gone much too f a r i n believing that only changes 
i n man could create change i n society," 
"Neither i s society as i r r e l e v a n t to understanding 
person a l i t y dynamics as psychoanalysis suggests, nor i s 
personality development as rooted i n biology and early 
l i f e experiences, or as independent of the current 
environment, as was assumed ..." 
Bettleheim (1960/70) pp.22-24, 42-43. 
Becker has commented on the way that many social s c i e n t i s t s 
assume that e i t h e r personality or value orientations are 
b a s i c a l l y stable and then seek to explain away anomalies: 
"Both these approaches e r r by taking f o r granted that the 
only way we can a r r i v e at generalised explanations of 
human behaviour i s by f i n d i n g some unchanging components 
i n the s e l f or personality. They e r r as well i n making 
the p r i o r assui^tion that human beings are e s s e n t i a l l y 
unchanging ..." 
Becker (1964/71) p,129. 
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Closely connected w i t h some awareness of t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y of 
dr a s t i c personal change have been certain education p o l i c i e s 
motivated by desires f o r s o c i a l control or order. Eager 
(1953) says of l a t e 19th century B r i t a i n that 
"The d i s c i p l i n e and order secured by the elementary 
schools was almost miraculous, but w i t h i n two or three 
years the w e l l - t r a i n e d schoolboy degenerated to the 
l a r r i k i n of the s t r e e t s , ignorant, foul-mouthed and 
predatory." 
quoted by Simon (1965) p.61. 
Simon also quoted a contemporary advocate of Boys Clubs, to 
the same e f f e c t . Such evidence as t h i s reminds us again of 
the problematic nature of the tra n s f e r of Master Patterns 
from one context (the school) to others, i n adult l i f e , and 
the need therefore t o view w i t h caution too s i m p l i s t i c a 
notion of the "Correspondence P r i n c i p l e " . 
(22) See Rex (1970) who argues that whilst s t r i c t l y speaking 
racism may r e f e r t o genetic deterinination, deterministic 
b e l i e f s that r e f e r to some other (e,g. " c u l t u r a l " ) 
"causation" are of the same basic character. I f u l l y agree 
w i t h t h i s argument. 
(23) Thomdike (1914) had t h i s t o say about sexual d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n : 
"The most s t r i k i n g differences i n i n s t i n c t i v e equipment 
consists i n the strength of the f i g h t i n g i n s t i n c t i n the 
male ajad of the nursing i n s t i n c t i n the female .,, And 
probably no serious student of human nature w i l l doubt 
that these are matters of o r i g i n a l nature. The out-and-out 
physical f i g h t i n g f o r the sake of combat i s pre-eminently 
a male i n s t i n c t , and the resentment at mastery, the zeal 
to surpass and the general joy at a c t i v i t y i n mental as 
w e l l as physical matters seem to be closely correlated 
w i t h i t . I t has been common (t o ) t a l k of woman's 
'dependence'. This i s , I am sure, only an awkward name 
f o r less resentment at mastery. The actual nursing of 
the young seems likewise to involve equally unreasoning 
tenderness t o pet, coddle, and 'do f o r ' others." quoted 
by . Bowles & Gintis (1976) p.198. 
For an account of sexism i n schooling, see Prazier & Sadker 
(1973). 
As f o r " r a c i a l " d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i n psychometry, Terman (1916) 
wrote the f o l l o w i n g : 
"Their dullness seems t o be r a c i a l , or at least inherent 
i n the family stocks from which they come. The f a c t that 
one meets t h i s type w i t h such extraordinary frequency 
among Indians, Mexicans and negroes suggests quite f o r c i b l y 
that the whole question of r a c i a l differences i n mental 
t r a i t s w i l l have to be taken up sinew .,, There w i l l be 
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discovered enormously s i g n i f i c a n t r a c i a l differences .. 
which cannot be wiped out by any schemes of mental 
c u l t u r e . 
Children of t h i s group should be segregated i n special 
classes ... They cannot master abstractions, but they 
can often be made e f f i c i e n t workers." quoted 
by Bowles & Gintis (1976) p.123. 
Jensen (1969) came to not d i s s i m i l a r conclusions. On 
challenges t o t h i s viewpoint, see Bagley (1925) f o r an 
attack on the " f a t a l i s t i c assumptions" that accompanied 
the use of i n t e l l i g e n c e t e s t s and Montague (1975, ed.) and 
Simon (1971) f o r consideration of r a c i s t mythology i n 
i n t e l l i g e n c e theory. 
(24) See the quotation from Terman (1916) i n note 7, f o r 
instance, 
(25) See Syer (1976a) f o r some discussion of t h i s "Happy 
Coincidence?. 
(26) Page references i n t h i s section r e f e r t o Pring (1970/71). 
(27) The l e t t e r i n g i s mine, and i s made on the basis of my 
own d i s t i n c t i o n s . 
(28) This f i n a l quotation i s l i s t e d by Pring separately from the 
one above, and i s his only hint at a " f i f t h " l i n e of 
argument. I t seems t o me t o belong w i t h those others 
quoted, under ( 4 ) , though somewhat anomalously. 
(29) I use the term " e t h i c a l " since i t i s the term used by Pring. 
However, as I say below, i t seems to me that i n t h i s 
context " e t h i c a l " (or "moral") i s roughly synonymous w i t h 
" p o l i t i c a l " * I t has to do w i t h the "Power" dimension of 
educational b e l i e f s . 
(30) See previous section of t h i s Chapter, cf also Syer (1974a) 
on the interdependence - which Bernstein e x p l i c i t l y denies -
of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and framing. 
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CHAPTER 10 
OPEN SCHOOLS. ORGANIC SOLIDARITY? 
The d i s t i n c t i o n between "openness" and "closure" i n 
educational b e l i e f s i s a matter of dimensions, not of types. I t 
i s i n many ways related to other d i s t i n c t i o n s made i n everyday 
language and i n s o c i o l o g i c a l theory. Most obvious are such 
dichotomies as " t r a d i t i o n a l " / " p r o g r e s s i v e " ^ ^ \ "formal"/"informal"^^\ 
" C o l l e c t i o n " / " I n t e g r a t i o n " ^ a n d "psychometric"/"epistemological"^^^. 
iAll these have s p e c i f i c a l l y to do w i t h education. I n t u r n they 
can be located w i t h i n a broader t r a d i t i o n of sociological 
d i s t i n c t i o n s , such as T»nnies' "Gemeinschaft"/"Gesellschaft", 
Weber's " t r a d i t i o n a l " / " r a t i o n a l " , Durkheim's "mechanical"/"organic" 
and many others. One w r i t e r who has deliberately set out to r e l a t e 
t h i s wider t r a d i t i o n to educational contexts i s Bernstein 
(1967/71; 1971). I n t h i s Chapter, I hope f i r s t l y to demonstrate 
how notions elaborated so f a r i n t h i s essay - p r i n c i p a l l y those of 
structured b e l i e f , Basic B e l i e f s and the three "realms" - may 
resolve c e r t a i n important ambiguities i n Bernstein's account. 
Secondly, I hope t o r e f i n e f u r t h e r our understanding of what "Open 
Education" might consist of - and what i t might not - i n s p e c i f i c 
contexts. 
As unfortunately i s the case i n much of Bernstein's w r i t i n g , 
i t i s not always clear i n "Open Schools, Open Society?" when he 
i s hypothesizing and when he i s asserting what he takes to be 
(5) 
empirical f a c t . ^ ' Related t o t h i s problem i s a rather more 
serious one: what i s the status of his use of Durkheim's concepts 
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of "mechanical" and "organic s o l i d a r i t y " ? B a s i c a l l y , does 
Berns t e i n intend to demonstrate the v a l i d i t y of Durkheim's 
theory, through looking at schools i n contemporary B r i t a i n ? 
Or i s he merely suggesting that one way of looking at t h i s 
contextual s i t u a t i o n might be to employ these concepts? I f 
the l a t t e r were the case, one might have hoped f o r some discussion 
of ways i n which t h i s a p p l i c a t i o n might not be us e f u l , or might 
be improved upon. But there i s a tendency to impose what may 
be an inappropriate framework on the " f a c t s " . This seems to 
accept Durkheim's concepts as unprobleraatic. I suggest that 
c e r t a i n ambiguities i n Durkheim's own ana l y s i s are based on 
clos u r e s that he himself held about education. These are 
r e f l e c t e d i n Bernstein's a p p l i c a t i o n . 
There are two major d i f f i c u l t i e s , which I s h a l l mention 
but not elaborate upon, since they are not so immediately 
relevant to the discussion of "Open Education". These are, 
f i r s t l y , the la c k of c l a r i t y i n Durkheim's notion of "society", 
and, secondly, the rather l i n e a r notion that he had of development 
from a mechanical to an organic mode of s o l i d a r i t y . A c c o r d i n g l y , 
(7) 
i t i s not c l e a r i n Bernstein's a r t i c l e whether the changes he 
observes i n contemporary B r i t i s h schools are supposed.to derive 
from p r i o r s h i f t s i n s o c i e t a l s t r u c t u r e , or from r e l a t i v e l y 
autonomous developments within the school system i t s e l f . Whilst 
(8) 
a few passages suggest the f i r s t i n t erpretation^ , he writes on 
the whole as though changes i n school oiganisation were themselves 
responsible f o r changes i n the mode of s o l i d a r i t y . S i m i l a r l y , 
t h e r e i s the impression that these changes are somehow 
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spontaneous - along a " n a t u r a l " l i n e of development. I would 
argue, however, that the motives of innovators (and others) 
are of fundamental imporfceince, i f we are to understand the 
actual and l i k e l y consequences of In t e g r a t i o n ~ about which 
Bernstein i s so pessimistic i n h i s l a t e r paper. ^ '^^ ^ These 
motives, of course, are contexted i n society, not j u s t w i t h i n 
schools. 
The two notions I discuss here are those of "boundaries" 
and "supra-content concept"* Boundaries appear to define, f o r 
Bernstein, the d i s t i n c t i o n between mechanical and organic modes 
of s o l i d a r i t y , ^ ' He sees the former as i d e n t i f i a b l e w i t h 
"symbolic orders /which/ point up or celebrate the idea 
of p u r i t y of categories". 
and the l a t t e r as 
"symbolic orders /which/ point up or celebrate the idea 
of mixture or d i v e r s i t y of categories" 
Bernstein (1967/71) p.168, 
He takes greater f l e x i b i l i t y of subject boundaries, of teaching 
r o l e s , of teaching groups, etc., to be evidence of a s h i f t from 
mechanical t o organic s o l i d a r i t y i n schools. The second notion, 
"supra-content concept", fi g u r e s more i n Bernstein (1971). But 
even there i t i s not adequately related to that of "boundaries". 
I t tends to be accorded less importance than i t merits. I t needs 
t o be seen how these two notions are related t o those of "education 
i n depth" and "education i n breadth". These apparently underlie 
what Bernstein regards as a "fundamental paradox", namely the 
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production of "the covert deep closure of mechanical s o l i d a r i t y " 
i n education systems characterised by an "overt structure of 
(12) 
organic s o l i d a r i t y " (Bernstein, 1971, p.6 6 ) . I suggest 
that t h i s paradox arises p r i n c i p a l l y i n the use of a de f i c i e n t or 
inappropriate t h e o r e t i c a l analysis «• that of mechanical and 
organic s o l i d a r i t y . 
Taking the notion of boundaries f i r s t , the p u r i t y or mixture 
of categories seems, f o r Bernstein, t o define the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between mechanical and organic s o l i d a r i t y . There i s ample 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h i s i n Durkheim's Division of Labour. For 
instance: ' 
" I t i s now manifest hpw i t happens that mechanical s o l i d a r i t y 
i s l i n k e d t o the existence of the segmental type ... I t i s 
because t h i s special structure allows society t o enclose 
the i n d i v i d u a l more t i g h t l y , holding him strongly attached 
t o his domestic environment and, consequently, t o t r a d i t i o n s , 
and f i n a l l y c o n t r i b u t i n g t o the l i m i t a t i o n of his social 
horizon; i t also contributes t o make i t concrete and 
defined." Durkheim (1893 /1964) pp.301-2 . 
And, 
"There i s d. decreasing number of c o l l e c t i v e b e l i e f s and 
sentiments which are both c o l l e c t i v e enough and strong 
enough t o take on a r e l i g i o u s character. That i s to say, 
the average i n t e n s i t y of the common conscience progressively 
becomes enfeebled ... The decrease i n the number of proverbs, 
adages, d i c t a , etc. as societies develop, i s another proof 
t h a t the c o l l e c t i v e representations move towards 
indetermination." i b i d , p.170.(''3) 
Problems a r i s e , however, when Bernstein seeks to i n t e r p r e t 
the p u r i t y of categories ( i . e . closure, mechanical s o l i d a r i t y ) i n 
terms of "education i n depth", and the mixing of categories ( i . e . 
openness, organic s o l i d a r i t y ) i n terms of "education i n breadth". 
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Tliis i s c l e a r l y intended as an o r i g i n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n on Bernstein's 
p a r t , adding t o Durkheim's analysis. But i t i s doubtful whether 
Durkheim's notions of "mechanical" and "organic" are appropriate, 
when t h i s development takes place. 
There i s a c e r t a i n ambiguity i n Durkheim's notions which i s 
not resolved by Bernstein, Certainly mechanical s o l i d a r i t y seems 
i n t e r p r e t a b l e i n terms of closure. But what exactly i s open, 
i n the case of organic s o l i d a r i t y ? I n issues s p e c i f i c a l l y 
educational, there are some c r u c i a l closures that Bernstein f a i l s 
t o appreciate. This can be seen i f we look at the questions of 
sp e c i a l i s a t i o n and f l e x i b i l i t y . 
On the one hand, Durkheim makes a great deal of the f l e x i b i l i t y 
of "organised" s o c i e t i e s , A whole chapter i s devoted to Heredity. 
The message might be summarised as, 
"Race and i n d i v i d u a l i t y are two contradictory forces which 
vary inversely w i t h each other." Durkheira (1893/1964) p.304, 
and, 
"The more specialised the forms of a c t i v i t y , the more they 
escape the action of heredity," i b i d , p.312. 
Por Durkheim, "organised" society i s characterised by geographical 
and s o c i a l m o b i l i t y . This i s undoubtedly a form of f l e x i b i l i t y -
or openness. 
On the other hand, another c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of such societies 
i s s p e c i a l i s a t i o n : 
" I n higher s o c i e t i e s , our duty i s not to spread our 
a c t i v i t y over a large surface, but to concentrate and 
specialise i t . We must contract our horizon, choose a 
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d e f i n i t e task and immerse ourselves i n i t completely, 
instead o f t r y i n g t o make ourself a sort of creative 
masterpiece, quite complete, which contains i t s worth 
i n i t s e l f and not i n the services that i t renders." 
i b i d , p.401. 
Durkheira has some very contemptuous things t o say about 
d i l e t t a n t e s ( i b i d , pp.311-2, 402) i n t h i s l i g h t , which I s h a l l 
mention i n a moment« An organismio metaphor i n e v i t a b l y carries 
w i t h i t connotations of s p e c i a l i s a t i o n . The dismissal of any 
idea of multi-purpose, adaptable and non-specialist organs ( i n 
a body) i s one of the main points of using that metaphor. I n 
other words, a c e r t a i n kind of f l e x i b i l i t y i s quite c l e a r l y 
r u l e d out. At f i r s t s i g h t , f l e x i b i l i t y and spe c i a l i s a t i o n are 
' incompatible. 
For Durkheim, t h i s i s resolved by a reliance upon cer t a i n 
closures which are assumed to be unproblematic. That i s , i t i s 
misleading t o see "higher" societies or organic s o l i d a r i t y i n 
terms of complete openness. They may be characterised i n terms 
of c e r t a i n kinds of openness. But i t i s important t o i d e n t i f y 
what closures remain. 
I n Durkheim's view of "organised" societies there are c l e a r l y 
closures i n respect of Societal Relations. A specialised d i v i s i o n 
of labour i s , i n f a c t , a defining c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . Associated w i t h 
t h i s are c e r t a i n assumptions about Subjective 'Knowledge' and 
mind-brain which, despite the f l e x i b i l i t y noted above, are not 
t o t a l l y open. His attack on hereditarianisra i s l i m i t e d t o the 
notion that s p e c i a l i s t occupational aptitudes are h e r i t a b l e , 
Amon^ the "very general f a c u l t i e s " that he allows to be her i t a b l e 
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are some which are rather dubious. He approvingly quoted 
De Candolle on the n o n - h e r i t a b i l i t y of s p e c i a l i s t aptitudes, but 
also on the general f a c u l t i e s that De Candolle's f a t h e r i s alleged 
t o have i n h e r i t e d . 
"Here i s the l i s t s w i l l , orderliness, sane judgment, 
a c e r t a i n power of a t t e n t i o n , aversion f o r metaphysical 
abstractions. Independence of opinion," i b i d , p,315. 
FurtheiTOore, Durkheim has some d i s t i n c t closures i n respect of 
learning theory (apart, that i s from those implied i n the above), 
which may best be considered a f t e r we have looked at Bernstein's 
"supra-content concept". 
As f a r as "boundaries" are concerned, i t i s clear that 
Durkheim's organic s o l i d a r i t y was not conceived of as t o t a l 
openness, or t o t a l lack of boundaries. However, one way i n which 
Bernstein distinguishes between "education i n depth" axid "education 
i n breadth" i s precisely i n these terms. Whereas f o r Durkheim i t 
was s p e c i a l i s a t i o n , w i t h in-depth knowledge of sp e c i f i c areas of 
'knowledge', rather than a d i l e t t a n t e s u p e r f i c i a l acquaintance, 
t h a t characterised "organised" society, f o r Bernstein education 
i n depth i s apparently associated w i t h segmental societies, For 
Bernstein, i t i s a move away from such s p e c i a l i s t subject 'knov/ledge' 
t l i a t characterises the s h i f t i n education (and i n society?) which 
he i s discussing. Yet he describes t h i s s h i f t i n teims of the 
same l i n e a l development described (and possibly prescribed) by 
Durkheim, I t w i l l help t o look at the supra-content idea, t o 
understand t h i s b e t t e r . 
Berastein uses the notion of "supra-subject idea" (1967/71) and 
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"supra-content concept" (1971) only i n respect of curriculum 
i n t e g r a t i o n , or the more general s h i f t t o openness (or organic 
s o l i d a r i t y or the Integrated Code), He does allow ( i n one place 
only) that the Collection Code may also have an i m p l i c i t 
(14) 
r e l a t i o n a l notion.^ ' But his a t t e n t i o n i s almost exclusively 
•''O e x p l i c i t r a t i o n a l e s f o r i n t e g r a t i n g : 
" I n t e g r a t i o n .., refers minimally t o the subordination of 
previously i n s u l a t e d subjects or courses t o some r e l a t i o n a l 
idea, which b l u r s the boundaries between subjects." 
Bernstein (1971) p.53 ( o r i g i n a l emphasis). 
I maintain that a l l b e l i e f s are structured. I n any structure of 
b e l i e f s , including those about curriculum organisation, there 
are high-level Basic B e l i e f s that attempt to unify those b e l i e f s -
however inadequate, and however i m p l i c i t , the s t r u c t u r a t i o n and 
u n i f i c a t i o n may be. By the veiy f a c t of being a "code", a 
Collection Code w i l l have such structure and u n i f i c a t i o n , j u s t as 
much as an Integrated Code. S i m i l a r l y , a code tha:t i s already 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d w i l l have them j u s t as much as one that i s 
p o t e n t i a l or innovatory. Berastein might argue that i n the case 
of I n t e g r a t i o n or innovation (he does not r e a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h 
between the two) the Basic B e l i e f s , or high-level "supra-content 
concepts", w i l l be more e x p l i c i t . This may of course be true. 
Yet what i s made e x p l i c i t may not adequately portray what i s 
r e a l l y believed (Value-Known), The e x p l i c i t formulations may be 
a poor r e f l e c t i o n of what a c t u a l l y motivatei^ p a r t i c u l a r forms of 
change. I n Chapter 9, I approved of Pring's insistance that 
poorly elaborated notions of i n t e g r a t i o n should be spelled out -
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and improved upon. Elsewhere, Pring has said that 
the "relationships between contents csin be properly character-
ised only i f there i s some reference t o the l o g i c a l structure 
of t h e i r d i f f e r e n t subject-matters and thus of the l o g i c a l 
structure of t h e i r possible inter-connection," 
Pring (1975) p.69. 
In using my " t r e e - r o o t " metaphor to consider Objectivated 'Knowledge'-
inclu d i n g school c u r r i c u l a - i t i s possible to picture t h i s i n t e r -
r e l a t i o n s h i p . We might i l l u s t r a t e i t as follows: 
supra-content concept/relational idea/Basic B e l i e f 
formerly " d i s c r e t e " subject A formerly "discrete" 
subject B 
etc.., 
(At the same time, such i n t e g r a t i o n would almost c e r t a i n l y not 
leave the formerly "discrete" subject structures i n t a c t . Since 
there w i l l already have been an i m p l i c i t high-level r e l a t i o n a l 
idea, the elaboration of a new supra-concept idea i s l i k e l y to 
change the Relevsinoe by which the objectivated curriculum i s 
understood). I n short, we may view objectivated c u r r i c u l a i n 
terms of the " t r e e - r o o t " metaphor. The Basic B e l i e f s on my 
dimension of Inclusiveness can then be seen as an elaboration of 
Bernstein's "supra-content concept". 
Bernstein does not e x p l i c i t l y d i s t i n g u i s h between Objectivated 
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'Ifeowledge' ( i n c l u d i n g c u r r i c u l a ) and Subjective 'Knowledge'. 
The e x p l i c i t concern of his "supra-content concept" i s only w i t h 
the former* However, he does t a l k of "deep and surface structures" 
i n ways that could be taken t o r e f e r t o both "realms" of 'knov/ledge', 
Where he t a l k s about c u r r i c u l a , i t i s reasonable t o suppose thiat 
the "supra-content concept" has something t o do w i t h "deep 
structures?, I suggest that the st r u c t u r i n g of subjective b e l i e f 
and understanding can be considered i n the sajne terms. How a l l 
these i n t e r - r e l a t e i s not clear i n Bernstein's w r i t i n g . The 
f o l l o w i n g passage shows t h i s ^ I t also suggests that Bernstein i s 
nonetheless concerned w i t h precisely these issues. 
" I n order t o accomplish any form of i n t e g r a t i o n .,. there 
must be some r e l a t i o n a l idea, a supra-content concept, which 
focuses upon general p r i n c i p l e s at a high l e v e l of abstraction, 
For example, i f the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between sociology and 
biology are t o be opened, then the r e l a t i o n a l idea (amongst 
many) might be the issue of problems of order and change 
examined through the concepts of genetic and natural codes. 
Whatever the r e l a t i o n a l concepts are, they w i l l act s e l e c t i v e l y 
upon the knowledge w i t h i n each subject which i s t o be 
transmitted. The p a r t i c u l a r s of each subject are l i k e l y t o 
have reduced s i g n i f i c a n c e . This w i l l focus a t t e n t i o n upon 
the deep structure of each subject, rather than upon i t s 
surface s t r u c t u r e . I suggest t h i s w i l l lead to an emphasis 
upon, and the exploration of, geneml p r i n c i p l e s and the 
concepts through which these p r i n c i p l e s are obtained. I n 
t u r n , t h i s i s l i k e l y t o a f f e c t the or i e n t a t i o n of the 
pedagogy, which w i l l be less concerned t o emphasise the need 
to acquire states of knowledge, but w i l l be more concerned 
to emphasise how knowledge i s created. I n other words, the 
pedagogy of integrated codes i s l i k e l y t o emphasise various 
ways of knowing i n the pedagogical r e l a t i o n s h i p s . With the 
c o l l e c t i o n code, the pedagogy tends to proceed from the 
surface structure of the knowledge to the deep structure ... 
With integrated codes, the pedagogy i s l i k e l y to proceed from 
the deep structure t o the surface structure ... Thus, I 
suggest that integrated codes w i l l make available from the 
beginning of the pup i l s ' educational career, c l e a r l y i n a 
way appropriate t o a given age l e v e l , the deep structure of 
the knowledge, i , e . the p r i n c i p l e s f o r the generating of 
new knowledge," Bernstein (1971) pp.60-1, 
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I f we consider Subjective 'Knowledge* as structured on the same 
dimensions as Objectivated 'Knowledge', then any i n d i v i d u a l 
learner's b e l i e f s and understandings can i n p r i n c i p l e be compared 
w i t h the curriculum.^^^^ Wjtiere there are closures concerning what 
i s ©ducationally v a l i d and valuable, t o introduce learners to the 
"^ deep s t r u c t u r e s " of the curriculum i s to attempt t o achieve a 
correspondence between those objectivated structures on the one 
hand and the structures of the learner's subjective 'knowledge' 
on the other. Even where some such correspondence v/ere achieved, 
hov/ever, the two "realms" should be kept quite d i s t i n c t , i n 
analysis of what i s happening. 
Turning again t o Durkheim, we f i n d that he too implies a 
v e r t i c a l as w e l l as a h o r i z o n t a l dimension to the s t r u c t u r i n g of 
'knowledge'. He too w r i t e s as i f there are not j u s t horizontal 
boundaries, but also v e r t i c a l l e v e l s of inclusiveness or supra-
(17) 
content r e l a t i o n . ^ Generalist 'knowledge' i s f o r him c l e a r l y 
what I c a l l "low l e v e l " and c l i c h e ' d . I t i s low-level - "shallow" 
even » i n that i t involves n e i t h e r deep i n s i g h t s nor thorough 
iHiderstandlng. I t i s cliche'd i n that without high-level elaboration 
i t lacks the a v a i l a b i l i t y of a l t e r n a t i v e relevance angles. I t 
lacks other ways of viewing the same phenomena c r e a t i v e l y , i n 
d i f f e r e n t l i g h t s . 
Two things must be noted about Durkheim's view of such 
generallsm. F i r s t l y , i t may or may not be " f u n c t i o n a l " t o 
" s o c i e t a l needs". Secondly, i t r e s u l t s from p a r t i c u l a r kinds of 
experience. I n the f i r s t place, low-level generalisms may be 
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f u n c t i o n a l to society. 
"The d i v i s i o n of labour presumes that the worker, f a r from 
being hemmed i n by h i s task, does not lose sight of his 
col l a b o r a t o r s , that he aots upon them, sind reacts to them. 
He i s , then, not a machine who repeats his movements without 
knowing t h e i r meaning, but he knows that they tend,in some 
way, towards an end that he conceives more or less d i s t i n c t l y . 
He f e e l s that he i s serving something. For t h a t , he need not 
embrace vast portions of the social horizon: i t i s s u f f i c i e n t 
that he perceives enough of i t t o understand that his actions 
have an aim beyond themselves ,.." 
Durkheim (1893/1964) p.372-3. 
However, Durkheim has nothing but contempt f o r the d i l e t t a n t e whose 
low-level 'knowledge' serves no s o c i e t a l purpose: 
"The complexity of ^ h e d i l e t t a n t e ' s / nature i s only 
apparent. As he assigns himself the task of being interested 
i n everything, i t seems that he has a multitude of diverse 
tastes and aptitudes. A pure i l l u s i o n ! Look to the bottom 
of things, and you w i l l see that i t a l l reduces to a small 
number of general, simple f a c u l t i e s .,. The surface upon 
which so many s k i l f u l l y shaded colours shine covers a base 
of deplorable monotony ... He has reared nothing personal 
and durable on the ground which nature has bequeathed him." 
i b i d , pp.311-2. 
" I t i s not without reason that public sentiment reproves an 
ever more pronounced tendency on the part of d i l e t t a n t e s 
and even others t o be taken up with an exclusively general 
c u l t u r e and refuse to take any part i n occupational orgsmisation. 
That i s because they are not s u f f i c i e n t l y attached to society, 
or, i f one wishes, society i s not s u f f i c i e n t l y attached to 
them and they escape i t , " i b i d , p.402. 
In the second place, low-level generalism, f o r Durkheim, i s 
a product of general experience, j u s t as s p e c i a l i s t 'knowledge' 
i s a product of specialised experience. Specialisation produces 
s p e c i a l i s t knowledge, as w e l l as r e q u i r i n g i t . The "education i n 
depth" to which Bernstein r e f e r s would be, f o r Durkheim, the 
development of s p e c i a l i s t high-level 'knowledge' through 
specialized experience. In short, Subjective 'Knowledge' derives 
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p r i m a r i l y , f o r Durkheim, from d i r e c t experience of Reality 
( i n c l u d i n g s o c i e t a l r e l a t i o n s ) . Par less important i s creative 
r e f l e c t i o n on the s t r u c t u r i n g of one's own ideas or on that of 
objectiv a t e d bodies of 'Knowledge'. Nor does d i r e c t determination 
by that objectivated c u l t u r e or curriculum f i g u r e i n Durkheim's 
account. 
In considering the question of b e l i e f s t r u c t u r a t i o n and the 
notion of "supra-content concepts", then, we are directed to 
f u r t h e r closures i n Durkheim's conception of "organised" society-
and organic s o l i d a r i t y . The notion of a "n a t u r a l " d i v i s i o n of 
labour and s p e c i a l i s a t i o n I s evident, together w i t h a (Value-Knovm) 
b e l i e f i n i t s d e s i r a b i l i t y , "Punction", indeed, connotes (desirable) 
purpose,as we l l as consequence, i n Durkheim's account. Moreover, 
his notions of learning theory are largely d e t e r m i n i s t i c : he sees 
Subjective 'Knowledge' as a product of ge n e t i c a l l y produced 
aptitudes of a general nature and of specialised experience w i t h i n 
an "organised" society. 
Many of Durkheim's closures are common to much contemporary 
educational t h i n k i n g . He believed i n the naturalness of i n d i v i d u a l 
and s o c i e t a l i n e q u a l i t i e s . He believed i n c r i t i c a l stages of 
i n t e l l e c t u a l development, both genetically and environmentally 
determined. He believed i n f l e x i b i l i t y as morally r i g h t and , 
s o c l e t a l l y useful i n childhood education - u n t i l such ci r L t i c a l 
stages were reached and "n a t u r a l " aptitudes were revealed. But 
he believed i n d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ( s p e c i a l i s a t i o n ) at a subsequent 
stage. He adhered, i n short, t o the "Equity of opportunity" 
i d e a l - as opposed to "Equality of opportunity". 
- 3 3 2 " 
"We always reason, i n educational i & f f a i r s , as i f the 
moral basis of man was made up of g e n e r a l i t i e s ,,. 
Such i s not the case at a l l , Man i s destined t o f i l l 
a special f u n c t i o n i n the social organisation, and, 
consequently, he must le a r n , i n advance, how to play his 
r o l e . For that an education i s necessary, quite as 
much as that he should learn his r o l e as a man. We do 
not, however, wish t o imply that i t i s necessary to 
rear a c h i l d prematurely f o r some ce r t a i n profession, 
but that i t i s necessaiy to get him t o l i k e the idea 
of circumscribed tasks and l i m i t e d horizons. But 
t h i s task i s quite d i f f e r e n t from that f o r general 
things, and cannot be aroused by the same meajas," 
Durkheim (1893/1964) p.402n. 
Some of the closures noted here may be ones which I f i n d 
disputable. But i t has not been my purpose to c r i t i c i s e Durkheim, 
Even i n supposedly "Open Education" there are i n e v i t a b l y closures. 
I t i s important t h a t these be recognised. To do t h i s , we must 
appreciate how they are structured. We must seek to explain them 
i n terms of s o c i e t a l context. And we must explore t h e i r possible 
and actual consequences i n pr a c t i c e , Durkheim, l i k e anyone else, 
l i v e d i n a p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l society. I t would be strange 
indeed i f he was not a party to b e l i e f s t h a t , to him and others, 
made sense of the conditions of that society. ( I n the passage 
j u s t quoted, there i s much that i s s i m i l a r t o the b e l i e f s of 
Progressive educationists i n the U.S., as we sh a l l see i n Chapter 14.) 
I have t r i e d t o locate the closures i n Durkheim's notions of 
mechanical and organic s o l i d a r i t y because these are i n e v i t a b l y 
imported into Bernstein's account, insofar as he applies these notions 
t o contemporary B r i t i s h education without c r i t i c i s m or comment. 
Bernstein too e a s i l y assumes that "mechanical" and "organic" 
(18) 
are respectively "closed" and "open". Yet, as we have seen, 
there are important closures i n Durkheim's notion of "organic". 
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(Indeed, so we should expect.) These produce d i f f i c u l t i e s that 
are insumountable, without considerable refinement of how we 
conceive of "openness" and "closure". 
I n t h i s Chapter I have explored the theme that the v e r t i c a l 
and h o r i z o n t a l dimensions of Inclusiveness and Consistency - by 
which we may consider both Objectivated 'Knowledge' and Subjective 
'Knowledge' - are Interdependent, i n practice. Bernstein's 
equivalents of these - "supra-content concept" and "boundaries" -
are not s u f f i c i e n t l y elaborated t o make t h i s clear. We have seen 
that i t i s important,, i n considering educational b e l i e f s , t o 
d i s t i n g u i s h between Objectivated 'Knowledge' and Subjective 
•Knowledge', And we have seen that"openness" and "closure" are 
misleading i f treated as i d e a l types of educational Ideology, but 
useful i f seen as dimensions on which such Ideologies can be 
analyzed. 
Notes 
(1) e.g. Ashton et a l . (1975)} Parsons (1959/61). 
(2) e.g. Bennett (1976). 
(3) Bernstein (1971). 
(4) Esland (1971). 
(5) I n d i c a t i v e of t h i s i s h i s p r e d e l i c t i o n f o r such expressions 
as " i s l i k e l y t o ,,," and "may be .,,", which sometimes tend 
t o be treated as i f synonymous with " i s " . These are especially 
common i n Bernstein (1971), e.g. pp.63-5. 
(6) B^ y comments on Durkheim are r e s t r i c t e d l a r g e l y t o his 
Division of Labour (1893/1964). 
(7) I n t h i s Chapter,I r e f e r to Bernstein (1967/71), unless 
otherwise stated. 
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(8) These are very few, i n f a c t . Por example:-
"The /«newer'y secondary schools celebrate d i v e r s i t y , 
not p u r i t y . This may be symptomatic of basic changes 
i n the culture of s o c i e t y j p a r t i c u l a r l y changes i n the 
p r i n c i p l e s of s o c i a l c o n t r o l , " 
Bernstein (1967/71) p,l69, 
(9) By "motives", of course, I do not just mean e x p l i c i t 
p o l i c y formulations. See Chapter 5,above, 
(10) i , e , Bernstein (1971), c f . Syer (1974a) and Chapter 12, 
below. 
(11) Nonetheless, as I have suggested i n Syer (1976b), Pring (1975) 
i s wrong t o see "boundaries" as the central notion i n 
Bernstein's analysis. Por the sake of defining d i s t i n c t i o n s 
between mechanical and organic ( i n Bernstein, 1967/71) and 
between Collection and I n t e g r a t i o n ( i n Bernstein, 1971), 
boundaries may o v e r t l y be most impor^;ant. But more central 
t o a l l of his work i s nonetheless the notion of "codes". 
( S i m i l a r l y , i t i s my i n t e n t i o n t o hold the notion of 
"Value-Knowledge" as cen t r a l to t h i s thesis - including t h i s 
chapter, where the discussion i s presented i n terms of 
openness and closure. I acknov/ledge my debt to Bernstein 
i n t h i s ) , 
(12) Bernstein already touches on t h i s i n the e a r l i e r a r t i c l e : 
" I s i t possible t h a t , as the open school moves f u r t h e r 
towards organic s o l i d a r i t y as i t s major p r i n c i p l e of 
s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n , so the pupils may move f u r t h e r towards 
the 'closed' society of the age group? Are the educational 
dropouts of the 50s to be replaced by the moral dropouts 
of the 70s?» Bernstein (1967/71) p.169. 
(13) I n t h i s and i n other cases, more quotatlonal evidence i s 
presented i n the f u l l e r account developed i n Syer (1975b). 
(14) "There may of course be some underlying concept to a c o l l e c t i o n : 
the gentleman, the educated main, the s k i l l e d man, the non-
vocational man," Bernstein (1971) p«.49. 
(15) of Chapter 2, above. I n p r a c t i c e , of course, so-called 
i n t e g r a t i o n i s often a change only i n name. That i s , the 
basic structures of curriculum remain r e l a t i v e l y unscathed. 
Midwinter i s r e f e r r i n g to something of t h i s sort when he says: 
" I n t e g r a t i o n i s not i t s e l f the answer. Take a topic l i k e 
Northumbria and give i t the i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y treatment. 
You f i n i s h w i t h early monastic l i f e ( h i s t o r y ) , the north-^east 
coast (geography), a day i n the l i f e of a monk ( r . e . ) , a 
model of a monastery ( a r t ) , and an acting out of the l i f e 
of a monk (drama). This i s Integratioh from the outside, 
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w i t h subjects advancing a few seemly steps i n the 
s t a t e l y i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y q u a d r i l l e . «,." 
Midwinter (1972) p»22. 
(16) I n p r a c t i c e , the comparison would l a r g e l y be with what his 
teacher takes t o be the curriculuHu In schools, what 
teachers, text-book w r i t e r s , examiners, etc. believe to be 
"a subject" i s the curriculum, so f a r as the p u p i l i s concerned. 
I t i s objectivated 'knowledge', external to him. 
(17) Durkheim (1925/56) t a l k s of the "cardinal notions" and the 
" l a t e n t philosophy" of the "fundamental d i s c i p l i n e s " , and 
urges pedagogues to pay e x p l i c i t a t t e n t i o n to what these 
might be, and to t h e i r consequently more e f f e c t i v e trans-
mission t o p u p i l s . This i s remarkably s i m i l a r to Bruner's 
p r e s c r i p t i o n s , and to Bernstein's account of I n t e g r a t i o n , 
(18) Thus he can say w i t h no f u r t h e r explanation, 
" I t might now be h e l p f u l to drop the terms mechanical 
and organic s o l i d a r i t y and r e f e r instead to 'closed' and 
'open' schools." Bernstein (1967/71) p.l69. 
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gh©__Gggt@xtuality. ofEdupatioml,, Beliefs, 
T o t a l openaess i a ©ducatioaal b e l i e f would e n t a i l a oomplst® 
lack of precoHoeptions - no assuiiaption of oonstraints, no 
@xp®ctatloi3s aad xio objectives. I n Reality, such complete 
openness i a iBcoaoeivabls.^^^ I n no matter what s o c i e t a l context, 
th@r@ ar@ constx^ints. We should therefore assume that some b e l i e f 
closures w i l l always be found. 5?h®y My eoaoess things that are 
"obviously" a©t open or negotiable» But t h i s i n ao way means that 
they are s o c i o l o g i c a l l y u n i n t e r e s t i n g , Qa the contrary, i t i s of 
the Hsture of i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f s t h a t they r e f e r t o what t h e i r 
adherents take t o be "obvious'** They are ao less consequential 
f o r t5mt» Kor are they any less determined ~ i n a way which w© 
should @@©k t o (Elaborate. 
l a the case of professedly "Open Education" ^  what i s frequently 
taken t o be laost ©pen i s the ©ad r e s u l t , the product of education. 
I t i s claimed, perhaps, that ther® ar® no objectives, that education 
i s desirable i a i t s e l f . Only the processes matter, not the 
oons©(|u©ac®s. That, i t may be saids i s f o r the learners themselves 
t o deoid®. But as many w r i t e r s have p o i n t t d o u t ^ ^ \ such professions 
©f openness are l i k e l y t o conceal v e j ^ r e a l objectives, nonetheless. 
A commitment t o learner autonomy, or to learner s a t i s f a c t i o n , o r t o 
" r a t i o n a l i t y " , are a l l forms of closure. They are prescribed 
•331 
@bj®etiT®s whieh sr® a®t to b© vi®lat@d, furfthennore, there are 
always limittd resourceso Th©r@ i s always an iaelusiv© sociatye 
A»d th@s® ®r® n@r&r Irv^lmmt to ©duoational beliefs. 
Part I I I ms eoacenaed with dsfinitional questions* In i t ^ 
I looked primarily at ^ logieaX^j rather than «»oont®xtual«»» aspects 
©f the fflotiea of «'Open Bduoatioa'^ I t must always be reaognised 
howawrj that beliefs ar© contextedo Stey exist irithia giTea 
hi s t o r i o a l 0oei®ti©@, in th© sdJJds of identifiable people, and they 
n@@d explaining in terms of that eontext. Sfeeir confeequeatiality 
depends ©a where and by whom th®y ar® held® And they refer to the 
r©al world-out-ther®. Often9 suoh r@f@r@no@ i s largely implicit in 
the statements ©f those m ©bs®rr®« But this makes attention to the 
societal context a l l the more important. Not just the general 
historioaj, era^ but the specific societal context, need to b© 
eonBidered. In the case of educational belief, for instance, ©pen-
is «ss@s aiay refer to some seetioas of society9 but not others. Which 
©MldTOa are b@ing considered? Which educational institutions are in 
question? How B.m these differentiated? 
For example9 ©ducatioa i s ©ftea thought of as liberating. 
Yet schooling for some i s anything but lib@mting. What then i s 
meant by "liberating" when t h i s i s forw,3?d©d as an objeotiw by 
educationists or politicians? Doss i t m@m the satoe tfedng, in the 
ease of a l l oMldren? What ±B i t supposed that children should be 
*^lib@rat@d^ from? (And what should they not escape?) Bernstein 
(1971) refers to the ^ \ilt±wat@ wystex^*' of "knowledge", accessible 
only to the (lucky?) few who reach the pinnacle of our fo.tml 
education system. ^ •'^  E&Tw&n ©t a l . (1968) seek in part to explain 
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th@ studeat smrest of -feh© lat® sixti©© isa t©OTs ©f th© disillusion 
®xp@rf.@a0ed aa ©alaa?g©d student bodys they f a i l e d to find that 
u^ltissat© fflystes^"* I s ©dueation th© iatroduction to some such 
B^steE^? Clearly I t depends not ^ ust on whai one means by 
'^©dmsation^o I t depends also on ^ os@ education one i s talking 
about» So f a r as b@haTlomr«d@t@MdMing beliefs are conceimed, such 
contexfeual eonsidemtions are orueial, Shis essay i s about 
ideology smd beliefs I t i s not direetly about sooietal stimcture. 
Yet partiottlas? b e l i e f s eannot be •validly oonsidesred exoept i n 
relation to social and societal context. Part IV, theiyefore, 
considers some ©ontexfeual features reltvaat to "Open Education." 
OQHa_t^ g^ijits,„and. Closures 
Constraints are deterujinative f®atar©s of the Real world-out-
th®r®« Closures, on the other hand, ar® features of Ob^ectivated 
or Subjective 'Knowledge'. They are taken to refer to real 
constraints. Since such 'Knowledge' i s i t s e l f a part of Reality» 
olosus'ea themselves may operate as constraints. , Ihey are less 
neoesaaiyj or l e s s inevitable^ ttea ©rtexsial physical constraints, 
however, in that they are subject to iatesmal logical experience, as 
well as that of erfeemal context. Moreover, they can be th© object 
of creative reflection (which i t s e l f can be belief-producing 
5fruly ©pen aducation would involve a total lack both of 
constraints and of closures i n the minds of people involved. 
Prescriptive or descriptive beliefs in "C^en Education" would 
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involve merely a lack of closures. Sine© some kinds of constraint 
are Inevitable, unqualified beliefs i n "Open Education" must be 
delusory, ©r at least inadequate - whether they refer to actual or 
potential educational arrangements. 
Closures ar© nen-xmidoma 2hey are neither arbitrary nor wholly 
op®» to negotiation or chang®« They tend to "correspond", however 
inadequately, with constraints ijx the world-out-there. ^  ' But the 
nature of the non-randomness - the nature of the structumtion both 
of the real constraints and of the notional closures - i s not often 
e x p l i c i t l y understood. Closures tend to take the form of rei f i e d 
categories - categories of what a ^ taken to be "natural" or 
"inevitable". For example, there i s clearly a r e a l i t y to which 
motions of "intelligence" somehow refer. Differences between people 
(5) 
i n t h i s respect ar® not mei^ly i l l u s i o n . But the categorisation 
that occurs in identifying - even implicitly - variations in 
"intelligence" frequently lacks an adequate appreciation of the 
nature ©f "intellig©no©^^\ or of i t s causation, or of i t s ideological 
consequentiality. The structured properties, both of the Reality 
i s which real variations (in ?riiat we c a l l "intelligence"!) exist and 
©f the beliefs and understandings within which such categories occur, 
remain inadequately understood and/or implicit. Making e a ^ l i c i t 
mor@ adequate accounts of the natu3E:>e of constraints and closures i s 
a necessary «• though not a sufficient > condition of deliberate and (7) autonomous action, whether to change or to maintain those constraints. 
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l a looking for actual constraints in given educational contexts, 
sicailar concept® my be used to those already developed for the 
ceasideratioa of closures. Just as we may look for closures about 
such-and-such areas, so w® l a ^ look for constraints in those areas. 
M obvious kind of constraint i s that of limited resources. 
Differential resourcing i s in turn inseparable from the power 
structure of the society and institutions involved and from 
participants' educational objectives. Differentiations occur 
(8) 
between regions i n a given society^ between schools in each 
and within schools themselves (e.g. between departments and 
b®tw©en teaching groups). Resources include not just buildings and 
©quipment, but things l i k e teachers' time and energy,^^^^ (Ehese 
may b© "oosted**, for instance in terms of teacher-pupil ratioM -
i<,e. s t a f f b i l l s ) . Inseparable from such resource diffe3?entiations 
are questions of national and local politios, and staff hiez^rchies 
and career structures within schools.^^^^ A l l these are a complexly 
related part of the wider questions of "Power" in education, 
discussed i n Fart I I , They are the subject of assumptions about 
societal and inst i t u t i o n a l inequalities and power structures and 
about the functions and objectives of education, 
m ©duoationa^. objeetivea w® see most clearly the importance 
of context, Though some may seek to define "education" abstractly, 
(A 2^ 
without reference to specific objectives^ , education i s i n 
practice institutionalised and financed, in most societies. Teachers 
ar© employed to pursue vezy definite objectives - however implicit 
these may remain. Whilst i t could be argued that "education" may 
not imply th© pursuit of objectives, "teaching" inevitably does. 
And fomal (and financed) education seem always to be conceraed with 
teaching. A question wMoh then arises i s , i s formal education 
(or schooling) necessarily conservative? 
Bduoation and gehoolingt Inevitable Closures? 
Bourdieu has suggested that schools are necessarily conservative: 
"A number of tSi® characteristic t r a i t s of the teaching and the 
teacher ^ i e h the most c r i t i c a l ooimneatators mention only as 
grounds for condemnation, properly feielong to the very definition 
of th© function of education. So, for instance, i t would be 
easy to demonstrate that the routine and routine-engendering 
a c t i v i t y of the school and the teachers, as frequently attacked 
by the great cultural prophecies as by small heresies (often 
consisting simply of this denunciation alone) are without doubt 
unavoidably implicit i n the logic of an instj.tution ^ i c h i s 
fundamentally entraated with a function of cultural 
conservation." 
Bourdieu (19€6/?1) p.178. 
But what may appear to be an analytical statement about the nature 
of schooling should not be regarded as such. What ''entrusted" means 
i n t h i s quotation i s di s t i n c t l y problematic. For i t clearly implies 
the operation of specific policies, by identifiable people. Elsewhere, 
Bourdieu (1966/74) again talks of the school as a conservative force. 
He talks of th© "cultural capital" that the least privileged social 
classes lack, but ^ i c h i s the basis of saocess in formal education. 
He discusses the legitimation of societal rigi d i t y , within an overt 
egalitailanism, that arises from th© "ideology of giftedness". But 
i n t h i s a r t i c l e Bourdieu i s spe c i f i c a l l y talking about the French 
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(14) pessiadsia",'' ^/ My distinction between eoastraint and closure 
should make t h i s clearer, when we consider educational institutions, 
toy i n s t i t u t i o a a l arrangement constitutes a real structure of 
relationships - however temporary or negotiable - which i s l i k e l y 
to contain eonstx^-ints on people participating. However, the 
®xistenoe of real constraints does not necessarily produce notional 
elogures* The l a t t e r exist insofar as constraints are only 
i m p l i c i t l y notionalised. They have the force of Value-Khoum 
" i n e v i t a b i l i t y " or "obviousness" i n default of explicit consideration 
But whether or not those re a l constraints are a bar to alte3:%iative 
action; they are not a necessary bar to understanding. That i s , 
an understanding of constraints need not in i t s e l f constitute 
Bernstein has asked: 
" I f educational institutions (following Bourdieu) can be 
considered as repeating agencies, we can ask the following 
question. What i s the social basis of a repeating agency 
which attempts to produce, unrepeatable or unlikely outcomes?" 
Bernstein (1971) p.66n. 
In a way, he i s asking the wrong question, Por t h i s s t i l l assumes 
an over-deterministic view of how beliefs and understandings are 
produced. Beliefs are not produced merely by experience of 
sxtemal r e a l i t y . Subjective creativity can lead to novel 
understandings. And i t can i t s e l f constitute belief-producing 
experience. Otherwise there would be massive consensus and 
oonformity on a l l manner of issues - where i t does not, in fact, 
Exists In default of e x p l i c i t consideration, r e a l constraints may 
produce, deteMaiaatively, s i m i l a r b e l i e f s in a l l concerned. But 
through explicit elaboration, people are able to create their own 
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understandings and the i r own notional opennesses. 
To draw a very pertinent analogy, both language and literacy 
can b@ determinative. The olassifioato::y schemes that we acquire 
from our oommoa language - and even from our own development of 
eoneeptual schemes «• can have a deteitaiaativ© effect on our 
subsequent beliefs and understsaidings. Th© ling>d.stic determination 
associated with Whorf and Sapir clearly opei^ates,:, in certain 
circumstaaoes. Similarly litejjacy can and does, in some circumstances, 
operate as a medium of social controls (Postman, 1970/73). But 
neither of these i s a necessary occurrence. Language can also be 
a vehicle for creative and even revolutionary thinking. Literacy, 
to©, does not necessarily entail subordination. An awareness and 
8@lf-»o©nc@pt that recognises t h i s i s Curiosity. Similarly, in the 
case of such institutional relationships as teaching-learning, 
constraints may be real and unavoidable in specific contexts. But 
th@y do not by th® same token have to be determinative of notional 
closures. Just as people can learn individually to be Curious, so, 
within objectively constraining relationships, can theire exist what 
Friedrich has called a "self-transforming tradition".^ 
In the case of schools, i t i s misleading to suggest that the 
content of what i s taught and learned i s unimportant, whilst only 
th© structure of institutional relationships - encoding th© "hidden 
curriculum" - matter*^^^^ The distinction between structure and 
content i s an analytical one, useful for some purposss (from some 
Relevance angles), but untenable as rei f i e d "fact". Non-conservative 
teaching (and therefor© non-conservative schooling) could indeed 
©xist, where what was involved was a deliberate and active attempt 
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t@ mak© the i n s t i t u t i o n a l relatioasMps of t@ache3^•leamer - and 
indeed wider societal relationships in general - the focus of 
©xplicit ©laboratioM, This my not in i t s e l f remove the 
oonstmints of i n s t i t u t i o n a l asrmgements and societal structure. 
(Indeed, a fa i l u r e to recognise the actuality of such constraints 
would i t s e l f b® inadequate closure)9 Bat i t could challenge the 
determination ©f closure that might other^se occur by default, 
Shis i s similar t® what Fi^ir© ©alls "coasoientisation". He 
defines t h i s as followsg 
"Gonseientisation refers to the proees© i a which men, not 
as reclpitntB, bat as Imowing subjects, achieve a deepening 
awareness both of th© soei@"~eultuml r e a l i t y which shapes 
thei r l i v e s and of t h e i r capacity to transform that r e a l i t y . " 
He says further, 
"Consciousness i s never a mtre refleetien ©f» but a 
reflection upon^ material reality. 
"For mechanistic objectivism, ooaseiousness i s merely a 
«C0py' of objective r e a l i t y . Por solipsism, the world 
i s reduced to a oap3?icious creation ®f consciousness. In 
the f i r s t case, ooaseiousntss would be smable to transcend 
i t s conditioning by reality? i n th® second, insofar as i t 
^creates' r e a l i t y , i t i s a j i r i o ^ to r e a l i t y In both 
conceptions of conseiousaess, there eaa be no true praxis. 
Praxis i s only possible where th® objective-subjective 
d i a l e c t i c i s maintained. 
Prfeir® (1970/72) pp. 51 n 2, 55. 
Totally open education - l e t alone ©pen schooling. •» i s quite 
impossible. But in Preir^'s conespt of "ooascientisation", there 
i s th® suggestion that the very constraints of Reality can become 
the object ©f reflection and action* An awareness of the dialectics 
of learning and of the non-necessaj^y relationship between constraint 
aad closure, would be the objective of a non-conservative education 
system. Th© openness would b@ conceptual, rather than out-there 
La Freire's case, th© ©n© i s dialeetieally related to th© 
To return to Bernstein, w@ can see again how the distinction 
between Reality on the on© hand and both Objeetivated and 
Subjactive 'Knowledge' on th© other, can resolve certain problems 
(17) 
in his worko Surprisingly, pertops , Mary Douglas, who i s 
both m admirer and an inspi3S«r of BeriQstein's work, has hinted 
at something not unlike the "consoientisation" just discussed. 
She s ^ s of her book Natural Symbols that 
"In the long run, the az^ument of t h i s book i s that the 
elaborated code challenges i t s users to turn round on 
themselves and inspect t h e i r values, to reject some of 
them, and to resolve to cherish positional forms of control 
and ooMDtunieation wherever these are available. This would 
seem to b@ th© only way to use our knowledge to free ourselvss 
from the power of our own oosmolo^. No on© would deliberately 
chooa© the elaborated cod® and the personal control system 
who i s aware of the seeds of aliens a t ion i t contains..," 
Douglas (1970/73) p.190. 
Btoy ^ o experience other forms of alienation might prefer just 
that option. I t i s to them that Freire addresses his remarks. 
But i t i s interesting that Douglas, following Bernstein (and indeed 
Durkheim), believes elaboration to be possible only through 
©speriene© of a particular kind ®f societal and family structure. 
Like them too, she also s©©s i t m somewhat rogrettable. Bernstein 
has TOferred to th© "penetration" of the Integrated code in 
education, which i s closely associated with this pessimism. This 
merits a chapter of i t s own, before we turn in Part V to some 
examples of "Open Education" ideology in practice. 
(1) Or, i f Myoae wer© found with such ©paaaess, his beliefs 
about the world would b@ eixtraordinarily inadequate . 
(2) In the collection edited by Nyberg (1975»ed.), for instance, 
H i l l f e e l s that "education" aeoessazlly implies objectives 
(p«5)ft Igan points to th© dangers of avoiding explicit 
©ducatieasil aims, sine© •mfais.t he c a l l s "ideological" ones 
naay take t h e i r place, as i t w®re, uaiavited (p.31). 
Strike also notes that attention to educational means, 
©r px^ooedures, may conceal elosur® as to objectives (p. 179). 
Morgan restates B©rsist©i.n*s position, pointing to the 
hidden ourriouluja of supposedly «"©p©n" educational 
(3) Holly nsikes a similar points 
"Uad®r the standaM educational dispensation, only the 
lucky few w i l l have broken through to a r®ally personal 
relationship with the intellectual world through which 
they have passed, and these w i l l have been enabled to 
do so to the measure in which they are professionally 
involved with extending and comprehending knowledge. 
I t i s only these who are to any degx^e emancipated i n 
Msrx*s teCTiSe.." Holly (1971/72) p«96. 
(4) of. Chapter 2, not© 4, on relativism. Popper (1945/66) 
similarly points out that "convention" does not imply 
total arbitrariness (pp^ 64"5)« 
(5) Compare ^ r a s (1972) on th© rmld^ (not mere i l l u s i o n ) 
of value (p.295), 
(6) Th© i n a b i l i t y of psychologists to define "intelligence" -
other tbMi as "tliat idaieh intelligence tests measure" 
(Boring, quoted by Jensen, 1969s p.8) - i s notorious. 
See, for instance, J.Eduo.Psychol. (12) pp. 123-147, 195-216. 
(7) Berger aad Pullberg come close to this point in the following 
isageI 
"A g,rio2;d,8 a social structure i s an open horizon of 
poss i b i l i t y for a l l i t s members .... /But/ we would 
emphasis© the a p r i o r i character of /6his propositioa7«•• 
?@3^ different propositions emerge as we look at man's 
de_fagto situation i n the world. On the level of pure 
possi b i l i t y , social structure provides an open horizon 
for ma's ongoing world » and self-realisation. On 
the level of actual h i s t o r i c a l experience, social 
structure functions p3?©tty much as the opposite of th i s , 
namely, as a narrowing of the hozlsons within which l i f e 
i s allowed to make sense. Social structure i s 
encountered by th© individual as an external f a c t i c i t y , " 
Berger & Pullberg (1965), p.202. 
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However, vigorous denials of solipsism do not prevent 
B@riger from tending to s©@ a l l constraints as man-made 
and therefor® explicit awareness as a sufficient condition 
of t h e i r removal, Ev@n social structur® i s not meroly a 
human creation, but a creation of man in relation to 
physical (natural) reality,, Straus^' view - that there are 
no rooks, but only ec®aa - i s , simply, wrong. 
("The realm ©f rules could ... be usefully pictured as a 
tiny island of st3?uotured s t a b i l i t y around which swirled 
and b®at a vast ocean of negotiation^ But ... there i s 
only vast ©eeano The rules th©ms@lv©s are negotiable," 
Strauss ®t a l . , 1964, p»313)«. 
(8) For instane®, Taylor & Ayrea (19@)l Boad@n (1971){ 
Byra©, Williamson k Fletcher (1975). 
(9) Pahl's development of th© notion of a "socio-ecologieal 
system" (Pahl, 1968? 1969/75) has interesting implications 
for ©dueation, that ^sa®, Williajnsoa & Fletcher (1975) 
have explored further,. 
(10) ef Shipman (1972)? Sharp & Green (1975), 
(11) c f Bernstein (1971)| Hoyl© (1969/71) po391} Shipman (1971). 
(12) McGloskey, for instance, distinguishes b©tw®©n "education" 
and "indoctrination" i n these termss 
"Indoctrination has been explained / i i c / in tonus of i t s 
aims, i t s methods, and i t s results. I t s aim i s said to 
bo to bring about a belief which i s hold in an unqu©stioned 
way. Th© methods i t uses ar® n©n- or even a n t i - c r i t i c a l , 
n@a-r©fl®etiv0 kinds* Th@ result at which i t aims i s the 
unquestioned acceptaae® of a belief or attitudes. 
Education, by contrast, i s claimed to i n s t i l beliefs or 
attitudes by i^ieans which leave I t open to the child l a t e r 
to com© c r i t i c a l l y to ©zamin© what he has been taught," 
McCloskey (1974) p.27« 
(13) Bourdieu (1966/74) Pe40. 
(14) " I t i s only i n th© light of such a pessimistic pathos that 
th© defeat of democratic values can b© assumed to b© 
probable, while their v i e t o ^ i s seen as a slender thing, 
delicately constituted and precariously balanced." 
Soultoer (1955/61) p,80. 
(15) Friedrich uses th i s expression i a this contexts 
"By being an ideology of progress towards an 
unattainable goal ^he p o l i t i c a l tradition of the U.Ss7 
was subject to a particular dialectic, as i s that of 
th© Soviet Union, for i t was a self«.transforming 
traditions frtiat th® tradition required was that men 
acted differently from th© way they had traditionally 
acted," Friedrioh (1972) p,35« 
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Whilst approving of the concept ««s©lf"'transfoimiag 
traditioa"^ I do not necessarily agree with i t s application 
i a t h i s instance. As Fr^.@dri@h says himself, i a discussiag 
what he c a l l s "Fourth-of-July oratory", 
"What was once the unchallengeable truth of 'self-evident' 
propositions has becoHie the empty rhetoric of vulgar 
speeches," ibid, p.24. 
(16) As Giatis ha® said «>• se® Chaptsr 3, above. 
(17) I find i t somewhat surprising i n that part of Douglas' 
message appears to concern th® impossibility of revolutions. 




The problem of "penetration" i s presented by Bemsteia 
as followss 
" I t i s l i k e l y that integrated codes w i l l give rise to 
multiple c r i t e r i a of assegsment cwipared with collection 
codes The weak frames enable a greater range of the 
student's behaviour to be made public and they make possible 
considerable diversity (at least in principle) between 
students. I t i s possible that this might lead to a situation 
where assessment takes more into account 'inner' attributes 
of the student. Thus i f he has the 'right' attitudes then 
th i s w i l l result l a t e r i a th@ attainment of vaxlous specific 
competencies. The 'right' attitude may be assessed in terms 
of the f i t between the pupil's attitudes aad the current 
ideology. I t i s possible, thea, that the evaluative c r i t e r i a 
of iateg3:®,ted codes with weak frames may be weak as these 
refer to specific cognitive attributes, but strong as these 
refer to dispositional attributes. I f this i s so, thea a 
aew range of pupil attributes become candidates for labels. 
I t i s also l i k e l y that the weakened class i f i c a t i o n and framing 
w i l l encourage more of th® pupil/student to be made public -
more of his thoughts, feelings, and values. In this way 
more of the pupil i s avadlable for control," 
Bernstein (1971) ppe 65-6, 
Just as the open/closed diehotemyt aad others closely related 
to i t , are sp e c i f i c a l l y educational versions of more general 
dichotomies ( l i k e Gemeinschaft/a®s®llsehaft), so the notion of 
"penetration" i s related to the broader notions of "anomie", 
"alienation" and "massificatioa". Various aspects of penetration 
are common i a educational l i t e r a t u r e , ^ But they are not often 
the subject of coherent elaboration. 
Th© prescriptions of certain "Open Educationists" are 
considered in Part V. Meanwhile, a few examples id.ll demonstrate 
what the notion of penetration refers to. 
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^Mrso Buchanan" in Sharp & Green (1975) comm©nts on an 
aspect of the "progr©ssiv®ness" of her colleagues and th© school 
ethos when sh® sayss 
"A lot of emphasis i s put on relationships, you know, 
whether a child can mak@ good social r©lationships, 
whereas i n a foMal school a l l th® ©n^hasis i s put on 
attainment." 
Sharp & Gr©©a (1975) pe104. 
She feels somei^t out of tun© with her colleagues in this 
respect t 
"P©rtiaps I'm just a traditionalist and put a lot on 
attainment, you toow, rather than social training." 
ibid, p.103. 
only does th i s forai of educational oonoem refer to training 
th© "whole c h i l d " - including "s o c i a l " as well as "attainment" 
objectives - but understanding and knowledge about the "whole 
child's" background i s f e l t to b® necessary, in order that the 
job be don© adequately and humanely. James and T©n©n (1953) say 
of Michael Daaa@, when he was at How© Dell school, near Hatfiolds 
"The headmaster and his staff ... interpjTsted learning i n 
th i s ^ d e s t s©Ms©9 so th@ ©motional needs of the children 
as individuals wer® considered to be as important as the 
more conventional academic raqulremants ... Th© headmaster 
and his s t a f f mad© i t their business to know as much as 
possible about the home l i f e of each child, and to help 
©ach to understand and solve i t s personal probloms. In 
his spare time, th© headimster visited th© villages from 
which h i s children were drawn, and talked to the parents 
i n their homes and at village meotiugs, ©xplaining to 
them his aims in the school 
James & Tensn (1953) 
same d@sire to help each child to maximise individual 
performano® rationalises close attention to individual "progress" 
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and attempts to keep close track ©f what ^work" i s done. 
"Co-operative teaching can bring th© advantage of tapping 
special s k l l l B and interests of the teachers; i t also 
brings the need for mo3?e discussion about what i s to be 
done and the sharing of information about how individual 
children have responded to ^mt i s offered,.. 
Th® keeping of records aad, just as importaat, the use 
of them to decide on teachiag strategies, i s time consuming. 
Th@^ i s no point i a doiag more thw can be of use, but i t 
i s neglectful to do les s than i s nseessary," 
Education and Scienee, Department of, (1972) pp.10-11. 
m varied and as opea»@nded as t h i s ... aeoessitates 
th® keeping of careful records aad the evolviag ©f evaluation 
procedures. I t becomes necessaxy to assess such things as 
i n i t i a t i v e , imagination, the a b i l i t y to plan, to work 
unsupervised, etc* The convenient captive class a l l doing 
the same thing and being assessed on a comparative basis 
has been l o s t i f l e x i b i l i t y and the unpredictable have 
taken i t s place. In consequence, the role of the teacher 
as tutor with a detailed knowledge of his group becomes v i t a l . 
W©,therefor®, instituted a system of recording s l i p s , 
whereby w@ jotted down comments about th© pupils while the 
points were a t i l l fresh i a our minds. These s l i p s were 
s©rt®d and fed back to the tutors so that background 
information was built up about a pupil based upon the 
viewpoints of different teachers and th© pupil as seen 
in different situations. I t was hoped that information of 
t h i s kind, used as part ©f th© tutorials which were held 
at the beginning aad the ©nd of each session, would help 
identify a pupil's weataaesses and strengths as well as 
his aeed®,'^  Catoa (1972) p.57, 
Bvea Postman, after a radical polemic against the controlling 
functions of lite r a c y and after suggesting that other media should 
therefore be used in education, oomments that 
means, among other things, that teachers would have 
to stop acting l i k e teachers and find something to do, l i k e , 
for iastaao®, helping young people to resolve som® of the i r 
more wrenching ©motional problems»" 
Postman (1970/73) P«94. 
Comment has not been lacking on this emphasis oa social, 
emotional and other "non-academic" aspects of ohilds^en's backgrounds 
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and learning. Parsons distinguished between cognition and 
(2) 
affeotivlty^ ' and applied t h i s to formal educations 
"In elementary school, th® purely intellectual tasks are 
relatively easy for th® pupil of high intellectual a b i l i t y . 
In many such cases, i t can be presumed that the primary 
challenge of th© pupil i s not to his inte l l e c t u a l , but 
to his 'moral', oapacitieso On the whole, the progressive 
movement seems to have leaned in the direction of giving 
enhanced emphasis to this component, suggesting that of 
th© two, i t has tended to become the more problematical," 
Parsons (1959/61) p,440. 
Nash employed Kelly's personal construct theory to ©xamine how 
teachers perceive pupils. Of on© school, h© says, 
"The junior school teachers i n this school perceived their 
pupils primarily in terms of their work habits, their 
maturity, and their classroom behaviour. A l l th© constructs 
related to aspects of th© child's personality. I t i s vary 
interesting to not© that none deal specifically with th© 
child's a b i l i t i e s . The B&T^-wprkin^^^I&zj- construct describes 
th© effort th® child puts into his work, not his a b i l i t y 
to do i t . Prom these teachers I only occasionally 
e l i c i t e d constructs such as B r ^ ^ ^ D u l l , Does good work-does 
poor works and Mg;h_Ig;^jLlR„ which I l a t e r found from other 
priiaary school teachers. 
This school has a local reputation for being 'progressive' 
and 'child-centred' ..." 
Nash (1973) p.23. 
This "Child"C©ntr©dness'' has meant differ©nt things to 
different people. Holt has worriod about the intrusion into the 
private and ©motional l i v e s of children i 
" I s i t possibl© that our modem way of t©aching, a l l 
gentleness, persuasiveness, and human contact, tends 
to make children get themselves and th©ir work a l l 
mixed up? .,, Msyb© i t was ©asier for children to 
grow up i n a world in which, when they impinged on 
the world of adults, they were treated firmly, 
impersonally, and unc©r@moniously, but wer© e t h e r i s e 
l e f t alone ... 
Not© th© danger of using a child's concept of himself 
to get him to do good work* W© say, 'You ar© the kind 
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of s e n s i b l e , smarfej, good, eto.s ©te^s boy or g i r l who 
oass e a s i l y do t h i s problem, i f you tryo" But i f the 
work f a i l s , so does the concept. I f he can't do the 
problem^ no matter how hard h© t r i e s , then, c l e a r l y , 
h© i s sot s e n s i b l e , smart, or goodo 
I f , when Johnny does good work, we make him 
f e e l 9g0od«, may we not, without intending i t , be 
laakiag him f e e l «bad» when h® does bad work? 
Do c h i l d r e n r e a l l y need so mueh p r a i s e ? " 
Holt (1965/69) pp. 54-5.^^^ 
l a a l a t e r book, he says furthers 
" I t i s p o s s i b l e to f a i l as completely at a free or 
altemativ® school .,. as at the most x l g i d and 
conventional school. I n a school whose main work i s 
having everyone get good marks i n exams, whoever cannot 
do t h i s i s a f a i l u r e . But i n a school whose main work 
i s helping eveityone to be happy, to love and be loved, 
anyone who cannot do t h i g i s j u s t as much a f a i l u r e . 
And the sham® and pain of such f a i l u r e may be even 
greater, because the student r e a l l y shares the aims of 
the school, r e a l l y wants to be a success at love and 
happiness, and knows that everyone i s r e a l l y tjoying to 
help him and that when he f a i l s he has only himself 
to blameo" 
Holt (1974/75) p.105. 
T h i s l o s s of a " p r i v a t e " s e l f , which slight escape the c r i t i c a l 
eye and evaluative attention of teachers, i s c r i t i c i s e d by 
I l l i c h s 
"Under the a u t h o r i t a t i v e ©y@ of the teacher, sever a l 
orders of value collapse into one. The d i s t i n c t i o n s 
between mojsality, l e g a l i t y and personal wojrth are 
blurred and eventually eliminated ... 
School teachers and ministers /of the Churcli/ ar® 
the only p r o f e s s i o n a l s who f e e l e n t i t l e d to pry int o 
the p r i v a t e a f f a i r s of t h e i r c l i e n t s at the same time 
as they preach to a captive audience," 
I l l i c h (1971/73) p.38. 
i m p o s s i b i l i t y of escape from so diffuse an array of "educational 
©valuations i s a3.80 commented on by Martin (1971). He considers 
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the "Sesame S t T O e f t e l e v i s i o n seiAesg devissd i n the U.S. by 
L e s s e r m& h i s ssollsagues, turaed doim by ths B.B.C. on the 
grounds that i t was too "authoritajri.an'', but screened by I.T.A. 
siao© researeh had shoim i t to b© "very popular" with c h i l d r e n . 
s t r e e t and th© hoas® represent the only r e t r e a t f o r 
ghetto k i d s . Invading t h i s , ultimately» may r e s u l t i n 
no ©seap® areas f o r 'disadvantaged' children - which 
simply Hseans that t e l e v i s i o n may have succeeded at l a s t 
i n hoiimdixig the off-spring of those who object to the 
c u l t u r a l and s o c i a l d i r e e t i o n of middle c l a s s s o c i e t y , " 
Martin (1971) pp« 399-400, 
Many of the above e r i t i o i s m s ar@ based on b e l i e f s soaroei^' 
more i n t u i t i v e than those that they attack. Fearing an over-
det©mination of c h i l d r e n i n t o t a l i n s t i t u t i o n - l i k e schools, 
they x'ely above a l l on some notion of i n d i v i d u a l i n t e g r i t y and 
the r i g h t to privacy from teachers' interference. The consequences 
f o r i n d i v i d u a l self-concept and s e l f - r e s p e c t are uppermost i n t h e i r 
minds J r a t h e r than any wider s o c i e t a l consequences. Yet, as I have 
repeatedly pointed out, wider i s s u e s are inescapable. They are 
the context of both the ideologies that "motivate" p a r t i c u l a r 
educational p r a c t i c e s and of the e f f e c t s of such p r a c t i c e s . 
Ultimately s i t i s one's conception of s o c i e t a l struotuare that w i l l 
detenaine how one seeks to explain and elaborate upon these p r a c t i c e s . 
Cieourel and Kitsuse (1963) have a view of an i n c r e a s i n g l y 
bureaueratised s o c i e t y . T h e i r "lakeshore" High School i s to them 
a prototype of the future. They se® a trend towards the i n c r e a s i n g 
p r o f e s s i o n a l l s a t i o n of counselling and c l i n i c a l work i n schools. 
Oonsequently, they foresee more l a b e l l i n g of children with, f o r 
example, "deep-seated" problems, where they would previously 
have imd s i t u a t i o n a l problems only - or none at a l l . 
I n contrast to t h i s b a s i c a l l y Weberian outlook, c e r t a i n 
n©o-»MarjdLan w r i t e r s ( e s p e c i a l l y i n th© U.S.) have emphasised the 
r i s e ©f the corporate s t a t e and th© increased subordination of 
i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s and autonomy to the i n t e r e s t s of corporate 
©ffioiencya Spring (1972), f o r instance, c r i t i c i s s e s what I have 
c a l l t d the " P a r t i c i p a t i o n i s t " standpoint, which defines "democracy" 
as the freedom to serve s o c i e t y , r a t h e r than the fj?eedom to exercise 
ehoic® or power« H® adds, 
"Another magical word i n ©ducstioa, one more widely 
used than freedom, has been individualism. Throughout 
th® wr i t i n g s of the s o c i a l educators appears the golden 
t®rm, i n d i v i d u a l i s a t i o n . Meeting i n d i v i d u a l needs and 
providing f o r i n d i v i d u a l differences were the phrases 
that were s o r e l y overworked. I t was believed that as 
long as education i n d i v i d u a l i s e d i n s t r u c t i o n , i t 
m i n t a i n e d some contact with democracy. i J u t / at times 
i n d i v i d u a l i s a t i o n memit using i n d i v i d u a l methods to 
assur® that © v © ^ student aehievedth® same goal..." 
Sps-iag (1972) pp«l63»4e 
Though perhaps a r i s i n g f o r diff©r®nt h i s t o r i c a l reasons, the appeal 
to c e r t a i n Ameslean wxlters^^^ of th® notion of "corporate c a p i t a l i s m " 
i s remiJiiscent of French (BSarsian) structuralism. The ideas of 
tfe© "hidden ourrloulum" and the "^correspondence p r i n c i p l e " are 
c l e a r l y r e l a t e d to that of "master patterns". I n Bourdieu's notion 
of " c u l t u r a l c a p i t a l " , again, a s o c i e t a l perspective i s applied 
to the s p e c i f i c problem of academic c r i t e r i a , which are derived from 
(5) 
th© r u l i n g c l a s s and used to judge -» or more frequently to nihilate'' 
th© oultur© of 6hildr®^ tmm the working and "lower-middle" c l a s s e s . 
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to a r a t i e a a l and r e a l l y u n i v e r s a l pedagogy ,.. 
e a r om pedagogical t r a d i t i o n i s i n f a c t , despite external 
app®arano@e of irreproachable equality and u n i v e r s a l i t y , 
©aly there f o r the benefit of pupils who are i n the 
^ a r t i e u l a r , p o s i t i o n of possessing a c u l t u r a l heritage 
oonforajing to that demanded by the school. Not only 
does i t exclude any questions as to the most e f f e c t i v e 
methods of t x ^ s m i t t i n g to a l l the knowledge and the 
know-how which i t demands of a l l and which d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l 
c l a s s e s transmit very unequally i i t a l s o tends to 
disparage as 'elementary' (with undertones of ?vulgar') 
and paradoxically, as 'pedantic% pedagogical methods 
with such aims, ..« The disparagement of examination 
techniques i s merely the o o r o l l a i y of the e x a l t a t i o n 
of i n t e l l e c t u a l prowess which i s s t r u c t u r a l l y akin to 
the values of c u l t u r a l l y p r i v i l e g e d groups..." 
Bourdieu (1966/74) p.38, 
And so, v i a Bourdieu, we come back again to Bernstein, and h i s 
Burkheimian concern with codes and boundaries. To Bernstein, 
b a s i c a l l y , the penetration of the Integrated Code i s a consequence 
of spontaneous s h i f t s i n s o c i e t a l (imd school) s t r u c t u r e . These 
s h i f t s do not r e s u l t from bureaucratisation and r a t i o n a l i t i o n , 
nor the aoted-upon i n t e r e s t s of eoxporate ca p i t a l i s m . They are 
a r e s u l t ©f the "growing d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of knowledge at the 
higher l e v e l s of thought", of "changes i n the d i v i s i o n of labour 
^ h i c f e / are creating a d i f f e r e n t concept of s k i l l " and of the 
general deregulation of s o c i e t y as a ^hol© (Bernstein, 1971, 
pp. 66-7). 
B a s i c B e l i e f s and Penetratioa 
Certain t h e o r i s t s , then, have attempted to describe or 
explain aspects of what, following Bernstein, I have c a l l e d 
"p®n®trati©n". I n so doing, they have r e l i e d on b a s i c patterns 
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@f b e l i e f <aMd understanding about the o v e r a l l structure of 
soc i e t y and about the functions of education systems. Importantly, 
so a l s o have people a c t u a l l y involved i n educational processes and 
praetio©s« 
"P©H®tration" i s e s s e n t i a l l y a s o c i a l psychological notion, 
s u r p r i s i n g l y , ideas of t h i s sort have been common amongst such 
w r i t e r s as froram (1942/60) ©r Bettelheim (1960/70), who have written 
about mass society from a l a r g e l y s o c i a l psychological viewpoint. 
T h i s viewpoint i s e n t i r e l y l e g i t i i a a t e , but i t does not - and cannot -
t e l l the whole s t o r y . I n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c i p a n t s i n educational 
processes and p r a c t i c e s l i k e w i s e tend to b® i n c l i n e d to consider 
i n d i v i d u a l and psychological i s s u e s rather than wider s o c i e t a l 
(7) 
ones. They adopt a " f o c a l " , r a ther than a " s t r u c t u r a l " 
perception, as Freir© (1972) puts i t e Nonetheless, the very f a c t 
of t h e i r necessary existence i n society i s l i k e l y to produce some 
not i o n a l understanding of the st r u c t u r i n g of society. Teachers are 
not t o t a l l y ignorant of the s o c i e t a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , 
job opportunities, e t c . They themselves are products of education 
systems. They have i n e v i t a b l y acquired b e l i e f s through t h e i r own 
experience. However much they l a c k detailed knowledge of l o c a l 
occupational s t r u c t u r e s and th© l i k e l y futures of t h e i r pupils, 
they do not l a c k notions about society and the role of schools 
within i t . Those b e l i e f s are frequently quite I m p l i c i t . E x p l i c i t 
understandings may be quite l a c k i n g , yet t h i s does not detract i n 
any way from th® point I am making. Not only do teachers ~ as 
w e l l as administrators and l e g i s l a t o r s Involved i n educational 
deelsion^making - have b e l i e f s about society, but these are 
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consequential. They ar© the "motives" on which behaviour i s based. 
Changes i n curriculum and i n school oargassisation do not occur 
spontaneously. They happen through behaviour based on (more or 
l e s s adequate) b e l i e f s and understandings about educational i s s u e s . 
I n turn, the phenomenon of "penetration", however much i t may be 
conceived I n s o c i a l psychological tenas, must be seen to be 
eonterted with the b e l i e f s and understandings of those involved. 
I suggest that penetration can u s e f u l l y be considered i n 
tewis of c l o s u r e s of b e l i e f and understanding. A l l educational 
contexts i n R e a l i t y contain c o n s t r a i n t s . These are determinative 
of b e l i e f i n s o f a r as they ar® poorly conceptualised - i n s o f a r , that 
i s , as they are the object of notional closures. Pupils i n schools 
may b® subject to penetration by mor® diffuse evaluative techniques 
and o r i t e r i a c But t h i s i s only the ease, f i r s t l y i n s o f a r as they -
and t h e i r teachers - are unamr® of th® struotur^tion of the 
schooling and of the society that supposedly "require" such 
©valuation, and secondly - Md consequently - i n s o f a r as they 
themselves l a c k th© conceptual t o o l s to a i h i l a t e procedures which 
detract from t h e i r indi-^ldual and c l a s s autonomyo The kinds of 
teachers' praetic©@ c r i t i e i g e d by som© of th© w r i t e r s quoted above 
can only b® properly understood i f w© examine the i d e o l o g i c a l 
b e l i e f s that underlie them. Thes© can u s e f u l l y be explored i f 
w© appreciate the structured natur® of those b e l i e f s and seek the 
B a s i c B e l i e f s , or Master Patterns;, that laake such behaviour 
meaningful, " r i g h t " and "natu3?al"o 
Sanctions i n schools might be seen as a clue to these Basic 
B e l i e f s . I have no intention here of expanding on Durkheim's 
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iBgenious suggestion that sanctions are i n d i c a t i v e of forms of 
s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y e Yet i t i s worth noting that, i n our society, 
there are at l e a s t two d i s t i n c t l y d i f f e r e n t views about punishment 
£B ®eh©ols«^^^ I n recent debates ov@r the us© of corporal punishment 
i n sohools, these two viewpoints come over c l e a r l y . To give one 
bri.©f example, the headmaster of a school i n l o r t h Shields has 
defended the caning of two g i r l s on the grounds that violence ( i . e . 
by p u p i l s ) m-a not to be t o l e r a t e d , that the g i r l s i n question knew 
t h i s and that s w i f t , prompt action was necessary and e f f e c t i v e 
(B.BoC, T.V, 13/1/76 ) , Th© headmistress of Stareross School i n 
London disagreed. She f e l t that protracted punishments gave pupils 
an opportunity to r e f l e c t upon i^h8,t they had done and on the j u s t i c e 
of the punishment. They could a l s o s©r?© the community - i n 
t i d y i n g up the school, f o r instan©®«> Th® Morth Shields headmaster 
thought that such work should b@ don© by volunteers. Moreover, the 
g i r l s knew what they had don® wa.® vreong and did not need to r e f l e c t 
on t h i s . 
T h i s example i l l u s t r a t e s a digtiaetion between punishment 
that i s r e t r i b u t i v e (and possibly deterrent) and punishment that i s 
r e h a b i l i t a t i n g (and possibly r e s t i t u t i v e ) . Neither party considered 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of no punishment. l e i t h e r , c l e a r l y , doubted the 
r i g h t and th© duty of the teachers i n question to punish. Both 
had c l e a r l y i n e g a l i t a r i a n assumptions about the teacher-pupil 
r e l a t i o n s h i p , though the one, I should say, was d e t e r m i n i s t i c a l l y 
i a e l i n e d , v i s ^ a ^ v i s learning theory, and the other v o l u n t a r i s t t c . 
Though more evidence would of course b@ necessary to prove the 
point e i t h e r way, the Shields teacher appears to be "Productionist" 
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i n h i s assumptions about teachissg-lear^jing smd the London teacher 
" P a r t i o i p a t i o a i s t " , A c l o s e r study of sanctioning p o l i c i e s ndght 
provide a u s e f u l clue to the assumptions that teachers i n 
p a r t i c u l a r schools ( o r more widely) hold to be b a s i c to formal 
education. 
We can see c l u e s to master pattersjing i f we turn d i r e c t l y 
fx'ora consideration of apparently l o c a l and i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s 
to notions of s o c i e t y as a whole. Consider notions of Mass Society, 
as described by Komhauser (1959). H© suggests that p r i o r to h i s 
otm contribution, there were two main kinds of c r i t i c i s m of Mass 
Society 8 one a r i s t o c r a t i c and the other democratic. The former 
feared th© debasement of c u l t u r a l values, through the p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
of the masses i n the making of c r i t i c a l d e c i sions. The l a t t e r 
feared the manipulation of the masses by th© l l l t e . ^ ^ ^ I n n e i t h e r 
case, however, i s the i n e v i t a b l e existence of an " e l i t e " questioned, 
A congruence might a l s o be seen between t h i s dichotomy and that of 
ascription/achievement (discussed i n Chapter 9 ) . The congruence 
between these three i s s u e s might be shown as followss 
•X' 
a r i s t o c r a t i c f e a r democratic f e a r 
of mass s o c i e t y of mass society 
'X' 
a s c r i p t i o n achievement 
•36? 
corporal 




r e h a b i l i t a t i o n 
(and r e s t i t u t i o n ) 
•X» 
I n a l l three cases, "X" represents a quit® d i f f e r e n t Relevance 
angle ~ perhaps that which i n Chapter 7 I c a l l e d "Egalltarianism", 
(Unlike the choices offered i n each case on the left-'hsmd side, 
"X" might be represented, or u n i f i e d , by th© Basic B e l i e f , 
" A l l Men are Equal".) 
So we return to Master Patterns and Basic B e l i e f s , But we 
must remain aware of the importance ©f oontext. I t i s quite 
p o s s i b l e to hold that a l l adults are equal, but that children 
(however these are defined) are net th© ©quals of adults. I t i s 
a l s o p o s s i b l e , i n a p a r t i c u l a r context, to adhere to a ( r i g i d i f i e d ) 
Relevance s t r u c t u r e wherein a l l members of a c e r t a i n category ~ 
those who have acquired a c e r t a i n o e r t i f i c a t i o n a l l e v e l - are 
®ach other's "equals", but th© "superiors" of others. Where such 
d i s t i n c t i o n s are made, then th© Ba s i c B e l i e f i s c l e a r l y not ( f o r 
example) thiat " A l l Men are equal"® That i s a lower-level notion 
( p o s s i b l y e x p l i c i t , even slogaaised) beneath a higher-level 
i n e g a l i t a r i a n i s m . I n t h i s case, s i m p l i f i e d «tree-roots" such as 
those shown i n examples A, B and C, above, may a?epresent not j u s t 
an a n a l y t i c a l representation of sy own, but act u a l Master Patterns, 
The notion of openness/closure i s Important i n understanding the 
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o e n t s x t u a l i s a t i o n ©f such high -and/or not^so-high - l e v e l notions. 
I t i s one thing to recognis@ the ©xistenoe of c e r t a i n i n e q u a l i t i e s 
i n a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t a l context. I t i s quite another to assume 
them to b@ " i n e v i t a b l e " and " n a t u r a l " . An awareness of oonstraints 
that a c t u a l l y # x l s t i s not i n i t s e l f notional closure. An 
e g a l i t a r i a n perspective, i n t h i s case, would seek to understand 
(and to teach m understanding of) the contexted structure of 
oonstraintg <- no doubt with a view to th©ir removal. 
F i n a l l y , these points are c l a r i f i e d i f we return to the 
notion of penetration. The s o c i e t a l context of penetration 
in v o l v e s both i t s determination and i t s consequences. Not j u s t 
observers, such as those discussed e a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter, but 
parkioipants, are l i k e l y to have some notion of th© determinative 
aspects ©f context. The same i s true of th© consequentiality -
and therefore th© nature - of penetration. 
One's understanding of the o r i g i n of increased d i f f u s i o n of 
educational evaluation i s not th© same thing as one's understanding 
of the nature of penetration and i t s oonsequenoes, (Although a 
f u l l y coherent theory would encon^ass both aspects, most 
p a r t i c i p a n t s and observers do not have such a coherent theoajy.) 
Akin to the a r i s t o c r a t i c and democratic c r i t i c i s m s of mass so c i e t y 
noted by Komhauser, are two common responses to penetration. On 
th® on® hand ar® f e a r s that "Open Education" allows the i n s i d i o u s 
entry of undesirable and s o c i a l l y disruptive "ideology". Such, 
f o r instance i s the argument of Egan (1973) when he says, 
"While open ©duoatlon i s dominated by well-meaning people, 
t h i s opening up of educational concepts may seem u s e f u l 
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f o r th® expanded a c t i v i t y i t penaits in ©ducational 
i a s t i t u t i o a s . But i t i s w e l l to b© awar© that i t i s 
based on a theory of education that l a c k s any s i g n i f i c a n t 
defens® against the techniques of r e l i g i o u s conversion, 
the EBanipulation of immature emotions, ideologlzing, 
atsd BQ on© I f we ©pen up concepts, i t i s good to be aware 
of the f u l l mage of what they are opened up to," 
Egan (1975) p»31e 
On the other hand, Bernstein - despite the spontaneity with which 
he seep Isategration o r i g i n a t i n g = i s not s o l e l y concersed with the 
©ffeets of d e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s.t£™S£» ^^^^ with th® opportunities 
that t h i s presents f o r i d e o l o g i c a l control within current power 
s t r u c t u r e s . T h i s i s c l e a r i n the passage quoted at the beginning 
©f t h i s chapter. 
lEy own view I s that th© "opening" of c e r t a i n aspects of 
fonaal ©duoation cannot be ©xplained except by reference to the 
"motives" of people concerned, to th© closures that they maintain 
and to the c o n s t r a i n t s that remain i n t a c t . Hor can the 
eonse^fnoes of such "opening" be understood without reference to 
those same c l o s u r e s . Penetration I s a r e s u l t not so much of 
d s Q l a s s l f i c a t i o n as of p e r s i s t e n t c o n s t m i a t s and closures. Those 
consequences ar© i n e v i t a b l e only i n s o f a r as those involved -> 
in c l u d i n g teachers and pu p i l s - l a c k adequat® e x p l i c i t understanding 
of the t o t a l s t r u c t u r e d context. 
Hoteg 
(1) Consider such diverse - but r e l a t e d - concepts as s i z e , 
b ureaucratisation, remoteness from deolsion^maklng, ( l o s s of) 
personal autonomy; normlessness, d e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , change 
of conceptual, evaluative and s o c i a l categories, ( l o s s o f) 
v e r t i c a l and/or ho r i z o n t a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n } diffuseness, 
moral evaluatio:a, psychological ( i n - ) s e c u r i t y , conformity,,. 
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(2) I was e r i t i o a l ©f the r e l f i e a t i o n promoted by t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n . 
( 3 ) Iater©stingly, McClelland would answer Yes to both of these 
l a s t two questions, i f one's aim w®r© to promote a need 
f o r Aohi@v©s}©at« Se© McClelland (1961 ) j McClelland et a l . 
(1953). 
( 4 ) For instaao®, BraTOMnaa (1974), S p e c i f i c a l l y on Education, 
s®e Camoy (1972/75,®d.)I Bowles & S i n t i s (1976); 
Spring (1973). 
( 5 ) B©rg©r k Mokmann (1966/67), pp, 132-3. 
( 6 ) GoEipar® th®B& statements? 
««Only i f man masters society and subordinates the 
economic machine t© th® purposes of human happiness, 
and only i f he a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t e s i n the s o c i a l 
process, ©an he overoom® what now drives him to 
despair - M s aloneness and h i s f e e l i n g of 
powerlessness," Fi'omm (1942/60), p,238, 
"AM age that o f f e r s so-way chaaoes f o r escaping 
personal i d e n t i t y because i t o f f e r s so many comforts 
smd d i s t r a c t i o n s requires equal stx'engthening of 
th® sens® of i d e n t i t y , " Bettelheim (1960/70) p,95. 
(7 ) of Beckers «*0©lleg@ f a c u l t y t y p i c a l l y see t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n 
with stud@nls as an individttal M,tt®r, The teacher presents 
mat e r i a l and attempts to i n t e r e s t students i n i t so that 
th®y w i l l d®vot© t h e i r ®fforfe to learning what he wants 
th&m to toow. I f they do not le a r n , i t i s because they 
d© not have th© a b i l i t y to do so, ©r because the teacher 
h&B i a i s u f f i e i e n t l y i n t e r e s t e d tfeemo" 
B@ek©r @t a l . (1968) p,130» 
(8) For mor® on punishment i n sohoolsj 8@®, ®»g. Highfield 
& Masent (1952)| Howell (1972), 
Komhauser a s s o c i a t e s himself with the "democratic" 
c r i t i q u e , bat b e l i e v e s that a middle my l i e s i n a 
s o c i a l demoeraey with a plu r a l i s m of intermediate 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
PAIS V - "OHil IDUCATIOM^ M PRAOTICi 
s@rs of t h i s ®ssay ar© about three 
M s t o r i o s l iastano@@ of "Open Educatioa'* ideology. I look at 
th© b e l i e f s ©f ©®rly-19th ceffltury B r i t i s h Badicals, early-20th 
c@»t®.^ Americaa Pi-ogressive© and mid'»20th ©entury B r i t i s h 
Ghild»©@ntr®d ©dwcatioaists. ^ © h would merit much l e n g t h i e r 
treatment than i s possibl© h@r@d S i m p l i f i c a t i o n s and general-
i s a t i o n s ar© iiaevitabl©. % ©bjectiv®, however, i s not to cover 
any of thes® three comprehensively. Much of my exposition r e l i e s 
on secondary somre@s and I have not t r i e d to unearth material 
th®.t i s aot f a i r l y e a s i l y a v a i l a b l e . I t i s i n no way my intention 
to " t e a t " any eubstantiv® hypotheses about any of the three groups 
c©n0id@rad<, % aim i s to illBit^mt© th® analyses developed i n 
th© f i r s t four p a r t s of t h i s essay. A ftmdamental argument has 
b®@n that b e l i e f s are ooat@xt®d. This f i n a l part i s designed 
t o shew that ®ai'li©r aaalyses ar® applicable to r e a l , 
h i s t o i ^ c a l situatioxi0, f ^ r th© b®tt®r «md@r®taading of r e a l , 
cont©xt@d ideologieso A l l ®SB^1®B ar@ chosen because they have 
&em® elaiffl to ©p®M2«@gis i n rsspeot of th® educational b e l i e f s 
coneeraed. As we s h a l l s t e , th© underlying closures ar© I n 
praotio® at l®ast as important, Th© thre® d i f f e r from each other 
l a imp©rfea«t respects - as Indeed one should expect, given t h e i r 
d i f f e r e n t s o c i e t a l contexts. A l l shar®, however, an attention 
to formal ©dueatioa as eomathing ©f siajor importance. A l l were 
a l s o , i n some respects, self-ooaseiousXy " r a d i c a l " or "progressive". 
A® such, thers w©r@ i n many cases genuine opennesses, i f by that 
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w@ maan a r e j e c t i o n of p r i o r elosures. Valuable i n s i g h t s ar© to 
b» encouraged by such eoi^paxdson of dif f e r e n t h i s t o r i c a l examples 
©f " s i m i l a r " phenomena, Hon@th©le@@, i t must be st r e s s e d again 
that such a oossrparison i s only introduced i n these f i n a l chapters. 
What follows i s intended to be i l l u s t r a t i v e of what appears above. 
I t could b® no more than preparatory to. a more extensive study, 
How©T©r, the f e a s i b i l i t y of suoh a study i s , I hope, demonstrated 
i n these pages. 
OHATOR 13 
EABLY HIlBTEMTH-cmTURY BRITISH RADICALS 
Early, U t i l i t a r l m i s 
Two dilemmas underlie contemporary l i b e r a l i s m . F i r s t i s 
the d i s t i n c t i o n (fr9qu©nt!|.y unappreciated) between society as i t 
i s and s o c i e t y as i t should be<> Second i s the p o t e n t i a l c l a s h 
between a b e l i e f that people should choose t h e i r own destiny and 
th® p r i o r 'knowledge' of what they "should" ohoos®. Both dilemmas 
were alr®ady c e n t r a l to B r i t i s h Radicalism i n th© e a r l y 19th century. 
They already had d e c i s i v e implioations and consequences i n educational 
theos^ and p o l i c y . 
The s o p h i s t i c a t i o n ©f th® philosophical Radicals l e d many of 
to be more e x p l i c i t l y aware of any i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s i n t h e i r 
ig than i s often the case, Bip:t they too had t h e i r Basic 
B e l i e f s and i t i s with these that I am concerned. Just as the 
18th century oult of th© "noble savage" foundered when put into 
educational practioe by ttdddle-olaas dissenters, i n th® domestic 
t u i t i o n of t h e i r o h i l d r e n ^ ^ ^ so a t h e o r e t i c a l adherence to 
i n d i v i d u a l s ' i n t r i n s i c r a t i o n a l i t y gave way to state intervention 
and education f o r s o c i a l control i n the 19th century. How t h i s was 
r a t i o n a l i s e d , and what Basic B e l i e f s were dominant i n any 
i a o o n s i s t e n c i s s of understanding, ar© important h i s t o r i c a l 
antecedents of contemporary E n g l i s h education - as w e l l as 
int@r@stiag pjienomena i n t h e i r own r i g h t . 
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faughaa and Archer (1971) m k © a el i i a r a n a l y t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n 
b©tw®@n middle ©lass and working c l a s s " a s s e r t i v e " ideologies i n 
ear-ly 19th century education.^ ' They bas® t h i s , i n turn, upon 
a d i s t i n c t i o n between c l a s i s l e a l p o l i t i c a l economy and (French) 
s o c i a l philosophy8 
"Siao® property was the f a c t o r which oharaoterlsed the 
Esiddle c l a s s , the the o r i e s they accepted uniformly 
accentuated the legitimacy of ownership and therefor© 
were predominantly economic. These were the pre-revolutionary 
theories emphasising the s o c i a l rol® of property and claiming 
that p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s should be inseparable from i t . . . 
Educational reform became restrictiv® rather than u n i v e r s a l 
and p o l i t i c a l r a d i c a l i s m was tempered int o l i b e r a l i s m r a ther 
than s o c i a l i s m . Conversely, the working c l a s s , i n s o f a r as 
i t d i f f e r e d from th© bourgeoisie in the formulation of i t s 
aims and i n t h e i r j u s t i f i c a t i o n , drew on revolutionary 
p r i n c i p l e s r e l a t i n g p o l i t i c a l claims to human r i g h t s r a t h e r 
than economic s e r v i c e s , freedom and equality were lnter>preted 
as p e r t a i n i n g to the i n d i v i d u a l , regardless of economic 
considerations. The g e n e r a l i t y of th© r i g h t s postulated 
l o g i c a l l y l e d to the u n i v e r s a l i t y of th® reforms advocated. 
T h i s applied to schooling as much as to the f r a n c h i s e . " 
"The philosophers ©f l a t e eighteenth-century France shared 
with economists a common o@nc@xn f o r r a t i o n a l i t y and a 
s i m i l a r commitment to the maximisation of human happiness. 
However, while the Physiocrats equated 2?ationality with 
submii^sion to immutable economic laws and happiness with 
th® aceeptane® of the n a t u r a l order, th© pre-revolutionary 
m o r a l i s t s ~ following Rousseau saw r a t i o n a l i t y as a 
n a t u r a l a t t r i b u t e of man and i t s operation as perverted 
by a r t i f i c i a l i n s t l t u t i o n a , ... 
Although eonsiderabl® o s c i l l a t i o n b®tw®®n the two outlooks 
occurred, even within th® works of on© auth®r ( f o r example, 
Diderot), eighteenth-century ©nlightenment thought iSan be 
po l a r i s e d i n t o thes® two extremes •» an emphasis on natur a l 
order and the r a t i o n a l i t y of i n s t i t u t i o n s embodying i t on 
th© one hand, and concentration on n a t u r a l r i g h t s and 
i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y on th© other." 
Vaughan and Archer (1971) PPo 60-1, 79-80, 
I n t h i s ohapt®r I look prima r i l y at the "middle c l a s s " 
v®r0i©n of Hadloalism: Benthamite U t i l i t a r i a n i s m . I then examine 
b r i e f l y i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p s with Owenit© rationalism on the one hand 
' 3 7 0 -
and with the views ©f Kay->SJiuttl®wort5a - as a major^ figure i n the 
d®T©l0pm®at ©f Stat© schooliHg - on the other-o 
As Yaughaa and Archer suggest, the ratioaality of ijistitutions 
tms fmsdameatal to the beliefs of the Utilit a r i a n Radicals. Man, 
i t was true, was essentially rationalo But some men were more 
ratioaal than others. By contrast, th© rationality of the "natural 
order^' was indisputable. Shis l a t t e r notion was inherited, via 
Adam Smith, from the French Physiocrats, Sfflith's interpretation 
involved positing a "spontaneous order", 5?he Physiocrats' 
paradoadoal proclamation of th© perfeotability of th® already-
perfect was avoided by blaming imperfections on deficient 
legislation and institutionso But th© further paradox of state 
intervention i n a lgi.sgez~faire ©eonoray m,m not avoided. This 
intervention was a crucial elemusnt in most Sadical thinking, when 
i t came to education. 
Per the early Utilitarianss th® ©S8®ntial rationality of the 
^spontaneous order" was operative whether or not appreciated by 
men th@ms@lv@s« I t operated l i k e any other laws of natua^e. But 
through science men could beeom® enlightened. That i s , they could 
discover th© self-evident truth of these laws. Thereafter, they 
oould act so as to remove any institutional imperfections, just 
as natural soieae® makes manipulation of the physical world 
possible* The basic "law" was that the mutual benefit of a l l was 
f u l f i l l e d through the pursuit of individual self-interest. I t was 
primarily as an attack on ari s t o c r a t i c a l l y controlled (and Churoh-
oontrolled) educational institutions that u t i l i t y in this sense 
was advocated in Bentham's Chrestomathia^^^ and promoted &t the 
H i l l s ' schoolfs at Haalewood l a Biradnghsffl md Bruo© H i l l i n 
LoMeHo^"^^ In these there TOS a strong emphasis on u t i l i t y and 
®ffi©i@Moyo Only "usefulknowledge was to be imparted. This 
did not inolnde, for instana©, the gratsmar of dead languages. 
«*U@®fuI«' !a@ant Tocational, in a broad preparatory sense, IDhere 
was a stTOSg emphasis on soieno® and teehnology, whilst the body 
©f 'toowl@dg®» to be acquired (by BenthaBi) rigidly systematised 
in a developiaeatal order, Effioieney ms further promoted by 
competition. Motivation wa@ developed through the use of inwards 
which (at Hasl®wood) were banked @nd carefully accounted. Although 
jffluoh emphasis «as l a i d on punctuality and the efficiency of 
tijae-keeping (at Hazlewood, the b e l l rang over 250 times a weekj 
to signal a different action to be taksn), there was also much 
©mphasis on self-discipline and on self-govemment by the pupils, 
Bentham advocated this as a my off avoiding any union in opposition 
$o teachers, a?his» in conjunction i»d.th the strongly imposed and 
constantly t®8t©d curriculum, suggests the Participationism of 
l a t e r progressives. However, i t must b© remembered that these 
schools (actual or proposed) w®r® designed solely for the middle 
elasss as the 0ub«»titl© ©f Otogglgigathla. makes clear? for 
th© extension of the new system of instruction to the higher 
branch®s of learaing, for the us® of the raiddliag and higher 
ranks in lif©."^^^ The logic of later Participation in schools 
may partly have derived from the Radicals' societal policies. 
However, proposals for popular education at that time were 
vexy different, in this respect. 
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I t m.B Jam©@ M i l who f i r s t spelled @mt a Radical societal 
t h e o ^ and policiy for edueation.^ He shared with other early 
Utilitar^.aas th© assooiatiosaist psyeholo^ of Hartley and the 
b@li@f that u t i l i t y was ooaduciv© to the general happiness. He 
also shared their environmental (or educational) determinism, 
fhat i s , he accepted the natural rationality^ and innate equality, 
of a l l men. Theoretically, a l l classes should have "an equal 
d®gx«0 of iat®Uig@net" (Simon, 1 9 6 6 , p o 1 4 7 ) o l a this , indeed, 
the *^ !iiiddl© c l a s s " Hadicals agreed with t h e i r woi^ing class 
and s o c i a l i s t counterparts. But M i l and his associates also 
assmned both a natuml divi@i@n of labour between the middle and 
workiag classes and the inevitabl® need for leadership by the 
foMjer* Given his enviroamental d®t@Kffliaiaja, this provided a 
"prsventlve esug@«», whereby only th® mlaority were able to acquire 
superior qualities of intslligene® (witMa th® "natural order"): 
"As we strive for an equal d®gre© of justice, an equal 
d@gs?@© of terapersmee, an ©qua! degree ®f veracity, in the 
poor as in the rich, so ought we to strive for an equal 
degree of intelligence, i f there w®rs not a preventive 
eauseo I t i s absolutely aec^ssasy for th© existence of the 
human rae®, that labour should b® perfemed, that food 
should be produced and other things provided, which 
huBsaa wlfar© r®quir®s. A large proportion of mankind i s 
required for this labour. low, th©n, in regard to a l l 
th i s porfei®© of mankind, that labour®, only such a posrfeion 
of time can by them be giv®a to th® acquisition of 
iatslligenee as can be abstracted from labour." 
M i l l ( 1 8 1 8 ) quoted by Vaughan k Archer ( 1 9 7 1 ) p.74. 
M i l l adds. 
«Ther® are degrees, therefore, of intelligence, which 
must b© reserved to those who are not obliged to labour." 
ib i d . 
H® no doubt intended "must^e h®r©, in a deseriptive sense, 
referring to wh&t h© took to be inevitable. But such Value-
KaoTO d®i!eription functions presoriptivflyo 
I t I s not surpi^sing, therefore, that the Radical Bdinburgh 
tegiew, i n 18199 strongly praised von Pell®nberg»s schools at 
H o f ^ l , i n Switzerland. Th© two schools at that time were 
th® Soientifio Educational Institution (or Institute) for th© 
Higher Social Classes and the Poor School, The former, drawing 
pupils from a l l over Burop® and ©v®n America» had thirty highly 
qualified teachers for i t s maximum of 1 0 0 pupils. Compulsory 
lessons w@3?e minimal and much i n i t i a t i v e was allowed to pupils. 
Bquipment and f a c i l i t i e s ^ r e unparalleled in Europe at that 
tlm@a The Poor School, on th© other hand, was for vagrant children, 
trained by one tiiacher (Jacob Wehrli) t© agricultural labour. 
Eleven hours a day (nine i n winter) xt®m spent in agricultural 
and craft labour. Only on© or tm hours were devoted to the 
three R«s, histoj^g geography, drawing and music. I t was this 
second school whose practices attracted the attention of educators 
in England and \ ^ i c h th© M ^ M s L - M S i i l ps^ised as follows? 
»Tfe© boys never see a newspaper, asad searoely a book (and) 
are taught, ,viya ,Yoo,@8 a f®w smtters of fact, and rules 
of cosamon application, Th© rest of their education 
eoasiats in inculcating habits of industry, frugality, 
veracity, docility and autual kindness*" 
quoted by Simon ( 1 9 6 0 ) p«135a 
Of th© Institute's pupils, the same wrl.t@r said, 
*«Th@y have evidently mor© to learn I t i s for them 
to understand th© true tenure of power, and especially 
of hereditary power, legitimate because of i t s public 
u t i l i t y I and feel the justice aad neeeasity of securing 
th® md so well, and making i t so evident and plain that 
ao ®a@ im^ be tempted to question th© means." ^^9) 
i b i d . 
Mill's «»p©0sisaism" about the actual p o s s i b i l i t i e s , within a given 
societal strueturs, ©f acquiring elaborated "intelligence" may 
follow from his environmentalist detexminism - that i s , a part 
of his learning theory« However, th© pr®B©ription of this form 
of societal structure derives from a quite different source. 
"So M i l l , while denying that th© humaa race should be 
divided i n two classes, i n fact acquiesces in existing 
class relations and proposes to pe^etuate them ... 
As Hallvj points out, M i l neither enquii^s' how this 
division ©am® into being, questions i t s just i c e , nor 
envisages i t s futusre disappearance." 
3imon (1960) p.147. 
The B@nthamite Hadioals w@r@ curiously inconsistent about 
th® kind ©f education that should be imposed , upon the working 
class e l i l l was confident both in the rationality of a l l men 
and i n th© natural order of ca p i t a l i s t relations. 
" I should have l i t t l e fear ©f the propagation among 
the oomrnes people of any doctrines hostile to property, 
because Xihave seldom met with a labouring man (and I 
IiavQ tsled th® experiment upon many of them) whom I 
oould not make to see that the existence of property was 
not only good for the labouring man, but of i n f i n i t e l y 
m@r@ inportanoe to the labourers as a class, than to 
M i l , Tetter to Brooghan^j 1 8 3 2 , quoted by 
¥aughan & Archer (1971) P*??. 
Yet m i l himself supported oensorship. Moreover, 
"the government of which Brougham was Lord Chancellor 
persecuted the working-class press more viciously than 
had theory administration of 1 8 1 9 " . 
Simon ( 1 9 6 0 ) p . 2 2 3 . 
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IH short, th® Badieals' vi©w of '9®alight®am®at«« was totally closed 
i n TOspect ©f property relations - and therefore of class relations, 
l o t only w@r® working saen unlikely or unable to acquire elaborated 
anderataadisgs of p o l i t i c a l ©eoaoisiy, but they should be prevented 
from doing so. Or rather, they should b® prevented from acquiring 
a '*wr©ag»» understanding - although there was only one valid 
©laboration "pos@ibl@^e Certainly th© most vooal c a l l , early in 
th© eeatu^, for popular ©ducatioa came from middle class Radicals. 
They rejected the Toi^ strat©^ of suppression and indoctrination. 
They advocated the ®nlight@nMnt of tke working class, so that 
they too could see thei r natural coMunality of interest with 
«»Sducati@n, i n thei r view, was the most powerful instrpient 
for ehaagiag men's minds ®nd ©utlooki i t was through 
education al@n@ that the working class could be brought 
within the orbit of c i v i l i s a t i o n and led to a s s i s t , rather 
than obistruet, the establlBhaeat of a new order. This 
was the Radical perspeetiv® at this stag® / i . e . immediately 
post»-Iapol@oaic Warg/. I t led dir©otly to the promotion 
of imrious forms of popular education®» 
Simon (I9S0) p.136. 
Yet for a l l tkts confidence, ther® could ©aly be one basic 
structure to this enlightenment. A l t e r a t i v e ways of conceiving 
of p o l i t i c a l eeoa©!^ were daageTOus "nonsense","Enlightenment" 
As th© 19tfe century parooeeded, erstwhile Radicals increasingly^^ 
adopted education for explicit reasons of control and moralisation -
as opposed to liberation and "©nlighteameat". By 1847* the 
Edinburg;h Review was claim3.ng that education was "the only effectual 
preventive of crime". «»The groat, the paramount duty of the people 
of Baglaad»^ was to reclaim the masses from ^gross ignorance" 
end n®mptations of vice" and to "bring them under the influence 
(12) 
of a wholesome iutelleotual and moral training."^ ' By then, 
there was littl® disagreement ©n t h i s , between Tory, Whig and 
Hadicals Demands were increasingly made for some universal 
system of educational provision for th© westing class, and these 
were eomonly based on th® dangers to property and to the societal 
structure underlying i t . 
As early as 18339 h^i® Horns® ©f Commons heard a motion to 
appoint a S@l@et Committee to inquire into the means of 
establishing a system of national education. J.A. Roebuck, M.P., 
"his d®sire was, by affordtog education to the people, 
not so much to raise them from their proper situation 
as to make them happy and contented in i t , " 
Another Badical,rt^feer, William lolesworth, thought that 
" i t was th© bounden duty ©f th© goversameat to provide for 
@ve^ child bom within th@ realm such an education as was 
f i t t i n g and suitable for th@ statioa which Providence had 
(from Hansard) both quoted by Hurt (1971/72) p.114. 
Kay-Shuttltworthj secretary of tha Coiaeittee of the Privy Council 
©a Education frem 1839 t i l l 1 8 4 9 , and of enormous influence beyond 
those years as well, advocated popular ©duication for similar ends. 
He was very e x p l i c i t i n his advocacy of "@duoation-as-insurance"^ 
as a means to protect property. l a 1839 h© warned of labourers who 
to extort by fear what they oould no longer procure 
by virtuous exertion. Property TOemed ^ o be/ their enemy, 
wrappad i a m® iadiicriaiaating flam© 
h&nmtm&m ®f th© muVmm counties, 
Bmkixig th® improvement ©f th®ir let by th® destruction 
©f capitals« 
fh® r®m@dy for these ©vils m^B to provid® 
''a good ®©ettlar ®du©®ti©a to @nsbl© them to und®r®tand 
tM© tma® eau@@0 which d©t©Miii@ their physieea condition 
and rsgalat® tk© distslbuticm ©f wealth among the several 
elasses of societyo" 
quoted by Hurt (1971/72) pe23. 
Kay«»Shttttleworth opposed Low©' 
r@dtt©®d ®l@m®ntary ©duoatios 1 
view, that th© people should 1 
s®d C@d@ of 1862, which 
3 R's, He held to Mill's 
Igfeteaed^ as to their "true" 
, h® returned as often 
iaduced to l©av@ undisturbsid tfe 
enterprises i n th© hands of tte 
quoted by Bimon (196©) p«357e 
the workmen be 
of commercial 
s." 
The dafeac© ©f property m,B always at least implicit in the 
"©nllghteament" which the Benth@sd.t© Radicals wanted transmitted 
to th® working class, XSJ his stTOiag iaaistenea on religion, 
Kay^Bhttttleworth was f a r removed from the secular rationalists 
of the early 19th century. But i n his essential Basic Beliefs 
about society, there was l i t t l e diff®reno@, Johnson ( 1 9 7 0 ) 
notes an ambivalene® in Ifey-Shutlsl©worth. On the one hand h® 
was an environmentalists he attacked those "prejudiced men" 
who blamed th® poor for a l l the i r sufforings. Yet he was also 
a moralists h® denouncod pursly environmental reform, since 
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"maxsy ®f th® e v i l s suff©3^d by th® poor flow from their own 
ignoMiMO® «Mid m®x'al errors" (hence the need for popular education)* 
Even th i s simbivalene© had i t s origins in the Radicals' own position. 
For this position declared th© possibility (and, in some cases 
©v®a th© right) of a l l men to pursue their own rationally assessed 
interests. And yet i t decreed i n advance what those interests 
must b®. "Enlightenment", an apparently open notion of 
objeetivated knowledge-to-be-leamed, was i n fact a closed system 
of be l i e f s , founded on th® aesumed "naturalness" of an existing 
soci a l order. 
This brief ©ketch of the ®arly Radical position on education 
has of course glossed over a number of differences between particular 
people and between various points i n time. Insofar as suoh 
generalisations are legitimate, however, I suggest that th® 
foregoing has shown i t to b© posoible and useful to talk about 
t h i s position i n teMas developed ®ax"li@r i n the essay« Societal 
Reality, for the Benthaiaite Radical®, was a 'Natural" or 
*»spontaM©oua" order, subject to immatabl® mtural laws. UShilst 
th® elaboration @f these laws was desirable in order to increase 
th® perfection @f already national institutions (i»e. by refuting 
a r i s t o c r a t i c claims of legitijaaey)^ they w®r® not themselves open 
to refutation, or ©v©n adaptation. Valid and valuable 'knowledge» 
ims pr©«-@0tablish©d9 aaad therefor© closed. The societal order 
«*a@c®ssarily" entailed a division of labour between classes, but 
the mutual interests of evexjoae lay i a th© harmonious acceptance 
of t h i s order. Consequently, b©th Objeotivated 'Knowledge' and 
Subjective 'Knowledge' also involved ©loaur®. The evident truth 
of U t i l i t a r i a n principles provited i t s own c r i t e r i a of adequacy -
affld also,; given a (perhaps half-hearted) belief i n Man's natural 
rationality0 provided i t s ©MI means of reinforcement. Nonetheless, 
despite t h i s logical ooiaaeetion between Objactivated "truth" and 
subjeotiv© mnderstaadiags, the Badicals' learning theory also 
to Smb3©etiv@ 'ISnowledg©'), fhi® created a "preventive cause" 
whereby th® labousdag classes w®r® unlikely or unable to acquire 
an elaborated understanding of that Objectivated 'toowledge' which 
wa® so clear to th© iatelleetuals« I t also demonstrates a basic 
incoasisteney in such Radical ideology, Aa Simon points out, 
th i s had 3jm®diat@ origins in Smith'® W®alth.Qf Hations; 
"Adam Smith's argument for education violates his main 
principle, that of th® jsatural identity of interests of 
a l l sections of society. In general he treats the 
divisi®a of labour as aa expression of th® unity of 
interest of a l l individuals in societyj since each 
o©ai;ribut@a i a his own f i e l d to provide the, su?a' of 
goods and services th© oomEamity needs, a l l are dependent 
oa ®aoh other and have a community of interest in the 
society of whioh they are aa ©ssential part. Yet 
G©nsid@riag the effect of the factoxy worker h© i s bound 
to advocate a system of popular education specifically 
i n order to counter th© adv@r@@ ®ff©ct ®f the division 
of labour." 
Simon (1960) p,139« 
l a his isach'»eit®d exaaapl© of pia-^manufaeture, concentration on 
a few simple operations makes the labourer "as stupid and 
Ignorant as i t i s possible for a huiaan ereatur® to become" 
(qtuoted, ibid, pe138). Thus th® rationality of the societal 
order may net b® s@lf"@vid@nt to working men* Contextual, 
rather than logioal, factor® moy play a more important part in 
th® dateriiaiaatioK &f subjoetiv© aotions, H@n©@ the need for 
0tat@ ii3t©rroatiOH (within a "IMHSirlSili. ' ' ©eoaoBsy) in th© 
cm® of popular ©ducation. H©ne® th© n©®d for educational 
leadership (as well as industrial and p o l i t i c a l government) -
for the frasKtog of va l i d and vsluabl© 'knowledge'^ for 
©aiasorship ©f the working class press, f®r th® diffusion of 
•Useful to@wl®dge», for control ov®r th® Meohaaics Institutes, 
for limited suffrage and, i a shert, for social control. Many 
of tha @dm©ati©fflal principle® evolved for th® children of the 
bourgeoisie may have been dra« from 18th ©eatury social 
philosophy. But t h i s was quit© different from th® education 
savisaged •» and in th® ©vent institutioaalised - for working 
class ehildrexje Th© "pr@v©ativ® cause", in fact, was a 
pr®v®ntiv® prsseription, Iav@rth@l0sSsi th® Radicals' view 
of mind"braia and subjective 'knowledge' was in many respects 
siKillar t© that ©f th© s o c i a l i s t rationalists of th© 19th 
e®ntu3^. Th®y did, after a l l , hold that i t was a child's 
olass position, rather than his innate a b i l i t i e s , that 
n®e©ssitat@d d i f f e r e n t i a l ©duoatioaal provision. Their beliefs 
war® than, so f a r as genetic determination was concezwed. 
Indeed, t h i s i s their main claim to b® considered within th® same 
tradition as contemporary "progreseiv©" or "Op®n" educationists. 
Yet this '^openness" was coupled with closure insofar as i t 
posited ©avireamental dttermiaism ©v@iy bit a strong as th® 
geaetio d@t®Maiaism rejected, Som© of these closures i a 
•ifeatharait© ideology wer© lacking in worktag~class radicalism 
i n the ©arly 19th century. To illusta?at® thiSf, l®t us briefly 
consider Robert Owen and the Owsnit® position. 
RobertjOwen 
Ifflportaat f@atur®@ of the soe i a l i s t tradition of educational 
be l i e f had their roots in 18tfe eentuxy French social philosophy. 
The writing ©f a@dM.a and Paia® helped to inject into that 
tradition a belief in th© naturalness of huasan equality, rather 
than in th® naturalness of particular societal institutions, 
(14) 
dodwiffls acknowledged by many as th© father of anarchism^ 
"th® action® and disposition® ©f nmakind are the offspring 
of oircumstaaees and @v®nts, and aot of any original 
dettadaation that they briag into th® world. ^  
God^n (1793/1972) p.25, 
"There i s a© particular mould for th® construction of 
lords and they ai?© bom neither better nor worse than 
the poorest of thei r dependents," 
aodwin, quoted by Vaughan and Archer (1971) pp.81-2, 
lo t only w«r® men ©qual in their innat® a b i l i t i e s and potentials, 
but also i a a natural "curiosity" which ms potentially the 
saotivating fore© for universally mtioHal edueatioHo As Paine 
put i t s 
'^ The hujaaa raiad has a natural, disposition to s c i e n t i f i c 
knowledge, and to th© things @onn@oted with i t . The 
f i r s t and favourite amus0m®nt of a child, even before i t 
beginii to play, i s that of imitating the works of man, 
and i t interests i t s e l f In the fat® of i t s works wi.th 
a care that resembles affection. I t afterwards goes to 
school, where i t s genius i s k i l l e d by the barren study of 
a dead language, Jind the philosopher i s lost in the 
lin g u i s t , " 
Pain® (1794/1972) pp« 46-7. 
I t ms social institution® that corrupted this natural a b i l i t y . 
For aodwin, ©dueation and govsMaient w@r® necessarily in 
oppositioa t© ©a©h ©there 
"'Th© great triumph of man i s in th® power of education 
to improve his i n t e l l e c t j, to sharpen his perceptions, 
and to regulate and modify his moral qualities.' 
Godwin ... sees education and government as competing 
for influence on human development. While tuition 
stimulates reason, the stat© perpetuates error. While 
education restores natural equality, government supports 
a r t i f i c i a l distinctions.«,," 
¥augjmn as Archer (1971)" p.SSt quoting Godwin, 
Godwin's insistence on th® importance of th© means by which 
?30ci©ty i s changed - for the result cannot be separated from 
those means - was but on© feature found l a t e r in the beliefs 
©fiRobert Ow®n, 
(s aeoordiag to S i l v e r (1965s p«94) "was a product of 
th© Godwiaiaa radical rationalism of th© 1790s, not the 
utilita.rlMisra of th® 1810s," Si l v e r attaches great importance 
to Owen, for a number of masons. Partly, Owen was a practitioner. 
The central them® of Silver (1965), i s that i't was Owen who put 
©dueational theory into practice, in th© context of m.aa education. 
for th® f i r s t time, i a a or i t i o a l stage of B r i t i s h 
soeiai development, mad® what had been a by-product of 
radieal philosophy ... a eentml feature of the analysis 
of social problems." 
Si l v e r (1965) Pe98. 
But beyond this, was Owen's influence on others. 
. 3 8 3 " 
„is eoaeept ©f ©dueability and th© isafluenoe of 
®n,viroas®Mt brought sharply imto focus a generous 
approaeh to th© rol® of ®dueation in preparfjng men 
f©j? th© f u l l e s t possible rights i n and contribution 
t s soeltty, 1 8 t h centasy 'popular' education practice 
aimed to produe© a specific kind ©f man for a sp©cific 
social rol©6 Th© mor® enlightened continental 
@ducati©aal thinkers aimed to liberate the human s p i r i t , 
but i t was a self-contained act of liberation, since 
the underlying assumption ®v@n of & Pestalozzi was that 
poverty was inevitabl©, or that i t was, at least, no 
conc@m of th@ ©ducator Owen went beyond these to 
place social responsibility for education in the context 
©f opposition to th© status quo, Th© result was th© 
©stablishjaent of traditions bridgiag across from 
education to j u s t i c e , eolleetiv© action and responsibility, 
common decency, tolerance and huamaity," 
Si l v e r ( 1 9 6 5 ) p e 2 3 6 o 
Owen was aa © g&litariaa. 
«»lo man has th© right t o require ®a®th®r man to do for 
hiiB what h© w i l l not do for that man? ©r, in other 
words» a l l m®n, by nature, have equal rights." 
Owen ( 1 8 3 7 / 1 9 6 9 ) p»203e 
mB new in Owen's ©ontribution, in th© s t r i c t l y 
@ducati@nal f i e l d , was th® hmanism with which he applied 
this th©ory /ihat ' eiroumstaaees mak© manl7« H© was not 
«sono@rn@d to us© @duoati©2s to inculcate particular beliefs 
©r theories, nor with happintss eoaceiv®d of in an abstract 
m-^ ys, but s©aght rather to ©duoat© children as human beings 
©apable of applying their reason to nature and society and 
@f ©ajoying a l l aspects @f lif®9 In th® New Lanark schools 
these ideas were translated into practice." 
Simon (1960) p»195» 
H® was opposed to "uanatural" class divisions and sought a more 
rational f®rffl of the division of labour^ According to his 
eventual solution the only natural differentiation was on© 
*'Sfe® natural and rational ela^sifieation of th® human 
»c© i® ..e th© claasification of ag® - ®aoh division 
@f sf© having th© 0ooupatio;ns to perform for, which each 
ag® i s th@ best adapted by nature," 
Ow®n (1837/69) p«204« 
Ffe prop©s®fl ©igfe'l "classes" ©a t h i s bas: 
though believing i n the discovembility 
sooie-feal ®tKistar@e did not hold to 
owrreiftt "order". Education m.& not, 
of an establishM p o l i t i c a l ©eonomy. 
IS , H® and his followers, 
of the most rational 
rationality of the 
, the mere transmission 
" A l l th® Owenit® ©dueator® stressed th© importance of 
learning about society and, t©©^ th® @^©nt to whioh 
fey foMia man, ,," Simon (1960) p«265. 
For a part of his l i f e , at least, Owen also believed in the 
education, His a c t i v i t i e s in the 





him from th® early 
charaot©ri®ti0s may have distinguished 
^ d i c a l @ , O^en also had much in 
m t i o m l i s t , identifying what I have 
called th@ logical and ooateztual dimensions of adequacy? 
„ ±@f that i t i s ever 
e®a@i0t@^t^, iiith,JLtgeK i t s?®wins one and the same, under 
@T3ry view and comparison of i t which can be made; ?Mle 
®3CTor w3.11 not stand the t®8t of this investigation and 
comparison, because i t ever l©ads to absurd conolusiono 
Had any ©n@ of the various opposing systems which have 
gov@ra©d the world, and disunited raan fjpom man, been true, 
without any mixture of error, that system, very speedily 
afte r i t s public promulgation, would have pervaded society, 
and compelled a l l men to have acknowledged i t s truth. 
Th® criterion however which has been stated shows that 
they are a l l , without ®xe©ptioa, ia part inconsistent with 
th® facts which exist around us." 
185" 
Though him beliefs w©r® "@p®a» in respeet of th© ideal soeistal 
gitructur© for much of his lif® •» i a that h® was for long unc©3?tain 
what that society would b® l i k e - they irer© "closed" in respect 
©f certain "fuadaneatal principles''. Thase were the "rational" 
priaeiples that would have to b© ©mbodi@d i a such a society. 
Moreover, 
"these principles r®quir® o n l y t© b© known in order to 
establish themselves." Owen (1812-13/1969) p.76. 
Owen was also an environmental d@t®Mda±8t» Indeed this centjreil 
principle strongly appealed to his followerss 
"Relieved from religious pr@jadioas and their obstructive 
influ@n©@s to th© attaiMiaent of common sense, ray mind 
became aimpl© i n i t s a©w arrangement of ideas, and gradiially 
cam® to th© conclusion that man could mt make his own 
©rgaaisatidn, or any on® ©f i t s qualities, and that these 
qualities war®, acoordiag to their nature, more or less 
influeneed by th© oircumstaaces which occurrsd in th® 
l i f e of eaeh, over ^ o h the individual had no other 
control than these combined circumstances gave him, but 
over ?*deh society had an overwhelming influence*,." 
"Character i s formed for and nofe^ th® individual." 
0w®n ( 1 8 5 7 / 1 9 6 9 ) pp.47,51o 
principl© h® retums to ti®© and again. Yet because of the 
lack of any distinction between H®ality and Objeotivated 'Knowledge', 
and consequently between th© logical @ad contextual origins of 
Subjective 'Ifiaowledg®', th©r@ i s m iacoasistenoy here. On th® 
on® hand "truth" i s so self"@vid®nt that i t has "only to b© known 
in order to establish" itself« Yet^ 
"Th© fradameatal priaoipl® o e . i s , that 'Children oolleotively 
fflsy b© taught any s®nti«nts and habits'9 or, in oth®r words, 
'trained to acquire any eharaoter'e" 
Owen (1812«13/1969) p«130. 
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gvitably, tki® includes ««f®l®©«« l3©li©£® aiad «irj?ational« notions. 
basis ®f t h i s Religiea of th® oaly one which 
@m ooraduot ma to th© ps^otiee of pu?@ ohazlty and 
maX r±vtu@, and to the ©n^ foyiaent of unalloyed happiness, 
i s th® ka@wl©dg© that the laws of mttt3?e have given the 
power to adult man, so to eontrol the mental faculties 
and physioal powers ©f his infant, as to force i t to receive 
error, howsver absurd and inconsistent 9 or to imbibe truth 
only Owen (1833/1969) p.193. 
l a short, both "truth** aad^falsity" can b© i n s t i l l e d as Value-
EnowledgQ. Yet "trath", once promulgated, w i l l always be s e l f -
evident. Shis inoonsistenoy may b® resolved for Owen in his 
distinction between adulthood emd infancy. That i s , whilst 
infants laay not be able to appreciate th© difference between the 
two, adult men oan. Having one® s@®n the "truth**, i t must always 
hold swaye However, thi s f a i l s to accord either with his approach 
to the **untutored'* working class, or with that to middle class and 
aMatocratio leadership. 
His environmental deteminism tended to weigh heavier than 
his f a i t h i n rationality, when h© considered the woz^ing class. 
Taugfesn and Archer suggest that 
"The sueoes® attributed to his endeavours /at H©w Jaja&vli/ 
can be largely accounted f©r by the low level of expectations 
concerning the a b i l i t y of working-class children at the 
time*** Vaughan & Archer (1971) p»87. 
This depression of expectations applied not just to admiring 
v i s i t o r s , but to Owen himselfe l a th© sohool i t s e l f , he clearly 
had a very low » albeit patronising opinion of the f i r s t teacher 
ther@, Jam@s Buohanan« He wag 
willing gewasatsto att@ai to the iastruotisffl given to 
as t&T @.B Ms g@©d-mtuTOd llialt@d powers would 
,^«c«» Owm (1857/1969) p«66o 
Q^m 3e®gard®d Baefeaaan'a t©aehiag a b i l i t y as almost wholly the 
produot ©f Ow©a«0 owa »»drilliag« aad "iastructioa". I t was to 
Ow@a^ s ^ bs@n@@e when Buehansun moved to London, that Owen attributed 
the latter*© f a i l u r e there, l i a r©plae®m@nt was superior i n Owen's 
eyes 8 but he to® was a credit largely to Owen himself i 
He *^m@ eager to be taught th@ means to oax>ry the 
iaproTemtats which I wished lato pmetioe. H® was f u l l 
©f faculty for the eaaploymeat, aad at 16 years of age was 
the best instructor of infant® I haw ever seen in any 
part of the worlds» ibid. 
More generally, too, Owen had the same pessiaistie and paternalistic 
b e l i e f s about the actual a b i l i t i e s of working class people. 
»»ST@a in lat@r years, when ©igaaisatiea in trade unions, 
co-operative s@oi©ti©s and p o l i t i c a l associations began to 
replaoe the blind and purposeless manifestations of the 
anger of the working poor «»« Owen did not cease to feel 
that the poor saust b© ©arefmlly shepherded into the good 
l i f e , l e s t t h e i r independent aotioas lead to disastrous 
consequences. A l l his addresses to the wording classes 
ar© c®uch@d i n language suggeeting that he m.m speaking 
to untutored aad mischievous children, who must be 
constantly guarded against their ignorance, prejudice and 
pa0si®n«« Miliband (1954) p o 2 3 9 . 
In 18339 Owen waraied workers that they 
w^@r@ s t i l l gravely deficient in knowledge, though signs 
were saaltiplying that they were making great progress i n 
the acquisition of the right principles," 
quoted, ibid, p8 242o 
Millbend finds i t 
^'retsarkable .oo that, deeply convinced though he was of 
the potentialities of o r d i a a ^ men, he should have held so 
«ion®i®t@ntly pessimistic a view of the i r pa?esent 
capabilities,« ibid, p,245. 
In other words^ though Owen may have had vesy different beliefs 
about the ^^aatural order" of society, he diffeired l i t t l e from 
M i l l in assuming that the eurront on® ms a major "preventive 
eause", Th© "light of reason" was not necessarily bright enough, 
®T9n for adult ia®n. 
I t was only late in his l i f e that Owen turned to the labour 
movement aa a specific educational policy, Sven then he regarded 
government as the proper sour®® of ©ducational provision. He did 
not, for instance, promote the Grand National Consolidated Xrade 
^^^^^'^ S^^BM^ employers, so much as for the matual benefit of a l l . 
His aim was (new) harmony, not olass struggle. In e a r l i e r days, 
his appeals were almost exclusively addressed to government and 
th® employing class, 
" I at this time <^n 1813/ published a pamphlet for private 
circulation, stating the preparation t(M.ch I had made to 
conduct the establishment at lew Lanark on principles to 
ensure th® improvement of th® condition of the people as 
well as to obtain a reasonable remuneration for capital 
and for i t s management, These were eiroulated among the 
best cireleti of the wealthy benevolent, and of those who 
desired with sincerity to commence active measures for the 
iffiprov®ffi@at of the condition of the poor and working 
classes,,.'' Owen (185T/1969) PeSS, 
He appreciated that vested interests might prevent "the 
Bignitaries of the Church and their adherents" from embracing 
the rationalism that "must inevitably destroy" the inconsistency 
of their position. (Owen, 1812-13/19699 pp.138-9). Yet he 
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f a i t h i n th® power of reason to sway th© 
wealthy benevolent9 I t was for their benefit, as 
muoh m for that ©f the poor, that h© proposed his indeed 
" I t w i l l .., b© th® @ss@ac@ ®f wisdom i n the privileged 
classes to @@">©p©rat@ sincerely and oordially with those 
who desir® a©t to touch one iota of the supposed advantages 
which they new possess i and whose f i r s t and la s t wish i s 
t@ in@rea@@ the particular happiness of those classes as 
well as the general happiness of S0ciety»*' 
Owen (181g"13/1969) ppoTS-S, 
Mllibsmd (1954, Peg35) sees this f a i t h in "the potential 
enlightenment of govejament, of whatever hue" as peculiarly 
the child ©f 18th eentus^ rationalism^ Voltaire and Diderot 
b©for® hi®, and Beatrice W©bb after him, had the same fa i t h in 
enlightened despotism. 
fh® mala reason that Owen gave for this approach to government 
was his fear of th© irreparable host i l i t y that would be aroused by 
aay others, nora violent, means to societal change. (Another reason 
ms the pessiffiistic ass@ssment of tlw a b i l i t i e s of workjjjg class 
men to goveisa^ Idke Godwin b@f@J?® him, Ow®a stressed the importance 
©f th® means by ^ *dch society must be transformed. What he did not, 
i t seems, consider, was the "hidden currloulum** of paternalist 
refoTO ~ quit® apart from i t s f e a s i b i l i t y oa other grounds. 
Xt was in his notions of seoi@tal change that 0w©n*3 persp©otive 
m.m perhaps most inadequate. H@ was opposed to the extension of 
sjiffrag®, b©oau@e of the incapacities of working class psople. H© 
opposed any violent form of revolution. He pinned his f a i t h in 
th® power of reason, example and enlightened leadership. Whilst at 
iv@l Owen^s central prinoipl® mm have been that Man 
th© p®3?f®0t society^ implicitly this did not mean 
a l l m©H^B©r did i t m%m any mm whatever. In his personal dealings 
h« was paternalistic - somsthing that was e@rtainly encouraged by 
(16) 
jBany ©f hie followers.^ And ija h i s ooaogptions of societal 
Chang© th© saa® pattern operated. 
i n a b i l i t y to m&ljs® th© mecSaaJiics of social change 
®r t© uad©rstsad th® nature @f power /and h i s / belief that 
change might be the rssuit @f a l l but miraculous events mad© 
consideration of any f o n of p o l i t i c a l action unnecessaxy. ** 
miiband (1954) p»240e 
As Yaaghan gmd Archer point out (1971. poSD, th© 18th century French 
p o l i t i c a l philosophical tradition did not provide a blueprint for 
action. I t had a© theory ©f ©hang®. l a tujm, Owen's rendering 
of i t r®li@d on ©ft®n implicit Basi© B@li©f® about harmony and 
leadership which w@r@ n®t signifieantly dlffersat from those of 
th© U t i l i t a r i a n Radicals. Indeed9 i t i s worth noting that th© 
I, of course, to 
th© fattor «° was meurmnt i n th® sp©@©h@s and writings of that 
(11) 
®n®ffl(y of socialism, Ksiy~Shuttl@w©rth. ' Bateraalism was i n many 
ways a Master Pattera ©f societal ehang® notions which Owen shared 
with his f a r l@s@ humanitarian and c^rtaialy nonosooialist, 
cont@itp©rari@Se I t was this that the *'politi6al** Chartists 
rejected.^ ' But i t marks Owen as a significant member of the 19th 
century radical movement, ©f greater sigaificanc® for l a t e r educational 
progr©ssivisffi than th© u t i l i t a r i a n s . Ihereas their prescriptive 
notions of society were eosgilex and explicit, Ow©n»s w©r© l e s s so. 
But th®y were clearly different i n important respects. Nonetheless, 
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h i s aotion @f change (through leadership) •» l i k e his environmental-
d®t@»ti:iist learaing theory, and his belief an objectivated 
(or at least ©bjeetivatafel®) rationality - was very much within 
the same paradigmatic frame. 
(1) See Musgrov© (1959/TO) m middle-class domestic tuition, 
Edgeworth was a good ©»mpl@ of one who abandoned Rousseau's 
system ©f tuition, Shough his son developed considerable 
a b i l i t i e s and some admirable qualities, he also became too 
s®lf«»will®d by Edgeworth»s standards. He was subsequently 
sent to boarding school. See Simon (1960) pp,39-40. 
(2) ?aughan & Archer distinguish between "asseiftive" and 
''defensive" ideologies, depending on whether they challenge 
®r attempt to maintain the status quo. 
(3) I say "most", because i t w s not only the anarchistic 
tradition (or sooial philosophy tradition) of the working 
ola@a i ^ c h saw dangers in stat© intervention, fhere was 
also a fear of Church domination and a self«help ethio 
amongst mny middle class Radicals, Voluntary°-isra was also 
©spoused, of course, by mny wl^thig religious societies. 
Sm S i l v e r (1965) PP9I02-4. 
Published 1816"17, the t i t l e means "conducive to useful 
Imowledge" - Simon09 60) p,79« 
(5) She H i l l brothers (or M.D.Hill) pmblished their book, 
Pubjdo^BdUigatioH.. ^  i n 1812, part3^ to publiois® Haalewood, 
l y infora!i.ti©n on thi s comes from Simon ( 1 9 6 O ) pp,79-84 
and Stewart (1971) ppo54->67. 
(6) Vaughan & Archer (1971) Po76. 
(7) Mill's "0a Education" appeared as a Suppi^ment to 
E:ag@lo|)a©€U,a Brit,aaniQa» 1818, I t i s republished in 
iiB) Simon (1960) p,135. 1^ description of the two schools, 
however, i s obtained from Stewart (1971) pp,77-81. 
(9) Robert Owen sent his son to the Institute, a point which 
should b@ remembered below, wher@ I discuss Owen's beliefs. 
(10) "Nonsense" i s her® mewst quit© l i t e r a l l y . Per the "obvious" 
Md ''natuml^ s®ns® of tte®ir © w view of p o l i t i c a l economy 
(11) I do a@ts ®f eours©, wish to iraply a steady dovelopment of 
&mh a p®li«^. I t d©v®l®p0d in el©@© relationship with 
©tfe®r ©vents and processes, I®t least ©f these was 
working class politioisatioa.Cf.Johnson ( 1 9 7 6 ) . 
(12) Quoted by S i l v e r (1965) p9208. 
(13) **lduoati0n^a@">iM@uraae@«' i s aa expression used by Sil v e r 
(1965) @«ge pp^SOa-f. 
(14) Iropotkia (1949) Pc874. 
(15) ''A prineiple regarding I t a , which seareely requires mere 
than to b© f a i r l y stated t© raate® i t self-evident ... i s 
that, ''Any general oham©t®r, frem th© best, to the worst, 
from th© most ignorant to th© most enlightened, may be 
given to any ©ommuaity, ®V@M to th® world at larg©, by th® 
applioatlM ©f proper m®m@i which means are to a great 
®xt@nt at th® command and rad@r th® e®atrol ©f those who 
hav® iafltt®ffl©@ i n the aff a l M of n®».»^ 
Ow©a (1812-13/1969) p^TOe 
This i s a good ©mafl© ©f a single bagio belief structure 
frming both iadividual learning thsea;^ and notions @f 
societal ehaag@« 
( 1 6 ) Por iastane©9 James Morsls©a9 dtseribed by Postgate as 
•*®a® of th® most l@v@l-fe©ai.®d l®a&@m of this time**, 
wrote to Ow@a in 1833, sa^iags 
*'Your doots^e® Jmv© mad© m@ a b®t|er and a happier 
being ... Sine© ssy p®Mmal intsrsoam® with you I have 
become better. Be, thmig isgr Physician ... Your practice 
inspires perfect o®afid@ne@ ... I shal l Icok upon you 
as a Father and txy to btcem© a faithful Son...** 
Ijloyd J0«®@, secretary t® th© ooasmitt®© of a Oo-oporativ© 
School at Salford wrot®, ta 1836, 
StTOagly impressed with ih@ truth ®f th© doctrines 
propounded and advajns@d by you, and having an interest 
in and consequently a d@sir@ f c ^ their promulgation, we 
hav@ @x©rt@d ourselves to make ttom manifest to those 
by wfeem w© are surrounded 
Quoted by S i l v e r (1965) pp^1999 243 (original emphasis), 
(17) S©@ JotosM (1968) ppo 72»5 aad (1970) p. 112. 
(18) For an aooouat of Hamsy's opposition to Lov©tt*s 
»'lto©wl@dg© Chartis®«5, s@© Simon (1960) pp.267-9. 
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fo g®n®»lis® about Aatrleaa Progr®s®iv@ educationists in 
th© f i r s t half of th® 20th Q®ntU3^ i s perhaps even more d i f f i c u l t 
than to mak® airailar attempts i n th© eas® ®f the BrxfrCsh Radicals 
a ©@ntury 'b®f®m^ As Swift (1971) poiat® out, 
" I t i s probable, in spit© ©f th® popularity which progressive 
education weatually attained, that few truly progressive 
schools ever ©sd-steds" iwift (1971) p.8, 
Yet this l a n® way detracts fr@m th® importance of the progressive 
education "movement^ ™ any Hj@r@ than th© importance of institutionalised 
Sioas depead on adherens® t© th© wrknQi-plm of their founders, 
introduoiag his c l a s s i c feistosj ©f the "movement", waxns 
««5fhe ^ rogreasiv© ©dueatioiJ mmmmt was marked from 
th® fe@gifflJBlag by a p l u r a l i s t i c , fmqiaently contradictoiy, 
character, The reader w i l l search these pages in vain for 
any capsule definition of progressive education. None 
exists, asxd aon© @v®r will? for throughout i t s history 
progressive education m®ml diff@r®at things to different 
people, aad these diff@r@ao08 wera ©aly compounded by 
Cremln (1962) p,s„ 
L®(S®, a "m©v0Mi®at^ @f eoa® sorfe clearly did exist 
and i t s impact on schools was of tremendous consequence. In 1928, 
th© founder ef th© Children's School, Margaret Wauraberg, could 
"Anything less than 'progressive fduoation' i s now quite 
out ©f date in Americso I© on® toshes any longer to be 
called oonservativ®, Bvery shad®, therefore, of radical, 
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progressive, and mildly Qonmrtedim ®duoator, from 
pablio m mil M prix'at® schools, was to be found at 
•th® 8th Ooaference on Progressive Education ,.." 
qu0t®d by Grsmin ( 1 9 6 2 ) p o 2 4 9 « 
Tiim magaaia® ©laisaed i n 1 9 3 8 that 
Oaited States school has coMijletely ©soaped i t s 
influeBG®" quoted ibid, p<,324o 
f h ® ^M@v@ffi0Bt^ i s important because of i t s involvement with a 
im&B education isystesae I t was dealing aot m®r@ly with a set of 
theories or priaeipl®s, but with sehooliag in practice. Though 
i t may b@ tra®, as GarMoy suggfsts, that J®hsj Dewey's ideas had 
th e i r greatest following i n mlMle-clas® private schools, he i s 
wroag iffl suggesting that th®y had littl® impaoit on public 
education unt i l th@ 1 9 5 0 B and ^SOs. What happened i n the 
publis schools ©specially th® high sohools - in mid-20th century 
iTOriea i s not sepax-at® from B®w@y-'an philosophy, but based upon 
(2) 
mmj ®f th® Basle Beliefs to which h© also adhered.^ ' Though 
th© ^faovem^nf was indeed r®isy diversified, and though much that 
went tmd®r th© name of "prog»©@@lv® ©ducatioa" was not in accordance 
with th® aaia b@dy of D®w®y^s ©xplieit outings, nonetheless there 
was a Q©rrtaln logic which uaif i t d a wid® bo^ of practice. 
B0wl@s aad Giati® ( 1 9 7 6 ) poiat ©ait that different sections 
®f Am©rl<san society sought different things through the "movement". 
E l i t e s BOMght both to control and to Motivate the labour force -
by A»®rf.eas3iisation, disciplia®, fragmtatation and s t r a t i f i c a t i o n , 
Edueationiste and reformers sought an antidote to urban poverty 
and many of th® humanely cono®iv®d "social problems" of mssive 
VLThm ©^aiisi©«. labour leaders ®©ught meMlity, security and 
so c i a l x'®sp®etibility for th®m®@lv@s and their members (Bowles and 
Gintisj, 1976, p « 1 8 6 ) o Th© dangers of g®a®raligati©ij are obvicus. 
I t must b© r®a®mb©r®d that v^f a i p i s a@t to reveal new hist©j?ical 
data, nor to test specific hypoth®s®s about American Progressivism. 
I t i s to d@ffl©nstrat© th® usefulness of a particular approach. A 
mer® detailed study could proceed on th© lines her© suggested. 
I s h a l l look principally at some writings of John Dewey and at 
how th@s® w@r@ related to actual praetieeso I shall again concentrate 
on closures and Basic Beliefs i n the areas of (Social) Reality* 
Objeetivated «^owledg©» and Sub^ectiv® ^Knowledge*, and the 
relationships between these. I shal l look for underlying themes in 
th@ ideologies @f educational theorists, corporate foundations, 
pel i t i o i a a s , admiaistrators and practicing teachers, 
Cr©min says of Marietta Piero© Johnson, th® guiding s p i r i t 
b@h±sid th® ProgMssiv© Education Assooiatioa after World War I , that 
**H@r outlook retained th© essential iPigour and ©qualitarianism 
©f Rou@s©aa<'s ... but i t pr©s©nt@d a l l th® d i f f i c u l t i e s as 
well. For to talk of control for th© child's good, of 
©onforwity merging into @b®di©n©©, and of w i l l s acting in 
hasmony, i s to beg a l l tfe® vesqr same questions Rousseau 
begged i n the laissez-fais® pedagogy of Emil©. Th® school 
i s supposed to honour spontaneity while i t moulds good 
habits, and to follow natur© assuming that reason w i l l 
®m®3fg© in i t s own go©d tim®? a l l children must constantly 
succeed, and yet r e a l i s t i c di.@eiplin© and int@llig®no© are 
ameag th© goals....*» Cr®!ain (1962) P6l53« 
G»«iHj1ji i s not particularly eoffle®rKi®d to sp®ll out or c l a r i f y thes© 
" d i f f i c u l t i e s " . Y®t t h e i r elaboration i s crucial for an under-
standing of Progressive ideology, losofar as i t i s possible to 
g©n@ralis@ about th® Progressiv© ©dueatioa «»aiov®m9nt" in ©arly 
- 3 9 6 " 
20th c®at»s^ AiB@irl@a, what war® i t s Basic B®li®f@? 
Th© Ameriean Progressives had much i n oommoa with the British 
ladieals of th© 19th oentary. Both were strongly influenced by 
developments l a ps^chologye Th© Radicals drew heavily on the 
aseooiatioaist d@otrin®s of Hartley, which was strongly related to 
the i r environmentsl detenssinisma Th© Progressives, on the other 
hand, were much influenced by th® Herbartian notion of measurable 
psyeh@logioal data, Ilarthermor®, th© animal psychology of Thomdlke 
was taken to have ma^or implications o©nc@ffiaing the ineffective 
d r i l l i n g TOtheds of "t3?aditional«» pedagogy. (Creiain, 1962, pp, 110-2), 
Despite iaportsiat differences in principle, both the Progressives 
and th© Radicals had a strong f a i t h in s c i e n t i f i c enlightenment. 
Th© rationalism of Dewey, for iastanc®, m ® more akin to that of 
Owen than to that of Mill «• at least ©xplioitly. But a fa i t h in 
th® discoverable ^natural" order underlay even his prsigraatism. 
Both set great store by th® ultimt®, i f not immediate, harmony of 
interestB ©f a l l , in a couples divisioa of labour. Both stressed 
©ffioienoy and therefore •» g i w s oth©x' assumptions about 
"natural" differentiatistn •» th® a©©d for ©alightened leadership. 
Both feared th© disruption of th® "waenllghtened" and saw education 
as a ma^or tool of social policy to preseirve or create the perfect 
society, f i n a l l y , both wer® attracted to the "family" metaphor •» 
wherein th® school, the businees organisation or even society as 
(3) 
a whole were mm ideally a© system® of paternalistic control, 
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B s l t i s h tedieal theories of ©ducatioa d©v@lop©d within a 
b®ttrg®ois i d e o l o ^ that l@giti«t®d industrial c a p i t a l i s t , as 
»pp0s©d t© iMd^owniag, interests. Though they arose at a time 
©f ma^siv© societal ©iiang®, they were not th© immediate souro© of 
eoBe3?©t® policy ixi mss, schoolings (By th® l a t e r 19th centuxy, 
s l ^ i f i o a n t changes had taken pla@® in their explicit fojsaulations.) 
Amerioan Progressive theories, @n th® other hand, w©r® a response 
to an imiediat© problem of social control in a period of massive 
urbanisation. They were widely institutionalised from an ©arly 
stag®, Muoation was central to Progressivist ideology. The 
urban population in the lfaiit@d States insr@a8®d sevenfold b©tween 
1 8 6 0 and 1 9 1 0 e , Only a f i f t h of thi s was a r®gult of natural 
increase. 4 1 % were from abroad and 3 0 ^ from rural areas (Spring, 
1 9 7 2 , p . 3 ) » The sis® and scop© ©f business oojrporations multipliod 
apae®, m© that both industrial and civle atoiaistration operated on 
m smpr©o@d@nt®d seal® (Butts and Gr®ains 1 9 5 3 , p«293)» Public 
education expanded oorrospondinglye Bj 1 9 1 2 , @l@m©ntaiy education 
was ©osapalsory throughout th® Iteited Stat®®. Th© public high school 
was also becoming a mass institution. Between 1890 and 1930, the 
p®r©®ntag@ ©f 14"- to 17-year ©Id® attending public high school ros© 
fr®ffli 4% to 4 7 % (B©wl9s and SiatiSg 1 9 7 6 , p « 1 8 1 ) . Already such 
r@f©»®rs as Horac© Mann, S@cr®ta^ of the Massachusetts Board of 
Bdttoation fro® 1 8 3 7 , and Ward, th© fath©r of th© ••Am©riean 
concept of socioty** (Kiarier, 1 9 7 5 , P9 139) Smd seen univ©r8al 
©dueation as th® basis of a l l isooial rsform. Th© ideas of 
PestalOEsgi and of Froebel had mad© their appearance in th© works 
.•s 
©f Ie@£ ( 1 8 0 8 ) and Maclur© ( 1 8 2 6 ) . By th© 18708, they had to some 
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®xt®at b@@K inetitutionalised, for instanc© in the public schools 
©£ Qulnoy, Massachusetts (Swift, 1 9 7 1 , p p 9 l 9 " 2 0 ) e When Beway came 
to Chicago in 1 8 9 4 , there w@r® already «»progr®s8ive" schools which 
he contrasted » a@t always fawurably - with "traditional" ones 
(Deweyg 1 9 0 0 / 1 5 ) , Aeeordiag t© Swift, 
'^Perhaps B3w®y's most importmt contribution to progressive 
education was the synthesis of hie pedagogical ideas with 
his ooao®sn for demooracy md social reform*" 
Swift ( 1 9 7 1 ) P e 1 9 . 
Whether a "synthesis" was indeed achi@ved w i l l be a point for 
discussion below, 
A further major influenc® upon Ameriean Progressives that 
distinguishes them from the English Radloals was the evolutionis^vv. 
©f the fSth century^ especially i n the biological sciences, For 
the individual child, for oo:^orat© Indixstry and for society as a 
whole, "growth" was a keyword. Survival was the ultimate criterion 
@f pragmatic efficiency, Waldo ( 1 9 5 6 ) ha® suggested that the 
concept of social efficiency was a product of a mechanical 
( 5 ) 
metaphor. But I suggest that both th® ssachia® and the body/ 
©rganism <» IMrkheim aoin©id@d as natu r a l i s t i c metaphors. 
Am@ri@aa Progressivism was ©v@rwh@liaiagly naturalistlc« The 
»«bi®logioal machlffl®", as i t w®r®s, m,s something of a Master Pattern, 
This accorded well with that frontier philosophy which i s 
dist i n c t i v e l y A m e r i c a n , k & Karier suggests, education 
^in th® 20th century ,0, in effect became a new frontier 
for many Americanse.o As this educational frontier emexged, 
a young man would more often be advised to go to college 
rather than to go West," 
Karler ( 1 9 7 5 ) p.2 , 
.399. 
Also distiaetlv® was a "a@w lib®rali@m» which saw n© 
pr8-»®stablish@d harm@ny in a society based on self-interest. Such 
s e l f - i a t e r s s t could be irr©@p©nsibl@, Th© bulk of Progrossiv© 
thought was ©ppoeed to th© ©vil uses of larg© corporations, rather 
than t o t a l l y anti-trust. Th© s p i r i t m.a Hamiltonian and fedeiTalist, 
rather than J©ff@rs©nian and individualist. I t in s i s t s d that 
©©"Operation was n@©®ssa:^ for societal hamony. I t saw freedom 
as a positive power to act, rather than as a negative lack of 
( J ) 
constmint@» Nevertheless, such generalisations are somewhat 
sweeping. Many Progressives did adhere to th© old individualism. 
There were also major ambiguities i n American Progressivism. The 
overt philosophy ©f th© dominant protagonists may hav® been ©n th© 
lin e s I hav® just outlined. But th©r® i s often a covert adh©r©nc© 
to some notion ®f a "natural ®rd®r««e^ ' With r©sp©ct to individualism 
as against eonfomity, for instaas© - generalisations ar© mad© m©re 
d i f f i c u l t i n that th© context needs always to be considered. One 
set of beliefs may hold for on© section of society, whilst a quit© 
different set applies to another* Charaetoxlstios that seem 
desirable i n ®a@*s own children saay n®t b® so considered i n those 
of another (class)., 
A similar ambiguity ©adsts i n r®sp®©t of Objcotivated 
'Sa©wl@dg@«» Implied in th© philosophical pragmatism prop©und©d 
by James and Peiro®, and developed by Dewey, i s an "op©n*» view 
©f such 'Knowledge*9 D®w®y«s notorious substitution of 
•»warmiatability»« for (objjeetiv®) truth would seem to sot him aside 
from th® rationalism of th© e a r l i e r English Radicals. How@v©r, 
(9) 
d@apit@ his warnings about th® danger® ©f pre-judgment^'", and 
sspite his adYOcacy of th© ®p®a-raind®d (^scientific") proposition 
i?th@9@s rather than r i g i d i f i e d b e l i e f s ^ D e w e y ' s adherence 
t© soleae© could i t s e l f eoastitut© a form ©f closure. In less 
philosophically inellned Progr®ssiv®s i t uadeubtedly did. Not 
^ust th® sci©ntific method, but "findings" made by that method, 
(11) 
aould b® and mm reified,'' ' Psychological data, for instance, 
beoaaie a particularly slgalfieant olosur® i n Progressive ideology. 
A brief l i s t of some of th@ practices and pslnoipl©® in the 
Progressive ©duoation "mov@m@at«» in 20th e®atury America w i l l 
indicate broadly the subject of this chapter, 
B©wl©@ and Gintis ®ufflw,ri®© sons® ©f th® practices as follows? 
^Th® educational practice of Progr©@@ivism brought us the 
comprahtasiv® high school, tracking, educational testing, 
heme economies, the junior high school, the student council, 
th® daily flag pledg®, high'^'sehool athletics, the school 
assembly, vocational eduoation aad gwidaac®, clubs, school 
newspapers aad monopolieation ©f ©Mcutiv© authority by 
Bowles k Gintis (1976) p e i s n 
Some ©f th® pxlnoipl®© b@hiad th®s© mey also b© briefly 
l i s t e d . fh©y ®rt elaborated further, below. Society was seen 
as ©rgaaieally ooaposedi, in @v©luti®a. I t s growth and survival 
w@r© fundamental, Th® child individually r@<»©naot®d r a c i a l 
©volution aad school must provid® for th® growth of the ^ o l e 
ehild« Each individual waa worthy of attention} each individual 
was diff®r@nt. His attributes needed elos© attention from teachers 
for effective education. (Cmsequently both "success*^ and 
««failur®w w®r@ individualised^- Such attsntion required professional 
©xpertis® " fihioh was of m©r© importance thaSa «'mer®*' academic 
liaffls Seieae® - including, potentially at least, pedagogical 
i® - was ©bjectiv© and nemtml. The teachor and th© 
atedJBistrator w©r® experts to th® sei®no® of management. Yet, 
igh objeotiv® and value-'fr®®, ©dueatioa was not purpos©-fr®©. 
ammal or sooiei 
a t©®l of social policy, e©asti?ain©d only by 
technological and natural (human) limitations, Th® school as a 
©ommraity in i t s e l f , and in i t s int©r»r9lationship with th© wider 
eommimitys inspired oo-operation. I t motivated young adults to 
participate i n a democratic eooiety. At the sam® time individuals 
war© selected by neutral and univerasl e3:lt®ria for their respective 
rol9{3 within that society. Dsmooracy was a condition of living, 
wh®r®ia people f e l t abl© and willing to contribut© to th® welfar® 
©f all,, according to th®ir mm imiqw© and individual qualities. 
Such, v©xj broadly, was th® ProgTOssiv© viewpoint. I turn 
now to th® writings of John Ssw@j and related Progressive p3?aotio© -» 
in part to ©valaat® this viewpoints % intention i s not to 
attadbut® to D©w©y any x'espoMlbility for those practic®®. Doubtless 
his iiafltt@no@ m,® strong, but th®/ls ±m not to say that he in some 
mmBB "eaussd** th® •^ movement" t© take th© form i t did. Kor, indeed, 
did that "movemant** arise from misunderstandings ©f D®w®y«® teaching. 
Such a «*gr®at m®n« view of histosqr i s at best p a r t i a l , at worst 
fallaeioue. I t i s important to l©@k at such influential individuals, 
but both societal and ins t i t u t i o n a l changes must be considered 
. '"^  Th® approach that I hav© adopted - of examining 
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laeologies aad l a a t s r Pattexas - Im i t s i l f alsio p a r t i a l . But I t 
n®&®m&r±lj dir@ot@ us t o th@ so@i@tal and i B s t l t u t i o n a l eoatext, 
iffl which ifisologi®® am ©r®a,t®d M d x-^predueed^ and hav® t h e i r 
(13) 
d@t@saiaativ@ ®ff©ets up@a feehavieur. l y o b j e c t i n looking 
at D©w®y i s p r i m a r i l y to jJ.lugtmt£ some ®f the themes i n 
Progr®ssiY© ideology. I t i s not possibl® t o go f u r t h e r and t o 
l © 0 k f o r causal l i n k s - though sR©h a p u r s u i t would b® a l o g i c a l 
d@v®lop!a©nt froffli the approaeh her® ad0pt@do 
-%®,M4LY1^ "^ 3- C o l l e c t i v i t y 
Dewey m.s a p r o l i f i c writer*^'"*'' I t i s s t r i k i n g how many o f 
th® t i t l e s of h i s works consist of diohotomonis d i s t i n c t i o n s ; 
^ ^^iofegQLj;^^ Society a The 6fe^ -3.d. and the gfarriculum, Demooraoy 
and MueatlpBa Ea:perleno@ and Bdugatioa msd many o t h e r s T h e 
same ©an be found i n h i s chapter h@adings„ I n DemoorBoy and 
Edueata^oM (1916) f o r instances we f i n t s «Mueation as Conservative 
and ProgresslY©»9 "Natural mvelopment and Social E f f i c i e n c y as 
Airm^^ ^ I n t e r e s t and Disoiplin©«'9 "Eis^ periisnc® and f h i a k i n g ^ j 
"Play and Work i n the Currioulim^^e ''Labour and Lelsur®"j "The 
I n d i v i d u a l and the World**, and others besides. The nature of these 
d i s t i n c t i o n s i s by n© means uniforms but •'dualities'* do seem t o 
be c e n t r a l t o ]^w©y's thought,^^^^ Perhaps the most fundamental, 
so f a r as Bewey^s edaoational w r i t i n g i s concerned, i s the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the i n d i v i d u a l ( o r the c h i l d ) and the c o l l e c t i v i t y (whether 
i t b© the school, the community, or the s o c i e t y ) . I n t h i s case as 
i n ©thers, Dewy emphasised the interoonneetedness of the "elements'* 
i i s t i a g t t i s k e t e H@ d i d not 0®® ttoHi, a© ®pp®s®d t o each other, as 
©@pamt© ©r i a ©oaflict* H@ ©aw - ©r sought "» the hamoay ^ i o h 
h® assumed basi@silly t o b© tk@s?®e H@ i a s i s t e d that such ranity 
afeoald not ©stist l a th© d«ia®fe©@ ©f 0s® omr th® othex*, but i a 
«3@ats?@to©®is aad ®xe®®siv© sttbj®at«»e©Btr©to@ss i n ©duoatiosij h® 
proelaisaed t i m t 
«*fh® e h i l d aad th® cawiouluai are simply two l i n d t e which 
defia® a sisgl® ps?oe@s®»«' B®w©y (1902/66) po129* 
iM diBOttasiag th© eohool's w l a t i o u s h i p s with th® hom®, M.th th® 
©ariTOBiaeat 8, with basiM©@s aad w i t h th@ oaivo^'giity ^  h® said that 
»»Sh® @©h©ol »ttst g®t e a t ©f i t s i s o l a t i o a asad s©ou2?® 
/&»/ ©pernio o@Hsa©eti©m w i t h s o e i a l lif®*" 
«A£I wast© i® du® t© i@0latioa»«» 
©@w@y (1900/15) pp. 71e SOo 
Sis p@d«®gieal OTitiHg® ar® 0ft@H fe®li®v®d t o b@ 
j d o j H i K M t l j ohild-csatOTdo But h© rgp@at@dly attactod exe©sses 
thi® dir®cstieB» H® a t t a c k e d thos® who saw fr®@dom as a laok 
TOstriotiosa aad who l®ft ©Mldy©n without t e a o h t r guidaae®. 
^Siao© fMQdosH s?®sid@(i iM th® &p®r&tlmB of i a t e l l i g e a t 
@b(g@watioa and judgaisat by which a parpos® i s developedj 
guidaa©® g i w H by th® tmeher t o th© ®x@a?ois© of th© 
pu p i l s ' iiflt@llig®no® i s m a i d to freedomj not a x ^ s t r i o t i o n 
upon i t . Sometimes t®mh@m s®®m t o b® afsaid ©voa t o mak® 
suggostioffls t o ths memb©M ®f a gsfoup a® t o what thsy should 
do a I hm® heard oases i a which ohili3P@ii ar® surrouisd©d 
w i t h ob^tota and matsrials and then l©ft ©atirely t o 
th®ffl®®lv@S9 the teaohei? fe®ing loat h t o suggsst ®ven what 
migb^ b@ doa© w i t h the matsrlala l e s t freedom b@ i a f r i n g e d 
upoa. Why9 thQa^ ®v®a supply m t e r i a l s , since they are a 
so«jro® of some suggestion or other?" 
DQw®y (1938) p.84.. 
( 1 7 ) argraed on these liaesa I©t many of Dewey's 
followers believed t h a t h® prsaehed th® openness of ourrtculuEa 
axtd the e®atrallty of i n d i v i d u a l c h i l d development*^^^^ K i l p a t r i c k , 
an Importaat populariser of Dewey's work, c e r t a i n l y l a i d t h i s 
( 1 9 ) 
esaphapis^^ ^ Dswey himself d i d Indeed ©mphasise the importance 
@f th0 i n d i v i d u a l , i n two respectg^ f i r s t l y , he stressed the 
importane© of se l f - d i r e o t i o n e What was d i s t i n c t i v e l y human^^^^ 
was th® mental a c t i v i t y involved i n adjustment t o physical s t i m u l i , 
r a t h e r than mere passive mechanleal adjustment (Dewey, 1916, Pe35). 
Freedom, he said, 
'•means e s s e n t i a l l y th® part played by thi n k i n g ... I t 
iseans int©ll@etual i n i t i a t i v e , independence i n observation, 
judioious invention, foresight of consequences, and ingenuity 
of adaptation t o them*" Dewey (1916) Po352. 
This was? cent r a l t o his notion ©f "democraey" and t o his notion 
©f ©ducatioa f o r d@moer«,oy» H® lalk©d of "the vice of exter a a l l y 
imposed ends'* and of "the democmtie oM,t©rion of the i n t r i n s i c 
significanc© of ©vexy groidng esspexdenc®" (Dewey, 1916, p. 127). 
Seoondljo Dswey stressed th© uniquaness of each i n d i v i d u a l . 
Teachers must 'know^ th© i n d i v i d u a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e i r p u p i l s . 
'»Iat@3?@@t M p r e s e n t s th® moving force of objects ... i n 
any experAenee having a purpose. I n concrete terms, the 
value of recognising th® dynaaiio place of I n t e r e s t i n an 
educative development i s that i t leads t o considering 
i n d i v i d u a l children i n t h e i r s p e c i f i c c a p a b i l i t i e s , needs, 
p r e f e r e n c e s . " Dewey (1916) p,153. 
"... the teacher / i h o u l ^ be I n t e l l i g e n t l y aware of the 
capacities, needs, and past ®3q)®ri©no® of those under 
i n s t r u c t i o n Dewey (1938) p,85. 
Dew@y c l e a r l y placed much importaae© on the i n d i v i d u a l - on h i s 
i n t e r e s t s , his capacities and his i n t e g r i t y as a c i t i z e n . 
Howewr^ thoagh child~o@stTOd ©duoators may have ia t e r p r e t e d 
D@w@y a® gi v i n g greater weight t o th® i a d i v i d u a l thaa t o th© 
e©ll®etiTityp D@w@y himself dsaied t h i s o More importantly, whatever 
Bswsy'ls owa pr©8oriptions wsr®, th® domiaana trend i n mass public 
®du©ati0a was t o ©mphasls® th® "soei a l " * Merej i t was t o emphasise 
(21) 
the eorporat®* iatorasto B©w®y c e r t a i n l y stressed th® importance 
of s s l f - d i r e e t i o H and opposed passiv® eenformity. He warned that 
«If w® thiBk ©f a habit simply as a ohanga wrought i n the 
©rgaaism, ign o r i n g th© faot t h a t t h i s ehange consists i n 
a b i l i t y t o ©ffoot subsequent changes i n the eavironmeat, 
w@ s h a l l b© l e d t o t h i n k of 'adjustment' as a coaformity 
t o ©nvirenmeat as wax conforms to th® seal which impresses 
it,« Dawey (1916) p«55* 
His very d e f i n i t i o n of education tended t o i s ^ l y an openness of 
©bjtctivQs that would saak® such eoafoxraity impossibles 
@du©ati®aal process ha® no ©ad beyond i t s e l f } i t 
i s i t s own @nd; and «»• th© educational process i s on© 
@f coatiaual reorganising^ r©eongtrueting, transforainge" 
«*Eduoati©a means the enterpris© of supplying the oonditioas 
which ©nsur® growth, or adequacy of l i f e , i r r e s p e c t i v e 
of sg@.«» D©w@y (191S) ppo 59«61, 
Y@4 D9w®y fundassentally believed i n th© actual or p o t e a t i a l 
harmoay of society. Bespit© his r e j e c t i o n of passive adjustment 
o r oonfonnity, th© active and r e f l e e t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n that he 
soaght WES i n a p a r t i c u l a r S0ci©tal context* I n d i c a t i v e of t h i s 
i s his us© ©f th© term "social^'e To him t h i s was a© mere 
ddseriptiv® t®rm<, I t was p r e s c r i p t i v e , ±a two ©eases. Social 
a@ti©n Maatj, f i r s t l y , the pursuit of socie t a l i a t e r e s t aad, 
secondly^ r a t i o n a l , i a t e a t i o n a l (ie@. aon«pas@ive ) actioa. 
"She H®ml and th.® goeial q a a l i t y ®f ©©Muet are, i n 
"DiscijJlia©, n a t u r a l d©T©l©pM©nt, eultar®, s o c i a l 
©ffisieaay, ar© moral trait® •» mrks of a person •^o i s 
& worthy member of tha t ®@oi®ty which i t i s the business 
D®w@y (1916) p p , 4 1 5 , 41T« 
"P®r@©ns d® net beeom® ® society by l i v i n g i n physical 
prosdMty s , . I n d i v i d u a l s do not ®v®n compose a soc i a l 
group beeams© they a l l work f o r a eossmsn end «,« I f , 
how®T®r, they were a l l ©ogniasaat ©f th® common end and 
a l l i n t e r e s t e d i n i t so tha t they regulated t h e i r s p e c i f i c 
a c t i v i t y i n view of i t , then they would form a community," 
i b i d , p o 5 , ( 2 2 ) 
For Dew^y^ such expressions as " s o c i a l e o a t r o l " and "s o c i a l 
effioiOToy" had c l e a r p r e s c r i p t i v e connotations. 
This p r e s c r i p t i v e element i n Dewey®s us® of th® term " s o c i a l " 
and i n h i s dliaowssion of th® ©olleoti^e aspects ©f' education 
might not i n i t s e l f mean that h@ attsch®d greater weight to t h i s 
then t o h i s equally p r e s c r i p t i v e notions of individualism and 
TOflection. But these ar© foot id®as i n th© abstract. They are 
i n d i c a t i v e of b e l i e f s contextaS i n a p a r t i c u l a r society - as 
( 2 3 ) 
Dewey would be the f i r s t t o j j S B i s t o ^ ' I t may seem surprising 
t h a t Dewey, tfe® p M i g m t i s t , ohorald b® pr®y t o th® classic l i b e r a l 
confusion between society as i t and society as i t should i d e a l l y 
be. Yet he was^ I t i s true t i i a t h® complained often of an 
"absOToe of a s o c i a l atmoepher®" (Dawey, 1916, p,352)^^^\ 
©specially of "those wh© ar® eat ranched i n command of th© i n d u s t r i a l 
maohinexy" ( i b i d , pp,372«"3). H® eomplaiaed that 
^ E f f i c i e n c y i n production oft©a demands d i v i s i o n of labour. 
But i t i s reduced t o a meohanical routine unless workers 
see the t e c h n i c a l . I n t e l l e c t u a l , emd social relationships 
involved i n what they do, and engage i n t h e i r work because 
of th® motivation furaiahed by such peretptions. Th® 
t®Hd®ncy t o reduc® such things as ®ffiai@noy of a c t i v i t y 
aad s c i e n t i f i c management t o purely technical oxt©mals 
i s @vid@nc@ o f th© on@"Sid@d stimulation of thought given 
t o those i a c o n t r o l of industry «> thos© who supply i t s 
aims*,." D0w@y ( 1 9 1 6 ) p e 9 8 < . 
Yet s h o r t l y a f t e r t h i s m,B w r i t t e n , I)®w@y WSLB himself engaged i n 
'.!?h® Polish Study, whose aim was e x p l i c i t l y to "orchestrate" the 
Polisfe eommiaity i a America, t o ««lib@rat®w them from th© leadership 
©f pjd.@sts and such ^^corrupt" and *«dang©rous" i n d i v i d u a l s as 
PacAerewskie I t s purpose was t o "Amerioaais©" them. I t sought 
th®ir adh®r®ao® t o an " i n d u s t r i a l d©m0omoy''9 which to Dewey was 
( 2 5 ) 
not mersly an i d e a l . I t was a p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y , ^ "^^ Dewey 
was more than a l i t t l e committed t o a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t a l s t r u c t u r e , 
©v@a i f w® allow t h a t his was a pragaatie v i e w ? t h a t he expected 
*'iadu©trial dsmoeraoy" t o ©volv® dynasdeally from American society 
as i t then waso S i m i l a r l y , s@m@ 20 y@ara l a t e r , Dewey jojjaed 
Counts, Hook aad other promiaeat lib®rals, i a organising th© 
»»e@«itt®@ f o r C u l t u r a l fr®©d@ffi«'» f h i s anticipated McCarthy by 
over a d®oad© both i n i t s target (members ©f the Communist Party 
and *'f©llow t r a v e l l e r s " ) and i n i t s t a c t i c s ( f o r instaac© i n the 
witoh»hunting ©f thos® g u i l t y by ©ssooiatioa) (Karier, 1975, P e 9 2 f f ) . 
I n a d d i t i o n , D@w®y was heavily iavolved i a stock market 
8ip@©ulati@a (lar±@r» 1 9 7 6 ) . His pr®seriptiv@ emphases ©a "the 
s o e i a l " must b© read i a the ©©at@xt ©f suoji a c t i v i t i e s aad alignments. 
Bv©a without such ©vid®ae® about Dewey's own oontescted 
?alu©«Kaowl@dg39 what i s f a r mor@ important i s what i n the ©vent 
happened ( i a r©sp@ct of t h i s iadividnal«-oolleotive dualism) i n 
America* s publio schools» K]ari@r suggests that 
pnsgr®0^g ^ I t h i t s s e i @ n t i f i c a l l y organised technology 
aad oemputer-fflanaged bmreaueraoy, has become r e a l i t y j 
the other side, however, i n d i v i d u a l freedom, d i g n i t y , 
and wll»b®iag have not far@d so welle" 
Karf.®r (1972/T3a) pp«85"6o 
tor® s p e c i f i o a l l y about ©te©ati©a, Giasapert Is Spring aay 
\% Qoaetpt of a ©hild«"0®ntred education based on a 
dootria® @f i n d i v i d u a l differ©ao@s psovlded a r a t i o m i l e f o r 
' d i f f e r e n t i a t e d education'9 Diffsreaces i n capacities, 
aptitudes, and i n t e r e s t s , i t was claimed, were great 
enough t o warrant organising i n s t r u c t i o n around them ,,, 
Despite diselaimeris and statements of objectives t o the 
oontraiy, there was an ©bvlous discrepancy between t a l k 
about i n d i v i d u a l i s e d i n s t r u o t i o a and education f o r c i v i c 
and i n d u s t r i a l objectives. Frequently, the needs of the 
i n d i v i d u a l wore equated w i t h th® seeds, not of society, 
but of eoonomie and p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s . The machinery 
©f e f f i c i e n c y took over," 
Stmpert k. Spring (1974) Pe?8. 
IM 1 9 I 8 , a special conraitt©® of th© national Education Association 
issusd what Spring (1972, p,109) call®? "the classic statement f o r 
the eossprehenslve h i g h school". This report, on "The Cardinal 
P r i a e i p l t s of B@ewdary Mueatioa", ©sicpressed a view of democracy 
tha t i s obviously r e l a t e d t o D®w@y'0 om. - though with less 
®3cpliolt ©laphasls ©a i n d i v i d u a l r®fl®etive acti o n , 
"The purpoeie of democracy i s so to ©x^Mise society that 
aetivitie© designed f o r the wall-being of his f e l l o w 
member® of society as a whole." 
quoted by Sp3d.ng (1972) p o 1 1 0 . 
I n bold typ©9 th® report stated 
"education i n a demooraoy should develop i n each 
I n d i v i d u a l th© knowledge, i n t e r e s t s . Ideals, habits, and 
p@w©s)« whereby he w i l l f i n d h i s place and use that place 
t o shape both himself and society toward ever nobler ends," 
quoted, I b i d , 
Within th®ffl® 0©Kpr©h@nsiv© Mgh ©oheols, traeking became 
eoi8m@Mplao®« I t was j u s t i f i e d by SeMaa^ f o r instance, as 
©Kisuxlag *«@dueati©nal democracy^ (Csxasy^ 1974, Pe249). B^m 
aad Gr#o@lius (1927) argued that tracking 
g©©ial B@gr©gati@n« I t i s aot a caste s t x ^ t i f i c a t i o n . 
i s aot an attempt t o point out thos© ^ o ar© worth^il® 
8 who ar© note I t i s not a m@v® t o separate the 
leaders fr@m th© f©ll©w@r@e«« 
quoted by Caraoy (1974) Po249» 
ith©l@0s, th® authors of th© t e s t s which were used t o select 
entrants t o p a r t i c u l a r tracks mm them i n precisely t h i s r o l e . 
Th0radik@9 f o r iastaae©, said I n 1939s 
" I t i s a gr©at good fostea® of ssaskijad that th©r© i s a 
su b s t a a t i a l p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between intelligenc® and 
moralityJ i n c l u d i n g good w i l l towards one's fellows, 
C©ns©qiu©ntly ©ur superiors i n a b i l i t y ar® on average our 
benefactor®, and i t i s ©ft©n safer t o t r u s t our i n t e r e s t s 
t o them than t o ours®lv@Se Mo group of men can be expected 
t o act 100% i n th® i n t e r e s t of msmkiad, but t h i s group of 
th© ablest m®n w i l l com® a®a:TOiit to the i d e a l , " 
Sh©radik0 (1939), quot@d by Karier (1972/73b) pp,122-3. 
TBmm^ iifeo i a 1917 m.s me ®f th© authors of th® f i r s t batch 
i n t s l l i g e n c e t e s t s , th® a M y Alpte and Beta t e s t s ^ , was also 
author of th© Stanford adaptation of Binet's i n d i v i d u a l t©sts, 
l a 1923 he wrote that 
««Int©llig9no© testa can t®ll us whether a chil d ' s aativ® 
bidghtaess corresponds mor® nearly t o th© median of ( f ) th© 
professional classes, (2) thos© i n the s©mi-professioaal 
pu r s u i t s , (3) ordiaaar @kill©d workers, (4) s®mi"skiH®d 
work®r@9 or (5) u n s k i l l e d workers, This information w i l l 
be of gr@at value i n planning th@ education of a p a r t i c u l a r 
c h i l d aad also i n planning th© d i f f e r e n t i a t e d curriculum 
Tenaaa (1923) quoted by Karier (1972/73b) p.121, 
Of eours®, not a l l Progressive e d u c a t i e s J l s t s adhered t o such views 
as th©s@» Bagley (1925), f o r i n s t a n e e , vehemently attacked the 
*'fatali®tio a s s m p t i o n s " ths-t aceompaniQd th® use of i n t e l l i g e n c e 
t e s t s , (On th@ o t h e r hand, even he by no means considered such 
t®st@ t o be i r r e l e v a n t , Cto th® contrary^ 
"mental t e s t s have made v@3^ important contributions t o 
©dueatloisal progress instruments f o r detecting 
i n d i v i d u a l differences i n learaing capacity," 
Mgley (1925) pp.45-6i ) 
However aspects of b e l i e f ar® essential t o the t e s t i n g and ti?acking 
phenomenon. These are (a) a b®ll@f i n th® importance of i n d i v i d u a l 
a t t e n t i o n t o children's a t t r i b u t e s , (b) a f a i t h i n the n e u t r a l i t y 
of seiene© and i t s "warrantable a n s e r t a b l l l t l e s " and (c) a fundamental 
b e l i e f i n the I n e v i t a b i l i t y and/or d e s i r a b i l i t y of a s t r a t i f i e d 
society. The®® @ono@3m, respeetively, ( a ) Subjective 'KSaowledge* 
o r mind-braiii, (b) Objeetivated »l&iowl®dg®' and (c) Societal Reality, 
A l l can b@ t » c @ d i n Dewey's @w worko To repeat, object i s 
act t o suggest a d i r e c t causal l i n k b©tw©®a Dewey's theory and 
Progressive praotio®. The point i s that Progressive educational 
b e l i e f s wer@ widely a p p l i e d i n tmmB education. They were not 
eonfinisd t o a l i b e r t a r i a n middl® elass movement, relevant t o a few 
p r i v a t e schools only. They were part of an ideology Tsfeich served 
t o l @ g i t i m t © fundamental s o c i e t a l i n e q u a l i t i e s . This i d e o l o g i c a l 
(27) 
fun©tion p e r s i s t s today,^ 
Soieat i f le, „ Seleet i o n a n d Soeialisat i o a 
Tracking i n the comprehensive h i g h schools was not a coercive 
\ 
8yst©ffio On the contrary, a strong element d f "voluntary-ism" was 
« . 4 1 1 ' 
iat©ad©d and achieved, l o t ®aly w@r© '»©bj®etive« t e s t s employed 
f o r s e l e c t i o n » themselves l®gitissatimg t h a t @®l@ctioa •= but 
vocational guidaao® aad counselling wer® used, whereby studeats 
(or t h e i r fataili©®) apparently oh@s® the tracks i a which they should 
e n r o l . Such guidaac® involved ©xp®rt (professional) management, 
which I s h a l l discuss below, f i w t , though, i t should b© r©m©mber©d 
that the single oompr@h©nsiv@ school a r r i v e d at against some 
opposition fr©m those who sought separate, more d i s t i a c t l y vocatioaal 
schools, Th® views of Dewey on vocational ©duoatioa and oa common 
schooling, and th© r e l a t i o n s h i p betwea th©s® views and ©veatual 
p r a c t i c e , ar® therefor® worth e@asid©rlQg, 
(28) 
D©w@y expressed ©pposaitien t o narrow vooationalism. ^  ' 
«*N©thiag oould b® mor® absurd than t© tty t o ©ducat® 
i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h an ©y© t o @nly oa@ lia© of a c t i v i t y . I n 
th© f i r s t plao®, ©aoh i a d i v i d u a l has of noeessity a vari®ty 
of oallingsi, i n each of which h@ should be i n t e l l i g e n t l y 
©ffeetives aad, i n th© s@©®ad plae®, any ©a© occupatioa 
loses it@ meaning aad hmomm a routin© keeping busy at 
s@ii@thing i n th® d@gr©@ i n # i i o h i t i s i s o l a t e d from 
®th®r int®rasts," D®w®y (1916) p.359. 
"There i s a standing daagtr that education w i l l perpetuat© 
the older t r a d i t i o n s f o r a ©elect f©w, that vocatioaal 
edueation w i l l into^r®t©d i n theoxy aad praotic® as 
trad© ©duoations as a mean^ of securing t@cbaical e f f i c i e n c y 
i n 8p@©ialis@d futu r e pursuitSo 
Education would th©n te©0@a© m instrument of pesfpetuating 
uaohall®ag©d th© e x i s t i n g i a d u s t r i a l order of society, 
instead @f operating as a means of i t s transformation*" 
D&wey (1916) p„369» 
However, D©w@y's notion of •mha.t such a transfomed society would 
( 2 9 ) 
b@ lik® was extremely vagu®. Moraovsr, h i s views of i a d i v i d u a l 
ttMiqu®a®ss s i g n i f i c a n t l y q u a l i t y t h i s opsaaess. We hav© already 
Bmn h@w M.n :f±m &f i n d i v i t o a l uaiqu@a®®s eould b© used t o j u s t i f y 
t©sting pTOa©dar©s that r e l i e d on and r§pr©duo®d deterministic 
u I t could ®1®0 b© th© basis ©f d i r e c t i v e "guidance". 
i s f i t t e d to do and t o secur® an 
oppojftunity t© do i t i s th© key to feapplaees, Nothing 
i s ffior® t r a g i c than f a i l u r e t o discover one's true business 
i n l i f e 9 ©r t o f i n d that ©n@ has d r i f t e d or been forced by 
eircrastaaoes i n t o an wacongenlal c a l l i n g . A r i g h t 
occupation means simply that th© aptitudes of a person are 
i n adequate play, working w i t h the iidjiimua o f f r i c t i o n and 
the m^imum of s a t i s f a c t i o n , " D®w©y (1916) p,360. 
AlthoM^h h© oft©n wrned against imposing c u r r i c u l a on children, 
guidance ms not, t o h i m , r e s t r i c t i v e . I t was the legi t i m a t e ( i , e . 
pmgfflatieally ©ff©etiv©) employment of expertise. 
'^auidaao© giv®a by th© t©aeh@r to th® ©xerels© of th© 
p u p i l s ' intelligene® i s an a i d to freedom, not a r e s t r i c t i o n 
upoa I t , " D©w®y (19! " 
Sttoh prissoipl®s war© i n s t i t u t i o a a l i s e d i n classroom practice and 
i n school ©rgaaimtion«, 
Prank Parsons, «'oft@n oalled th© fa t h e r of vocational 
gttidano®" (Spring, 1972, p»92)9 opened the f i r s t vocational bureau, 
i n Boston, i n 1908. His dream isms a "Iferadise" of "mutualism" 
( i b i d , p<»93)9 which i t was i n th© power of soc i a l reformers to 
achieve. 
«Mf@ oaa b® moulded i n t o any ooneelvabl® form. Draw up 
your specifioation® f o r a dog, or laan and i f yjsu:.W,!! give 
IB© c o n t r o l of th© environment, aad time enough, I w i l l 
cloth® your dream® i n f l e s h and blood," 
ParTOn® (1894) quoted by Spring (1972) p,95. 
Guidance, f o r him, wis a matter of dir g o t i n g and shaping th® raw 
mate r i a l (people) i n the most e f f i c i e n t manner possible. 
A "@©asibl@ i n d u s t r i a l system w i l l ,00 s@®k ... t o put 
men, as w e l l as timber, st@a@, aad i r o a , i a th© places f o r 
which th@ir natures f i t th©p, aad t o p o l i s h aad prepare 
th®s f o r e f f i c i e n t s@rvic® w i t h at least as much oar© as 
±B b@stow@d upon elooksg @l@ctrf.o dysaamoa or locomotives." 
Parsons (1894) quoted by Spriag (1972) p,92. 
l a t t e r coae®^ was shared by th® i a d u a t r i a l psychologist, 
st®rb®rg« wh© believed t h a t i a th© past - but aot th© 
Affi@riea "could a f f o r d th@ l i m i t l e s s mst® of human ®n®rgy 
j u s t as i t f e l t j u s t i f i e d i a wasting th® timber r®sourc®s 
of th® f o r e s t e " 
M&@t©rb®rg (1913) quoted by Spriag (1972) p,92. 
Miasterberg pi©a©®r©d th© us© ©f vocational aptitude t®sts. His 
e x p l i c i t i a t e a t l o a yms t o unit© s c i e n t i f i c naaagement aad 
m® t®ohaiqu©a and a@swptioas t?®r@ applied i a schools, 
es p e c i a l l y th© mushrooming s©otor of j u n i o r high schools. Hor© 
they r®li®d ©a a p a r t i c u l a r view ©f ad©l®se@nc@o Ag@s twelve t o 
f i f t e e n were s@©n as a a a t u r a l stag® i n a ch i l d ' s d©v©lopment^"'°^ 
i a ^Mch subsequently stabl® s o c i a l ©rieatations w@r® acquired. 
"Thos© wh© know th® aatur® of ehildr®a ar© awar© that the 
j u n i o r high seheol period coljaQid®® w i t h th® time when th© 
so c i a l i a s t i a e t s b©gi» t o assert themselves w i t h great 
fore©9" 
Oosliag (1919) quoted by Spj?iag (1972) p»105. 
Edttcatieaal guiianc© involved helping atudeats t o s©l©ct ©duoatioaal 
programm®© t o imteh t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , a b i l i t i e s aad futu r e 
oecupatioas (Spring, 1972^ p»98)a I t ms i a th® j u a i o r high 
school period t h a t these war® supposed t o becom© s t a b i l i s a d . As 
Bloomfield, who took over Par@©as« ?ocati©n Bur@au a f t e r his death. 
pat i t s 
^^Ad©l@s®@ne@ i s th® p©ri.®d ®f decisive b a t t l e s , th© tla® 
•mhm tfe© M @ t ® ^ of may an i n d i v i d w l i s almost f i n a l l y 
irsltt@n(,«' quoted by Spring (1972) p^lOO, 
Th@ 0©apr©h©agiv® juai@r high school usad® possible d i f f e r e n t i a t e d 
o u r r i o u l a aoeording t o such supposedly stable aptitudes and i n line 
also w i t h th® ffi@rit®er®tic princlpl® of equity, Moreover,^- I t 
p r o v i d t d a lo o a t l e a f o r o o n t r o l l e d s o c i a l i s a t i o n i n t o "democratic" 
p r l n e i p l e s - f o r adolesoene© was also th© ''gang stage", ^^ "'^  
s e l e c t i o n and s o c i a l i s a t i o n became, in f a l c o t PaMons' 
(32) 
th® aaajor s o c i e t a l fsmctions of schooling'' i s i t s e l f 
witness t o th© ©s@-»@idednes® ®f the i M d i v i d u a l - e o l l e c t i v i t y 
^ d u a l i t y " i n frogr@ssiv® praetie®, Th® iraportanc© of i n d i v i d u a l 
ianlqm®n®@s isas r©-iMterpr©t®d i n terras ©f selection t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e d 
©urriottla and teaching group® (and theno© to Societal p o s i t i o n s ) . 
l o t g u r p r i s i a g l y , the imperfeaao® of "goolal" loarpoe®, " s o c i a l " 
(31) 
c o n t r o l and " s o e l a l " e f f i e i e n e y ^ ' was not neglected. Dewey, as 
m hav® @®@n, E9tr@83s®d th® ispcportsao© of c o l l e c t i v e harmony. Though 
he o v e r t l y r@j@ot@d passive e o a f ^ m i t y , t h i s was only because h® 
assumed t i m t m i i t y was th© i n e v i t a b l e •» or at least most probable -
ottteorae o f rati@nal iadividualitj« Noaetholess, his view of the 
t@aoh©r &B as ©spert le d him to advooat® th® eoaseious manipulation 
of children«s eaviroament i n ordax' t o promote t h i s end. Soci a l i s a t i o n 
waa f o r him a prooess ?da©reby i n d i v i d u a l s I n t e r n a l i s e d p a r t i c u l a r 
kinds ®f " s o o i a l " o r i e n t a t i o n , 
"Th® fundamental mean® of c o n t r o l i s not personal but 
i n t e l l e c t u a l I t consists i n the habits o f understanding 
which ar© set up i n using objects i n correspondence w i t h 
others A s o c i a l i s e d ffiiad i s th© p®w@r to uaderstaad 
/ f h i a g f / i» terms of th© us® t o which th©y ar© turned i a 
j o i a t ©r mb&md isituatiense And Ednd i a t h i s sens© i s th© 
S8i®th©d of s o c i a l coat role*' 
'Mmj (1Sl6) pp® 39'»40 (®Bipto@iB i a o r i g i n a l ) . 
D@w®y'e p8rBp@ctiv@ TOS P a r t i o i p a t i o n i e t . 
**A mwj ®m h® pr®v®nt©d from breaking i a t o oth®r p®rsoBs' 
houses l y s h u t t i n g him up^ but shutting him up may aot altor 
Ms di s p o e i t i o n t o commit burglary, Wh©a we coafus© a 
physical w i t h aa @ducativ@,r©suit, we always lose the ohaac® 
®^ ®Plisttog th@ peraen's own p a r t i c i p a t i n g dispositioa i a 
i^@tting t t e r e s u l t desiredo sud thereSiy ©f developiag withia 
him asa i n t x l a s i c aad p e r s i s t i n g d i r e c t i o n in th© xisht way," 
B@w@y (1916) p.32 iw ©mphasis)o 
l a discus@:3^g the r©le of ©bj©etivat®d eurrioulum ( o r "th© value 
©f th© formulated wealth of knowledge that makes up the course of 
study«»)« B©w©y giaggeated th a t 
*»It may ©aabl® th® educator t o d®t©rmin© the ©nvironment of 
^^^^ by, i a d i z ^ o t i o n t o d i r e c t . I t s primary .. 
valu®, i t s prij^ary i n d i c a t i o n , i s f o r the teacher, aot f o r 
th© c h i l d . I t says t o the teachers Such and. such ar© th© 
capacities, th® fulfilments,, In t r a t h and beauty and behaviour, 
op®n t o th@s@ childr@ae low see to i t that day by day th© 
o©nditi®n@ ar© such that thgjLg^o'ro^agti.vtties mov® i n e v i t a b l y 
i n t h i s d i r s e t i o n , totrairds such culmination of themselv©s..•" 
B&mj (1902/66) P9I46 (emphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) . 
I n short9 ^^socialisation" eawi®d the same preseriptiv® 
eoaaotatioag, f o r D©w©y, as d i d th® t®rm ^'social". I t was a 
pTOoess ^hieh th® t©aeh@r should iafluene®, i f not controlo Th® 
r@f®r©nc@ t o d i r e c t i o n "by i a d i r e e t i o a " i n the l a s t quotation 
suggests that B@w®y had a el@ar notion ©f what i s now ca l l e d fh® 
"hidden eurrieulum"^^^^-' and that h® advocated i t s manipulation 
fey th® teacher. 
T M . ® Bjanipulatioa of th® "hidden eurriouluia" was a major 
©leraeat i n high school p r a c t i c e , Th@ overt aiim, i n the words of 
©a© j m i o r high 0©hool roottoj was. "Bo i n Co-operation" (Spring,1972, 
P s 1 0 T ) o Again th@s°© ar© clear parallel® i n Dewey's writJjng, Per 
iastafflCQg having eondeimed the " t r a d i t i o n a l school" because i t 
'^ wa® Hot a group or oommunity held together by p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
i n ooasmon a e t i v l t l e s " , 
'D@mj went on t© support the "new schools" because . 
"th® primaiy source of s o c i a l control resides i n the veiy 
B a t u r e of th© work don® as a social ©nterpris© i n which 
a l l i n d i v i d u a l s have an opportunity t o o®nt3?ibut® and t o 
which a l l f e e l a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , " 
Buch s o c i a l ©atorprlse, though grounded ©n children's "natural 
'*d0@s not ©rgaais® I t s e l f i n an,@aduriag wiay purely spontaneously," 
laetaad. 
ahead, Ti^e educator l a 
igiM® f o r a knowledge of in d i v i d u a l s and f o r a 
knowl®dg@ ©f subject-matter that w i l l enable a c t i v i t i e s t o 
be selected which lend themselves to s o c i a l organisation,,," 
Dw©y (1938) pp. 6 0 - 1 (my ©laplmsis). 
I ©mphasise "hav® an oppor-'laaity^ baoaus® I t i s j u s t t h i s ovga^l^ 
v o l u n t a r l s t ©thic which at the s o c i e t a l l e v e l underlies th© "©quality 
©f oppoxijuaity" p r i a e l p l e , lh@n oouplod w i t h children's f e e l i n g 
of s ^ s p o a s i b i l i t y and th© educator" s aejf?jgl r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , i t 
eharaot@r4.s@s th® P a r t l c l p a t l o a i s t p o s i t i o n o u t l i n e d i n Chapter 7.^ 
For D@wy, t h i s oo-operatioa i n school m.8 not an end i n i t s e l f -
although I t was f o r some other Progressiv® educationists,^^^^ 
?f I t was a means t o s o c i e t a l 
««Wh®a th© school introdsse©® aad t m i a a ©aoh c h i l d of 
@ooi@ty i n t o membership w i t h i n ^h© iseshool as an embxyoaic 
©©Hfflimity. lif®7, saturating him. with the s p i r i t of service, 
aiJd providing him w i t h th® iastrumsats of ©ff®ctiv® 
s®lf'»dis'®@ti®a, w© s h a l l hav® th® deepest ®nd best guaranty 
of a l a x ^ s r society which i s worthy, l o v e l y , and harmonious." 
D®w®y (1900/15) . pp» 27-8, 
furtfci®r!a@r@9 th® anioa b®tw®®a school aad community was t o be 
©ncouraged and ®xplor®d ©v©a w h i l s t cM.ldr@a w@r@ s t i l l at school. 
For i@©lation •m& wast® (Dewey, 1900/15, Pe60) aad 
"DsMcraey must begin a t h®m®, and i t s horn© i s th© 
a@ighbotts4ag ©omisnaity** 
D@w®y (1927) quoted by Curtis k Beultwood (1953/65) p.492. 
"Th® ©©ho@l w s t g@t oat ©f it® i s o l a t i o n and secure 
/ ^ f f l j ®rg®siic @oaa@®ti©ja w i t h social l i f e . " 
D@w (1900/15). 
I n s®@iag hew actual ®ehe@l pmotio®s "eorrespoaded" w i t h 
these Dewsy-aa p r i n c i p l e s , i t i s convenient t o d i s t i a g u i s h b@twe®a 
iatra-seh®®! a c t i v i t i e s aad those which re l a t e d th© school t o th© 
©xteraal commuaitys Within th® school, as w© hav® s®©a, "Do i a 
G©°-op®rati0n" was a eommoa th®M®9 Th® ^hom® room", th© school 
assembly9 clubs and aoa»acad©fflic a c t i v i t i e s , aad studeat govemmeats 
(what i a t h i s oouatEy would b© ©all®d " s c h o o l councils") w®r© 
(37) 
e@Bim©n devices, ^"^  ^ l a th® f i r s t place, th@y brought together 
(38) 
students d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i a other a c t i v i t i e s through tr a c k i n g , ^ ' 
I n th© 0@©0ad pla©®^ they 0ff©r®d a "f®®liag" of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
as w e l l . Spring i s contemptiaows of the Progressive aotioa of 
"demeoracy^. 
\ 
"Dtmoorasy d i d aot iavolv® oh@io® but rather doing that which 
y@u w©r® best abl® t o do. This d©fiaitioa of democracy became 
v@iy i n f l e x i b l e aad l i m i t i a g when i t was assumed that there was 
a psrsaaneacy of i n t e r e s t s during adolesoonc® /!,©, that 
i a t e r e s t s , l i k e a b i l i t i e s and aptitudes, w©r© S t a b i l i s e d / . " 
Spriag (1972) p,107» 
««B@M®oraey i t pertaia® to personal oh®io® becomes aa 
illasi©» i f fx»@@d©m i s TOducsd t© aetiag i a teiros of social 
M@®ds9 Ohildrew as?® taught to f©®l fre® even though their 
llfBB B.-m being diraeted by i a s t i t u t i o a a l foroese A well-
fuBOtioMiHg tomoojeaey b©©©m@s m®r© possible i a a society 
&t a«®r® ®©1TOS,® ibidj, p © l 6 3 e 
I t ±u i r o a i e t h a t i n the wltiag® -» i f notj possiblyj, the Value-
KBowl^dg® - of D©?(f®y« d©mo©moy would b® possible i a such 
©oBditionsa 
As fox* the commtJiity-sohool TOlationehip, i a the ©veat this 
was da^eloped psAmailly as the professioaal lead@3?ship of experts, 
rather than as *'gx^@s-roota corasunity ooatrol"© School boards 
deer®as©d i n siss© i n the early years of th© eenturj; and "increased" 
i a t e m s of the social status of th e i r mensbersa Drawing oa evidence 
©0ll®et©d by H©ys ( 1 9 6 4 ) 9 Iss@l ( 1 9 7 0 ) and Syack ( 1 9 7 ® ) , Bowles and 
G i a t i s ( 1 9 7 6 ) suggest that t h i s was a geaeral pattern, in urban 
ar®a®€^^^^ This oonoeatration was r®ltvaat aot just i a terms of 
e o a t r o l mw adiaiaiatrativ® policies and edueational practice within 
schools, but i n t@Ms of eoamuaity^oritated a c t i v i t i e s also, l a 
the provision ®f ©duoatioaal f a e i l i t i e s for adults of urban 
ooHmmiti©® (Sprixig, 1 9 7 ^ , G h e 4 ) and of "omt^of-sohool" a c t i v i t i e s 
f o r youth (Gumpert mid Sprfjig^ 19749 Ch » 4 ) , th® dominant pattezm 
appears t@ have b@®a ©a© of expert and ©alightened leadership •» 
©v®r thOB© wh@ mm a©t themselves adequately ^'socialised"* Indeed, 
th© ''leadership*' patterns was c e n t r a l to Progressive ideology. 
f o r I)©w$y$ as a pragsmtist, there was no universal absolute of 
humaa rationality* Miad aad iatalligene® have evolved h i s t o r i c a l l y 
419= 
through the nmd t© d®al with pTOblomti® s i t u a t i o n s . With th® 
mss has e@atiaa®d. so far that the 
I &v isstzwaentalism) 
«Warmnt®d ags©3Ptabil±ty", 
B0ci®1iy i s a t toadc 
I K th@ pragmtism (@r @: 
JoteH Dewejs, tTOth i t s e l f wa 
rtie rul® i» *o discoTsr the 
s®aaiag ®f th® id©®» ask f©x» i t s coas©qtt©3ac©a«»» 
Th© top©tfe©si@ that work© i s th© tro© ©B®." 
]D®w®y (1920/48)s ©xtraet i s Garforth Cl966s®do) pp.3179327 
(®mphasis i s ®rf.giKal)® 
ffl0r©oT@x>9 M©t @alj ideas mErontabl® i a s o f a r as they "worked", 
but m alis® w®r@ a@ti@ase ®M.® f©ll©w®d frem Dewey's desir® to 
tmit® (ai3 ^ t f c i ©tfeex" toalitisis) id®a and aetiou, theo:^ aad 
pmetie®» I t aX^ @ l e d l o g i o a l l j t o a positioa i a which what was 
TOalistieally possibl® eould b© e©B©®iv®d as that which was 
desirables what would work shoald b® don®,!, Ithlos, l i k e t?uth, 
^ItMcsal th®®3?y ®v®r siae® / I he (}i?@@k^ has b®©n singularly 
ijyp®;6ii@@d by th® ac t i o n t h a t it® buslaess i s to discorer 
som© f i a a l ©ad @r good mm% ultimate aad supreme lawo 
2his i s th@ ooKwoa el@Ki©at mmng th® diversity of theories. 
hm® h®ld t h a t th® ©Md i s l o y a l t y ©r obedieao® t© a 
higher powsr o r authority ^ ^ g . Godj ruler, institutions or 
rati®Ml e0asei®Me%7* Others have a@@@rfe®d that »». morality 
i s sought i a @Bds that ar© goods./©,g, i a self-realisation, 
holisi©3@p h3,ppia@ss or aggregate pl@asurt7» And yet these 
Bohools hay® agreed i n th® assumption that there i s a single, 
usd fisaal good, fhey haT® b@en able to dispute with 
mother m l j b@@au@@ ©f t h e i r comon prendse, 
tbi® qu@@tion arises whether th@ way oat of the oonfusion 
©oafliot i s not to go t o th® root of the matter by 
qu@3tidaii3g th i s fsmmm element.., 
I4®t M ®.« f o l l o w th® pragmtie ru l e and transfer 
th@ weight aad burden of mor a l i t y to iatelligeno©." 
D©w@y (1920/48)s ©xtraet i a Gai^orth (1966,®d.) ppo3lS"7. 
Th@ s t t b e r t i s a t i o a ©f m o r a l i t y t o iatelligene® accounts for 
B@w@y«g pr©m©ti©® of the s c i e n t i f i c methsde I t does aot, however, 
avoid th© pr©bl0Bj h@ noted aboat the "siagle, f i x e d and f i n a l good". 
What i t raised t o the l e v e l @f th© '^aatuarail" and "iaevitable" was 
seiene®, How©v®r r e l a t i v e i t m&j have recognised the findings of 
®ei@ne® t o b®s th® method® th©ms@lves had a prescriptive 
'^ aaturala@s8'« tha t was j u s t i f i e d i a terms of evolutionary theory 
and, t e l e o l o g i e a l l y (®r pragmatically), i a terms ®f i t s supposed 
a b i l i t y to produe® th© i d e a l society. I t viewed as ef f i c i e n t . 
And e f f i e i e a o y was a f u r t h e r " n a t u r a l " value, or "single good". 
Furthermore, i n t i m a t e l y ooaaeeted ^ t h a Basic Belief i a s c i e n t i f i c 
e f f i e i e a e y was th© ^'natural"' p o s i t i o n ©f s c i e n t i f i c experts? those 
who were masters ©f the s o i s a t i f i e method. This pattern applied 
at a l l l e v e l s . 
At the l®v©l ©f th® todividual^ th® s c i e n t i f i c method iavolved 
i n t e l l i g e n t and active experiene©. I t evolved observatioa ©f, 
hypothesisiag about, and ©xperimanting w i t h the eaviroament, for 
the disoovesy o f warrantable " t r u t h s " , l a school, the individual 
c h i l d should ©agage i n such a method, not t o discover such "truths" 
f o r th® adyaa©@ffl®nt of ooll©etiv© Imowledge, but, rather, for the 
growth of his own a b i l i t i e s and i n t e r e s t s , 
" l o oa® ezptets th«t young t o make o r i g i n a l discoveries ©f 
j u s t the earn® f a c t s and p r i n c i p l e s as are embodied i n the 
sciences ©f nature and msa. But i t i s aot uareasonable to 
expect th a t learaing may take plao© under such conditions 
that from the standpoint of the learaer there i s genuine 
discovery,.." Dewey (1916) p,354. 
Dewey was a f o l u a t a r i s t , i n t h i s TOspeot. Yet at the same time, 
th© i d e a l of r a t i o n a l s c i e n t i f i c method applied t o th© teacher, too. 
f o r th© i a d i T i d u a l ( i a e l u d i n g the c h i l d ) t h i s method involved 
aetiv® iavolv©Hii®nt w i t h th® environment. I n the teacher's ease, 
t h a t ©MvfroHMfflt included h i s charges» Th® teacher had to observe 
children's i n d i v i d u a l eapaciti©® aad i n t e r e s t s , and also the stock 
of established 'knowledge', H© had t o plan rationally what 
pedagogical approach t o tak® ( f o r ©ach child, i d e a l l y ) . And he 
had t o experiment •» i . e . t o teach, Dewey stated that 
"Th© problesa of teaching i s t o k®®p the experience of the 
student i n th® d i r e c t i o n @f what th© ©spert already knows," 
Dswey (1916) p.2l6. 
He th©B w®nt ©n t© explain that s©i@ao© represented "the p®rfect 
0uto®ffl® of leasalng"' smd "the safeguard of the race against /th§7 
m t u r a l propensities'' of er@dulity aad pre-judgment (Dewey, 1916» 
pps 221,223), Th® teacher was both teaching th® s c i e n t i f i c method, 
aad t®aohi»g bj; i t o H© wa® th© experto !S!h® children were (a part 
©f) k i s ®avi»a®©at t o b® mast©r®do His objective was the growth 
of the c h i l d ' s i n t e r e s t s and a b i l i t i e s » for education was growth. 
But h±B objeetiv® was also s o e i t t a l (or oommaiity) growth, through 
teacher was s o t , ©f course, the only " s c i e n t i s t " -
my more than the i n d i v i d u a l c h i l d wasa. At the societal lev e l , 
ga^wth was a^aia th® (vague) @bj®etiv® - progress for i t s own sake, 
t o b® ®ffioi®atly pursued, Th® view, that what was r e a l i s t i c a l l y 
possible was by th© same token desirable, eould thereby legitimate 
SM^ enlightened leadership, so long a® t h i s aim of growth or progress 
was h©ld r-®a.listieally, and ao long as the "led" had a feeling of 
freedom i a th® process, (Th® need f o r euoh a f e e l i n g was no doubt 
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m l - by some other "single 
good" - r©quir©!B@Mt.) Aeoordiagly t®&ch®r® ms® themselves a part 
@f mrm higher experts' ©nviromaeat - th® professional admiaistrator, 
perhaps. U l t i g i a t e l y th@r© i 8 a px^gsaati©/moral preecriptioa of 
©Xpert leadership aad (m@r®) public participation, 
So attribttt© such ® 3 c p l i e i t s®qu®nc© t o Dewey himself may well 
be unjustified, i a view o f h i s asaay assortlens of the importaace 
of i a d i v i d u a l mental r®fl@©ti@ao What I have tried to demonstrate 
i s the cempatiMlity betweoa his philosophical pragmatism and the 
actual praotiees ©f expert leadtMhip, aad therefore of the latter*s 
legitimation w i t h i n a master pattern ©f Progr^ssivism, To summarise, 
I s h a l l aew r@vi@w the i ^ a i c Beliefs of Progreasivism as they have 
emerged i a t h i s m a l y s i s , SKOh broad gisieralisatioas as these should 
aot, of &oum®i ^® taken too l i t e r a l l y , A more detailed consideratioa 
i s not, h©w©v@rg possible, i a t h i s @asgiy« Again, lay aim i s to 
demoastrat® th® usafulaess @f p a r t i c u l a r kinds of questioa, for the 
esajBtoatioa ef h i s t o r i e a l l y sitimt®d ideologies, rather than to 
produe® a defiaitiv® statement @a AraieKiean Progressivism, 
A eoaeis® version of th© mB.i®r m s t e r pattern of Americaa 
?0gr@saivisiB i s contained i a Kaad,®r®e phrase j 
"th® kaowleigsabl® @xp®rfi dedicated t o the survival of 
Karier (1972/73s) p995. 
Sxpertis® fflay hav® resided p3d.aeipally i a method. But "warrantable" 
'kawledg®* frera which to work » iaeludiag, for instance, soieatifio 
mm and s©i@ntifio management - was 
sation0 Dedication certaialy existed 
Md i t would b@ n®gv@ t o dismiss t&e Progressive "movement" as 
what mts taken to be a 
oany of the most influential 
i n d i v i d u a l , was & "biological 
P centuries of evolution, but 
•» survivalo For t h i s l a t t e r reason. 
latel® id®al society 
is©i¥e@o Boeiety, l i k e 
edueational reform®?, lik© the l i b e r a l p o l i t i c a l 
In ®ff®et a f l e x i b l e conservativ®," 
f e r th® M®T±&m 'Bs^smmlrmo Reality •« including societal 
r@lati©ns -» wa® s e i e n t i f i e a l l y "kaowable* and controllable. Society 
m.& sub;|©et t o a a t u r a l evolution anyway. But th® p3?ogressive 
a c q u i s i t i o n of ka@wl©dge (and through i t th® possibility ©f control) 
a part ©f that very ©volutiM. I t mu #sat ultimatoly promised 
th® fulfilKs@nt ®t man i a a p e r f t e t sooietyo Though genuine mass 
refltctiv© awareness would b© a sis® i d e a l , in practie® this was 
Hot a r e a l i s t i c p o s s i b i l i t y . Th® enlightened expert - as teacher^; 
as bttsijj®®® maaager.and as p o l i t i s i a n - m.B iadispensibl® to the 
©oll@6tiv© b e n e f i t , fhrough th@Hi ©ffioienoy could produce the growth 
t h a t ensured an end t o a l l the s o c i a l problems that cursed the ov®r-
@spand@d Amerism c i t i e s , 
f&r th© Progressives, Objectivated 'lEnowledge' was i n principle 
a®v@r s t a t i c . As society ©volv®d, so contexts chang®d. Accordingly, 
pragjmtic w a r r a n t a b i l i t y of p a r t i c u l a r 'knowledg©' changed also. 
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Howavar, a f a i t h i a s c i e a t i f i e method led t o an assumptioa that 
a©i©nee i t s e l f was value«»fr@®, that i t ms beyond ideology and 
t h a t t:fatth could be pursued s c i e a t i f i c a l l y with no coasequeaoes 
0tfe®r thBM beneficial progress,^^^^ Even f o r Dewey himself, there 
were i a px'aetiee aacertaiaabl® t r u t h s •» though i t was recognised 
i n priaoipl® that such closure was potentially misleading, 
F«rth®OTor®, i t was assumed that ther© was a basic, attainable 
(aad f o r some, inevitable) harmony i n society. This was oonsisteat 
w i t h the na t u r a l i s t i c metaphor® so often used about society aad 
about the individual. Consequently, an ©vert belief i n the merits 
of "©peaaesB"^^^^ was also subordinate t o th© collective purpose, 
Th±B pui'pos® wa® in turn diseemibl® t'o th® laoral/iatelligeat experts 
of gooietye 
As f o r Subjective 'Knowledge% ther® was a© automatic 
eorr®ap@ad©no® betweea e i t h e r the Steal world, or sc i e a t i f i o 'Knowledge' 
@f i t , aad what people learn.. lxp@ri®ae@ alone deterraiaed what was 
learned* @?Abj©0t t o pred®t@rmla®d lisaitatlonse So th® shapiag of 
th® © a v i r o M f a e a t m.m th® daty ©f ©alighteaed ©xpex'ts. Nonetheless, 
t h a t shapiag had t © take into aeeoimt subjective feelings ef autoaomy. 
Bemooraoy ms, as Dewey said, a m y ©f liv i n g (Dewey, 1916, p,101), 
a©t a form of govsrameat. People had to be socialised into a 
Participati®aist wi.lliagn®ss t o ooatslbttt®, according to their own 
eapa©iti©@, t o th© eolleetiv® haMony, To this end, various 
devices - from t h ® organisation of teaching groups aad club a c t i v i t i e s 
t© ©wgeaieist policie©^^^^ were variously open t o the experts. As 
f®r original dispositioa© i a t h © iadividual, accounts varied. Some 
Progr®8siv©s were heirs to th® Oaltoaian traditioa, often leadiag to 
©mtjrf.^ -^'^  r a c i s t statements m& p o l i c i e s , Ot&ers adh®r®d t o 
a®atalist agsumptioa®, producing a so c i a l pathological view 
©f d®p»dTatioja mid i t s oonsequeaees, ^'^ ^^  In a l l oases, however, 
actual capacities were determined, whether by environment or 
hes^dity, Purthermer©, th® nature-nurtur© debate was always 
uadsrwritten by assiamptions ©f n a t u r a l inequality and an inevitable 
need f o r ©^ert leadership, I t was not the fact of differentiation, 
but i t s j u s t i f i c a t i o n , that was at issu®. However, what was 
certainly a matter for ©nvironraental ®s|>®ri@nc® for most (though 
@v@n h@r@ extreme eugenicists attributed a l l manner of physical 
and s o c i a l handicap to defective plasm) was the " s o c i a l " 
s p i r i t , 0®mpr@h@aeiv® high schools, ©specially, devised various 
©rganisatioaal patterns aad a c t i v i t i e s i n ord©r to promote a 
d e M o r a t i e f ©thio. "Democracy", her®, meant " a l l for each and 
each, f o r a l l " , as one school p r i n c i p a l put i t (Spring, 1972, p,120), 
l^his was very different, of cours©, fmm th® Jeffersonian 
i a d i v i d u a l i t y ©f th® pr9»oorp©rat® ®ra, aad different also from 
th® s@lf"interest utilitariaaiara of th® Bxltish Radicals, 
f i l i a l l y , th® Progressives on the whole had a particular view of 
aoeietal ©hang®. As so often appears t o happen, this was congruant 
w i t h t h e i r view of i n d i v i d u a l ( c h i l d ) development. Growth was the 
uaderlyiag notion i n both ©as®®, coupled w i t h an assumption that 
growth was always progress, l a some respects, such growth was 
i n e v i t a b l e , (Mk® th® child, society inevitably gets older). To 
D@w®y, certainly, th© ©volution @f an organically mature society 
was iBor® or less iaevitabl©,^^^^ But the nature of the growth was 
s t i l l mm t o b® largely in the hands of enlightened leaders. 
Education was am important - indeed th® most important - t o o l of social 
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(1) CaMoy ( 1 9 7 4 ) P e 2 5 4 . Karier ( 1 9 7 2/73a,p , 9 7 ) points out 
t t e t the high fees at Dewey*a "laboratory school" i a 
Chicago would have made i t a middle and upper-middle class 
eBtablighffl@at<, The reactions of such l i b e r a l educators as 
Silbewaa (1971) might seem to indicate that "progreesiire 
©duoatioa^' had aot touched th® public schools. But thi s 
implies tool narrow a definition @f "progressive eduoatioa", 
i s o l a t e d from th® o v e r a l l ideological structure. Differeat 
prescriptions may be mad© f o r the ©duoation of the childrea 
of differeat c l a s s e s . But the various presoriptioas 
nonetheless relate to oa® another within a single ("progressive") 
b e l i e f system, 
( 2 ) I am H©t suggestijag that Dewey was responsible for the 
massive changes that took place •» though some aati» 
progressives, l i k e Luad ( 1 9 5 0 ) have don® so. 
(3) w® have seen, the family metaphor was used especially, i a 
England, by latter-day aeO"»Ha.dicals li k e Kay~Shuttleworth. 
Th@e@ opening remarks are extremely geaeralised and must be 
read i a the light of the qualifications that follow. 
(4) of l a t g (1971 ) 5 Bowles & S i n t i s ( 1 9 7 6 ) p. 1 6 5 f f . 
( 5 ) ef Guapert & Spring ( 1 9 7 4 ) p , 6 7 o 
(6) ?ailiara® (1966)'s development of Turner (1950)'s froatier 
t h e s i s i s re f e r r e d t o by l a r i e r (1975) pp« 1"2,' 
(7) Th® distinction between p o s i t i v e and negative freedom i s made 
by B e r l i n (1969a). For dissussioas of the new and old 
l i b e r a l i s m amongst American Progressives see Spring (1972), 
mv 1$ Karier (l972/73a) esp, p p . 8 6 - 9 0 . 
(8) Bowles Ik (Siatig (1976) distiaguish between two "schools of 
thought" " the Dewey-an "dtoocratie" school and the 
*^m@rltooratiC"teohaocratio" ®a©, Th© former, accordiag to 
theiH, saw iategrative, egalitariasi aad developmental fuaetioas 
of ©ducatioa as necessarily associated i a the evolviag 
democratic society, whilst th© l a t t e r saw them as associated 
©aly through the iaterveation of enlightened leadership (pp20-26), 
I would suggest, however, that both themes were ambiguously 
oo-exist®at i a the beliefs of th® same people. 
(9) ie®8 the daagers, in my terms,of Value-Kaowo closures. 
(10) as®, mi©, so t o speak, f©r b@li®f| c r e d u l i t y i s n a t u r a l , 
fh@ undis0iplia@d mind i s averse to suspe^ise . 
aad iMt©3ae©tual he s i t a t i o n ? i t i s prone t o assertion. I t 
l i k e s things undisturbed» s e t t l e d , and t r e a t s them as such 
•dthout du© m r r a a t , " B©w©y (191S) p»222. 
"Seiene© r@pr©8oats th© safeguard of th® race against these 
n a t u r a l propensities and th© ©vils ^ l i e h flow from them." 
i b i d p«223, 
(11) "I'h® kind ©f assurance attending science i s rationai 
assuranoffl - l o g i e a l warraBty, Sh® i d e a l of s c i e n t i f i c 
©itiaaisatioa i s , therefor©, that ©very conception and statement 
s h a l l b@ of such a kind as to follow from others and to load 
t© others oo,** De^wy (1916) p«224 (original emphasis), 
"Th© usjivarsity f u n c t i o n i® th® truth-function ,,, Th© one 
thing that i s inherent and essential i s the id®a of truth," 
D®mw (1902/75) p.54. 
Whilst mathematics, sstroaos®?, physics or chemistry "have worked 
out ©ueh a d@finit© body of t r u t h and such definite 
inst3?a!m@ffltaliti©s of inquix^r and v e r i f i c a t i o n as to give them 
a p o s i t i o n aeeur© from attack*^ ( i b i d ) , th® social sciences hadv 
s t i l l t o reach that point - but ¥f©r@ ol®arly expected to do- so. 
( 1 2 ) Swift (1971)'9 approach i® a aovel aad well-conceived one. 
D i f f e r i n g iMportaatly frois aor© usual organisational approaches 
(see, f o r iastaac®, Bidw®!!, 19658 Davies, 1 9 7 5 ) , Swift looks 
to conditions i n public schools themselves for explanations of 
Pj»gr@s®iv® praetio® aad ideology. As h® admits, this i s 
i t M l f p a r t i a l (p»8), but i t i s most important. In Chapter 1 5 , 
I s i m l l disouss a B r i t i s h study that also looks at processes 
of i d a o l o g i c a l r®produ0ti©n i n schools •» although again by a 
v@jy d i f f e r e n t approach (Sharp k Greon, 1 9 7 5 ) , 
(13) " l a many respects, th® ®ducati@aal state came to b® th® mirror 
iaiag© ©f th® s o c i a l md p o l i t i c a l p h i l o a o p i ^ practiced by th® 
oontTOlling classes of M®v&.®m soeietys This assumes that th® 
ideas aad values that men hold dear often mak® a difference in 
t®zias of s o c i a l a c t i o n , " l a r i e r (1975) Po5» 
( 1 4 ) l a preparifflg t h i s chapter, I hav© r e l i e d p r i n c i p a l l y ©n ^ wey • 
(1900/15, 1916 aad 1 9 3 8 ) , together w i t h c e r t a i n a r t i c l e s by 
" " I acknowledge where 
(15) f o r instaae®! aBBSLfcllffi^-^asaaSl5 lSE®^iafie-iM.Jaia2gJ 
SfeaaiMajS§-.teaSii Art and Edueattens Individualism, .Old 
aad mm Pftiiosoptar and CivilisatiOB} Liberalism and Social 
i? ^^ueatien and the H®w Mberaliam: ShO-ZEfellaJSaa 
(16) They ar® often dualiti®® whos® oorrsspondent r e a l i t y h© denies. 
( 1 7 ) 8m @©p®©ially S@w®y (1902/66), 
(18) ©oge 'Mm Shufflaker'® gh@ Ohild-^Q®atr®d School, quoted 
by Cwfflla (1962) peg07* 
( 1 9 ) OmiAn (1962) p«220o S©© also P e r ^ ( 1 9 6 7 ) . 
( 2 0 ) «»Htmaa^  i s i»t®rpr©tati©a, Dewey«@ word was "social", 
whose afflbigmitie® I difseass below, 
( 2 1 ) ^^Corporat®" i s a b i o l o g i c a l metaphor ®f a© small sigaificanoe, 
( 2 2 ) fh® laek of di@tiaoti@a between "society" mid "eommuaity" 
h@re dom aot, of oouw®, d@t»ot frem my argumeat. On 
th© eoatmxys 
(23) I t i s ©®atral to soiratifi© pragsmtiim that ©urreat 
(coatextual) circmstaaees sad eoastraiats b® observed ©ad 
mad© tfe® basis ©f ac t i o n , Oa morals, Dewey aaids 
^M0»ls ceaoera aothiag less than the ^ l o l e character, 
and th® whol® ©hara©t®r i s i d e a t i e a l w i t h the man i a a l l 
hi® @@a©rtt© mak®"Up aad saaaifestationse" 
D9w©y ( 1 9 1 6 ) . p,415o 
«»C@aeTOt© jsak®"-up aad Maif@station®" place man i a his 
coatexfeual r t a l i t y , 
( 2 4 ) Of- o©ara©g "®eeial«^  earrf.®8 th@ pr e s c r i p t i v e eonaotations 
(25) & r i @ r (1976), I t was ©a thess© grounds that Dewey advocated 
to©»icias iavolvemeat in World Was' I , 
(26) P®r aa aso^aat ©f thes® t e s t s - d®vis®d aad sent to the 
pttblishers w i t h i a 64 w®®to (iaeluding a fortnight's recess) -
and t h e i r subsequent ©pplieatioa on a wide seal© in schools, 
see Sutptrfe &,Spring (1974) pe91 f f , 
(27) Jeaaea, f o r iastaac@, hm nB9d substaatially the same 
argum®at® as th®e® uoad by Tenaaa nearly half a o®ntuxy 
TO now mean by iat@Hig®Me© i s something li k e the 
p r o b a b i l i t y of acc@ptabl© perfoiroace (given the 
©pportmsity) i n oeoupatioas varyiag in social status. 
So we see that the prestige hierarchy of occupations i s 
a -.'ftliabl® objective x w l i t y i n our society,.," 
Jeasea ( 1 9 6 9 ) ps.14, 
l o s t published c r i t i c i s m of Jensen's arguments (eog. 
Harvard Idueatioaal , ^ vl@Wa Spring aad Summer 1 9 6 9 ) , has 
concentrated oa methodological issues. The basic assumptioas 
of inevitable inequality aad the ideological basis of 
'^'prestige" and"sooi©tal rewards" have received less 
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att®ati@a9 S@® Ohosssky's c E l t i e i s m &i Hsrmst®in'i 
artiel® ©stitl@d "IQ^ (GhmBky, 1972/13)c On. th© 
l®gitiraati®n of s o c i e t a l i n e q u a l i t y , am Bowles & Gintis 
( 1 9 7 6 ) , @sp, Ohapt@r 4, Btmoa ( 1 9 7 0 / 7 1 ) discusses 
iat9llig®n©©, mm m& class i a Bxltata, 
f o r th® iav@lv®m@at ©f many ©arly psyeh®m©trf.ciaaB i n 
®ug®aiea and immigratioa TOstrictioa, @®e Karrier (1972/73b} 
1975)I fi^mpert & Spring ( 1 9 7 4 ) Oh«3, On th© baokiag of 
larg® fomdatioas, Bowles t Gintis ( 1 9 7 6 ) pp. 195»8 draw 
®n l a r t e (1972, u/p). las-ks (1975) i s also iastruotive 
i a sttgg®@ting ^*iy such fomdatioM backing subsequently supported 
th© ®wir®»uEi@atalist positiono 
( 2 8 ) "Ste desir©! transfoBEatioa «oo s i g a i f i e s a society i a which 
m®^ p@»@@a s h a l l be ©e@upi@d i a something which jaakes the 
l i v e s ®f ©th®rs b e t t e r worth l i v i n g , aad lAiioh aocordiagly 
sake® th© t i e s which bind persons together more perceptible... 
I t denotes a state ®f a f f ^ r s i a i*,i©h th® interest ®f each 
i n h i s work i s uaeo©TO@i aad i n t e l l i g e n t . , , " (Not® again th® 
soeiml aad iadividua! compensator Th® change to such a 
society "i® ©sseatially a chaag© i n tfe® quality of mental 
d i s p o s i t i o n , , , " DeweiR ( 1 9 1 6 ) PP9370-1, 
( 2 9 ) S®® alTO Wirth ( 1 9 7 2 ) f o r @a @seell@at pr©-D©w®y account, 
(30) Shis view of efelldhoed i®TOl0pffl®at wms often formulated i n 
t®rsia ©f a s?@-@aaotffi@ttt ®f human s o c i a l ©volution » a theory 
t h a t was iiifXtt@atially wri.tt©ra i n biological terms by 
CJ, Staaley H a l l . (S@@ Spring, 1972, pp. 1 0 0 - 1 0 4 ^ D»wey 
M.mB®lt ' •m.B iaflu®a©@d by H a l l (uad®r whom he studied), 
mooriins t o Curtis & Bsultwood ( 1 9 5 3 / 5 6 ) p.477, of Dewey 
( 1 9 0 0 / 1 5 ) pp8,45-6. He wae ©®rta3jily moh influenced by 
th® bi@logioal/th®@l0glcal debates that gr©®ted Darwin's 
(31) Puffor, a u t t e r of T^^@X s A ^ t J ^ ^ a » ^ also a s^wd®at 
of Hall's (Spring, 1972^ F«103), 
(32) Parsoas ( 1 9 5 9 / 6 1 ) . S©@ also Chapter 5, abov®, 
( 3 3 ) fBml&l^ i s flae@d i n iav«rt®d ooBsaas her®, because i t i s 
Dewey's seas® of th® term that i a iateaded, 
( 3 4 ) Oompar® aleo« "The ftoeativ© prooess 9,, goes oa w i l l y - n i l l y , . , 
W® ffliiv®r ®tooat® d i r s e t l y , but i n d i r e c t l y by means of th® 
®aviroaffl®nt.® D®w®y ( 1 f l S ) p.gg. 
( 3 5 ) A ©isailar "wluat&ry"isfa«' charaot®ri8@d the views of some 
m@mb©rs @f the B r i t i s h Hel, Inspectorate, even i n th® mid» 
19th ceattts^ (Johasoa, 1 9 6 8 , ©sp, p p . 3 8 9 - 4 0 0 ) , 
( 3 6 ) f o r iastaao® Oelia Seotto See Spring ( 1 9 7 2 ) pp. 5 0 - 6 1 , 
( 3 7 ) of Spriag ( 1 9 7 2 ) pp» 1 0 S " ? (horae rooms), 1 2 3 (assemblies), 
106 (clubs, ®to,) aad 118»I20 (studsnt governments). 
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(38) Heae® i. m,$®r parfe ©f th® Progyeoslv© mti@aale for th© 
(39) B®?A®0 &. ©iatis ( 1 9 7 6 ) ppo 186-191 s Th® discussion i s 
r©!aiai@@fBt @f the ©twggl® i a tfcd© eotmtry f o r School 
Boart atitOHOB^, p r i o r t© th® 1 9 0 2 Muoatioa Act, (See 
Simoa, 1965, C h e 6 . ) - fhongfe coaditiea® and histories were, 
of eottrstj- @xtr@m©ly d i f f e r e n t , th@r® would appear t© be a 
o©iKB©a @l@sa®at i a tfe® ideology @f pr©f®@si©aal expertise 
aad ©ffieieaey. Bacon ( 1 9 7 6 ) sugg©st@ similar tendencies 
i a B r i t a t o today^ Ae t h i s essay im writtea (Summer, 1976), 
th® Taylov E@port ©a Sefeool l a a a g g M a t i s s t i l l awaited. 
(40) Such eonterapoTOry c r i t i c s as Upton S i n c l a i r aad Scott 
Neariag a t t r i b u t e d great sigaifieano® to the iaflueaoe 
©f corporate business i n school boards aad university 
maaagemeat. See, for iastaas®. Spring (1972) Chapter 7, 
Kar i e r ( 1 9 7 5 ) iaoludes 8®M iat@r@stiag documentary 
©vldeas® m c e r t a i a "aeaieaaic freedom" cases. I have 
already meatioaed Marks' work oa th® r o l e of large 
fousdatioas i a the baokiag ©f geaetieist research i a th© 
1920®, as w e l l a s eavir@am@atalist r®®®aroh (such as the 
study) i n the 1 9 4 0 0 , (s@© not® 27). 
(41) Maay others, ©f course, hav® aald s i r a i l a r thiags of 
lib@»lirai!J, S p t o i f i c a l l y ©a ©duoatioa, s@@j f o r iastaaee, 
M©r-t©n k Watson (1971/73), 
(42) fhme Bell"® Si4,»iOil£lSK ®Fit©rai@®d aa older Progressivist 
( 4 3 ) l a academic freedom, f o r inataae©. See Karier (1975) 
ChaptQM l^-S, 
( 4 4 ) S@® l a r i e r (1972/73b & 1975 Otopters 5 - 1 0 ) i Gump^rt & 
Spriag.(1974), Chapter 3, 
( 4 5 ) Dewey's visi®a of the ®id©al achool" being l i k e th© 
"i d e a l h©ia@«' - which h® outl i a e d » presaged many of the 
lat@r asstmptions of e u l t u r a l d@privatioa-ism. See Dewey 
(1900/15) p p e 3 5 - 7 . 
I say ^n&m or le s s " , beeaus© i n none ©f th© w r i t i n g s 
that I hav® ©oasidered does Dewey aak® aaytMng but v©:^ 
vagtt® refereao© t o what th© ©ventual i d e a l society would 
look l i k e , Ooasequeatly his notion of ohaage t o tha t 
society i s imprecise. That he does se© some kiad of 
inevitabl© transforajation, however, i s iadicated, f o r 
iastaac©, i a Dewey (1916) p o 3 7 3 et passim. 
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fWEmSTH-CENTURY BRITISH CHII<D-GEMTRED EDUCATIOM 
The Established Orthodoxy of ^Child-eentredness" 
Van der Bykea (1973, p.94) suggests that Robert Morant's 1904 
Code of Regulations f o r Public Elementary Schools "set the scene 
f o r an imaginative new concept of primary education, and embodies 
a philosophy of teaching which s t i l l influences schools today". 
Certainly i t t a l k e d of "development" and " i n d i v i d u a l c h i l d r e n " 
and "natural a c t i v i t i e s " , I t was applauded at the time by 
Katherine Bathurst - an H.M.I. and outspoken advocate of "advanced" 
(2) 
t h i n k i n g and action i n respect of Infant Schools. A s i m i l a r 
philosopljy was contained i n th© f i r s t Handbook of Suggestions f o r 
the Con^ ^^ ^ of Teaohers^ published i n 1905. This marked a 
decisive break from the imposed *'Paym©nt by Results" system, which 
was abolished only a decade e a r l i e r , "^^ ^ 
Edtnond Holsaes published his i n f l u e n t i a l What I s And What Might Be 
i n 1911, having recently r e t i r e d from th© post of Chief Inspector t o 
/ « \ 
the Board of Education. Ever sine®, the dlchotomisation between 
"ol d " and *»n®w" pedagogies has been a prominent feature of 
(5) 
"progressive" w r i t i n g on ©ducationo As Selleck has pointed out, 
t h i s view of h i s t o r y , wherein the e v i l s of " t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s " could 
be l i s t e d t o prove the "sel f - e v i d e n t " merit of "progressive" methods, 
served a cohesiv© f u n c t i o h amongst tha early (post-World War I ) 
"prog3?essiv9s" i n t h i s country (Selleck, 1972, pp,69-70), There 
was remarkable agreement about what was wrong axid broadly what kinds 
of approach should be adopted, though conssnsus on conceptual 
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d®fiaitioas was quite lacking, ^  I t was a raissionaxy z©al with 
which such rsformers as Russell, H e i l l , Ensor, Caldwell Cook, 
MacMunn aud Kiany others found some sort of unity i n t h e i r "movement". 
Theirss says S e i l i c k , was a messianic enthusiasm. They were s e t t i n g 
out t o co.nv@rfc an ©ntire education system (Sslleck, 1 9 7 2 , p.63 f f ) . 
Even Nunrij the r©putabl® theor i s t s resorted to the old/new dichotomy -
as indeed had Deweyj i n America Dewgy, 1 9 0 2 / 6 6 , p e 1 2 8 ) . 
"Expressed i n broad terms, th® p r i n c i p l e s of the movement are 
t h a t th® o l d a u t h o r i t a r i a n a t t i t u d e of parents and teachers 
should be modified, that more r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e i r conduct 
and progx*©ss i n school studies should be entrusted to the 
c h i l d r e n themselves, that methods of i n s t r u c t i o n should be 
made more f l e x i b l e so as to meet bet t e r the widely d i f f e r i n g 
ne©ds of i n d i v i d u a l s , aad that more aecount should be taken 
of varying tastes eind a b i l i t i e s . I n a word, i t i s a movement 
t o e3£ploit more f u l l y than heretofore that spontaneity of 
th® i n d i v i d u a l which w© have described as the essence of play," 
Nunn (1920/45) pp,104-5, 
This passage demonstrates not j u s t th® "movement's" prevalent 
diohotomisation, but also some of i t s p r i n c i p a l catchwords -
" f l e x i b l e ' ' , "needs of i n d i v i d u a l s " , "spontaneity" and "play". 
Nunn's book r a p i d l y became th® "progressives'" textbook. I t s f i r s t 
e d i t i o n went through thirt@@n rep3?lntSo The second e d i t i o n ( 1 9 3 0 ) 
(•J) 
was r e p r i n t e d ©ight times. A t h i r d e d i t i o n was published i n 1 9 4 5 . 
P.A. Gavenagh call e d i t "th© outstanding book of the period". 
"The studies of a generation of teachers i n t r a i n i n g have 
b©en based on i t , and i t has profoundly affected t h e i r 
outlook and t h e i r subsequent practice," 
Cavenagh (1936) quoted by Selleck (1972) p,47. 
Selleok ( 1 9 7 2 ) describes how the l a r g e l y i n t u i t e d , vague, missionary 
enthusiasm of c e r t a i n "outsiders" i n the years immediately a f t e r 
World War I became the established orthodojiy of educational thought 
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i n t h i s country. The 1927 e d i t i o n of the Board of Education's 
Handbook of Suggastions was f u l l of advice c l e a r l y compatible with -
where not derived from ~ "progressive" pronouncements. The Hadow 
Reports, especially that of 1931, on The Primary School, also 
adopted the new outlook. As Selleck puts i t , 
Progressive ideas were s u f f i c i e n t l y prominent i n educational 
debate to be adopted by men who did not have time t o forge 
t h e i r ovm educational vocabularies but who were not s a t i s f i e d 
w i t h the conventional p i e t i e s . . . " 
"By 1939, a s u b s t a n t i a l m ajority of opinion leaders worked 
w i t h i n the progressives' i n t e l l e c t u a l o r b i t . Most of those 
who wrote books on education, spoke at conferences, produced 
o f f i c i a l r e p o r t s , or sat on important committees, trained 
teachers, or contributed t o the educational journals came to 
accept progressive views as a basis f o r t h e i r ovm t h i n k i n g . . . 
As the 20s and 30s progressed, i t became clear that the 
progressives were d i c t a t i n g the terms of the debate..." 
Sellack (1972) pp. 123,120, 
I t was not u n t i l a f t e r World War I I , hov/ever, that orthodox 
theory bscame anything l i k e orthodox practice. Most of the " r a d i c a l " 
p r i v a t e schools were already registered as e f f i c i e n t by the Ministry 
of Education by 1944.^®^ Th© conversion of state schools^^^ t o 
"progressiva" p r i n c i p l e s was sjaother matter, I cannot deal here w i t h 
the h i s t o r y of t h i s conversion. Suffice i t t o say that by 1967 the 
Plowden Report could boast that a t h i r d of the primary schools i n 
England and Wales were what i t ca l l e d "good"^''^^ - that i s of the kind 
described and recommended i n the Report. Moreover, th© B r i t i s h 
Primary School i s commonly taken to be the model f o r "Open Education" 
(11) 
i n practice today. The emphasis i n t h i s chapter i s on the primary 
school, rs-ther than on other sectors of the education system. The 
Proebelian and Pestalozzian - not t o mention the Owenite - t r a d i t i o n s 
gained some hold i n i n f a n t education before they "spread" up the 
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age-range i n ti s i s centui^o The removal, In most areas, of the 
^'ll-'plus" ©xaffi:lnatioBi was oft©a accompanied by a " l i b e r a l i s i n g " 
of primary school ©ducatioHo This lends credence to a common, but 
somewhat shallowp explanation of educational change, which hinges 
on the "i n f l u e n c e " of infant educational ideas, f i n a l l y " r e l e a s e d " 
(12) 
from the c o n s t m i n t s of extex^al examinations. Many c h i l d -
centred ideas have looked to infaJicy f or an understanding of the 
"nature" of childhood. But such t h e o r e t i c a l understanding i s not 
the same as committed b e l i e f , nor i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d p r a c t i c e s based 
upon such understandings« T?ro features suggest an i d e o l o g i c a l 
patterning that i s deeper than s i m p l i s t i c ^'influence" theories 
would imply» F i r s t , there i s a congruence between Child-centred 
tenets and b e l i e f s about teacher autonomy. Second, Child-centred 
p r a c t i c e s have been applied d i f f e r e n t i a l l y i n secondaiy schools, 
depending on the "type^ of secondary school c h i l d involved. 
Meanwhile, my concern here i s with the theory and p r a c t i c e of 
Child-centred education. Undoubtedly t h i s was i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d 
i n an important proportion of B r i t i s h primary schools during the 
1950s and 'GOs, 
The l a s t e d i t i o n of the Board of Education's Handbook of 
Su£gistions was published i n 1937» Twenty-two years l a t e r , the 
Ministry of Education's MSSL«SfiMSSi2S declared that "Handbook 
of Suggestions" would no longer be an appropriate t i t l e , given the 
(13) 
changing s t a t u s of the teaching profession,^ Primary Education 
already described and praised the pr a c t i c e s of the "new" primary 
schools i n t h i s country. But the v e r i t a b l e Bible of Child-centred 
education was the Plowden Report (1967), For Peters (1969) i t 
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eontaiaed a "littl© vade mecum of ©dueational theory" (p«2). For 
Bernstein and DaviQS (1969) i t came "veiy close .to the s e m i - o f f i c i a l 
ideology of primary education ixi t h i s country" (po56), Ex-Chief 
Inspector B l a c k i e ' s book-for-parents followed shortly afterwards. 
I t t e l l s a reTj d i f f e r e n t t a l e to the oae t o l d by that other 
ex-Chief Ki^pector, h a l f a centui^y e a r l i e r o Holmes had allowed 
that there TOS 
*»at l e a s t a breath of healthy discontaat s t i r r i n g i n the f i e l d 
of elementary education, a breath which sometimes blows the 
mist away and gives sudden gleams of sunshine" 
Holmes (1911) pp»v-vio 
Yet he had f e l t that i n most elementary schools the aim of teachers 
was 
"to leave nothing to /^he c h i l d ' s / n a t u r e , nothing to h i s 
spontaneous l i f e , nothing to h i s free a c t i v i t y ? to repress 
a l l h i s n a t u r a l impulses? to d r i l l h i s energies into complete 
acquiescence; to keep h i s whole being i n a state of sustained 
and p a i n f u l tension" Holmes (1911) p»48» 
BlackiBs on the other hand, wrote h i s book i n the hope of conveying 
"the excitement of the E n g l i s h primary school at i t s best" 
B l a c k i e (1967/71) p.Xo 
Like Plowden, he 'knew" that these "best"^ schools were to be t y p i c a l 
of a l l primary schools i n the near future,, By the 1960s, Child-centred 
education had undoubtedly a r r i v e d as orthodox p r a c t i c e , as well as 
theory. 
A b r i e f comparison might be made between t h i s Child-centred 
"movement" and those of the 19th century Radicals and the American 
Progressives., I t i s immediately apparent that the two B r i t i s h 
"movements'* are importantly opposed to each other. Indeed, the 
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contemporary Child<»centred "movement" i s i n many ways a conscious 
re a c t i o n to the pedagogical p r a c t i c e s a r i s i n g out of ea r l y 19th 
centuj:y Radiealismo I t i s the 19th century p r a c t i c e s that are held 
up as the " t r a d i t i o n a l " and "a u t h o r i t a r i a n " side of the notorious 
d i c h o t o m y , ^ O n the other hand, the contrast with American 
Progressivism may not at f i r s t sight be so obvious. 
Much of the theory of E n g l i s h progressivism before World War I I 
was close to, and even i m i t a t i v e of, American educational 
Progressivisra, Yet i t may w e l l be that d i r e c t American influence 
was smalle Evidence of Dewey's influence, f o r instance, i s sparse, 
Godfrey Thomson s a i d i n 1929 that 
" I n Great B r i t a i n , except i n Scotland,oo I have been repeatedly 
st3?uck by the absence of references to Dewey's ideas and 
sometimes by evidence of complete ignorance of them, although 
the same views i n other dress are often mentioned i n t h e i r 
p r a c t i c a l aspects" 
Thomson (1929) Po78, quoted by Selleck (1972) p o l H . 
Nunn (1920/45) recommended that "students should read How We Think" 
(p«246) and also "know" Dewey's work, e s p e c i a l l y The School and 
Society and Schools f o r Tomorrow (po276). Yet these are recommended 
i n footnotes. Only once does he r e f e r to Dewey i n h i s text (ppo 238-9), 
even i n h i s t h i r d edition,, lonetheless, the between-war progressives 
i n t h i s country, such as those of the New Education Fellowship 
(N,E.P.), consciously took the term "progressive" from t h e i r American 
counterTparts ( S e l l e c k 1972, p»113). Some of them, at l e a s t , thought 
e x p l i c i t l y i n terms of "Prpgress"^ They conceived of education as 
that extra spur to natu r a l evolution which might bring about the 
s n i l l e n i a l societye Beatrice Ensor, he r s e l f an ex-H.M.I, and a 
leading l i g h t i n the N.E,P„, declared that 
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«^ It i s t h i s seeming i n e v i t a b i l i t y of c e r t a i n fundamental 
ideas which helps us to believe that we are on the track 
of something r e a l , something that i s i a l i n e with the 
progress of ©volution 
Ensor ( 1 9 2 7 ) quoted by S e l l e c k ( 1 9 7 2 ) p o 7 1 c 
These e a r l y progressives were often disgusted by a society that 
had erupted i n ?/ar i n 1 9 1 4 o There was a eomnon f e e l i n g that, as 
MaeMuna put i t 
"Reform can only com© through th© children themselves." 
MaoMunn, quoted by S e l l e c k ( 1 9 7 2 ) p « 9 5 . 
Disgust and d i s i l l u s i o n with t h e i r society was aJi important 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of e a r l y E n g l i s h progressivism. There was c l e a r l y 
g r eater uucertainty as to th© future than there was amongst most 
(15) 
Amerieai^ Progr^ssiveso I n i t s c l e a r e s t and most extreme form^ , 
N e i l l put i t as follows s 
''We must not says 'That i s r i g h t " , because we don't know 
what i s righte We must not say? ^This i s wrong', because 
w® don't kaow what i s wong. The most w© should do i s to 
t e l l a c h i l d our ©xperiene©^" 
l e i l l (1918) p,19, quoted by Sell e c k (1972) p.98. 
Even Nuan could a s s e r t that 
"fher® can b® no u n i v e r s a l aim of ®dueatipn i f that aim 
i a to include the a s s e r t i o n of any p a r t i c u l a r i d e a l of l i f e ? 
f o r there are as many i d e a l s as there are persons. 
Educational e f f o r t s must b© li m i t e d t o securing f o r 
©vezyon® the conditions under which i n d i v i d u a l i t y i s most 
completely developed To enquire whether t h i s view 
i s supported by the f a c t s of human development - that i s , 
whether i t i s based upon th© s o l i d ground of nature or only 
upon an amiable i l l u s i o n , s o w i l l be our task i n the 
following chapters," lunn (1920/45) p. 13. 
Dewey, a l s o , e x p l i c i t l y r e j e c t e d a l l dogma. He did not want 
merely to replace the narrowness of the r e l i g i o n from which he 
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f e l t himself e x t r i c a t e d with s i m i l a r closure. Yet Dewey's own 
pmctic© 8Uggests closures about the possible ordering of society, 
and these coloured h i s writings alsos In t h i s respect, Nunn's 
a s s e r t i o n s about the i n d i v i d u a l - s o c i e t y dichotomy are decidedly 
ambiguous i n pieces« There are c l e a r signs of a corporatism 
s i m i l a r to that which char a c t e r i s e d American Progressivism. Yet 
h i s emphasis on i n d i v i d u a l i t y was more .prominent than was Dewey's.^''^^ 
More importantly^ i t was a s t r e s s on i n d i v i d u a l i t y that was overtly 
to predominate i n post-World War I I B r i t i s h Child~centred educational 
p r a c t i c e , Again I would not press an "influence" theory i n t h i s 
respect. But Nunn's wri t i n g m s an important r a t i o n a l i s e r and 
r e i n f o r c e r of subsequent p r a c t i c e , j u s t as i t was f o r the "missionary" 
progressives i n the 1920s. ThusjNunn speaks out against l i c e n c e 
(p.lOO), declares that teachers have a s o c i e t a l mandate ( p . I l l ) , 
seeks a harmony of i n t e r e s t s i n society through a d i f f e r e n t i a t e d 
secondary school system (po275) and proclaims the importance of 
d e l i b e r a t e l y fostered r i t u a l s (e^g. Empire Day, p.78), Yet he 
i n s i s t s that " I n d i v i d u a l i t y i s the i d e a l of l i f e " (p.18). He 
"admits" that i n the l a s t resorfe i t i s the i n d i v i d u a l pupil who 
should decide on h i s own educations 
"The reader may press the case of a pupil who withstands 
the s o c i a l f o r c e s tending to drive him to n a t u r a l l y d i s t a s t e f u l 
s t u d i e s . I s he to be allowed to leave school ignorant of an 
e s s e n t i a l subject simply because he chances never to have f e l t 
i t s a t t r a c t i o n ? ... Let us face the issue and admit that i n 
our i d e a l school the ultinmte veto l i e s with the pupil - though 
i t i s never to be exercised l i g h t l y or without genuine t r i a l 
of the r e p e l l e n t subject . . o Moreover, though i t may seem to 
a teacher deplorable that a pupil should leave school with 
wisdom at one of her main entrances quite shut out, t h i s 
f e e l i n g expresses a professional prejudice rather than the 
judgment of the greater worldo" Nunn (1920/45) pp.273-4. 
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T h i s may seem a r e l a t i v e l y mild form of op©n i n d i v i d u a l i t y , 
©Bpeoially when re l a t e d to closures elsewhere i n Nunn's book -
concerning the organisational d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of schoolchildren, 
f o r instance. These i n d i c a t e important assumptions on the "Power" 
dimension of education b e l i e f , as we s h a l l see. My point here i s 
that though there was indeed ©mphasis^ i n th© orthodox pi'ogressive 
theory of the 19308, on the importance of corporatism, as against 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y , yet there were importajit signs already of the 
Child-centr®dn©ss that became th© orthodoxy of the 1960s, 
The most d i s t i n c t i v e feature of the Child-centred "movement" 
i n mid-20th century B r i t a i n i s i t s neglect of the s o c i e t a l functions, 
and purposes of education. Attention has been predominantly to the 
"needs" and "nature" of the i n d i v i d u a l c h i l d . This tendency was 
c l e a r from th® e a r l y days of Brl,tish educational progressivismo 
S e l l e c k sums up some of the p r i n c i p a l slogans of those e a r l i e r days 
as follows. There were 
''different i n d i v i d u a l s with some differences i n what they 
reeommended, but the same ideas r®ours growth, nature, 
i n s t i n c t , freedoffi, play, a c t i v i t y , s e l f - a c t i v i t y , innate 
goodness, development, i n d i v i d u a l i t y , spontaneity, i n t e r e s t . 
These words had s p e c i f i c (and sometimes d i f f e r e n t ) connotations 
f o r each speaker ,,. Yet a l l the progressives used these ideas 
so that they bound together diverse axid i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c people 
who shar©d a d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n ^vith the e x i s t i n g order." 
S e l l e c k (1972) po81. 
This l i s t i s outstanding i n that, i n a l l cases, reference i s 
p r i m a r i l y to th® "Knowledge" dimension of educational ideology. 
They r e f e r to th© c h i l d , to learning and occasionally to curriculum. 
They are f a r l®ss e x p l i c i t l y about society, or even about teaching. 
This emphasis i s at l e a s t as strong i n the 1967 Plowden Report. 
I t s t i t l e , even, was "Children a^d Their Primary Schools"^ The 
very f i r s t chapter (excepting th® Introduction) i s devoted to 
"The Children? T h e i r Growth and Development",, This emphasis i s 
maintained throughout^ As Berrastein and Davies (1969, p<.74) point 
out, "there i s no systematic exposition of the role of e i t h e r the 
head or a s s i s t a n t teacher," Furthertnore, despite some p o s i t i v e 
recommendations on Educational P r i o r i t y Areas, there i s a systematic 
playing"»down of the imporfcanc© of s o c i a l c l a s s ( i b i d , p,63). I n 
a chapter on "Th© Aims of Primary Education", the Report declares 
that 
"On® obvious purpose i s to f i t children f o r the society into 
which they w i l l grow up« To do t h i s s u c c e s s f u l l y i t i s 
necessary to predict what that society w i l l be l i k e . " 
Plowden Report (1967) i 494, 
(17) 
I t then proceeds to d©vet© p r e c i s e l y ten l i n e s to t h i s subject. 
This neglect of the "Power" dimension i s common to the 
e x p l i c i t educational thinking of p r a c t i c i n g teachers, a l s o . However, 
such e x p l i c i t neglect cannot remove i t s importance i n p r a c t i c e . 
B e l i e f s are i n e v i t a b l y contexted and i n e v i t a b l y r e f e r - however 
i m p l i c i t l y - to the r e a l world^out^there. I n the remainder of t h i s 
chapter,, w® must consider the natux'e and s i g n i f i c a n c e of i m p l i c i t 
b e l i e f s a c t u a l l y held i n t h i s respect. 
j^ ®-."^ ?-gj-®j:g.g"' Dimension 
In th© post-World War I period, the thinking of educational 
progressives was marked by a vagueness and sunbiguity which was 
i t s e l f important to the missionary z e a l of i t s adherents. 
"'Progressiv© education was not produced by cool, poised, detached 
philosophers i n t e n t on s i f t i n g ideas u n t i l they found the few 
grains of t r u t h . I t s theories did not r e s u l t from the c a r e f u l 
placing together of an i n t r i c a t e argument. They came white-hot, 
forged on th© reformers* a n v i l , they aimed at conversion, at 
changing a t t i t u d e s and behaviour and did not allow f o r doubts 
and q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ! they were not attempts to a r i l v e at the 
t r u t h , they were proclamations of the truth; they did not 
define, they demonstrat©d»" Se l l e c k (1972). 
When we ta r n to th© Plowden Report, t h i s vagueness and ambiguity 
i s s t i l l not resolved. What the report i t s e l f c a l l s i t s "recognisable 
philosophy of education and ,<,, view of s o c i e t y " (Plowden Report, 
1967, i 504) i s summarised i n paragraph 505,^^^^ Peters (1969,p»3) 
r i g h t l y points out that t h i s suzmary ° and hence "the l i t t l e vade-mecum 
of educational theory" of the Report as a whole - " p r o l i f e r a t e s i n 
importsjit h a l f - t r u t h s that are paraded as educational panaceas." 
Ambiguities and i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s are even more apparent i n the accounts 
(19) 
of p r a c t i c i n g teachers of the Child-centred "movemenf?.^ 
Such ambiguities - even within single accounts, l e t alone 
between those of d i f f e r e n t w r i t e r s •» mean that generalisations about 
the Child-centred "movement" should b© treated with caution. However, 
as with the E n g l i s h Radicals i n Chapter 13 and the American Progressives 
i n Chapter 14, a general pattern does seem to be discemable. I 
outline below the s a l i e n t features of t h i s pattern. I t must be 
remembered, however, that my aim i s more to i l l u s t r a t e a methodological 
approach, than to "prove a point" about the Child-centred "movement". 
The l a t t e r would require much more detailed a n a l y s i s of s p e c i f i c 
h i s t o r i c a l contexts. However, the appropriate research could f r u i t f u l l y 
be conducted along the l i n e s here suggested. 
The same ambiguities which d i s t r e s s such philosophers as Peters, 
H i r s t , Dearden or Pring^^'^^ ar® of considerable importance to the 
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s o c i o l o g i s t o As Sharp and 6y@©n point outs 
" l a n j of these ambivalences have been revealed elsewhere i n 
mrf.ous commentaries, us u a l l y by philosophers, on some of the 
intex-saal p h i l o s o p h i c a l and t h e o r e t i c a l contradictions within 
th8,t body of thought that we could loosely c a l l the ' c h i l d 
centred progressive? approach to education. Nevertheless, the 
i m p l i c a t i o n of some of these commentaries seems to be that 
such eontra,dictions and l o g i c a l i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s are merely 
the r e s u l t of woolly thinking and with a l i t t l e more l o g i c a l 
c l a r t t y and philosophical expertise, the confusions and 
ambiguities could be ironed out.... From t h e i r perspective 
as s o c i o l o g i s t s , however, the a u t h o r ^ would suggest that 
such i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s may w e l l be i n d i c a t o r s of diverse and 
c o n f l i c t i n g c o n s t r a i n t s on the position of the educator which 
pose i n t e r e s t i n g questions regarding t h e i r explanation on the 
macro l e v e l , and have important implications f o r actors i n the 
way they function at the micro l e v e l , " 
Sharp and Green ( 1 9 7 5 ) P a S G , 
Some such s i g n i f i c a n c e was i n d i c a t e d by S e l l e c k , when he pointed 
to the cohesiveness that ambiguities mad© possible, or even 
encouraged, a f t e r World War I . 
loTOOvtr, the very l a c k of e x p l i c i t elaboration was regarded 
as a vir-fcue by some of the e a r l y missionary progressives. This 
too i s an important aspect of contemporary Child-centredness, 
Caldwell Cook s a i d , 
"To have one's feet thus planted on a rock of c e r t a i n t y ... 
does not come of having aeoepted a doctrine a f t e r l o g i c a l 
consideration, but i t comes of innate b e l i e f ; f o r the springs 
of human action l i e not i n the reasoned intention of the 
i n d i v i d u a l , but i n the i n t u i t i o n of man's mind, i n the gathered 
energy of i n h e r i t e d tendency and communicated de s i r e . And so 
t h i s expression of ein educational i d e a l w i l l ultimately appeal 
only to those who already f e e l an answer to i t within 
themselves," 
Caldwell Cook ( 1 9 1 7 ) p. 5 3 s quoted by Selleok ( 1 9 7 2 ) p , 6 9 . 
J u s t as i t was r i g h t f o r the educators themselves to r e l y on 
" i n t u i t i o n " , so i t was " n a t u r a l " - and therefore " r i g h t " - f o r 
c h i l d r e n to develop t h e i r emotions at l e a s t as much as t h e i r i n t e l l e c t . 
' 4 4 3 " 
l e i l l t y p i c a l l y took an ©xtr@m© position on t h i s s 
«Sop3® of you mj b© doubtful about the importance of ©motion. 
Believe me^ and I speak from a long experience, i f you educate 
the emotions the i n t e l l e c t w i l l look a f t e r itself« When a boy 
l o s e s h i s g u i l t y conseieace about masturbation he always learns 
h i s lessons more ©asily and w i l l i n g l y , I use t h i s i l l u s t r a t i o n 
because, s t r i c t l y speaking, one cannot ©ducat© the emotions: 
the most one can do i s to t r y to destroy the bonds that have 
t i e d up emotion and changed i t into g u i l t and hate. A l l you 
ean do i s to fwrnish o u t l e t s f o r ©motiono,^" 
K e i l l ( 1 9 3 9 ) p « 1 5 9 , extrs-ct i n Perry ( 1 9 6 7 , ed.) p . 1 2 8 . 
From here, i t i s a short Bt©p to t a l k of ©dueating the "whole c h i l d " . 
This i s strongly advocated today. For instances 
" I t i s most important to emphasis® that the curriculum, stated 
merely i n terms of subjects or a c t i v i t i e s , omits what schools 
v/ould regard as fundamental i n the education they o f f e r . From 
the nursery school upwards, education i n school i s concerned 
pj.'imarily with the development of children as persons*,. The 
ultijnate c r i t e r i o n of the qua3i%of^ach c h i l d ' e d u c a t i o n i s 
the q u a l i t y and balance of the personality which r e s u l t s •» the 
c h i l d ' s competence and confidence in using and enjoying the 
knowledge and s k i l l s he has acquired, and, above a l l , the 
nature of h i s a t t i t u d e s and h i s behaviour towards those with 
whom he works and p l a y s , , , " Education, Ministry o f , ( 1 9 5 9 ) P e 1 1 5 . 
" I think t h i s i s where w© would probably paii; company with more 
t r a d i t i o n a l , more formal schools, in such schools perhaps the 
head teacher would think i t was no part of the function of the 
school to meet the ©motional needs ,,. that the school was here 
to hand on a c e r t a i n culture^ a cer t a i n way of l i f e , along with 
a l o t of s k i l l s 5 information^ knowledge and that sort of thing,., 
and that the emotional needs of children /Rave/ nothing to do 
with the school,,. We don't take that view; we t r y to see 
chi l d r e n as whole people with emotional needs, i n t e l l e c t u a l 
needs, p h y s i c a l needs and so on. I t ' s become almost 
platitudinous now but w© t r y to t r e a t the education of the 
whole ehildo" 
"Mr. Mcintosh", headteacher of "Mapledene" Primary School, i n 
Sharp & Green ( 1 9 7 5 ) p , 6 l o 
In shoi't, ambiguities i n the e x p l i c i t accounts of Child-centred 
e d u c a t i o n i s t s i n d i c a t e the need to look at the empirical context of 
r e l a t e d p r a c t i c e , f o r an understanding of the b e l i e f s involved. 
Besides t h i s , they are congruent with a major aspect of the ideology, 
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namely the supposed importance of encouraging the i m p l i c i t , i n t u i t e d , 
emotional, non-cognitive aspects of the "whole c h i l d " . 
K e i l l ' s a s s o c i a t i o n of emotions with masturbation reveals the 
influence of psychoanalysis. His writing often shows a s i m i l a r pre-
(21) 
occupation.^" Another e a r l y progressive, Homer Lane, was an ardent 
devotee of Freud ( c f Lane, 1918/64). He had some influence on N e i l l 
(22) (23) himself. • Susan I s a a c s ^ ^ was a l s o well-versed i n Freudianism, 
On the whole, though, such work supported or reinforced progressives' 
b e l i e f s r a ther than formed them (S e l l e c k , 1972, p.107). Moreover, 
knowledge of i t was i n most cases s u p e r f i c i a l . S u p e r f i c i a l knowledge 
can of course be extremely important. Such i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s as 
Oscar Wilde's summary of Freud ("Never r e s i s t temptation"^^^^) may 
have outraged more knowledgeable Freudians l i k e Ernest Jones, but 
that does not reduce t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n c e , New__Era, the journal of 
the New Education Fellowship^ could declare i n 1921 that "Suppression 
of any kind i s dangerous." (Se l l e e k , 1972, P9IO8). Psychoanalysis 
provided " s c i e n t i f i c " support f o r i n t u i t e d l i b e r t a r i a n i s m , and was 
important f o r t h i s reason, Nunn's declared objective i n Education; 
jlg-.-^'^g-- ffl^ •^ ^^ ^^ '^  P r i n c i p l e s was to seek what s c i e n t i f i c support 
there was f o r h i s f a i t h i n i n d i v i d u a l i t y as the aim of education. 
He drew heavily on the evidence of psychoanalysis (1920/45, p,55 f f ) , 
" I t i s , i n f a c t , unquestionable that the records of 
psychoanalysis g r e a t l y strengthen the argument for making 
the autonomous development of the i n d i v i d u a l the c e n t r a l 
aim of education. They reveal i n what depths the foundations 
of i n d i v i d u a l i t y are l a i d , how endlessly varied are i t s 
n a t u r a l forms, and how disastrous i t may sometimes be to 
force upon the growing character a form discordant with i t s 
p r i n c i p l e of u n i t y . " Nunn (1920/45) p.65. 
What was good enough f o r Nunn must c e r t a i n l y have been good enough 
f o r many who had dug l e s s deeply into Freud's work. 
Psychoanalysis was c l e a r j y important to these e a r l y progressives, 
HsrTOy's assooiationism underlay th© learning theory of th® 19th 
century Radicals, Small's r e c a p i t u l a t i o n theory, Herbert's 
a e a s u r a b i l i t y of psychological phenomena and Thomdike's animal 
psychology underlay that of th© American Progressives, A s i m i l a r 
rol© was played by Freud's psychoanalysis i n B r i t i s h educational 
progressivism between th© wars, 'Even today, the emphasis placed 
upon horn® background and "deprivation" in infancy derive p a r t l y from 
s i m i l a r o r i g i n s . As w© s h a l l see, however, t h i s i s today combined 
rat h e r u n e a s i l y with a more e x p l i c i t r e l i a n c e on Piaget's develop-
mental psychology. T h i s dual tr8,dition •» of Freudian psychoanalysis 
and Piagetian psychology •» i s perhaps responsible f o r serious 
ambiguities i n the matter of teachers' "expertise". 
Meanwhile, an admiration f o r the findings of science, and of 
psychology i n p a r t i c u l a r , was as c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the E n g l i s h 
progressives as i t was of t h e i r American counterparts, Nunn's en t i r e 
book i s saapl© demonstration of t h i s , Persy sums i t up when he says, 
of both B r i t a i n and the U,?*, that 
" I t was widely f e l t at th© time these reformers f i r s t were 
a c t i v e that the only redemption from ignorance, s u p e r s t i t i o n 
or a mere eonmonsense l e v e l of action was systematic s c i e n t i f i c 
r©search| and to show that something was s c i e n t i f i c a l l y a r r i v e d 
at was equivalent to showing that i t was reputable." 
Perry (1967) P o 2 0 « 
Even R u s s e l l , whose support f o r psychoanalytic theories was somewhat 
luk©"Warm, declared that, 
' ' S c i e n t i f i c psychology shows tliat flbgging on week-days and 
sermons on Sundays do not constitute th© i d e a l technique f o r 
th© production of virtu©." 
R u s s s l l ( 1 9 2 6 / 6 0 ) p , 2 5 < . 
However, the function of such s c i e n t i f i c revelations was to reinforce, 
E-ather than to produce, b e l i e f s already held about the "nature of 
the c h i l d " and about what was ©ducatidnally worthwhile. This i s 
s t i l l the case today, 
A word should be s a i d about psychometrics. The t e s t i n g of 
mental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s played a major part i n American Progreasivism, 
and i t i s c l e a r that the search f o r s c i e n t i f i c "data and p r i n c i p l e s " 
a l l i e d many of the e a r l y B r i t i s h progressives with t h i s "movement". 
Nuan went to some lengths to summarise s t a t i s t i c a l techniques and 
(25) 
psychometric findings, Burt play®d a prominent r o l e i n many 
N.E.F, conferences and most of the major educational reports between 
the wars were influenced by l i i s view of i n t e l l i g e n c e . In h i s 
e a r l y days, as the f i r s t educational psychologist employed by the 
London County Council, Burt was r a t h e r tentative about h i s work. 
The Educational O f f i c e r of the L.CC, ( B l a i r ) acknowledged t h i s i n 
h i s introduction to Burt (1917)« S i g n i f i c a n t l y , however, B l a i r 
i n s i s t e d on r@~int@rpreting Burt's tentativeness f o r more popular 
consumptions 
"Several times Mr.Burt has i n s i s t e d that h i s suggestions and 
conclusions ai?e t e n t a t i v e and p r o v i s i o n a l . Even so, many of 
them are of immediate p r a c t i c a l value for those engaged i n 
educational administration and p a r t i c u l a r l y for the teachers 
i n the schools, f o r example, i n testing the value of t h e i r 
own c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . A f t e r much he s i t a t i o n I have endeavoured 
to r e ~ s t a t e some of h i s conclusions i n a d i f f e r e n t order, I 
am f u l l y conscious that i n removing such conclusions from t h e i r 
context I have i n e v i t a b l y given them much baldness; and that 
i n using as f a r as possible the l e s s t e c h n i c a l language to be 
fou^d frequently i n the body of the memoranda, I have l o s t much 
of the p r e c i s i o n , I hope, however, that i n gathering the main 
conclusions together from the body of the text I have done 
something to a s s i s t those who w i l l be unable to f i n d time f o r 
an exhaustive study of memoranda trtiich occasionally demand 
severe e f f o r t s on the part of t h e i r readers," 
B l a i r (1917/73) p.197. 
B l a i r then proceeded to susmaris© Burt's "findi n g s " on educational 
a b i l i t i e s and on normlj, backward and mentally defici©nt children. 
I n tisH©, Burt himself became f a r I s s a tentative, about th© r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
(26) 
between s o c i a l ©lass and "innate" i n t e l l i g e n c e , f o r instance, ' 
Those who s^ought substantiv® "findings" to j u s t i f y a t r i p a r t i t e 
reorganisation of secondary education found i n Burt an abundant 
(27) 
A tendency to think i n terms of innate a b i l i t y , or at l e a s t 
f i x e d p o t e n t i a l , p e r s i s t s todays Blackie (1967/71) - unlike th© 
Plowden Report «» even employ© Burt's d e f i n i t i o n of i n t e l l i g e n c e , 
(28) 
though he i s somewhat apologetic about i t , ^ On the whole, however, 
the contemporary Child-centred "movement" has been opposed to 
i n t e l l i g e n c e t e s t i n g , A common p m c t i e a l feature has be©n opposition 
to the "11 plus^'' exam. Emphasis i s made on the ir r e l e v a n c e of 
chronological age and th© importano© of i n d i v i d u a l l y diff©rent courses 
of development, Plowden reports that 
"the notion of th® constancy of the I«Q, i s b i o l o g i c a l l y 
e0lf™®xploding as w e l l as ©ducationslly ©xplosiv®,,. Th© 
nearer th© approach to th© i d e a l state i n which each person's 
©nvironment became perfect f o r him throughout h i s whole 
growthg the nearer^ i t i s true, would be th© approach to 
constancy. But, even then, the long term gains and l o s s s s 
du© to the d i f f e r e n t r a t e s of i n t e l l e c t u a l development 
would remain^,,. 
There ar® a l s o short term v a r i a t i o n s i n I.Q, t©st r e s u l t s 
attribatabl© to t r a n s i e n t a f f e c t s i n ©nvironment,«," 
Plowden Report (1967) I 60,61, 
Plowden ©ven comes down on th© sid@ of unstreaming, at l e a s t i n 
primary schools, 
"W® welcom® unstreaming i n th© infant or f i r s t school and hope 
that i t w i l l continue to spread through the age groups of the 
j u n i o r or rolddl© s c h o o l s a , I t i s e s s e n t i a l to ensure that the 
s t a f f r e a l i s e that any c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s bound to be f a u l t y , 
that there e s r t a i n l y w i l l b© big differences between i n d i v i d u a l s 
i n each c l a s s and that those differences can be expected to 
increase as c h i l d r s n grow older,,,," 
Plowden Report (1967)^ 8199P2!lo 
The l a s t passage a l s o demonstrates an esaphasis on i n d i v i d u a l 
d i f f e r e n c e s , B l a c k i e i l l u s t r a t e s the same points 
seen that i n d i v i d u a l children grow at d i f f e r e n t speeds, 
thats, though the stages of growth are the same f o r a l l , the age 
at which they are reached v a r i e s widely, and that the 
d i f f e r e n c e s between them are the product of a very complex 
i n t e r a c t i o n , which begins at conception, between heredity and 
environments I t follows from t h i s that we need the most 
f l e r i b l e ©duoational system that we can manage. A l l neat and 
t i d y c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s are wrong, Ag© of entry, ag© of t r a n s f e r , 
age of leaving, a l l expectations based on chronological age, 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n by I,Q, or by examination, basic c u r r i c u l a , 
agreed s y l l a b u s e s and a l l the r e s t ar© uneducational because 
they are based on an e n t i r e l y obsolete view of growth,,." 
Blackie (1967/71) pp»23-4. 
Th i s emphasis on the i n d i v i d u a l c h i l d , on i n d i v i d u a l differences and 
uniquenessg has obvious l i n k s with th© d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n associated 
w:Lth psyehometry. But there i s a deliberate attempt not to c l a s s i f y 
c h i l d r e n , i n the ©xglicit theoxy of Child-centredness. Whilst the 
American Progressive t r a d i t i o n tended to emphasise differences as a 
b a s i s f o r o r g a n i s a t i o n a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , and whilst the psychometric 
wing of progressive educational thinking i n t h i s country was 
s i m i l a r l y preoccupied with a meritocratic j u s t i f i c a t i o n of c l a s s 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s , contemporary Ghild-centredness s t r e s s e s i n d i v i d u a l 
uniqueness f o r i t s own sake. Overtly, i t i s a l l that matters. 
This emphasis on the "nature of th© c h i l d " and i n d i v i d u a l 
uniqueness i s not new, Nunn declared that 
education that aims at f o s t e r i n g i n d i v i d u a l i t y i s the only 
education 'according to nature'," Nunn (1920/45) p,26. 
The (Hadow) Consultative Conmittee Report on the Primary School 
f e l t that 
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"The primary school should not be regarded merely as a 
preparatory department f o r the subsequent stage, and the 
courses should be planned and conditioned, not mainly by the 
supposed requirements of the secondary stage, nor by the 
oxlgencies of an ©xaminatioa at the age of eleven, but by the 
needs of th© c h i l d at that p a r t i c u l a r phase i n h i s p h y s i c a l 
and mental development," Hadow Report (1931) i 59, 
The 1937 e d i t i o n of the Board of Education's Handbook of Suggestions 
s a i d that 
''Th© c h i l d ' s ©njoyment i s i n i t s e l f worthwhile, f o r childhood -
a stage i n i t s e l f - i s more than a preparation f o r matu3rf.ty, 
and there i s no doubt that children l©am a great deal n a t u r a l l y 
through spontaneous and undirected play." 
Education, Board of, (1937)^ quoted by Education, Ministry of, 
(1959) p,53<» 
Thes© e a r l i e r pronounc©m©nt8 s i t ra-ther uncomfortably beside 
a s s e r t i o n s about the dangers of l i c e n c e and the needs of the 
community - j u s t as i n American Progressivism, However, i n more 
rae©nt years the tendency has b©©n to play down siny s p e c i f i c 
r s f s r e n c a to such "Power" factorsa Not that that dimension i s now 
l e s s important. On the contrary, i t remains fundamentals But 
ref e r s n c a to i t i s f a r l e s s e x p l i c i t . I t ssems, almost, a source 
of embarrassments In contemporary Child-centred orthodoxy, the 
c h i l d / l e a r a e r i s at the centre of educational theory, as t h i s i s 
e x p l i c i t l y elaborated. 
The e x p l i c i t b a s i s of contemporaxy Child-centredness i s no 
longer Fr©udianism, Though t h i s psychoanalytic basis s t i l l has 
considerable importance i n f a c t , i t i s developmental psychology, i n 
p a r t i c u l a r that of Piaget, which now reigns, 
"According to Piaget, a l l learning c a l l s f o r organisation of 
ma t e r i a l or of behaviour on the part of the learner, and th© 
l e a r n e r has to adapt himself and i s alt©red i n th® process, 
Loaming takes plac® through a continuous process of i n t e r a c t i o n 
between the l e a r n e r and h i s ©nvironment, which r e s u l t s i n th© 
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building up of consistent and stable patterns of behaviour, 
p h y s i c a l sjjd mmtal^ Each a©w ©xperienoe r©orgajiis©s9 however 
s l i g h t l y , the s t r u c t u r e of the mind and contributes to the 
c h i l d ' s world p i c t u r ® o 
Piaget's thought5which influenced the 193'' Report and our own, 
i s not easy to understands«» Piagot's explanations appear to 
most e d u c a t i o n a l i s t s i n tM.s countiy to f i t the observed f a c t s 
of children«s l e a r n i n g more s a t i s f a c t o r i l y than any other* I t 
i s i a accord with previous research by genetic psychologists and 
\fith ?/hat i s generally regarded as the most e f f e c t i v e primary 
school p r a c t i c e ^ as i t has been wrked out e m p i r i c a l l y , " 
PlovYden Report ( 1 9 6 7 ) § 5 2 1 , 5 2 2 . 
Central to Piaget^s t h e o r i e s i s a notion of maturation» Plowden 
embraces i t wholeheartedly, 
''fher® i s plenty of ©vid®ne® that, up to two years of age, brain 
functions appear when p a r t i c u l a r structures mature and not before. 
We know p r a c t i c a l l y nothing, however, about the development of 
the brain beyond that age, but there i s no p a r t i c u l a r reason to 
suppose that t h i s g e n e r a l i s a t i o n suddenly ceases to b® true at 
2 or 3 or 139 On the contrarys i t i s more probable that the 
higher i n t e l l e c t u a l a b i l i t i e s also appear only as maturation of 
c e r t a i n s t r u c t u r e s oceursee. Piaget and Inhelder have described 
the ©m©rgenc® of mental structures i n a majaner strongly 
reminiscent of developing brain or body st r u c t u r e s ; the mental 
stages follow i n sequence, f o r example, which may be advanced or 
delayed, but not a l t e r e d , There seems good reason to suppose 
that Piaget«s successive stages depend on progressive maturation 
OX' at l e a s t progressive organisation of the cerebral cortex." 
Plowden Report ( 1 9 6 ? ) i 2 3 . 
T h i s v e r s i o n of "d®V9lopm©nt'» - i n the Report's f i r s t nain chapter, 
e n t i t l e d "The Children? T h e i r Growth and Development" •» l a r g e l y 
supersedes the ©volutionaa:^ notions that i n s p i r e d pre~war progressives. 
Small's r e c a p i t u l a t i o n theory, so i n f l u e n t i a l i n Progressivism proper -
i n the United States^ - was s t i l l drawi on by Nunn ( 1 9 2 0 / 4 5 , p p o 8 0 - » 2 , 
4 6 - 7 ) 6 But i t has now l a r g e l y given way to the emphasis on 
"readiness". Sharp and Green ( 1 9 7 6 ) r i g h t l y pounce upon t h i s notion. 
I return to i t b©low„ Meanwhile, i t w i l l s u f f i c e to agree with H i r s t 
and Peters when they say that 
teacher of progressive persuasion „ o» who demands that the 
content and manner of teaching must he c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to f a c t s 
of huma development oaBKot proceed purely on the b a s i s of 
empirical factso For h i s s e l e c t i o n can only bis made i n the 
l i g h t of some e t h i c a l view about what q u a l i t i e s of mind are 
constitutiT® of hunsan development,, His b i o l o g i c a l approach to 
h i s tasks therefore 5 only provides stimulating analogies. In 
the ©nd hSj l i k e any other teacher, has to make up h i s mind 
about v a l u a t i v e i s s u e s ^ " H i r s t and Peters (1970) p o 5 8 o 
As Peters puts i t 9 i n d i s c u s s i n g Plowden's "recognisable educational 
philosophy'% the Report assumes 
"'that the c h i l d has a "nature* which w i l l 'develop' i f the 
appi^opriatg ©Hvironment i s providedo ZBut7 what w i l l fee develop 
into? Presumably a 'mature adult' a o . 
The notions of 'growth" and 'development' immediately begin 
to c o l l e c t v a l u a t i v e overtones when we pass out of the realm 
of the purely physicals For i s there not lurking even in the 
f a i r l y c o l o u r l e s s notion of 'mental development' some concept 
of what a man ought to be? <.oo" Peters (1969) ppo3-5<> 
"Play" i s another important notion i n ehild-centredness. I t s 
appeal i s again i n i t s "naturalness"., Caldwell Cook, i n h i s 
i n f l u e n t i a l book, The, Play Way, argued^ 
"What could be more serious than c h i l d ' s play? I know of 
nothing so wholeheartedj, so thorough^ so n a t u r a l , so free from 
s t a i n , so earnest, as the spontaxieous playing of a c h i l d . . . 
A c h i l d following h i s n a t u r a l bent w i l l play. His whole power 
i s i n playo Beware of t r y i n g to make r i v e r s run up h i l l s 
instead of flowing round them^" 
Caldwell Cook (1917), extract i n Van der Eyken (1973,©d.) p.173. 
Plowden a l s o emphasises the importance of play (Plowden Report,1967, 
i 523"8) without even such q u a l i f i c a t i o n s as Nunn f e l t obliged to 
make, about "play" not meaning lic®nc©o^-^^^ The absence of any such 
e x p l i c i t q u a l i f i c a t i o n does not, or course, mean that none i s assumed. 
But again the "Power" dimension receives l e s s overt iattention. 
F i n a l l y , i n t h i s b r i e f consideration of the "spontaneous" nature 
of " n a t u r a l " learning, i t i s worth observing that recourse i s 
frequently m d © to the ©X8,mpl© of pre-school learning and to the 
l e a r n i n g of supposedly non-°intell®ctual c a p a c i t i e s . The Minist3:y of 
Education's "'iriandbook" i n 1 9 5 9 makes several such a l l u s i o n s . I t s t a t e s 
that nursery school c h i l d r e n 
"ar© not strangers to the concepts of sis©, number, money, 
weight 0jad other measures, and they may w e l l have contributed 
t h e i r s c r i b b l e to a family l e t t e r . This they have l e a r n t mainly 
through play and i n c i d e n t a l experience, without much deliberate 
teaching, though often with parental encouragements" 
Education, Ministry of, ( 1 9 5 9 ) p » 3 7 (my emphasis). 
And 
"Most eblld3?©a from th3?®e or four onwards provoke the teaching 
they ne©d« demanding r e p e t i t i o n of words, of rhymes, or s t o r i e s . . . 
They can be heard p r a c t i s i n g - speaking, singing, repeating words, 
rhymes and rhythms, finding pleasure i n the making of noises and 
i n c r e a s i n g s a t i s f a c t i o n i n what the growing powers of speech 
can coaanajido»e" i b i d , p o 1 9 (my emphasis)* 
The e f f e c t of s t r e s s i n g t h i s " n a t u r a l " learning at the pre-school 
age i s to r e i n f o r c e a f a i t h i n the "naturalness" of s e l f - d i r e c t e d 
l earning when at school. 
" I f a l l t h i s i s true of children before they reach school does 
i t continue to be true afterwards, or does a quit© new phase 
begin? o«. I t i s p e r f e c t l y true that school i s a new phase of 
l i f e and that most children expect to learn new things there,,. 
But e o, the process of learning develops gradually and play 
continues to be of the greatest importance as a means of 
understanding and l e a r n i n g s " Blackie ( 1 9 6 7 / 7 1 ) p » 3 3 » 
Amongst Child-centred teachers, such assertions about what i s " n a t u r a l " 
before school are l i k e l y to r e i n f o r c e assumptions about what i s 
" n a t u r a l " i n school? the reaching of stages of "readiness" i n the 
(31") 
course of "development". A f a i t h in such "naturalness" w i l l 
f u r t h e r imply that one pedagogy i s appropriate f o r a l l children and 
that those who f a i l to "develop" optimally are Nature's f a i l u r e s 
r a t h e r than Society's or the school's. 
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Jx). discussing the "Knowledge" dimension of Child-centred 
aceoante, I have so f a r d©alt predominantly ?/ith matters of 
Subjective 'Knowledge' and the i n d i v i d u a l l e a r n e r . This follows from 
the e x p l i c i t emphases of those accounts. I t i s a major c h a r a c t e i d s t i c 
of Child-eentredness that the l e a r n e r , rather than what i s learned, 
i s pre-eminent - at l e a s t e x p l i c i t l y . Two aspects concerning 
Objeetivated 'EEHOwledge» should, however, be mentioned here, before 
we turn to the more s i g n i f i c a n t "Power" dimension (which of course 
i n c l u d e s 'knowledge' about s o c i e t a l structure and about pedagogical 
r e l a t i o n s ) , 
I have already commented upon the f a i t h i n s c i e n t i f i c 'knowledge'. 
I suggested that b e l i e f s are u n l i k e l y to have been determined by 
s c i e n t i f i c discoveriese The reverse, i s more probably the case. The 
role of p a r t i c u l a r s c i e n t i f i c theories and "findings" seems to have 
been to r e i n f o r c e b e l i e f s , and perhaps r a t i o n a l i s e p r a c t i c e , rather 
than to promote them. I t i s l i k e l y that b e l i e f s about education 
have l e d to s e l e c t i v e consideration of theories a v a i l a b l e , or at 
l e a s t s e l e c t i v e adherence to them. Nonetheless, to say that "science" 
i s a r a t i o n a l i s e r i s not to dismiss i t as unimportant, A more general 
f a i t h i n the f a c t i c i t y of the world-out-there and i t s discoverable 
order c l e a r l y precedes adherence to p a r t i c u l a r aspects of s c i e n t i f i c 
theory. I n t h i s respect, the naturalism of both the Radical and the 
Progressive "movements" i s to be found again i n contemporary C h i l d -
centredness. In p a r t i c u l a r , psychoanalysis and developmental 
psychology have played prominent parts. As f o r c u r r i c u l a r subjects, 
the p o s i t i o n i s somewhat more ambiguous, 
Plo?/den pays s u r p r i s i n g l y l i t t l e attention to the "integration" 
of curricula» Nonethelfsss, a r e j e c t i o n of conventional subject 
•45^ 
bomidaries seems to be an inherent part of Child-centredness. 
Impor-tantly, i t i s j u s t i f i e d i n terns of the c h i l d ' s own nature, 
r a t h e r than on grounds of r e l a t i v i s m or ©pistemological uncertainty. 
As Blackie puts i t , the subdivision of c u r r i c u l a into subjects may • 
be convenient f o r the adult mind, but 
"Young children simply do not think i n t h i s way and only begin 
to us© c l a s s i f i c a t i o n towards the end of the j u n i o r school. 
A r i g i d l y c l a s s i f i e d timetable .., may be harmful to learning 
and may disguise the nature of knowledge," 
Bla c k i e (1967/71) pp» 51-2, 
C l e a r l y the 'knowledge' to which Blackie i s r e f e r r i n g i n t h i s 
passage i s s u b j e c t i v e , not objectivated. I n d i v i d u a l understanding 
r a t h e r than epistemological " t r u t h " i s endejagered. On the whole, 
es t a b l i s h e d 'knowledge' boiondaries are taken as given. Children, 
i f unhampered by the imposition of such boundaries at too e a r l y a 
stage, w i l l no doubt "discover" them, of t h e i r own accord. Indeed, 
continued adherence to c e r t a i n standards •- of what i s "usual*^ or 
"normal"^^^^ and, indeed, " d e s i r a b l e " " i n d i c a t e s that no epistemo-
l o g i e a l revolution i s envisaged,^•^'^^ Meanwhile,what i s s o c i o l o g i c a l l y 
most imporfcant i s 'knowledge' about s o c i a l and s o c i e t a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
I t i s to the "Power" dimension that we now turn. 
Thg^J^Power^Mmension 
I f Robert Morant's 1904 Elementary Code set the scene, as 
?an der Eyken suggests, f o r a new concept of primary education, i t 
was i n i t s references to "development" and ^ i n d i v i d u a l c h i l d r e n ' s " 
c a p a c i t i e s and needs. I t r e f e r r e d also, however, to children 
" f i t / ' t i n g j themselves, p r a c t i c a l l y as well as i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , f o r 
the work of l i f e " * I t talked of a "sense of d i s c i p l i n e " , of 
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"habits of industry, s e l f - c o n t r o l and courageous perseverance i n the 
face of d i f f i c u l t i e s " , and of "upright and useful members of the 
oommuaity".^-^'^'' The s p i r i t of t h i s lajtiguage was by no means new. 
I t was only gradually that orthodox educational theory contained fewer 
e x p l i c i t references of t h i s kind. Holmes, Morant's Chief Inspector, 
condemned the Western notion of s i n axid th© e x t e r n a l i t y of reward and 
punishmento Yet even he fulminated against anarchy. 
(35) 
"What X c a l l the Utopian^ •' scheme of education, f a r from 
making f o r antinomianism and anarchy, i s the sworn enemy of 
in d i v i d u a l i s m and therefore, a f o r t i o r i , of everything that 
savours of l i c e n c e * . , " Holmes (1911) p.206, 
He declared that 
"Th© c h i l d r e n of the 'upper c l a s s e s ' have such an advantage 
over th© ch i l d r e n of Utopia i n the matter of environment, -
to say nothing of i n h e r i t e d capacity - that one would expect the 
path to do much more f o r t h e i r mental development than i t has 
done f o r the mental development of the Utopians, e s p e c i a l l y as 
they could afford to remain much longer i n the f i r s t and most 
important of i t s stages, the stage of self-education,.. The 
gain to the whole nation i f th© mental development of the highest 
s o c i a l stratwun could be r a i s e d as much above i t s normal l e v e l as 
th© mental development of youthful Utopia has been r a i s e d above 
the normal l e v e l of an E n g l i s h r u r a l v i l l a g e , would be i n c a l c u l a b l y 
greater," Holmes (1911) ppe271-2, 
I n short, the precursors of Child-centredness e x p l i c i t l y held on to 
strong "Power" c l o s u r e s . They advocated not l i b e r t a r i a j i individualism 
but a morality i n which s o c i e t a l r o l e s were not p a r t i c u l a r l y open to 
question. 
Some of the post-World War I "missionaries" did indeed adopt 
pos i t i o n s more i n l i n e with the a n a r c h i s t i c t m d i t i o n - notably A,S. 
N e i l l . But more common throughout has been an adherence to "values" 
whose ; j u s t i f i c a t i o n was taken to be self-evident. For instances 
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"Duty w i l l f o r ever be duty To love one's neighbour as 
oneself w i l l f o r ever be the highest s o c i a l imperative These 
ar-e among the f i i i i t s of i n s i g h t and wisdom whose permanent 
v a l i d i t y and supreme worth can hardly be doubted." 
Wunn (1920/45) p.196, 
" I t i s , 0 , during h i s e a r l y l i f e at home that the roots of the 
most fundamental moral p r i n c i p l e s are established i n a c h i l d , . i 
By three years of age, many children have some idea of 'mine' and 
'thine' and i n some degree control the actions to which 
unrestrained c u r i o s i t y or greed would lead them...," 
Education, Ministry of, ( 1 9 5 9 ) P s Q O . 
"The older vi i ^ j u e s , as they are usually c a l l e d , of neatness, 
accuracy, care and perseverance, ... are genuine v i r t u e s and an 
education which does not f o s t e r them i s f a u l t y , " 
Plowden Report ( 1 9 6 7 ) i 5 0 6 . 
As Peters i s at pains to point out, "education" n e c e s s a r i l y 
i m p l i e s "valuation".^ Moreover, the pr a c t i c e of education must 
e n t a i l o b j e c t i v e s . Such p r a c t i c e i s inev i t a b l y consequential and 
b e l i e f s must e x i s t about at l e a s t some actual or hypothetical 
consequences. Those b e l i e f s must always be evaluative. Even the 
somewhat sparse and ambiguous treatment that Plowden gives to "The 
Aims of Primary Education" (Chapter 15) e x p l i c i t l y or i m p l i c i t l y 
i n d i c a t e s a morality - an evaluative view of what s o c i a l and s o c i e t a l 
jfelations are or should be. I t could not be otherwise. 
Objectives and morality concern the relationship between S o c i ( e t ) a l 
R e a l i t y and Objectivated 'Knowledge'. They concern accepted or 
prescribed views of what the s o c i a l world should be l i k e . Leadership 
and professionalism are a f u r t h e r aspect of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p . But 
t h i s w i l l most e a s i l y be discussed a f t e r looking at the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between S o c i ( e t ) a l R e a l i t y and Subjective 'Knowledge' i n Child-centred 
ideology. Here we f i n d b e l i e f s about d i f f e r e n t i a l learning p o t e n t i a l 
and need. 
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The Ministry of Education (1959) distinguished between the 
"handicapped" c h i l d - including those handicapped by absence from 
school through i l l n e s s , by p h y s i c a l handicap, by a narrow environment 
or 8X\ adverse influence, and "(an unfortunately large group) those 
with l i t t l e capacity" (ppo70-1) - and, "at the other end of the 
s c a l e " (p,73)6 those with exceptional a b i l i t y . Quite apart from the 
extraordinary comprehensiveness of the r e s i d u a l category, "handicapped 
c h i l d r e n " , t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n unquestioningly r e i f i e s the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n 
described. The same passage r e f e r s to the d i f f e r e n t needs of the 
" d u l l " and the "bright", B l a c k i e (1967/71) makes the same broad 
d i s t i n c t i o n (pp. 144-5). Th© Plowden Report i t s e l f r e f e r s to the 
reseai'ch of Terman ©t a l . - the sole reference given on t h i s matter -
(37) 
to substantiate i t s comments on "The Education of Gifted Children", ^  
The Report suggests that " d i s l i k e of p r i v i l e g e , doubts about 
i n t e l l i g e n c e t e s t s 8ind defensiveness about comprehensive schools" i s 
"an i r r a t i o n a l obstacle" encountered by "giftedness" ( i 862). Although, 
i t agrees, mental t e s t s are un r e l i a b l e , i t i s quite c e r t a i n that 
"giftedness" e x i s t s , and has d i s t i n c t needs. Plowden i s non-committal 
on how best to f u l f i l these needso^^®^ 
B e l i e f s i n i n t e l l e c t u a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n n a t u r a l l y "motivate" 
p o l i c i e s which concern organisational d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . Secondary 
s e l e c t i o n hs-s been a major i s s u e throughout t h i s century. Nunn 
(39) 
( 1 9 2 0 / 4 5 ) , who made s e v e r a l references to mental t e s t i n g ^ ' and 
accepted Burt's "findings" concerning the r e l a t i o n s h i p between s o c i a l 
c l a s s and i n t e l l i g e n c e (p.134), was strongly opposed to comprehensive 
schooling (pp. 3 5 7 - 8 , 2 7 4 - 5 ) , He had no doubts about the need to 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e between the " g i f t e d " and the " d u l l " i n schools, and i n 
so c i e t y at large. He stated p l a i n l y that 
458^^ 
" I n the general i n t e r e s t a community must seek out high 
i n t e l l i g e n c e wherever i t can be found and see that i t i s 
provided l i b e r a l l y with a l l i t needs f o r f u l l development| 
but, i f i t i s wise, i t w i l l a l s o see that the a b i l i t i e s of 
the l e s s i n t e l l i g e n t are fostered with equal care, - i f only 
because 'without these cannot a c i t y be inhabited' and i t i s 
they who ' w i l l maintata the s t a t e of the world'. Here, then, 
as always, the claims of i n d i v i d u a l i t y and of s o c i a l need are 
found to be convergent i f not i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . " 
Nunn (1920/45) p.127, 
I n other words, s o c i e t y needs i t hewers of wood and drawers of water, 
and adequate (or appropriate) educational provision should a l s o be 
made f o r them, i f s o c i e t y i s to "survive", Blackie (1967/71) escapes 
the reluctance of the Child-centred "movement" to speak out on 
s o c i e t a l ( o r "Bower") functions of education. He condemns as 
"muddle-heads" those who cannot see the "obvious" need to d i f f e r e n t i a t e 
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l l y between the " g i f t e d " and the " d u l l " . The needs of the 
g i f t e d 
"seem to include contact with others, adults, and children, 
who have the same kind of i n t e l l i g e n c e as t h e i r own eind there 
ai'e schools i n which t h i s would not happen. Only 59^  of the 
t o t a l population have IQs of 125 or over and 0,5 of 140 or over. 
There are schools and whole areas i n which the g i f t e d c h i l d might 
never meet another l i k e him of his own age. Besides, there are 
some teachers who not only cannot provide the g i f t e d with what 
they need but think i t wrong to do so. They t a l k about 'equal 
treatment f o r a l l ' and confuse i t with ' f a i r treatment f o r a l l ' . 
The two would only be the same i f we were a l l identical,and since 
we are a l l d i f f e r e n t ' f a i r treatment' would i d e a l l y mean 
'dif f e r e n t tz'eatment f o r a l l ' . The modern primary school does 
t r ^ to give that, to meet, as f a r as i t can, the needs of every 
i n d i v i d u a l c h i l d ajad i t would be a tragedy i f t h i s were ever 
i n t e r f e r e d with by muddle-headed e g a l i t a r i a n s , " 
Blacki® (1967/71) PPe 144-5» 
(The Plowden Report noted cautiously that i t had become the 
government's p o l i c y to promote comprehensive secondary schooling, and 
confined i t s comments on secondary s e l e c t i o n to the e f f e c t s of 
s e l e c t i o n procedures on the primary school i t s e l f (Chapter 11),) 
'459" 
There i s an i m p l i c i t {and i n some cases e x p l i c i t ) assumption that 
"giftedness" and "d u l l n e s s " a.re determined and consistent i n d i v i d u a l 
q u a l i t i e s , and that they are furthermore a t t r i b u t a b l e l a r g e l y to 
innate f a c t o r s . Yet there i s a l s o a strong emphasis on environment, 
e s p e c i a l l y i n contemporary Child-centredness, B e l i e f s about innately 
detei*m3.ned maturational development s i t uneasily beside s o c i a l 
p a t h o l o g i c a l explanations of i n t e l l e c t u a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . Yet the 
combination i s common.^^^^ B l a c k i e , f o r instejjce, returns time and 
again to the importance of the home as determinant of children's 
educational performance. For instance: 
"The s i n g l e most important f a c t o r i n success at school i s 
pare n t a l i n t e r e s t . " B l ackie (1967/71) p . 1 1 . 
" I t i s time to think a l i t t l e about 'good' homes and 'bad' 
homes, and what home can do to help children to grow f u l l y or 
to hinder them from doing so... The home i s the place where 
development begins and at a l l stages of education i t remains 
the most importaint influence i n a c h i l d ' s l i f e . , . " i b i d , p,22, 
"The foundation i s l a i d by the parents whether they do i t well 
or badly and by the time th© c h i l d gets to school the good or 
the damage i s done, Th© school can build on the good, but i t 
cannot r e p a i r the damage, or only to a li m i t e d extent. The 
e s s e n t i a l job i s the parent's and not the teacher's." 
i b i d , p.94, 
I r s t u r a to t h i s l i n e of argument below, i n considering assumptions 
about teachers' p r o f e s s i o n a l expertise. Meanwhile, i t may be noted 
that the Plowden Committee paid considerable attention to th© survey 
cofflmissioned from Wiseman.^^^^ I t praised the survey f o r taking 
i n t o accouiit " a l l " the environmental influences involved i n a c h i l d ' s 
development ( § 9 0 ) . I t accepted the argument that parental a t t i t u d e s 
are a more s i g n i f i c a n t cause ( s i c ) of educational performance than 
any other f a c t o r . A,s Bernstein and Davies ( 1 9 6 9 , p . 6 3 ) have pointed 
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out J the Report s y s t e m a t i c a l l y plays down the importance of s o c i a l 
elas8« lonetheleas, much p u b l i c i s e d recommendations were mad© 
cojaeeming p o s i t i v e discrimination i n favour of "educational p r i o r i t y 
a reas". These xmre not, i n f a c t , defined i n terms of parental 
a t t i t u d e s . "^^ ^^  
I have picked out three aspects of b e l i e f about the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between S o c i e t a l Relations and Subjective 'Knowledge's i n t e l l e c t u a l 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , secondary s e l e c t i o n and s o c i a l pathology. These 
are not d i s c r e t e b e l i e f s . They are sub-dimensions, as i t were, on 
which b e l i e f s are held. More important, b e l i e f s held on these sub-
dimensions are contained within broader b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s . Not only 
do b e l i e f s not e x i s t i n d i s c r e t e i s o l a t i o n , but t h e i r "value" element 
i t s e l f ~ i.©« th© extent to which they are r e a l l y ( o r strongly) 
believed, rather than merely entertained as understandings or fancies -
depends upon t h e i r i n c l u s i o n within broader s t r u c t u r e s . These i n turn 
a r i s e from, and r e f e r to, structured experience. 
B e l i e f s about th© S o c i a l Relations-Subjective 'Knowledge' 
r e l a t i o n s h i p must be seen i n the context of b e l i e f s about s o c i e t a l 
r e l a t i o n s themselves. Th© lack of e x p l i c i t reference to such matters 
by th© Child-centred "movement" makes i t d i f f i c u l t to decypher these. 
We cannot r e l y merely on e x p l i c i t statements. After looking b r i e f l y 
at three more clues to the s o c i e t a l perspective i n contemporary 
Child-centredness, I s h a l l therefor© look at an example of C h i l d -
centredness i n p r a c t i c e . This v / i l l o f f e r f u r t h e r i n s i g h t s i n t o 
p r a c t i t i o n e r s ' b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s on the "Power" dimension. 
There i s an a n a r c h i s t i c t r a d i t i o n i n B r i t i s h education^^^\ which 
has had i t s place i n the Child-centred "movement". A study of N e i l l ' s 
w r i t i n g s reveals c e r t a i n closures that his often i n t u i t i v e approach 
overlooks® Yet h i s h o s t i l i t y to d i r e c t i o n and control i s c l e a r l y 
of t h i s t r a d i t i o n . Consider, f o r example, h i s comments on moral 
education, and i n p a r t i c u l a r h i s h o s t i l i t y to Montessorian pedagogy; 
"There i s no case whatever f o r the moral i n s t r u c t i o n of 
c h i l d m i o o o " K e i l l ( 1 9 2 6 ) P0I85 extract i n Perry ( 1 9 6 7 ed.) p . 5 8 . 
"Another reason why I am not wholly on the side of Montessori i s , 
I fancy, that her r e l i g i o u s attitude repels me. She i s a church 
woman? she has a d e f i n i t e idea pf right and wrong. Thus, 
although she allows children freedom to choose t h e i r own 
occupations, she allows them no freedom to challenge adult 
morality. But f o r a c h i l d to accept a ready-made code of 
morals i s dangerous? education i n morality i s a thousand 
times more important than i n t e l l e c t u a l education with a 
d i d a c t i c apparatus." 
N e i l l ( 1 9 2 0 ) pe1485 extract i n Perry (ed.) p o 4 6 . 
S e i l l was not alone i n t h i s suspicion of Montessori, Susan Isaacs 
found her experimental r o l e at the Malting House School compromised 
(44) 
by the need to act as guardian and leader, i n some cases. ^  ' She 
c l e a r l y regretted t h i s - and not s o l e l y on the grounds of experimental 
o b j e c t i v i t y . Many years l a t e r , her husband wrote a disparaging 
review of Montessori's w r i t i n g s , 
"The outstanding f a c t i s the f l a t i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y of 
^ o n t e s s o r i ' s j proclaimed gospel of freedom and spontsuaeity 
with her i n t e n s e l y d i r e c t i v e doctrine of actual t r a i n i n g , " 
I s a a c s ( 1 9 6 6 / 7 3 ) P o 3 0 1 , 
I t i s worth quoting from t h i s review at some length, because i t 
c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s the opposition of l i b e r t a r i a n s t r a i n s i n B r i t i s h 
progressivism to Montessorianism. 
"Montessori's books show that she ... sta r t e d from a number 
of ... firm b e l i e f s which c a r r i e d her i n a t o t a l l y d ifferent 
d i r e c t i o n from that of most English progressive educationists, 
and indeed, as i t seems to us, a long way back towards the very 
yokes from v/hich we have been so anxious to free children ... 
Tfeus fflontessori aridved at the conviction that everything which 
we wanted chi l d r e n to learn ~ reading, writing, arithmetic and 
a l l we noMsally mean by education - could be put into forms which 
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tri?.ly TOsponded to the c h i l d ' s own needs and s t r i v i n g s , and 
wers thus Sjaherently abl® to lead to joyous, yet d i s c i p l i n e d . 
But what must here bs noted i s that however sharply the 
foregois^g; d i f f e r s i n method from conventional education, i t 
f u l l y accepts the l a t t e r ' s assumptions and aims. In f a c t i t 
seeks to apply these from an. even e a r l i e r age. I t s most novel 
contribution l i e s i n the preliminary e a r l y sense-training 
phase I but what i s gained from tbds, as Montessori ©mphasizes 
over and over again, i s not merely senses trained i n a l l the 
above ways^, but a l s o th© invaluable habits of d i s c i p l i n e and 
obedience. These are indeed j u s t what the conventional 
o b j e c t i v e s of ordinary education need and normally r e s t upon. 
But w h i l s t i n the regular course they have to be vigo]X>usly 
_^forc®d, l o n t e s s o x l claims the,t by her method and her early 
s t a r t she tu3::^ 8 them into the n a t u m l patters of the c h i l d ' s 
own l i f e . I t seems indeed as i f these r e s u l t s of her method 
are those f/hich she personal3.y values inost. 
And 30 w© com© to th© c l e a r parting of the wayso A l l the 
above sta^ads i n diametrical contrast to both the aims and 
the methods of most px'ogrsssive ©duoationists i n t h i s country." 
Xsa0X8 (1966/73) pp. 196-7, 
T h i s passage c l e a y l y i n d i c a t e s the h o s t i l i t y that some people (such 
as I s a a c s ) f e l t to Montessor-ian methods. But i t i s not, I think, 
an accur9,te reading of th© bulk of B r i t i s h educational progressivism. 
I t i s c e r t a i n l y not representative of orthodox Ghild-o@ntr@dn®ss today. 
Even Ljine, considered sjn extremist i n h i s attempts to overthrow 
authoritar'ion pedagogic r e l a t i o n s h i p s , believed some expertise i n 
Freudian a n a l y s i s to be an indispensible q u a l i f i c a t i o n f o r teaching. 
At the very l e a s t , he f e l t that 
"no on® should teach who haa not hem himself analysed and 
through the process gained that true psychological i n s i g h t 
which produces th© 'Art of Teaching'." Lane (1918/64) p . 2 6 5 . 
R u s s e l l had c l e a r words of approval for fflontessoris 
"The modera ©ducationist does not simply eschew d i s c i p l i n e ; 
he secures i t by new methods. On t h i s subject, those who have 
not studied th® new methods are apt to have mistaken ideas. 
I had always understood that Madame l o n t e s s o r i dispensed with 
d i s c i p l i n e , and I.had wondered how she managed a roomful of 
c h i l d r e n . On reading her account of her methods, I found that 
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d i s c i p l i n e s t i l l held an important place, and that there was 
no attempt t o dispense with i t . On sending my l i t t l e boy of 
three to spend h i s mornings i n a Montessori school, I found 
that he quickly became a more d i s c i p l i n e d humam being, and that 
he e h e a r f u l l y acquiesced i n the rules of the school. But he had 
no f e e l i n g whatever of external compulsions the r u l e s were l i k e 
the r u l e s of a game, and were obeyed as a means of enjoyment,.. 
The fundamental idea i s simple; that the ri g h t d i s c i p l i n e 
c o n s i s t s , not i n extessaal compulsion, but i n habits of mind 
which lead spontaneously to desirable rather than undesirable 
a c t i v i t i e s . What i s astonishing i s the great success i n finding 
t e c h n i c a l methods of embodying t h i s idea i n education. For 
t h i s , Madame Montessori deserves the highest p r a i s e , " 
R u s s e l l (1926/60) pp,22-3o 
T h i s sentiment, r a t h e r than that of Isaacs, has predominated. Holmes 
was e n t h u s i a s t i c about Montessori's work. Then, on her f i r s t v i s i t 
to England i n 1919, i t was Slsher, the President of the Board of 
Education, who took the c h a i r at a banquet held i n her honour. When 
she ran a t r a i n i n g course i n her methods i n that year, there were a 
thousand enquiries - three times the number she could accommodate. 
Th e r e a f t e r she returned every other year u n t i l World War I I to run 
f u r t h e r courses ( S e l l e c k , 1972, pp.28-30), One reason f o r t h i s 
p o p u l a r i t y was that w h i l s t 
"some of the leading reformers e x p l i c i t l y acknowledged her 
influence, teachers l e s s committed to reform saw i n her 
work an attainable goal," Selleck (1972) p, 3 0 , 
T h i s comment could a l s o apply to the popular Dalton Plan. 
Developed by Helen Parkhurst i n Massachussets, under d i r e c t 
Montessorian influence, the Dalton Plan was publicised i n t h i s 
country by B e l l e Rennie, Nunn recognised that i t did 
"not challenge the conventional curriculum but, wherever 
pos s i b l e , would replace class-teaching by free i n d i v i d u a l 
study unregulated by a time-table," 
Nunn ( 1 9 2 0 / 4 5 ) pp* 1 0 2 - 3 , 
He apparently approved of i t f o r t h i s reason, regarding i t as 
"an important innovation" (po1G2)„ The "Pleja" gained adherents 
a l l over the country,, Two thousand ScKools were s a i d to have adopted 
i t by 1929 ( S e l l e c k , 1972, p,41)o Such popularity was importantly 
r e l a t e d to i t s continued c l o s u r e s , rather than to any unbridled 
openness, 
"To a. teacher who was worried that the progressives were c a l l i n g 
i n t o question the procedures which once had guaranteed him 
s e c u r i t y , the Dalton Plan had a p a r t i c u l a r a t t r a c t i o n . I t 
offered a methodology - a set of procedures, ways of organising 
a classroom and conducting discussiono To adopt i t , or even to 
go through the motions of adopting i t , meant a c e r t a i n immunity 
from c r i t i c i s m , f o r one could be mistaken f o r a reformer. Yet 
i t was not too f a r removed from what had gone before and the old 
h a b i t s , the old expectations did not need to be f u l l y 
discarded. I t offered s e c u r i t y at a time when the educational 
culture of the E n g l i s h pr3.mary school was uncertain and unstable," 
S e l l e c k (1972) p,153. 
Th i s continuity i n b e l i e f s about the teacher^pupil r e l a t i o n s h i p 
was evident i n the bulk of "progressive" educational writing and 
p r a c t i c e even between the Wars, I t remains i n Child-centredness today. 
There i s a l s o , today, more emphasis on teachers'; r e l a t i o n s h i p s with 
p u p i l s ' parents. I n t h i s respect, the promotion of teachers' 
p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a t u s has been s i g n i f i c a n t . I n the sphere of- elementary 
education i t increased a f t e r the 1890s, when the practice of Payment 
by Results was formally abandoned, and was reinforced by a growing 
preoccupation with " s c i e n t i f i c " 'knowledge' about education and 
pedagogy. Nunn was at pains to point out that h i s emphasis on the 
" n a t u r a l " development of children did not make the teacher redundant, 
"However 'natural' the conditions of school l i f e may be made, 
i t rema-ins a l i f e l i v e d i n a selected environment, an a r t i f i c i a l 
microcosm within the macrocosm, and ...the teachers do the 
s e l e c t i n g . They set the stage and f u r n i s h the properties f o r 
the play. I t follows that even though they claim no share i n 
the composition of the drama, but merely watch i t s development 
with f r i e n d l y i n t e r e s t , they have already s e t t l e d within certain 
l i m i t s what form the action s h a l l take. Thus, though i t i s true 
that i n a Montessori school a c h i l d may do what he pleases, yet 
what he may please to do i s r i g i d l y and even narrowly l i m i t e d . " 
Nmm ( 1 9 2 0 / 4 5 ) p«.107. 
What t h i s msant i n terms of the teacher's expertise was hinted at i n 
a Board of Education report on the Training of Teachers f o r Public 
Elementary Schools, 
" I t i s not enough ,,, that th© teacher should know j u s t a l i t t l e 
more than h i s p u p i l s . The teacher i n an elementary school must 
know much more of h i s subjects than he w i l l have to teach, but 
he w i l l a l s o have a general sens© of the r e l a t i o n s which th© 
subjects bear to each other, of t h e i r place and ©xtent i n the 
world of knowledg©, so that he may convey or suggost to h i s 
p u p i l s th© main features of that world," 
Education, Board of, (1925)? extract i n Van der Eyken (1973 ed.) 
p,302. 
There ^ s a s t r i k i n g contrast between t h i s pronouncement - and i n i t s 
conclusion that elementary school teachers be educated " i n the way i n 
which a l l other members of the professional c l a s s e s are educated" 
( i b i d ) 8Jid the sentiments of Kay and T u f n e l l , when they established 
t h e i r Normal School at Battersea some 70 years e a r l i e r . ^ ^^^ But i t was 
i n strong accord with the sort of scientism that Nunn's book, f o r 
instance, was designed to f o s t e r , i n the f i e l d of pedagogy.^^^^ 
This i s apparent when we consider the role of the parent i n 
(47) 
r e l a t i o n to the p r o f e s s i o n a l teacher.^ In Chapter 4 of the Plowden 
Report, i t i s c l e a r that the parent i s expected to bow to the teacher's 
p r o f e s s i o n a l e x p e r t i s e , w h i l s t at the same tim© acting as "partner" i n 
th© educational e n t e r p r i s e , Blacki© (1967/71), i n a book aimed above 
a l l at parents, repeatedly expresses the game message. For instances 
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'*Mo0t t eachers are euixious to do t h e i r best f o r t h e i r c h i l d r e n , 
and to improve t h e i r knowledge and t h e i r techniques wi th that 
purpose i n T iewo I f they adopt a new method, they do i t because 
i t seems to them a good one and because they f e e l able to cope 
wi th i t= A parent who f i n d s that h i s c h i l d i s being educated 
i n a v/ay tl:iat s t a r t l e s him ought to begin by assuming that the 
t e a c h e r s know what they are doing and only complain when he 
has some c l e a r evidence that they don't ," 
B l a a k i e ( 1 9 6 7 / 7 1 ) P o 5 1 o ^ ^ ^ ^ 
S i m i l a r l y 5 a Department of Education and Science booklet on "Open 
Pla3i Primary Schools" r e f e r s to "wise leadership by the head and 
f r i e n d l y understanding by parents" , 
"A few of the schools produce a t t r a c t i v e aind h e l p f u l booklets 
f o r parents t e l l i n g them about the school and what the pairents 
might do to help t h e i r c h i l d r e n make a good stax-t i n i t , " 
Educat ion and Sc ience , Depajrbment of, (1972) p . 1 4 o 
I n a l l c a s e s , teachers supposedly have a v i r t u a l monopoly of wisdom. 
For they are the p r o f e s s i o n a l e x p e r t s . 
F i n a l l y , having looked b r i e f l y at b e l i e f s about t e a c h e r - p u p i l 
and teacher-parent r e l a t i o n s h i p s , a few words can be s a i d about 
not ions of the ovex-^11 society^ C l e a r l y apparent i n the foregoing i s 
a Master Pat tern of expert i ses a necessary and i n e v i t a b l e mode of 
organ i s ing 'knowledge' and p e o p l e „ This i s qui t© cons is tent with 
assumptions about the need to se l ec t ch i ldren f o r d i f f e r e n t types of 
secondary s choo l , over t ly on grounds of i n t e l l e c t u a l d i f f e r e n c e s . 
However, i n the w r i t i n g s considered i n t h i s chapter, there i s a l so 
a r h e t o r i c a l a l l e g i a n c e to "democracy". This resembles the corporate 
i d © a l of many American P r o g r e s s i v e s , In t h e i r case , "democracy" 
seemed to imply a f e e l i n g , r a t h e r than an a c t u a l i t y , of choice and 
autonomy, A s i m i l a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n can be put on such statements as 
the fo l lowings 
"The task of education i s two-fo ld . I t has to enable ch i ldren 
to grow up as good raembers of the s o c i e t i e s i n which they l i v e 
and t h i s © n t a i l s t h e i r developing a s u f f i c i e n t degree of 
conformity to the. ways of those s o c i e t i e s . At the same time, 
i t i s expected to develop i n them a proper sense of 
independence i n thought azid a c t i o n , which impl ies a power to 
choose and to make judgments on t h e i r own account. These two 
aims are c o m p l e m e n t a r y , . » " Education, Min i s t ry o f , ( 1 9 5 9 ) p « 7 8 . 
(my emphasis) . 
T h i s c l e a r l y r e l a t e s to the P a r t i c i p a t i o n i s m discussed i n Chapter 6, 
C h i l d r e n at school are taught to "part i c ipate" and adu l t s a l so are 
i n v i t e d (or al lowed) to do so , Aa the Schools Counc i l working paper 
on ^•Raising the School Leaving Age" puts i t , 
»*fhe p o s s i b i l i t y of t rue secondary education begins when the 
p u p i l r e a l i s e s that he i s ho longer a c h i l d , and becomes aware 
of h imse l f - of h i s needs, s a t i s f a c t i o n s and expectat ions -
and of h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p s wi th other people and with h i s 
environment outside the narrow c i r c l e of f a m i l y , neighbourhood, 
peer group or s choo l . I t i s part of the nature of t h i s 
awareness that i t invo lve s him i n taking dec i s ions which are 
a d u l t , or near a d u l t , i n c h a r a c t e r . » . There i s no sharp break 
between childhood and an adult awareness; there i s a period 
of t r s j a s i t i o n of vary ing length . Indeed, f o r a few the 
t r a n s i t i o n to a f u l l y adult s ta te over a l arge f i e l d of a c t i v i t i e s 
i s never r e a l i s e d , " Schools Counci l ( 1 9 6 5 ) , e x t r a c t i n Van der 
Eyken ( 1 9 7 3 ) , e d . ) p o 5 0 5 . 
Such an a s s e r t i o n does not i n i t s o l f "prove" p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s m or 
cox*poratisra. I f w© are to appreciate underlying assumptions then 
e x p l i c i t statements must be examined i n the context of s o c i a l and 
i30cietal c ircumstances , and of other e x p l i c i t or implied b e l i e f s . 
Nonetheless , i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to not© that f o r the Schools C o u n c i l , 
both adulthood and childhood appear to be def ined i n terms of 
"awareness" - not of b i o l o g i c a l age, or of pos i t ions wi th in the 
s o c i e t a l s t r u c t u r e . We must, however, look to other evidence, 
i n c l u d i n g that a lready quoted, to understand what t h i s "awareness" i s 
i n f a c t taken to mean. 
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A f i n a l quotation again points to the importance attached to 
c h i l d r e n ' s f e i l i j M s i*ath©r than to any o b j e c t i v e l y def ined pos i t ion 
of autonomy.. 
"The c h i l d r e n f e e l f r e e s^d re laxed and at the same time, i n the 
care of some one whom they respect and to whose author i ty they 
can tx'ust themselves^ '^ B l a c k i e (1967/71) p .37 , 
Such "fee l ings" ar® to be learned at schoolo They are expected to be 
t r a n s f e r r e d to adult experience , too, in the face of expert and 
s e l e c t i v e s o c i a l controle^^^^ 
Having s a i d t h i s , i t should again be s t r e s s e d that the.main 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f ea ture of Chi ld-centredness i s i t s l ack of e x p l i c i t 
treatment of the "Power" dimension. We cannot look s o l e l y to the 
e x p l i c i t accounts of t h i s "movement's" proponents and t h e o r e t i c i a n s 
to apprec iate the underly ing b e l i e f s * We must look to the p r a c t i c e 
of C h i l d - c e n t r e d e d u c a t i o n i s t s f o r a f u l l e r understanding. I t i s to 
the context of schoo l , then, that we now t u r n . 
"Chi ld -cen tred" P r a c t i c e 
The C h i l d - c e n t r e d "movement" i s i n some respects h e i r to an 
a n a r c h i s t i c t r a d i t i o n , wi th roots i n 18th century s o c i a l philosophy 
r a t h e r than c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economy. T h i s v/as seen i n the 
opposit ion of Nathan I s a a c s to Montessori and i n the overt ly more 
extreme p o s i t i o n of A . S . N e i l l . I t i s in part to t h i s that the 
"movement" owes i t s emphasis on the "whole c h i l d " and i t s e x p l i c i t 
a t t e n t i o n to the c h i l d and l e a r n i n g , ra ther them to soc ie ty aind 
t each ing . The s t i l l prevalent tendency to dichotomise ( inadequately) 
between the "old" and the "new", or between " t r a d i t i o n a l " and 
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"progress ive" teaching s t y l e s , suggests a conscious ant i -conservat i sm 
and a r h e t o r i c of "openness"., But i t i s wrong to suppose that the 
Chi ld -centredness p r a c t i s e d i n schools i s so divorced from not ional 
c l o s u r e s as t h i s her i tage might imply. At the same time, i t would 
be wrong to regard C h i l d - c e n t r e d teachers as merely ignorant of 
s o c i e t a l c ircumstances , b l i t h e l y pursuing p r a c t i c e s that are e i t h e r 
i r r e l e v a n t t o , or opposed t o , c u l t u r a l conservatism. Such teachers 
work wi th in a complexly s t r u c t u r e d education system. T h i s contains 
patterned c o n s t r a i n t s - euid tends accordingly to produce patterned 
c l o s u r e s i n t e a c h e r s ' educat ional ideologye 
I n the f i r s t p l a c e , even Chi ld -centred teachers have standards 
as to what i s educa t iona l ly worthwhile. They have goals which are 
regarded as v a l i d * P luckrose , f o r example, headteacher of an "open 
plan" primary school and w r i t e r of many books and a r t i c l e s on the 
s u b j e c t , says , 
"A teacher to succeed as a teacher needs goals which are 
understood both by her and by the c h i l d r e n f o r whom she i s 
responsible* I n the past these goals might be l earn ing the 
m u l t i p l i c a t i o n tab le s up to 12 or l i s t s of words from a s p e l l i n g 
book, the c a p i t a l c i t i e s of Europe or the p r i n c i p a l r i v e r s of 
the worlds W© might deplore that such shallovr objec t ives passed 
f o r educat ion, we might d ismiss the gold s t a r s and house points 
given f o r s u c c e s s f u l memorisation as a worthless e x e r c i s e . Yet 
who can deny t h a t , played w e l l , the game gave a f e e l i n g of 
s e c u r i t y to both p a r t i c i p a n t s . 
Replac ing the formal curriculum - the chunks of E n g l i s h , 
mathematics, h i s t o r y , r e l i g i o u s i n s t r u c t i o n eind nature study -
wi th an a l l - embrac ing l e a r n i n g programme has mer i t . But i f 
• things f a l l a p a r t , the centre cannot hold and pure anarchy 
i s loosed upon t h e i r w o r l d , ' " Pluckroae (1975) p .57 , 
As Pe ters says , education impl ies v a l u a t i o n . 
I n the second placis, teachers belong to s p e c i f i c educat ional 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . Through t h e i r own education and c a r e e r experience, 
they a l s o belong to p r o f e s s i o n a l communities. They have c a r e e r and 
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subjec t i d e n t i t i e s which are the product of pas t , ongoing and 
a n t i c i p a t e d experience (Barnes , I969 /7I5 E s l a n d , 1971) . I n the 
immediate experience of school , b u i l d i n g s , re sources , teaching-group 
sisses and other c o n s t r a i n t s are decided wi th in a s o c i e t a l frsimework 
which i s no t , by and l a r g e j of the t eachers ' own making. The poss ible 
appeal of "progressive" methods before World War I I was not strong 
enough i n i t s owa r i g h t to ovez*ride the c o n s t r a i n t s of l i m i t e d 
resources and c a r e e r opportuni t i e s ( S e l l e c k , 1971, C h , 5 ) . S i m i l a r l y , 
the acclaimed need f o r nursery school or nursery c l a s s prov is ion took 
second p lace to the expansion of secondary and t e r t i a r y education even 
i n the r e l a t i v e l y a f f l u e n t 1960s,^^^^ In the current mood of 
f i n a s i c i a l s t r ingency , ^ t h high teacher-^unemployment, large cut""backs 
i n t e a c h e r education and renewed c a l l s f or a c c o u n t a b i l i t y and the 
i n d u s t r i a l "relevance" of educat ion, the Chi ld-centredness of the 
Plowden Report •» l e s s than a decade old - a lready seems cur ious ly 
outdated. Not j u s t the immediate m8. ter ia l cons tra in t s occasioned by 
f i n a n c i a l r e s t r i c t i o n s , but c lo sures i n th© Object ivated 'Knowledge' 
of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and l e g i s l a t i v e th inking and b e l i e f , cons t i tu te 
c o n s t r a i n t s on a c t u a l teaching p r a c t i c e . T h i s was so i n the 
19th century when State in t ervent ion e n t a i l e d the suppression of 
(51) 
a l t e r n a t i v e educat ional i n s t i t u t i o n s o I t was so i n the 1920s, 
when the Hadow Committee found i t s terms of reference c a r e f u l l y 
pre-^defined to exclude an o v e r a l l examination of post-eleven education 
i , e » i t could not inc lude "secondary" education as w e l l as upper-
elementary. There i s an important sense i n which other people 's 
c l o s u r e s become one's own c o n s t r a i n t s , as they are i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d 
i n the immediate context of one's own experience and behavioure 
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I n the t h i r d p l a c e , determinative r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n r e a l i t y tend 
i n e v i t a b l y to produce determinative (or "causal") models i n people's 
' r e a l i t i e s ' . Teachers , l i k e other people, have theor ies to account 
f o r events ajid processes i n t h e i r experience. T h i s i s the more 
l i k e l y , the more r e g u l a r s j id /or imposing such events and processes 
a r e , even though the r e s u l t a n t theor ies may be i m p l i c i t and inadequate. 
I n contemporary B r i t i s h schools some of the most imposing and 
c o n s t r a i n i n g f a c t s of l i f e f o r teachers inc lude v a r i a t i o n s i n the 
apparent a b i l i t y of p u p i l s to achieve the marks of "success" and 
" f a i l u r e " . To a l a r g e extent , these too are patterned - as a r e s u l t 
o f the e s s e n t i a l s t ruc turedness of s o c i e t a l r e a l i t y . I t i s not 
s u r p r i s i n g , t h e r e f o r e , that teachers develop theor ies of some sort to 
account f o r these v a r i a t i o n s . The predominajit model today, which 
c o - e x i s t s with and belongs to the same o v e r a l l b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s as 
( 5 3 ) 
Ghild~centredness i n p r a c t i c e , i s one of s o c i a l pathology, 
Adherence to t h i s t h e o r e t i c a l model can be i l l u s t r a t e d by reference 
to Sharp and Gr©en (1975) , whose research I draw on i n t h i s section,^^^^ 
The headmaster of "Mapledene Lane", the school they observed, 
says that 
"By not having t h i s r i g i d set up, k ids who are i n acute d i s t r e s s , 
and, l e t ' s face i t , we have got a great number who are r e a l l y 
i n d i s t r e s s ; t h e r e ' s no other phrase f o r i t . . , , and t h e i r d i s t r e s s 
i s caused by t h e i r home c o n d i t i o n s . . . t h i s kind of s e t t i n g 
enables them to withdraw, opt o u t . o . " 
"Mr. Mcintosh", i n Sharp & Green (1975) P.60 (my emphasis) . 
Though they v a r i e d i n c e r t a i n respec t s , the other three teachers 
observed and interv iewed by Sharp & Green (aind Lewis) made s i m i l a r 
re ferences to the depr ivat ion of most of t h e i r pupi l s and to the 
o r i g i n s of t h e i r "disturbances" i n parental mistreatment and 
incompetence. They regarded the Chi ld-centredness of t h e i r school 
( 5 4 ) 
as p a r t i c u l a r l y appropriate f o r "these ch i ldren" ,^ ' 
The Ghi ld-centredness of p r a c t i s i n g teachers i s not a n a r c h i s t i c , 
but framed by i m p l i c i t and e x p l i c i t models ( inc lud ing t h e o r i e s ) about 
R e a l i t y , I t might be asked whether they are as attached to the model 
of s c i e n t i f i c method as some of the more t h e o r e t i c a l l y i n c l i n e d w r i t e r s 
prev ious ly cons idered. On the whole, I suggest that they are not, 
though t h i s needs q u a l i f i c a t i o n , as we s h a l l see. Theory tends most 
often to fo l l ow from experience , r a t h e r than to precede i t . Of course, 
b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s and thought processes themselves cons t i tu te experience 
f o r the i n d i v i d u a l s u b j e c t . The c r e a t i v i t y of Man l i e s p r e c i s e l y i n 
t h i s s e l f - d i v o r c i b i l i t y from concrete circumstsince. T h i s i s a necessary 
(but not s u f f i c i e n t ) condit ion of autonomous act ion upon the environment. 
Nonetheless , there i s a d i f f e r e n c e between an i n d i v i d u a l ' s creat ion of 
o r i g i n a l theory a,nd the more general popular i sat ion and i n s t i t u t i o n a l -
i s a t i o n of t h e o r i e s . I n the event, many of the s o c i e t a l l y most 
momentous t h e o r i e s are at l e a s t as much t h e o r e t i c i s a t i o n s of p r e -
ex i s t en t experience as they are novel spurs to changed circumstance. 
T h i s seems to have been so, f o r instance , , o f psychometric theory, 
which tended to r a t i o n a l i s e s o c i a l c l a s s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between types 
of schoo l ing , r a t h e r than to create novel ("meri tocrat ic") arrangements. 
I n any case , where i t comes to p r a c t i t i o n e r s i n schools , as opposed to 
educat ional t h e o r i s t s , those t h e o r i e s which appear to be most 
i n f l u e n t i a l take on ver-y d i f f e r e n t forms, Preudianism f o r many 
amounted to "Never r e s i s t t e m p t a t i o n " » B e r n s t e i n ' s a n a l y s i s of 
l i n g u i s t i c codes has commonly been reduced to "Working c l a s s c h i l d r e n 
don't t a l k properly". I n such cases as these , i t i s not the s t r u c t u r e 
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and content of the t h e o r i e s themselves which has such widespread 
p r a c t i c a l impact. I t i s the f a c t that there are theor i e s at a l l 
which are regarded as i n t e l l e c t u a l l y respectab le . Into the master 
pa t t ern of l eg i t imate exper t i s e f i t s a r h e t o r i c a l obeisance to 
approved theoiyo T h i s almost precludes any d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between the substance of that theory and p r a c t i c a l commitment. 
Keddie (1971) , Sharp and Green (1975) and others tend to see t h i s as 
p a r a d o x i c a l or c o n t r a d i c t o r y » ^ ^ But the very meaning of theor ies 
to t e a c h e r s (and o thers ) i s dependent upon the context i n which they 
are l earned and r e i n f o r c e d . That context i s f i r s t l y s o c i a l or 
e x t e r n a l compare my example of drinking and d r i v i n g i n Chapter 2, 
And secondly i t i s l o g i c a l -» that i s , i t inc ludes the other b e l i e f s 
and understandings of the subjects new theor ies have to be integrated 
i n t o s u b j e c t i v e ' k n o w l e d g e ' » Looked at i n t h i s way, i t becomes even 
c l e a r e r that t h e o r y - a s - i t - i s - i n t e r p r e t e d - o r - u n d e r s t o o d fo l lows 
exper ience , r a t h e r thetn preceding i t . I t tends to r a t i o n a l i s e or 
t h e o r e t i c i s e p r a c t i c e , r a t h e r than to i n s p i r e novel forms of behaviour. 
Nonetheless , the master-patterned leg i t imacy of expert-der ived 
theory i s important as a l e g i t i m a t i o n of (tea,cher) p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m . 
A s i g n i f i c a n t aspect of t h i s i n (Dhild-centred education i s the notion 
of "readiness", to which Sharp and Green r i g h t l y pay some a t t e n t i o n , 
"Mrs, Lyons", the deputy headteacher, 
"frequent ly maintains that she cannot teach u n t i l her pup i l s 
are ready. Neverthe less , i t i s she who decides when the c h i l d 
i s ' ready' and what c r i t e r i a she w i l l use to j u s t i f y 'moving 
the c h i l d ' to the next stage when he has reached the appropriate 
l e v e l . F o r example, with respect to ' readiness f o r r e a d i n g ' , 
she argued 'medical evidence has shown that t h e i r eyes cannot 
focus properly much before f i v e ' , and would use such things as 
h i s a b i l i t y to complete pat terns s y m m e t r i c a l l y , / J t c / , . , as 
i n d i c a t o r s of the c h i l d ' s r e a d i n e s s , , . 
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I t was not i ced by the observer that the teacher did not 
c l o s e l y s p e c i f y what the stages were and t h e i r operat ional 
indicatoi->3 beyond re ference to such g e n e r a l i t i e s r e f e r r e d to 
when g iv ing examples of her notion of ' readiness f o r r e a d i n g ' . , . 
She seemed to 'know* where they were a t , and what they needed, 
and appeared very r a p i d l y to a r r i v e at judgments regarding t h e i r 
cogni t ive end. emotional q u a l i t i e s and t h e i r requirements. This 
s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e may be a r e f l e c t i o n of her being more highly 
q u a l i f i e d than the other s t a f f . She has an advanced diploma 
i n psychology, regards h e r s e l f as an expert and i s so regarded 
by o t h e r s , " Sharp & Green (1975) p ,94 . 
The seime teacher , 
"has very c l e a r not ions about what the parents should and 
shouldn't do a t home i n t h e i r attempts to ' h e l p ' the c h i l d r e n . 
educat iona l ly , o . They shouldn't encroach on the t e a c h e r ' s ro le 
or 'make a convenience' of schoolo Above a l l , 'you've got to 
t r u s t us , leave everything to u s ' , and a l io®' the teacher to be 
the best judge of what i s i n the c h i l d ' s i n t e r e s t s , , . She informs 
the parents that she knows 'what stage each c h i l d i s a t , what 
he most needs ' , and that teachers, have good reasons f o r doing 
th ings that they do and i f subsequently there should be any 
changes there w i l l be v a l i d reasons f o r that too," 
Sharp & Green ( 1 9 7 5 ) P e 8 7 o 
The w r i t e r s comments 
"This pub l i c p r o j e c t i o n of i n f a l l i b i l i t y i s i n t e r e s t i n g when 
appraised a longside the concession to the observer and to other 
t eacher col leagues of the d i f f i c u l t y of knovd.ng what and how 
and when the c h i l d i s l e a r n i n g , presumably with consequent 
ambiguity f o r the ro le of the teacher vis-^a-vis the taught. 
Again, t eacher i n f a l l i b i l i t y i s i r o n i c when seen i n the context 
of the almost u n i v e r s a l tendency to blame the home f o r the 
c h i l d ' s f a i l i n g s but not n e c e s s a r i l y h i s successes ." i b i d . 
The notion of "readiness" i s an important i n d i c a t o r of , and 
l e g i t i m a t o r of , t e a c h e r s ' p r o f e s s i o n a l a loo fness . At the s t a r t of 
Sharp aiid Green's r e search period at l e a s t , the p-robationer 
"Mrs. Buchanan" f e l t h e r s e l f to be on good personal terms with the 
p a r e n t s , / Yet even she wanted to be seen as a p r o f e s s i o n a l , with 
appropriate s o c i a l d is tance and autonomy from parenta l in ter ference 
( p p « 1 0 1 - 2 ) . The headmaster's viewpoint i s taken to r e f l e c t the 
o v e r a l l school "©thos" . 
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"We w i l l b r i n g parents i n t o the school o. , I 'm c e r t a i n that 
to get the parents involved with the non-academic aspects of 
the school i s the w^ ay to do i t . , . I f you can get f a thers 
or mothers to come in to school and work wi th a smal l group 
of c h i l d r e n they see that the place i s not a blackboard jungle 
at a l l , and that although there appear to be a number of 
c h i l d r e n m i l l i n g about, i t ' s i n a k ind of framework of a 
secure kind of order ,«« i t ' s reasonably o r d e r l y . " 
"Mr,Mcintosh", Sharp & Green (1975) p .58 . 
Sharp and Green cont inue , again quoting the headmaster, 
"He wants to l i m i t parent s ' involvement, never the l e s s , to 
non-acadsmic a c t i v i t i e s ? 
'At the Bioment I pi^efer to presearve that area f o r the t e a c h e r s . . . 
we've got a l o t of evidence to show that parents and non-
p r o f e s s i o n a l people can do the ch i ldren a l o t of harm and 
u n i n t e n t i o n a l harm, '" i b i d . 
I t i s i n t e a c h e r s ' b e l i e f s about, parents and about p u p i l s ' 
home backgrounds t h a t we f i n d some of the c l e a r e s t i n d i c a t i o n s of 
t h e i r b e l i e f s about s o c i e t a l re lat ions ,^^^^ This i s f o r c e f u l l y 
i l l u s t r a t e d i n Sharp and Green's booko The teachers at "Mapledene 
Lane" School saw C h i l d - c e n t r e d pedagogy a s p a r t i c u l a r l y appropriate 
f o r "deprived" c h i l d r e n . T h i s i s not something that would e a s i l y be 
pred ic ted from most t h e o r e t i c a l w r i t i n g i n the "progressive" t r a d i t i o n , 
S tewart ' s book on Progres s ive s and Radica l s i n E n g l i s h Educat ion , 
VJ50^1^T0_ i s a compendium of unorthodox ventures i n p r i v a t e - and 
there fore predominaxitly middle c l a s s » education. These were 
c l e a r l y minor i ty ventures and t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r popular 
education i s not s e l f - e v i d e n t . As S e l l e c k says , 
"However e x c e l l e n t these schools / s u c h as Abbotsholme, Bedales , 
Summerhil l , Rendcomb, Dartington H a l l , Bryanston or Wennington/ 
were, they a r e r e l a t i v e l y few and, though they may l a s t , they 
are c l e a r l y not r a p i d l y i n c r e a s i n g . Progress ive education, i f 
l i m i t e d to them, would be an i n t e r e s t i n g but p e r i p h e r a l feature 
of the E n g l i s h educat ional scene," S e l l e c k (1972) p.32. . 
( I t i s S e l l e c k ' s argument that they were of c e h t r a l importance, 
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however, because "the modem px±WBry school . , , has been made i n 
the progress ive image," ( i b i d ) . ) I t i s not an uncommon assumption 
that "Open Educat ion" i s j u s t not s u i t a b l e f o r "ordinary ch i ldren" . 
I t i s sometimes argued, f o r instejace, that Chi ld-centredness r e l i e s 
on the "hidden curriculum" of the middle c l a s s home ( e . g . Strodtbeck, 
1 9 5 8 / 6 1 ) . N e i l l confessed that 
" I should l i k e to be able to say tha t , s ince freedom touches 
the emotions p r i m a r i l y , a l l c h i l d r e n , i n t e l l i g e n t and d u l l , 
r eac t equal ly to i t , I cannot gay i t , , . " ,CQ\ 
N e i l l ( 1 9 5 3 ) , ex trac t i n Perry ( 1 9 6 7 , ed , ) p.67,^^^^ 
Keddie ( 1 9 7 1 ) a l s o suggests that the innovatory "enquiry-based" 
course i n the school she obsex-ved 
"in f a c t c a t e r s f o r a p u p i l who already e x i s t s : the A stream 
academic and u s u a l l y midd le - c la s s p u p i l , " Keddie ( 1 9 7 1 ) P o 1 3 7 . 
E a r l y on i n Sharp and Green's r e s e a r c h , "Mrs. Buchanan", the 
P'robationer, f e l t that the schoo l ' s Chi ld-centred methods were not 
s u i t a b l e f o r the type of c h i l d r e n attending "Mapledene Lane",^^^^ 
Nonetheless , the " o f f i c i a l " view in that school was that C h i l d -
centredness was p a r t i c u l a r l y appropriate f o r "problem c h i l d r e n " . The 
other two c l a s s - t e a c h e r s observed("Mrs,Lyons" and "Mrs,Carpenter") 
be l i eved the overwhelming major i ty of the school ' s c h i l d r e n to be 
" tMck and those who a r e n ' t t h i c k are disturbed" (Sharp & Green, 1 9 7 5 , 
p . 7 0 ) , T h i s was put down to the i n s t a b i l i t y and incompetence of the 
p u p i l s ' parents ( e . g , pp. 7 1 - 3 , 8 3 ) , I t was the very "disturbejice" 
of these "deprived" c h i l d r e n that made "Open Educat ion" s u i t a b l e . 
"Mrs, Carpenter" 
"shares the headmaster's b e l i e f that the nature of the c h i l d r e n s ' 
needs and the aims of the school d ic ta te an informal and 'open' 
approach to pedagogy and classroom organi sa t ion . There should be 
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no r i g i d i t y of s t r u c t u r e but r a t h e r an open environment where 
c h i l d r e n caja choose what they want to do i n accordance with 
t h e i r needs. The i n s t a b i l i t y and deprivat ion of the c h i M r e n 
presents problems to the teacher in t h i s approach to the 
teaeh5.ng s i t u a t i o n but at the same time provides i t s own 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n . The c h i l d r e n can play out t h e i r problems i n 
a secure ajid therapeut i c environment without f e e l i n g 
threatened." Sharp & Green ( 1 9 7 5 ) P e 7 6 , 
S i m i l a r l y , "Mrs,Lyons" 
"agreed with the genera l approach of the school both as a 
therapeut ic i n s t i t u t i o n which would enable the ch i ldren to 
r e s o l v e t h e i r needs engendered by t h e i r u n s a t i s f a c t o r y sind 
unstable home backgrounds, and on the ground of p r a c t i c a l i t y 
s i n e ® 'these c h i l d r e n ' were considered not capable of f i t t i n g 
i n to a formal context , not 'bright enough to conform' and 
not s tab le enough to cope," i b i d , p , 9 0 . 
Sharp and Green's book i s an important attempt to bridge the 
gaps between s o c i a l and p h y s i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s , t eachers ' ideologies 
and what c h i l d r e n a c t u a l l y come to l e a r n . Chi ldren i n "Mapledene Lane ' s" 
"open classrooms" were d i f f e r e n t i a l l y t r e a t e d . The authors descr ibe a 
s t r a t i f i c a t i o n of s u c c e s s f u l l l i t e , "bedrock of business", and 
"pecu l iar" dev iants . What the c h i l d r e n themselves l earn from t h i s 
c a t e g o r i s a t i o n and s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n i s extremely important. But 
my concern i n t h i s essay has not pr imar i ly been with c h i l d r e n s ' 
l e a r a i n g i i t has been with t e a c h e r s ' ideologies and b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s . 
Sharp and Green's contr ibut ion i n t h i s respect i s to elaborate on 
how t e a c h e r s ' perspect ives 
"are i n themselves r e f l e c t i o n s of the s t r u c t u r i n g of mater ia l 
and s o c i a l c o n g t r a i n t s , e x t e r n a l to th© classroom, which impinge 
upon the teacher and s t r u c t u r e her a c t i v i t i e s . The understanding 
of s t r a t i f i c a t i o n i n th© classroom, w h i l s t i t may be r e l a t e d to 
and a f f e c t e d by the t e a c h e r s ' consciousness , cannot be s o l e l y 
explained by i t . ~ . . . The teachers are encapsulated within a 
context which produced the necess i ty f o r some h i e r a r c h i c a l 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of the pup i l s i n order that the teacher may solve 
the problems she i s confronted with and provide some l eg i t imat ion 
f o r the a l l o c a t i o n of her time and energ ies ," 
Sharp & Green ( 1 9 7 5 ) p . 1 1 6 . 
Whilst I might quibble at the d e t e r m i n i s t i c s trength of the term, 
"Hecesslty", i n t h i s passage, t h e i r book on the whole adds both 
empir'ical observat ions and t h e o r e t i c a l e laborat ion to many of the 
po ints I have t r i e d to s p e l l out i n t h i s essay. While the experience 
of one's own thinking and b e l i e f s may o f f e r the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
autonomously developed conceptual understandings, even these must 
i n e v i t a b l y be i n the context of ex terna l c ircumstances . The very 
pressures of time and other re sources , which tend to make such 
autonomous, c r e a t i v e t h e o r i s i n g l e s s l i k e l y ( l e s s p o s s i b l e , even, and 
l e s s "re levant" to the people concerned), tend a l s o to enforce and 
r e i n f o r c e s t r u c t u r e s of b e l i e f that are r i g i d i f i e d and therefore 
"closed". To the extent that these pressures are p r e - i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d 
or ongolngly decided by others w i th in soc ie ty , Chi ld -centred education 
i n contemporaj:^ B r i t a i n would seem l i k e l y to reproduce, r a t h e r than 
undermine, e x i s t i n g s o c i e t a l r e l a t i o n s . I n short , the "Power" 
dimension i n C h i l d - c e n t r e d ideology seems to contain o v e r - r i d i n g 
c l o s u r e s . I t must be predominantly conservat ive , i n defaul t of any 
e x p l i c i t e laborat ion of these c l o s u r e s by p r a c t i s i n g t eachers . 
Notes 
(1) The in troduct ion to the 1904 Code i s repr inted i n Van der 
Eyken (1973, e d . ) pp„ 95-6 , 
(2 ) Bathurst (1905/73) p,123. 
(3 ) According to Holmes (1911) p.116, Payment by Resul ts was 
abol ished i n 1895. Simon (1965) p,118 puts the date at 1897, 
To the Plowden Report (1967, § 508) i * was 1898, 
(4) I t had been the pub l i ca t ion of Holmes' c i r c u l a r on the q u a l i t y 
of elementary school teachers that had occasioned the downfall 
of Moranto 
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(5) T h i s i s s t i l l true today. See, f o r ins tance , B l a c k i e 
(1967/71) PPo39^41« Also an ex-Chie f Inspector , B l a c k i e 
c o n t r a s t s the "old fashioned" and the "new type" of teacher . 
Pr ing has c r i t i c i s e d what he takes to be the tendency of 
contemporary, sociology of the curriculum to dichotomise on 
s imj . l ar l i n e s . See Chapter 8 , above and, of course , Part I I I , 
pass im, on the need to s p e c i f y the dimensions on which "Open 
Educat ion" might be cons idered. 
( 6 ) Perry (1967) p,17 makes the same point . 
( 7 ) I t i s from t h i s 3rd e d i t i o n that I s h a l l be quoting i n t h i s 
chapter . 
( 8 ) Stewart (1972) p.436. The word " r a d i c a l " , here , i s S tewart ' s . 
H i s book i s a compendium of the or ig ins and f a t e s of p r i v a t e 
experimental schools . I t almost e n t i r e l y ignores mass (or s t a t e ) 
educat ion, 
( 9 ) L e g a l l y , of course , there are no "state schools" i h t h i s country -
they are maintained by l o c a l education a u t h o r i t i e s , not by the 
D . E . S . The term nonetheless seems to me appropr ia te . 
(10) Plowden Report (1967) @ 270. The H . M . I ' s survey to which the 
report r e f e r s was conducted. in 1964 ( B l a c k i e , 1967/71), p . 1 2 ) . 
(11) e . g . Kyberg (1975, ed , ) ppo59 16 and 6ls i n a r t i c l e s by H i l l , 
Tunne l l and P e t r i e r e s p e c t i v e l y . I n recent y e a r s , a "backlash" 
has developed, which was f i n a l l y given o f f i c i a l recognit ion i n 
the D . E . S , "Yellow Paper" (Times Educat ional Supplement 15/10/76, 
pp. 2 - 3 ) , I do not deal wi th t h i s react ion i n t h i s essay, I 
suggest , however, that i t should be understood, not j u s t i n terms 
of " f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s " , but of Happy Coincidences (Chapter 6) 
whose conceptual inadequacies are revealed when c e r t a i n s o c i e t a l 
( i . e . r e a l ) con trad ic t i ons become manifest . See a l so Syer (1976a) . 
(12) See, f o r i n s t a n c e . Educat ion , Min i s try of (1959) p.37; B l a c k i e 
(1967/71) p . 6 . One i n d i c a t i o n of the o v e r s i m p l i c i t y of t h i s 
k ind of " inf luence" explaJiation can be found i n Lunn's (1970) 
f i n d i n g that younger primary schoolchi ldren tend to be taught under 
lg£s "infonnal" condit ions than do older ones. See a l so 
Nash (1973) . 
(13) Educa t ion , M i n i s t r y of (1959) p . i i i . Nonetheless, the s u b - t i t l e 
of Primary Education was "Some suggestions f o r the considerat ion 
of "teachers 8-nd others concerned with the work of Primary Schools", 
(14) T h i s point i s genera l l y overlooked. To read , e ,g . B e r n s t e i n ' s 
account of "Open Schools , Open Society?" (1967/71) , one might 
suppose that i t i s the c a p i t a l i s t (or i n d u s t r i a l ) suid the feudal 
( o r p r e - i n d u s t r i a l ) s o c i e t a l types - and t h e i r education systems -
that are being contras ted . T h i s i s simply not the case . Though 
dichotoffious Gemeinschaf t /Gese l l schaf t views of modem h i s t o r y may 
have had some relev&nce i n the 19th century, they are no longer 
adequate today. 
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(15) N e i l l stood outside the main "movement" i n the in terwar y e a r s . 
O v e r t l y , h i s philosophy was undoubtedly more a n a r c h i s t i c than 
most. His s i g n i f i c a n c e - and poss ib ly i n f l u e n c e - i n post-war 
B r i t a i n should not , however, be underestimated, 
(16) I have not considered any research on Nunn's own l i f e , comparable, 
f o r Instajnoe, to Wir th ' s or K a r i e r ' s work on Dewey. I must 
conf ine mysel f , t h e r e f o r e , to the evidence of h i s w r i t i n g , 
(17) I t i s expected that Soc iety w i l l be marked by rapid economic and 
s o c i a l change, r i c h e r , wi th more l e i s u r e and more frequent changes 
of occupation, and ^d.th "tastes dominated by m a j o r i t i e s " . The 
wri te i ' s hope that m i n o r i t i e s (the old and young, handicapped and 
g i f t e d , deviant and conformer) w i l l be "cared for" and that the 
environment w i l l be "s t imulat ing , honest emd to l erant" . They 
f e a r that there may be excess ive pursui t of m a t e r i a l wealth, 
h o s t i l i t y to m i n o r i t i e s , domination by mass opinion and uncerta inty 
of v a l u e s . And that i s a l l , 
(18) "A school i s not merely a teaching shopj i t must transmit va lues 
and a t t i t u d e s . I t i s a community i n which ch i ldren l earn to 
l i v e f i r s t and foremost as ch i ldren and not as future a d u l t s . 
I n fami ly l i f e c h i l d r e n l e a r n to l i v e with people of a l l ages. 
The school s e t s out d e l i b e r a t e l y to devise the r i g h t environment 
f o r c h i l d r e n , to a l low them to be themselves and to develop i n 
the v/ay and at the pace appropriate to them. I t t r i e s to equal i se 
opportuni t i e s and to compensate f o r handicaps. I t l a y s s p e c i a l 
s t r e s s on i n d i v i d u a l d i scovery , on f i r s t hand experience and on 
opportuni t ies f o r c r e a t i v e work. I t i n s i s t s that knowledge does 
not f a l l i n t o n e a t l y separate compartments and that work and 
play are not opposite but complementary, A c h i l d brought up i n 
such an atmosphere at a l l stages of h i s . education has some hope 
of becoming a balanced and mature adult and.of being able to l i v e 
i n , to contr ibute t o , and to look c r i t i c a l l y at the soc ie ty of 
which he forms a p a r t . Not a l l primary schools correspond to 
t h i s p i c t u r e , but i t does represent a general and quickening 
t r e n d . " Plowden Report ( 1 9 6 7 ) i 5 0 5 , 
( 1 9 ) See Sharp and Green ( 1 9 7 5 ) , e s p e c i a l l y pp, 63-6, I return to 
t h e i r work below, 
( 2 0 ) F o r i n s t a n c e , Pe ters ( 1 9 6 9 ) , H ir s t and Peters ( 1 9 7 0 ) ? 
Dearden ( 1 9 6 9 ) ; P r i n g ( l 9 7 1 ) , 
(21) e ,g . Perry ( 1 9 6 7 , ed . ) p p o 4 9 - 5 0 , 1 3 4 - 9 . See a l so Waks ( 1 9 7 5 ) . 
( 2 2 ) N e i l l v i s i t e d the L i t t l e Commonwealth dur ing World War 1 . Had 
the Home O f f i c e not c losed i t i n 1 9 1 8 , i t i s l i k e l y that N e i l l 
would have gone to work there a f t e r the War (Stewart , 1 9 7 2 , p , 2 3 0 ) , 
I n s t e a d , he went, f i r s t to King Al fred School i n Hampstead, and 
then to j o i n B e a t r i c e Easor as co -ed i tor of New Era, . 
( 2 3 ) See Van der Eyken and Turner ( 1 9 6 9 ) ; Gardner ( 1 9 6 9 ) . 
( 2 4 ) S e l l e c k ( 1 9 7 2 ) p , 1 0 7 . 
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( 2 5 ) Nunn ( 1 9 2 0 / 4 5 ) ? e s p e c i a l l y Chapters 9 and 10, 
( 2 6 ) e , g „ Burt (1923, 1943a). Both of these are drawn on by Nunn -
u n c r i t i c a l l y , 
(27) Even so, Burt h imse l f challenged the Norwood Committee's (1943) 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of three types of adolescent . See Burt (1943b). 
On the other hand, a l l e g a t i o n s have r e c e n t l y been made that Burt 
d e l i b e r a t e l y concocted important "evidence", l a t e r i n h i s 
c a r e e r , ( T ^ E ^ , 29 / 5 / 7 6 ) , 
( 2 8 ) B l a c k i e (1967/71) p.20s I n t e l l i g e n c e " i s not even exact ly 
d e f i n a b l e , or at any rate not everyone w i l l agree with any 
p a r t i c u l a r d e f i n i t i o n ths-t we may adopt. However, we a l l know 
p r e t t y w e l l what we meaJi by i t and would perhaps assent to a 
d e f i n i t i o n by S i r C y r i l Bur t . He c a l l s i t ' i n n a t e , genera l , 
cogni t ive e f f i c i e n c y ' , " 
(29) By "Progress iv ism proper", I mean b e l i e f i n the power and worth 
of progress per se . T h i s i s c e n t r a l to American Progress iv ism, 
whereas i n t h i s country "progressive" has come to mean, r a t h e r , 
"advanced" o r "fol lowing the l a t e s t ideas" , whether or not 
these are themselves concerned with "progress", 
(30) Nunn (1920/45) Chapter 7, On p.100, he points out that "play" 
i s to "work" as "freedom" i s to " d i s c i p l i n e " . I n both cases 
the extremes are between ugly , unchecked l i c ence and dejagerous . 
ajad corrupt ing repres s ive d i s c i p l i n e . "The higher values of 
freedom ^ ^ d there fore of play also/" emerge only when i t chooses 
worthy ends and i n pursuing them submits i t s e l f to the control 
of w e l l - i n s p i r e d forms or methods." I t i s worth contrast ing 
R u s s e l l , too, on the power of concentration and the need f o r 
s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e i n seeking accuracy ( R u s s e l l , 1926/60, p«134 f f ) 
a passage that i s reminiscent of Gramsci 's account of mental 
woi'k (1926/65) - with N e i l l ' s t o t a l l y l i b e r t a r i a n staJidpoint i n 
t h i s r e s p e c t . 
(31) Related to t h i s i s a l s o the importance attached to the supposed 
spreading of pedagogical ideas up the age range - something I 
have a lready commented on. c f . Education, Min i s try of , (1959) 
p.37? B l a c k i e (1967/71) P o 6 , Also re levant i s that other 
source of supposed i n f l u e n c s s Art and the other express ive 
a r e a s , c f . Plowden Report (1967) g.677. 
(32) What i s "na tura l" or "normal" or "usual" f o r ch i ldren to do or 
'know' at p a r t i c u l a r ages or stages i s a constant pre-occupation 
i n the M i n i s t r y of Educat ion ' s "handbook" of 1959. Despite the 
f e e l i n g that every c h i l d ' s development i s d i f f e r e n t , t h i s i s 
a n a t u r a l i s s u e of concern f o r teachers - and those advis ing 
them - where there i s a perceived need to evaluate c h i l d r e n ' s 
progress , aind thereby, of course, t eachers ' p r a c t i c e , "Perhaps 
one of the hardest things a young teacher has to l earn i s the 
standard of work that i s to be expected from a c l a s s of any 
p a r t i c u l a r age, and from each c h i l d i n i t , " Educat ion, M i n i s t r y 
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of8 (1959) P»50c T h i s i s hardly s u r p r i s i n g when i t i s a l so 
claimed that the t eacher should not be expecting r e i f i e d 
standards,, anyway» The Plowden Report a l so c o n t r a d i c t s many 
of the main tenets of i n d i v i d u a l i t y when i t says that "What 
goes on i n primary schools cannot g r e a t l y d i f f e r from one school 
to another, s ince there i s only a l i m i t e d range of mater ia l 
w:ithin the capac i ty of primary school c h i l d r e n , , . " (g 289). 
(33) c f , Syer (1974b)» 
(34) Educat ion , Board of , (1904)s extract i n Van der Eyken (1973,ed,) 
pp« 95-6 . 
(35) "Utopia" was the v i l l a g e of Sompting i n Sussex, to whose school 
Holmes looked as "what might be". 
( 3 6 ) See, f o r i n s t a n c e , Peters (1969)5 H i r s t and Peters (1970) . 
These w r i t e r s , i n seeking a source of author i ty that i s beyond 
the i n d i v i d u a l t eacher , try to e s t a b l i s h "object ive" values i n 
the s t r u c t u r i n g of curr icu lum, Peters even exc la ims that 
" I t took acute t h i n k e r s such as Hume and KaJit a considerable 
time to e s t a b l i s h tbiit mathematics i s d i f f e r e n t from empir i ca l 
s c i ence i n important re spec t s aoid that morals i s not r e a l l y much 
l i k e e i t h e r of them. Are we suggesting that philosophers s ince 
the 17th century have been wrong about such matters?" Peters 
(1969) pp.13-14* 
That such d i s t i n c t i o n s have d i s t i n c t s o c i o l o g i c a l funct ions means 
that an eva luat ive stance must i n e v i t a b l y be taken on those 
f u n c t i o n s , i n p r a c t i c e . T h i s seems to escape P e t e r s . Warwick 
(1974) po ints out that such philosophers as Bantock and P r i n g , 
i n c r i t i c i s i n g a s o c i o l o g i c a l concern with the s ta tus of 
G u r r i c u l a r d i v i s i o n s , have l a r g e l y missed the po int . The 
s o c i o l o g i s t ' s concern i s not (merely) whether subject d i v i s i o n s 
are i n some sense wrong, but whether they are e x p l i c a b l e , or have 
consequence, w i th in p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t a l formations. 
(37) Plowden Report (1967) Chapter 22, For f u r t h e r comments on 
Terman, see Chapter 14, above. 
( 3 8 ) Plowden Report (1967) @ 863 and Chapter 22, passim, 
(39) See e s p e c i a l l y Nunn (1920/45) Chapter 10, 
(40) See a l so Chapter 6 above on "Cul tura l deprivat ion", 
(41) Reported i n the Plowden Report (1967) V o l , 1 , Chapter 3 . 
(42) Plowden Report (1967) Chapter 5. On the d e f i n i t i o n of E . P , A s . , 
see Halsey (1972, e d . ) Chapter 5. 
(43 ) On contemporary l i b e r t a r i a n i s m , see A r b l a s t e r (1971). Standard 
works on anarchism remain Woodcock (1963) and J o l l (1964). 
(44) See Van der Eyken & Turner ( I 9 6 9 ) ; Gardner ( 1969 ) . I t may be 
noted a l s o that Susan I s a a c s col laborated with Burt , i n providing 
evidence to the Hadow Committee on Infant and Nursery Schools 
(1933) - see VaJi der Eyken (1973, Q d . ) , pp.354-363. 
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(45) See Hurt (1971/72) p,118o 
(46) A f u r t h e r congruence might be noted between pleas f o r teacher 
"autonomy" and the i n d i v i d u a l i s t e th i c of c h i l d r e n ' s l e a r n i n g . 
I t i s c l e a r l y the i d e a l of autonomy ( c f E n t w h i s t l e , 1970, 
pp» 205-8) x-ather than psychologica l assumptions that are here 
involved - the "Power''^ r a t h e r than the "Knowledge", dimension, 
(47) See a l s o Cha-pter 6, above, on Parenta l P a r t i c i p a t i o n , 
(48) F o r s i m i l a r passages i n B l a c k i e (1967/71), see ppo 45, 55,89,110, 
(49) N o n - f u l f i l l m e n t of such expectations i n paarb expla ins the force 
of the recent r e a c t i o n against Chi ld-centredness and "informal i ty" , 
c f . the p u b l i c i t y that attended the p u b l i c a t i o n of Bennett (1976). 
T h i s n o n - f u l f i l l m e n t should i t s e l f be understood i n terms of 
s t r u c t u r a l con trad ic t i ons i n society and of the c r e a t i v e 
p o t e n t i a l of people to r e s i s t being merely "patterned" by 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t I n turn , the "react ion" i s an 
express ion of p r e v i o u s l y . i m p l i c i t b e l i e f s on the "Power" 
dimension, r a t h e r than of new or d i f f e r e n t s o c i e t a l assumptions. 
( 5 0 ) c f D . E . S , C i r c u l a r s 8/60 - which banned the prov is ion of any 
more nursery school ing - and 2/73 ~ which l i f t e d the ban, 
(51) Johnson (1970)5 F r i t h (1974)5 Vaughan ft Archer (1971) . 
(52) Simon (1974) P«76 f f f S e l l e c k (1972) po133 f f . 
(53 ) See Chapter 6, above, on " C u l t u r a l depr ivat ion". 
(54) At the r i s k of being e x c e s s i v e l y r e p e t i t i v e , I should again 
point out that t h i s chapter i s e s s e n t i a l l y i l l u s t r a t i v e , I am 
not attempting here to v a l i d a t e any empir ica l hypotheses -
about C h i l d - c e n t r e d education, f o r i n s t a n c e . Rather, my in ten t ion 
i s to i l l u s t r a t e how the methodological suggestions made i n 
e a r l i e r chapters might be applied i n c e r t a i n substant ive a r e a s . 
C l e a r l y i t would be i l l e g i t i m a t e to genera l i se from Sharp and 
Green's re search on a s i n g l e i n f a n t s ' school to B r i t i s h primary 
education as a whole. Nonetheless, i t i s convenient to use t h e i r 
r e s e a r c h to i l l u s t r a t e my po ints , ra ther than using my own f i e l d 
notes . The l a t t e r ^ however^ do not s i g n i f i c a n t l y c o n f l i c t with 
Sharp and Ga'een's observat ions , 
(55) Sharp and Green s e l ec t ed the school because of i t s reputat ion 
f o r Chi ld -centredness . 
(56) c f Keddie (1971) p,136; Sharp & Green (1975) pp.63-6. Sharp 
and Green q u a l i f y t h i s , however. See the passage quoted above 
i n the second sec t ion of t h i s chapter, 
(57) "Mrs. Buchanan" subsequently became more committed to the s o c i a l 
pa tho log i ca l theor i e s of the other s t a f f . See Sharp & Green 
(1975) p « 1 0 1 . 
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(58) There a.ref of course , other areas of t e a c h e r s ' b e l i e f s that 
would a l so be in format ive i n t h i s r e s p e c t , f o r instance on the 
question of v o c a t i o n a l re levance of school ing and p u p i l s ' 
c a r e e r - p o t e n t i a l s . See, f o r ins tance , ffiusgrove & Tay lor (1965); 
Schools Counci l (1968)e As f a r as primary school C h i l d -
centredness i s concerned, however, the l a r g e l y i m p l i c i t b e l i e f s 
on the "Power" dimension seem p o t e n t i a l l y most a c c e s s i b l e through 
cons iderat ion of t e a c h e r s ' views about pup i l s and t h e i r home 
backgrounds. See a l s o Nash (1973)5 Goodacre (1968) and, f o r 
a d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , Murphy (1974) . 
(59) N e i l l would h imse l f argue that i t vifaa p r e c i s e l y the "hidden 
curr iculum of the home" that Summerhill's freedom was designed 
to overcome, "Brightness" and "dullness" f o r him, presumably, 
must be the product of genet ic endowment. There i s an 
i n t r i g u i n g p a r a l l e l here with a sect ion i n Sharp and Green's, 
book, where they describe the i d e a l parent - not i n terms of 
how the teacher sees them, but i n terms of how the teachers 
perce ive t h e i r products? the children, , The s u c c e s s f u l parent, 
say Sharp and Green, i s one who provides compensatory education 
f o r the c h i l d , to make up f o r the l a c k of e f f i c i e n t teaching at 
s choo l . Yet t h i s i n t r u s i o n must not be known to the teacher , 
who would resent the " interference". See Sharp and Green, 
p.208 f f . 
(60) T h i s was, however, q u a l i f i e d by Mrs. Buchanan's l ack of 
confidence i n her own a b i l i t y to use the methods e f f i c i e n t l y . 
Sharp & Green (1975) Po103. 
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Conclusion 
The most fundamental point that t h i s essay has t r i e d to make 
i s that b e l i e f s matter . To produce an adequate s o c i o l o g i c a l account, 
they must and they can be the object of elaborated understandings. 
I have attempted to devise conceptual tools whereby t h i s may be 
done and to i l l u s t r a t e these by reference to c e r t a i n educational 
contexts , i n p a r t i c u l a r three broad h i s t o r i c a l "movements" devoted 
to v e r s i o n s of "Open Educat ion". 
What I have c a l l e d "Value-Knowledge" i s the motive force of 
i n d i v i d u a l behaviour. I t i s a property of i n d i v i d u a l s ' mind-brain 
and i t i s r e a l . Not s o c i e t i e s or i n s t i t u t i o n s , nor even groups or 
ca tegor ie s of people, be l i eve and behave on the b a s i s of b e l i e f s . 
B e l i e f s e x i s t only i n p h y s i c a l l y unique and d i s t i n c t i n d i v i d u a l s . 
Yet Man i s n e c e s s a r i l y a s o c i a l animal . He could n e i t h e r produce 
nor reproduce i n i s o l a t i o n . I n d i v i d u a l s can only e x i s t i n and be 
understood i n r e l a t i o n to , t h e i r s o c i a l and mater ia l context . So 
a l s o wi th the ir ' b e l i e f s . T h i s i s my f i r s t c e n t r a l premiss. 
My second c e n t r a l premiss i s that R e a l i t y i s non-random. 
However complex the r e l a t i o n s h i p s which we indsh to explore , apparently 
d i s c r e t e i n d i v i d u a l s , "things" and b e l i e f s only e x i s t - a j i j f f e l l as 
only being conceivable - i n s o f a r as they are r e l a t e d non-randomly 
to each other . T h i s i s true of b e l i e f s as much as i t i s true of 
the s o c i a l and the m a t e r i a l world. Moreover the e s s e n t i a l q u a l i t y 
of b e l i e f - of committed and committing Value-Knowledge - i s i t s 
s t r u c t u r a t i o n . I t i s only b e l i e f i n s o f a r as i t i s s t ructured and 
r i g i d . R i g i d i t y i s commitment. Accordingly , i t i s c r u c i a l that 
some way be devised whereby that r i g i d i t y and that s t r u c t u r a t i o n 
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may be explored t h e o r e t i c a l l y arid e m p i r i c a l l y . I have suggested 
a "tree-root" metaphor f o r t h i s purpose. Any account of the 
s u b j e c t i v e s ide of raind-bz-ain must n e c e s s a r i l y be metaphorical . 
A more u s e f u l metaphor than "tree-root ing" may w e l l be poss ib l e . 
I n the meantime, however, t h i s does a s s i s t our understanding of 
a number of the most important aspects of b e l i e f . I t enables us, 
i n the same terras, to t a l k about the " interna l" or l o g i c a l 
dimensions of adequacy as w e l l as the "external" or contextual 
dimensions. I t d i r e c t s us to the e x p e r i e n t i a l b a s i s of Value-
Knowledge - determinants of r e i n f o r c e d r i g i d i t y ~ which are both 
i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l to i n d i v i d u a l b e l i e v e r s . Furthermore, i t 
presents a way whereby c r e a t i v e or autonomous r e f l e c t i o n can be 
d e s c r i b e d , understood and indeed i n t e n t i o n a l l y pursued. Conversely, 
a l a c k of such r e f l e c t i o n can be seen as the behaviour-producing 
f a c e t of Value-Knowledge, I n short , the "tree-root" metaphor 
a s s i s t s our understanding of the nature^ o r i g i n s and consequences 
of b e l i e f s , by s p e c i f i c re ference to the e s s e n t i a l l y s t ructured 
property of that b e l i e f . I t does t h i s , moreover, i n a way that 
a l lows us s imultaneously to cons ider the s o c i a l , contextual 
s t r u c t u r i n g of i n d i v i d u a l b e l i e f s . For the same metaphor i s 
a p p l i c a b l e to 'knowledge' that i s object ivated i n the school 
c u r r i c u l a , i n the c u l t u r e s and ideo log ies , and i n the wr i t t en or 
otherwise "frozen" accounts wi th which the i n d i v i d u a l l e a r n e r i s 
confronted. The r e l a t i o n s h i p s between subjec t ive and object ivated 
'knowledge' may thereby be examined. I have had r a t h e r l e s s to say, 
i n t h i s essay , about the s t r u c t u r i n g of s o c i e t a l and i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
R e a l i t y , My emphasis on b e l i e f should not be i n t e r p r e t e d as an 
attempt to play down the importance of that R e a l i t y or of t h e o r e t i c a l 
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accounts of i t . On the contrary . Rather have I t r i e d to redress 
the ba lance , or perhaps to bridge a gul f between "merely" object ive 
and "merely" s u b j e c t i v e accounts of s o c i a l phenomena. I t i s to 
t h i s end that I have s t r e s s e d the m a t e r i a l i t y and structuredness 
of b e l i e f s J and stressed b e l i e f as the primary basis of behaviour. 
My t h i r d c e n t r a l premiss i n t h i s essay has been that 
s o c i o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s - any mora than s o - c a l l e d "everyday" 
understandings - can have no recourse to simple b l u e - p r i n t s of what 
the world-out- there i s r e a l l y l i k e . I t i s not poss ib le to produce 
a o n c e - a j i d - f o r - a l l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of "types" of s o c i a l phenomena, 
which can then be app l i ed to or imposed upon R e a l i t y to produce 
adequate understajnding. What may, however, be poss ib le i s the 
adoption of c e r t a i n djimensioHs which, according to the aspect of 
the t o t a l i t y wi th which the ana lys t i s s p e c i f i c a l l y concerned, are 
u n i v e r s a l l y r e l e v a n t , whatever the s o c i e t a l context . Thus production 
axi6. ( b i o l o g i c a l ) reproduction are n e c e s s a r i l y /universa l condit ions 
of human e x i s t e n c e . I n the case of education (or l earn ing ) there 
are a l s o , I have suggested, c e r t a i n u n i v e r s a l l y re levant dimensions. 
Leaz^ing always i n v o l v e s contexts , contents and processes , which I 
have l a b e l l e d the "Power" and "Knowledge" dimensions. My suggestions 
f o r applying these dimensions involved a d i s t i n c t i o n between three 
"realms": ( S o c i a l ) R e a l i t y , Object ivated 'Knowledge' and Subject ive 
'Knowledge'. These i n turn l e d to a considerat ion of people's b e l i e f s 
about these realms and about the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between them, which 
involved questions of epistemology, framing, l earn ing theory (both 
contextual and l o g i c a l ) and "eth ics" . These d i s t i n c t i o n s I f i n d 
more u s e f u l , f o r i n s t a n c e , than Berns te in ' s Curriculum, Pedagogy and 
E v a l u a t i o n . But beyond t h i s , one cannot s p e c i f y what "types" of 
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b e l i e f one would expect to f i n d on each or ajiy of these dimensions 
without a somewhat - a r b i t r a r y dec i s ion to see c e r t a i n lower l e v e l 
re levances as more important than others . Already a t tent ion has 
been d i r e c t e d to l e a r n i n g / e d u c a t i o n , r a t h e r thaui to other no doubt 
equal ly important - and no l e s s r e l a t e d - aspects of human s o c i a l 
e x i s t e n c e . Genera l ly , though Relevances can be s p e c i f i e d , and a 
p e r f e c t l y v a l i d search f o r u n i v e r s a l dimensions then undertaken, 
t h i s does not then j u s t i f y any c la im that those Relevances are 
themselves the only or most v a l i d ones p o s s i b l e . S o c i a l existence 
i s too complex f o r such a c la im to be l eg i t imate , and Man too f a l l i b l e , 
To a l arge extent , then, t h i s essay has been concerned with 
methodological i s s u e s , r a t h e r thaja education tout court . Or ra ther 
methodology has emerged as a d i s t i n c t i v e l y educational i s s u e . Whilst 
my i n i t i a l concern was to develop a s o c i o l o g i c a l understanding of 
b e l i e f s and ideo log ies which seemed so l a c k i n g - but so necessary -
i n a study of educat ion, that understanding i s i t s e l f i n the province 
of i t s own subject matter. I t i s i n t h i s l i g h t that the m a t e r i a l 
on "Open Educat ion" should be viewed. I t i s above a l l i l l u s t r a t i v e 
of the approach out l ined i n the e a r l y chapters of t h i s essay. Yet 
the subj^jct matter i s p e c u l i a r l y appropriate to that approach. The 
very c lo sure that de f ines the r i g i d i t y of Value-Knowledge i s what 
"openness" c la ims or attempts to escape. B e l i e f s i n whatever form 
of "Open Educat ion" are themselves i n e v i t a b l y h i s t o r i c a l l y s i t u a t e d . 
They a r i s e i n and from p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t a l contexts . They have 
p a r t i c u l a r forms - by v i r t u e of which they jare b e l i e f s . And they 
are at l e a s t p o t e n t i a l l y consequent ia l . The subjec t , then, i s not 
"merely" educat ion, but i d e o l o g i e s . As such, t h i s essay i s , I hope, 
a contr ibut ion to more than a narrow f i e l d c a l l e d The Sociology of 
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E d u c a t i o n , The i s s u e s I have r a i s e d ares I b e l i e v e , of s i g n i f i c a n c e 
to socio logy i n generals For t h i s I do not c la im any s p e c i a l cred i t 
f o r myse l f . I t has been a f ea ture of B r i t i s h sociology of education 
i n recent years that i t has re-emerged as a c e n t r a l , r a t h e r thm 
a p e r i p h e r a l or s p e c i a l i s e d , f i e l d of sociology. I t i s to that 
re-emergence that I hope t h i s essay has contidbuted. 
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